M. HAYAT JUNEJO, J.-----This petition under Article 98 of the Constitution has arisen in the following circumstances.
2. The petitioner was elected Chairman of Union Committee No. 60 (Martin Quarters), Karachi, in an election held on 18-1-1966 under Article 12(2) of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959. He continued to hold this office for about five months after which the Chairman, Karachi Municipal Corporation (respondent No. 1) issued a notice to all the 13 B. D. Members of the said Union Committee in exercise of powers conferred on him under rule 3(1) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963 ; and convened a special meeting of the said Union Committee on 26th June 1966, in the office of the Deputy Chief Officer, Karachi Municipal Corporation (respondent No. 2) to consider a motion of no-confidence against the petitioner. By the same notice respondent No. 2 was appointed to preside over the said meeting. The notices were received by 11 out of 13 members within the time prescribed for service under rule 3(2) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman) Rules, but two of the 13 members, namely, Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi and Atiqur Rehman were served on 21-6-1966, i.e. Only 5 days before the scheduled meeting. They did not accordingly have 7 clear days' notice as provided under rule 3(2) of the Basic Democracies (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman) Rules. The meeting was, however, attended by all the 13 members including Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi and Atiqur Rehman who participated therein. The motion of no-con--fidence was, thereafter, passed by majority of 9 to 4 as a result of which the petitioner was liable to removal from his office of the Chairman, Union Committee No. 60.
3. Mr. Abdul Aziz the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two-fold contentions before us. In the first place, the learned counsel contended that the Chairman of the Karachi Municipal Corporation was not authorized to convene the aforesaid meeting as under rule 3(1) only the Controlling Authority could do so. The learned counsel contended that the meeting thus held was not in accordance with the rules.
4. Under Article 3(10) of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959 "Controlling Authority" means:- ---(i) Government, in the case of gall Divisional Councils, and such Union Committees as are within the Jurisdiction of the Cantonment Boards at Karachi and Lahore;
(ii) Commissioner, in the case of a District Council; and
(iii) Collector, in the case of all other local councils.--- Under sub-clause (8) of the same article "Collector" means "the Chief Officer incharge of the Revenue Administration of the District concerned, and includes a Deputy Commissioner, and any other officer specially appointed by the Government to perform all or any of the functions of a Collector under this order".
It will thus be seen that "Collector" within the meaning of Article 3(8) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Order, 1959, does not necessarily mean the Chief Officer incharge of the Revenue Administration of the district but may also include any other officer specially appointed by the Government to perform all or any of the functions of a Collector under the Basic Democracies Order. By Notification No. BDI/25-9(MC/60), dated 16th March 1966, the Governor of West Pakistan appointed the Chairman of all Municipal Committees to perform all functions of the Collector as Controlling Authority of Union Committees under the Municipal Committee concerned. It was sought to be argued that this Notification is bad in law as it has been issued by virtue of the powers granted to the Govern--ment under the definition clause of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, which is ordinarily meant for defining words used in the statutes, and not for the purpose of conferment of powers. We find no substance in this argument for the simple reason that it is not for the Courts to correct or amend the definition clause. On the contrary effect must be given to the clear and un--ambiguous intention of the Legislature that the word "Collector" does not necessarily mean the Chief Officer incharge of the Revenue Administration of the District, but would also include any of the Officers appointed by the Government to perform all or any of the functions of a Collector under the Order. It is well settled that the word "include" is used in an interpretation clause in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the Statute or where it is intended that while the term defined should retain its ordinary meaning, its scope should be widened by specific enumeration, of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may no comprise, so as to make the definition enumerative and no exhaustive, and when it is so used these words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to the natural import, but also those thing which the interpretation clause declares that they should include. It would, accordingly, be seen that on the date of the election which took place on 26th June 1966, the Chairman of the Karachi Municipal Corporation was the Controlling Authority of Union Committee No. 60, Karachi, and was, therefore, 9oanpetent to hold the said meeting.
4. The only other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the meeting was not convened in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, as under the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No---Confidence against Chairman) Rules, 7 clear days' notice had to be given for a meeting convened under the provisions of rule 3. The learned counsel contended that 2 of the 13 members, namely, Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi and Atiqur Rehman received the notice for the meeting on 21-6-1966, i.e. Only 5 days before the convened meeting and as they did not have 7 clear days' notice as provided under rule 3(2), the meeting was illegal and the action taken therein, namely, the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner, was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. We find no force in this contention as well; as we find it difficult to agree with the learned counsel that rule 3(2) is mandatory.
5. In Sadiq A.I v. Collector, Gujranwala and another (PLD 1944 Lab. 531) a Division Bench of this Court consisting of S. A. Mahmood and Muhammad Akram, JJ. Observed as follows:- ---An objection was also taken in the writ petition that seven clear days' notice was not given for the meeting which was convened under rule 3(2). It is stated in the report that notice of the meeting was served on the members on the 5th December and the meeting was held on the 12th December. It is true that seven clear days' notice was not given thereby, but this was a mere irregularity and did not affect the result or prejudice the petitioner. No prejudice has been alleged or complained of. The rule cannot be deemed to be a mandatory one, so as to invalidate the proceedings of the election. Nineteen members out of twenty-one attended the meeting and, therefore, no such illegality as invalidates the result of the meeting can be deduced.---
6. The same view was expressed in a later authority of this Court reported as Abdul Majid v.
Province of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1944 Lab. 531). Sajjad Ahmed, J. (as his Lordship then was) while dealing with this point in paragraph 8 of his judgment summed up the conclusions thus ---As regards the construction of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 it will be seen again that it is expressed in affirmative language 'seven clear days' notice shall be given---------------The word `clear' emphasizes that both the terminal days, i.e. The day on which the notice is given and the day on which it is received have to be excluded. I consider that the sub-rule is couched in words of command but the command is directory in nature and is not absolute and obligatory in the sense that its non--compliance or disobedience nullifies all the incidents connected therewith and the consequences flowing therefrom.---
7. In this connection we may also refer to the case of Ghulam Moeenuddin v. Controlling Authority, Bahawalnagar (PLD 1967 Lab. 1040) wherein the cases of Sadiq A.I and Abdul Majid referred to above were cited with approval. The question involved in that case was whether the failure to serve on members three clear days' notice of the first meeting and failure to comply with provisions of rule 5 of the West Pakistan Local Councils (Assumption of Office) Rules, 1960, rendered an election invalid. It was held that although the emphasis in rule 5 of the West Pakistan Local Councils (Assumption of Office) Rules, 1960, is on addressing of the notice to the members, and the intention also is that it should be served on the member, a failure to serve the notice on the member on three days' clear notice cannot invalidate the election unless it is shown in terms of rule 7 of the West Pakistan Election of Chairman Rules that it has materially affected the result of the election. It was further held that "the failure to serve the notice to comply with rule 5 is not mandatory, and cannot invalidate the election, is plain from the fact that if the members attend the meeting and an election is held, the meeting is not invalidly convened."
8. This view also seems to be in accord with the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chief Commissioner of Karachi v. Jamil Ahmed and others (PLD 1961 SC 145). The question involved therein related to interpretation of sec--petition 2800) of City of Karachi Municipal Act and it was held that the provision regarding holding of general elections being notified was directory and not mandatory ; and that substantial compliance thereof was enough.
In the words of Cornelius, C. J. :- ---I entertain no doubt that the relevant provision in the Act viz., that the `Provincial Government' may-issue an order directing that the Corporation shall be dissolved from such date-and that general elections shall take place in accordance with the provisions of this- Act, so far as they may be applicable, is to be treated as a directory provision, and that the use of the verb `shall take place' does not necessarily import a mandatory effect. The governing verb is indeed in the earlier expression `may issue an order directing', and if due weight be given to this, then the verb 'shall take place' may carry the emphasis of futurity rather than the view accepted in the High Court, viz. That it represents a command of the Legislature. In any case, the prescription is as to the performance of a public duty, and should prima facie be treated as directory, so that by non- performance of this ancilliary or supplementary duty of directing fresh elections in the same order by which the Corporation was directed to be dissolved, the latter order could certainly not be thought to be invalidated.---
9. Mr. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied on the case of Muhammad Akram v. Capt. C. A. Saeed and another (PLD 1965 Lab. 703). That this authority would not apply to cases relating to rule 3(2) of the West Pakistan Basis; Democracies (Vote of No- Confidence against Chairman) Rules, has been made clear by their Lordships themselves in paragraph ? 3 of their judgment; the distinction pointed out being that the proceedings contemplated therein were to take place before judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal and not before a Union Council as in the instant case. A judicial tribunal, unlike a Union Council is entrusted with judicial functions to decide a `lis' between the parties before him. The case cited by the learned counsel accordingly does not lay down anything contrary to the decisions in Sadiq A.I's and Abdul Majid's cases referred to in paras. 5 and 6 above; and is clearly distinguishable from the one before us.
10. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 that Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi refused to receive the notice when it was sought to be personally delivered to hiii on 18-6-1966 and Atiqur Rehman was not to be found either at the Office of the Union Committee or at his residence.
The notices were, therefore, sent to both of them by Registered Post and they received the same on 21-6-1966. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is further stated that no objection on this account was raised by any member or by the petitioner in the meeting convened on 26-6-1966.
True copy of the minutes of the meeting was filed to show that the averment in the petition regarding such an objection having been raised in the meeting, was not correct. Be that as it may, the fact remains that both Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi as well as Atiqur Rehman were not only served with notices on 21-6-1966, but they attended the meeting held on 26-6-1966 ; and in fact participated therein. The vo:: of no-confidence against the petitioner was passed by a majority of 9 against 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not~ been able to point out whether there could possibly be any prejudice to the petitioner on account of the fact that 2 out of the 13 members received notices only 5 days before the scheduled meeting instead of 7 clear days' notice as provided under rule 3(2).
11. For the reasons given above, we find no force in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed with costs.