ALI HUSSAIN QAZILBASH, J.----Leave to appeal was granted to M. Abdul Rashid appellant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 15-1-1974.
2. Shop No.20 Kutchery Bazar, Ward No.2, Lyallpur, was transferred in favour of Ahmad Shafi and Muhammad Aslam, respondents 5 and 6, by the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated 29th November, 1959. The effort by respondents 3 and 4 to get the transfer cancelled failed before the Settlement Commissioner on 12-4-1960. It seems that subsequently Mahmood-ul-Haq, respondent No.7, laid information before the Settlement authorities that respondents 5 and 6 were not displaced persons and thus the transfer of the shop to them was illegal. This matter came up before the Settlement Commissioner who while exercising his suo motu revisional jurisdiction held respondents 5 and 6 to be locals and thus cancelled the transfer of the shop from their name vide his order dated 24-5-1961. Respondents 5 and 6 filed a writ petition in the High Court but pending decision of the said writ petition the disputed shop was transferred to Mahmood-ul-Haq respondent No.7, as an informant on 28th June 1965 and P.T.O. Was also issued to him on 10-5-1966.
In order to pay the transfer price of the property, respondent No.7 associated with him M. Abdul Rashid appellant. In the meantime, the writ petition filed by respondents 5 and 6 came up for hearing before the High Court which was accepted on 10-10-1966, as a result of which order of the Settlement Commissioner, dated 24-5-1961, was declared to be without lawful authority. Feeling aggrieved of this order, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution.
This petition came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 9-11- 1973 who dismissed the same vide his order dated 15-1-1974.
3. We have heard Messrs Zaki-ud-Din P.I and Bashir Zafar for and against the appeal. The impugned order has been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant on two-fold ground Firstly, he submitted that the suit shop was transferred to Mahmood-ul-Haq (respondent No.7), his predecessor-in-interest, as an informant on the basis of Notification No. SRO 824 (K) /61 dated 1st September 1961 and as such it was validly transferred to him. Secondly, his contention was that the appellant had associated with Mahmood-ul-Haq, respondent No.7, the original transferee, for a valid consideration, he thus had a vested right and, therefore, under the doctrine of audi alteram partem he was required to have been afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing an order adversely affecting his rights.
4. As the record stands, we are of the view that none of the above submissions will prevail with us.
The question of transfer of a property to an informant under the notification relied upon had come up for consideration before this Court in a number of cases, wherein it was held that the informant had no locus standi to obtain transfer of a property about which information was laid before the relevant authority and that no right vested in him to claim transfer of a property under the said notification. Reliance in this respect is placed on Abida Khatoon v. Ghulam Shabbir PLD 1964 SC 793 wherein it has been held: "The writ appears to have been moved in the belief (1) that the informant, like a complainant in a criminal case has an interest in the end result, and therefore independent locus standi to pursue the proceeding and (2) that in the event of the information leading to a positive result, the informant has a vested interest in the property. Neither of these suppositions has the least support of law. If the Settlement Authorities acting on a reference by the Enforcement Staff hold the transfer to be irregular, the transferee having a vested right in the property may move by way of appeal, and if a writ be competent, in the High Court. But the informant has no vested right in the property, and certainly would have no right of appeal or revision under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to have the decision re-considered or reversed, if it went in favour of the transfer being regular****.
There being no conceivable vested interest in the informant, the relief by writ was clearly inadmissible. We dismiss this petition. "
It has been further held in Allah Ditta v. Jan Muhammad PLD 1974 SC 113: "Under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 only those persons were eligible for transfer of a house, shop etc. Who were in possession before the 20th of December, 1958. A person who laid information under S.R.O. No.824 (K)/1961 that an evacuee property was in unauthorized possession or was the subject-matter of irregular transfer was obviously not in possession. He was, therefore, not eligible to apply for transfer of the house, shop etc. In respect of which he laid information to the Department of Enforcement. The legal force behind the S.R.O.
No.824 (K)/1961 which was promulgated by the Central Government on 1-9-1961, was clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. It authorised the Chief Settlement Commissioner to dispose of an evacuee house, shop etc. In such other manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government. Section 10 was re-drafted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance,1962 (II of 1962). Both clauses (a) and
(b) were substituted by subsection (2): 'Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), the Central Government may order the transfer in public interest of any property out of the compensation pool in such manner as it may deem proper.'
Power to transfer evacuee properties to informers who were not in possession was thus taken away with effect from the 13th January 1962 when the Ordinance came into force. The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act also did not apply as no right had come to be vested in the informers. All pending cases under S.R.O. No. 824 (K)/1961, therefore, lapsed with the repeal of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958."
5.This being the legal position, Mahmoodul Haq, respondent No. 7 or for that matter the appellant had neither any right for the transfer of the suit shop had the locus standi to claim such a right.
6.As for the second contention, admittedly the transfer of the suit shop to respondent No.7 and the execution of association with the appellant had been made when the writ petition of respondents No.5 and 6 was pending before the High Court, obviously meaning C thereby that both the transfer of the suit shop to respondent No.7 and the execution of association between the appellant and respondents No.7 were subject to the decision of the writ petition filed by respondents 5 and 6 was thus hit by the principle of lis pendens. Reliance is placed on the case of Ikram Elahi v. The Settlement Commissioner reported in 1976 SCMR 143 wherein it has been held: "The argument is without substance for in the Writ Petition No.128-R moved by respondent No.2, the cancellation of the temporary allotment was held to be void ab initio for want of notice to him. That being so, the respondent 2's rights as temporary allottee of the land remained unaffected.
However, that may be, the petitioner on the principle of Us pendens has no independent right to further agitate in the matter."
7. In the light of the above this appeal is dismissed with costs.