MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, J.-By virtue o Sales-Tax Notification No. 7 dated 27th June 1951, as amended by Notification No. 5 of 18th December 1953, certain commodities were exempted from the payment of sales tax. The Notification contains a list in which the following Items appear at No. 40------ "Concrete Building Components (including beams, columns roofing, cement, block, doors, windows, excluding pipes)."
2. A large number of building contractors including the present respondent claimed exemption in respect of wooden doors and windows made by them and used as components for the construction of concrete buildings. The matter went up ultimately to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which has help d that the words "doors and windows" in this item have been byway of enlargement of used the scope of the item and that the exemption applies to all types of doors and windows irrespective of the material of which they are made if they are used as components of building.
3. The Department has felt aggrieved and the Commissioner of Sales Tax has referred the following question to us for opinion:- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in vacating the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax by holding that wooden doors and windows were exempt from tax under item No. 4) of Sales Tax Notification No. 7 dated 27-6-1951 as amended."
4.Muhammad Afzal Lone, Advocate appearing for the Sales Tax Commissioner has vehemently submitted before us that--
(a) the word "concrete" appearing in item No. 40 refer to the word "components" and not the word "building."
He consequently urges that if exemption is sought in respect of a component, it must be made of concrete;
(b) the use of the word "include" in the sentence placed in parenthesis in item No. 40 is illustrative and enumerative of the types of components that are to fall under the exemption;
(c) in any case. The scope of the exemption has not been enlarged by the word "include" at least, in so far as the basic condition of the components being made of concrete has not been done away with by this expression.
5. Learned counsel was also at pains to demonstrate to us that the Tribunal was not well informed when it came to the conclusion that doors and windows were not being made of concrete-
6. In this connection, he adverted our attention to a book entitled "Tropical Architecture" written by Maxwell Fry Jane Drew, and more particularly to page 108, where the "Check list of low-income housing" contains the following entry- "Doors and windows of wood, metal, reinforced concrete or composit . . . . ."
This, according to him, was a clear proof of the fact that doors and windows made of concrete were not unheard of. This book was published in the year 1964.
7. He, then, adverted our attention to a book entitled "Moulds for Caste Stone and Concrete Products" by F. Burren and G. R, Gregory. He referred to page 58 which deals with "Window Frame". It prescribes a formula for the construction of a reinforced concrete window frame. This book was first published in the year 1930.
8. So much for windows frames. He referred us to a brochure, published by A. C. I. L. i.e., Asbestos Cement Industries Ltd,, of Pakistan, who, inter alia, manufacture asbestos-cement moulded roofing etc., under the brand name 'Dadex'. At page 27 of this booklet which deals with Flat Sheets, one finds its various uses which include "door panels". Mr. Lone, therefore, submitted that not only door frames, but even door leaves were made of concrete.
9. At this stage, Mr. M. A. Lone referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Limited, Chittagong v. Sales Tax Officer (PLD 1971 SC 205) at page 211: "In my opinion the word 'concrete' in item No. 40 of the Notification under consideration is used with reference to the trade or business of building and, therefore, it should be understood according to its trade and business sense . . . . ., and (at page 212)- Thus it is quite clear that in understanding the meaning of the word 'concrete' cement is one of the essential ingredients of concrete when used in connection to a building."
10. Mr. Lone, therefore, wants us to infer that the components In respect of which exemption is being claimed should be made of concrete and that the concrete should be such as has cement as an essential component. We informed him that cement by itself was a generic term and a large variety of cements was used for joining various surfaces of diverse materials. Mr. Lone, however, had only Portland cement in mind and he, therefore, included the Dadex Products, referred to above, in the category of concrete building components.
11. He submitted that the other ingredient had to be "aggregate" and although Ballast is one of the forms that aggregate takes, it is not the only one. In the manufacture of chip-board, particles of wood or jute or similar material form the aggregate. Mr. Lone would, however, have nothing of it and said that the book he had consulted, i.e., Concrete Products and Caste Stone" by H. L, Childe mentions two types of concrete
(a) dense,
(b) light weight.
In the latter category fall clinker and breeze, pumice, vermiculite expanded clay, foamed slag, sawdust etc. Etc., and he included asbestos in this category for the purpose of showing that the Dadex Products were made of concrete since cement and asbestos had been used for the purpose of manufacturing those door panels.
He contended that since, admittedly, the assessee wanted exemption in respect of windows and doors made of wood, item No. 40 of the Notification was not attracted at all and the Tribunal had misdirected itself in law and thus reached a patently incorrect conclusion.
12. In the Usmania Glass Sheet Factory case, the afore--mentioned Notification was interpreted with a view to finding out whether Glass Sheet is covered by the term "concrete building component". Their Lordships held that- "Thus it is quite clear that in understanding the meaning of the word "concrete" cement is one of the essential ingre--dients of concrete when used in connection to a building."
We agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that this clinches the matter so far as the ingredients of concrete is concerned to the extent that the Supreme Court has chosen to go. Their Lordships have stopped after saying that cement has to be essential ingredient. They have advisely chosen not to go into the further question as to what is meant by cement and how many different forms and types it might take.
Their Lordships have also held that- "I have already examined this aspect of the question and, in my opinion, the word "concrete" should be read with the word 'component' and not with the word 'building' of which cement is an essential ingredient. It, therefore, means cement concrete component of the building."
We have been told that after this observation, it is not open to us to classify anything which is not "cement concrete component of the building" under item No. 40 of the Notification and thus hold it to be entitled to exemption.
13. Who could quarrel with such a simple proposition?
This Court is respectfully bound by all the interpretations of law made by the Supreme Court. The question, however, is whether the point that falls for determination before us was considered in the case referred to above.
14. In the Usmania Glass case, the contention of the assessee was that-- "The Glass Sheet is used for domestic building and, therefore, it is a component of concrete building."
That is not the question before us nor does the assessee claim that the wooden doors and windows used by him are made of concrete or that cement has been used in manufacturing them and all this is, therefore, irrelevant for our purposes. What we have to see is whether the use of the word "including" attracts the provisions of item No. 40 to articles other than concrete components of a building.
The Supreme Court has, in the Usmania Glass Sheet Factory case, clearly pointed out- "In my opinion, the word 'including' has been used byway of enlargement of the meaning of the phrase. The word 'including' or shall be deemed to include is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words and phrases occurring in the body of the Statute."
This proposition laid down by the Supreme Court has been, similarly, expounded In other cases including Lt. Col. Muhammad Amin Khan v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1966 Lah. 111) to which one of us (Mushtaq Hussain, J.) was a party, and where it was observed as follows:- "One of the two words 'means' or 'includes' is generally employed to define the scope of a word in the interpretation clause of a statute. The former is used to restrict the scope of the word to the four corners of what is stated in the Clause and to deprive it of any other meaning that it may have in the English language. The word 'includes' on the other hand, is used with a view to enlarging the meaning of the word, by also clothing it with the connotation given to it in the interpretation clause in addition to the sense which it conveys in common parlance.
'Include' is not used In a sort of a conjunctive sense so as to make only such things correspond to the word 'defined' as answer to the meaning given to the word in the ordinary language as well as the scope assigned to it by the definition. Since the purpose is to extend the scope of the word, it will cover not only cases which are covered by the dictionary meaning plus the meaning given In the interpretation clause, but also by either of them individually. To hold otherwise, is to defeat the very purpose for which the word 'include' is used in the interpretation clause.
It should not be forgotten that the meaning of particular words used in Statutes is to be found not so much in a strict etymological propriety of language nor even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which they are used and the object that is intended to be attained. Words used in Statutes, of course, should not be so interpreted as to extend their meaning beyond their ordinary sense but there Is no warrant for so restricting them as to exclude a case both within their object and within their ordinary sense, for the basic principle of interpretation that effect should be given to such intention of the Legislature as they have used fit words to express cannot be disregarded."
15. Similarly, in Kamil Noor Khan v. Controlling Authority, Union Committee No. 60, Karachi and 3 others (PLD 1970 Kar. 730), it was observed:- "It is well settled that the word 'include' is used in an interpretation clause in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the Statute or where it is intended that while the term defined should retain its ordinary meaning, its scope should t-e widened by specific enumeration of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise, so as to make the definition enumerative and not exhaustive, and when it is so used these words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to the natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they should include.
16. A Full Bench of the Sind Chief Court in Emperor v. Jiand and another (AIR 1928 Sind 149), observed:- "It is a well known rule of interpretation that the word 'includes' is used as word of enlargement and ordinarily implies that some thing else has been given beyond the general language which precedes it; to add to the general clause a species which does not naturally belong to it, State v.
Montello Salt Co. 98 Pac. 549."
17. In Madras Central Urban Bank Ltd. v. Corporation of Madras (AIR 1932 Mad. 474) it was observed:- "When it is mentioned that a particular definition 'includes' certain things, it should be taken that the Legislature intended to settle a difference of opinion on the point or wanted to bring in other matters that would not properly come within the ordinary connotation of the word or expression or phrase in question."
In Nasibun v. Proeosunkar Ghose ((1882) 8 Cal. 534) the Court observed:- "The word 'includes' has an extending force and does not limit the meaning of the terms to the substance of the definition."
The words used in the parenthesis are "including, beams, columns, roofing, cement blocks, doors, windows." It cannot be denied that they are components of building. It can also not be denied that if they are made of concrete, they would be concrete building components. In other words, even if the items had not been mentioned at all in item No. 40 and it had read only as "concrete building components", beams, columns, roofing, cement blocks, doors, windows, made of concrete would have still been covered by these three words.
19. We have already seen that the word "including" is used for enlarging the scope and for bringing in species which would otherwise not be covered. We have also seen that the words in the parenthesis, referred to above, would be covered even by the expression "concrete building components". Can it, therefore, be said that these words are redundant? It is too late in the day to suggest that words and expressions which can be clothed with a meaning can be said to have been put in without any cause. If, therefore,
(a) redundancy is not to be attributed to the Legislature;
(b) the use of the word "include" is for the purpose of enlargement of the scope and bringing in species not otherwise covered t
(c) the species mentioned in the brackets are covered by the words outside the brackets if they were intended to be made of concrete alone: the only meaning that can be given to them is that the Legislature meant also to exempt doors, windows, beams, columns, roofing as were not made of concrete.
20. We, therefore, reject the reference and answer the question in the affirmative with costs.
The case is certified as fit for appeal to Supreme Court.
K. B. A.