1. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.-This appeal by special leave, which is directed against the decision of a Division Bench of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, has been brought by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad, in the following circumstances.
2. Respondent No. 1, Mannu Khan, is a displaced person from Jaipur State (Bharat). He filed a claim form, including a claim for agricultural lands allegedly abandoned by him in Jaipur State. His claim for agricultural land was verified by the Claims Officer on the 19th of March 1959, for 139 acres 15 ghuntas, 134.8 acres in respect of land in village Beswa and 5.7 acres in respect of land in village Balaram. On the 28th of July 1959, Q P. R. V. Was issued to him by the Central Record Office, Lahore, for 9323 produce index units, and by Khatoni dated the 31st of August 1959, he was allotted 86.33 acres of land in Deb. Chamber, 64.21 acres in Deh Chhachh, 51.30 acres in Deh Sandki and 27.34 acres in Deb, Chab, equivalent to 9344 produce index units. One Syed Kasim Hussain, a temporary allottee, who was dissatisfied by the allotment of the land in favour of Mannu Khan, respondent, in village Chamber, filed an appeal before the Deputy Rehabilita--tion Commissioner. This was summarily dismissed on the 31st of March 1960. A revision application filed by Syed Kasim Hussain before the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad and Khairpur Divisions, was also dismissed on the 20th of June 1960. While dismissing the revision petition, Mr. Enver Adil, the then Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, observed as follows :----- "Should the claim of the petitioner also be under investiga--tion with the enforcement police, this land ought to be utilised towards the satisfaction of the other pending claims in Tando Allahyar."
3. However, on the 13th of July 1960, the Rehabilitation Mukhtiarkar, Tando Allahyar, took the above observation as amounting to cancellation of the land situated at Deh, Chamber, and cancel led Mannu Khan's allotment in respect of 64.21 acres of lane situated at Deh Chamber, on the ground that his claim bad been found to be bogus. He allotted the same to one Abdul Majid Khan, respondent No. 4. Mannu Khan filed a revision-cum review petition before the rehabilitation and Settlement Com missioner, Hyderabad, against this order. The latter called a report from the Mukhtiarkar, Tando Allahyar, and in the meanwhile stayed action for dispossession of the respondent. It appears that during this interval, the claim of Mannu Khan was investigated by the enforcement police, as a result of which respondent No. 3 submitted a report to the Claims Commissioner, recommending cancellation of his claim by way of suo motu revision, as it was found to be bogus. The report was in due course forwarded to Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, the then Addi--tional Claims Commissioner, Hyderabad, for disposal in accord--ance with law. The latter issued a show-cause notice to the respondent on the 29th of October 1960, in the exercise of his powers under section 7(3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act III of 1956 (hereinafter described as `the Act') and finally by his order dated the 27th of December 1960, revised and set aside the entire claim of the respondent. It was held by him that the documents produced in support of the claim by Mannu Khan were false and fabricated. Mannu Khan challenged this order in a revision application before Mr. I. A. Minai, another Additional Claims Commissioner vested with the powers of Claims Commissioner. Mr. Minai, by his order dated the 11th of April '1961, allowed the revision in res--pect of the respondent No. 1's claim for urban immovable pro--perty, but he declined to pass any order in respect of the agri--cultural land, as in the meantime Martial Law Regulation No. 84 had come into force on the 28th of December 1960, which deprived the Claims organization to deal with the pending claims for agricultural lands.
4. Respondent Mannu Khan then filed his statement under Martial Law Regulation No. 84 but did not disclose the fact that his claim had already been rejected by the Additional Claims Commissioner on the 27th of December 1960. On the 23rd of August 1961, Martial Law Regulation No. 89 was promulgated, which re-constituted Martial Law Regulation No. 84. Under this Regulation, a slab formula was introduced under which every accepted claim was proportionately reduced on the basis of the slab formula, as contained in para. 5 of the Regu--lation. Mannu Khan filed a fresh statement under this Regula--tion, and on the 27th of September 1961, an M. R. V. Was issued to him for 2249 produce index units. Mannu Khan exercised his option to re-purchase the excess land held by him which he had otherwise to surrender under Martial Law Regulation No. 89. Under para. 4 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, the Chief Settle--ment Commissioner had to appoint special officers to inquire into pending cases, and Malik Aslam Hayat, Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), West Pakistan, Lahore, who was one of the appointees in this behalf, examined the case of respondent Mannu Khan, and notwithstanding the order of Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul passed on the 2"th of December 1960, allowed the claim of respondent No. 1 in respect of the lands in village Beswa but rejected his claim in respect of land in village Balaram by his order dated the 30th of November 1961. As a result, a fresh M. R. V. Was issued to respondent No. 1 for 2180 produce index units. It appears that in the meanwhile Mr. A. Rauf Chaudbry, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, allowed the revision petition of one Alimuddin on the 15th of December 1962, and restored his land to him. Mannu Khan's revision, which he had filed in the year 1960 for restoration of his lands, had been linked up with the case of Alimuddin. As a result of Alimuddin's success in getting back his lands, Mannu Khan also applied to Mr. A. Raoof Chaudhry for the restoration of his lands on the' ground that his case was identical to the case of Alimuddin, mentioned above. The learned officer, by his order dated the 5th of April 1963, passed the following order; "Seen. The application of Mannu Khan was allowed by my predecessor to be amalgamated with that of Alimuddin. Hence the following corrigendum shall be issued; As Mannu Khan's case was amalgamated with that of Alimuddin, the order issued in Miscellaneous Case No. 108/60--TDA dated the 15th December 1962 shall apply also to Mannu Khan as to Alimuddin."
5. Thereafter respondent No. 3 (Abdul Qadir, Inspector of Police) sought review of the said order, whereupon the learned Settle--ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner, by his order dated the 23rd of July 1963, withdrew the corrigendum, and made the following direction; "As a consequence of the withdrawal of the corrigendum, I further order that the allotment of the existing allottees shall hold good. If Mannu Khan's entitlement for 134.5 acres by virtue of the order dated the 30th November 1962, by the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Lahore), West Pakistan, was subsequently challenged by the Enforcement Police in the Court of the Chief Settlement Commissioner with a request for revising that order, still holds good, he may approach the local Rehabilitation authorities for allotment of other available agricultural land under the Scheme in force."
6. Mannu Khan challenged this review order by a writ petition in the High Court, on the main ground that his entitlement having been verified by the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), West Pakistan, under clause 4 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, by his order. Dated the 30th of November 1962, to the extent of 134.5 acres, the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had tea jurisdiction to cancel his allotment and to maintain the allotment of respondents Nos. 2 and 4, namely, Nisar Ahmad Farooqi, who was a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Enforcement Staff; Claims Department, and Abdul Majid Khan. Respondent No. 2 was an allottee of the disputed land in Dehs Chamber and Sandki, while respondent No. 4 was an allottee of lands in the Deh Chab.
7. The contest in the High Court mainly centred around the point whether Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, Additional Claims Commissioner, Hyderabad, who had cancelled the entitlement of respondent Mannu Khan by his order dated that 27th of December 1960, was ever delegated with' the powers of the Claims Commissioner for the exercise of suo motu revisional powers under section 7 (3) of the Act. If he was not the delegatee of such powers, obviously his order was a nullity being without jurisdic--tion. It may be observed here that Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul had entertained the proceedings at the instance of the Additional Claims Commissioner (Administration), who forwarded the report of the Enforcement Police to the Additional Claims Commissioner (Judicial), for disposal according to law, with the following remarks; "The record be forwarded to the A. C. C. (J) for disposal according to law as per standing instructions of the Claims Commissioner, Pakistan."
8. It was contended on behalf of the Settlement Department that by this order the Claims Commissioner had delegated his powers to Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, who, in turn, exercised them as a delegatee for suo motu action under section 7 (3) of the Act. The department did not produce any material in support of this con--tention. No standing instructions of the Claims Commissioner, such as were noted in the forwarding endorsement, were produced in the High Court. The whole contention was based on the assumption that because the record was forwarded to Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, he must be presumed to have the delegated authority to deal with the case. It is difficult to proceed on this assumption, and the High Court was quite right in rejecting it. The High Court even gave an opportunity to the department to file an affidavit by any competent officer of the department to prove the factum of this delegated authority in favour of Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul, which, however, was not availed of. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the department very candidly conceded that no officer was prepared to file such an affidavit. As it was not proved that Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul was duly delegated with the revisional powers of the Claims Commissioner for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 7(3) of the Act, it follows that he acted without jurisdiction in assuming those powers.
9. Our attention has been drawn to a notification of the Central Government dated the 9th of December 1960, which was issued in exercise of the Central Government's powers under section 3(1) of the Act, which reads as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred under section 3 (1) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 (III of 1956), the Central Government is pleased to invest the follow--ing Additional Claims Commissioners of the Claims Organiza--tion with the judicial powers of Claims Commissioner assigned to him under the said Act, within their respective jurisdiction with effect from the 8th December 1960, till further orders."
10. It was submitted on behalf of the department that Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul was invested with the judicial powers of a Claims Commissioner under this notification, and that on the day when he made the impugned order, viz., the 27th of December 1960, he did possess the power's of the Claims Commissioner under the said notification, which was to have effect from the 8th of December 1960. The High Court has rejected this contention on grounds which we consider to be unexceptionable. 1n the first place, Mr. Ghulam Hyder Moghul had issued notice to the res-- pondent No. 1 for action under section 7 (3) of the Act on the 29th of October 1960, when he did not possess any such powers. It is difficult to accept the proposition that all the proceedings in the action taken by Mr. Moghul, although without jurisdiction, were sanctified because before he issued his final orders, he was vested with the necessary powers. The jurisdiction of a tribunal is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the inquiry. In this context, the observations of Lord Lpenman, C. J., in Rex v. Boltan ((18411) 1 Q B 66) may be usefully, reproduced; "The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsehood of the charge, but on its nature. It is different at the commencement and at the conclusion of the inquiry ; and the affidavits, to be receivable, must be directed to what appears at the former stage, and not to the facts disclosed in the pro--gress of the inquiry."
11. In the case of Ledgard and another v. Bull (13 1 A 134 (P C)) the Judicial Com--mittee in a suit for damages and injunction for infringement of a patent filed in a subordinate Court, which had no jurisdiction to entertain it and later on transferred to the District Court, which was competent to entertain such suits, held that the decision was without jurisdiction. In the case of Sridhar Jha v.
12. Emperor (AIR 1947 Pat. 234) an offence under Rule 39 of the Defence of India Rules (1939), which was triable by a First Class Magistrate, was tried by a Second Class Magistrate. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Magistrate was conferred with the powers of a First Class Magistrate. It was held by the High Court that the fact that the Magistrate was invested with First Class powers when he had practically finished the case, cannot validate such trial.
13. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that at the worst it was a case of irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction on the part of Mr. Moghul. We are unable to agree, as in our view it was a case of lack of jurisdiction on his part. However, apart from this question of lack of jurisdiction on the part of Mr. Moghul in passing the impugned order, the respondent's claim was rightly upheld by the High Court on another ground, namely, that his claim was pending within clause 4 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, and Malik Aslam Hayat had competently accepted it. It was contended on behalf of the department that clause 4 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89 referred only to original claims pending before the Claims Officer and not to claims which were the subject-matter of appeals or revisional proceedings. This question was considered by this Court in an unreported decision in Civil Appeals Nos. K-10 and K-11 of 1962 decided on the 11th of March 1964, wherein the following observations occur; "The above section clearly provides that the decision of a Deputy Claims Commissioner is appealable and also open to revision and review. In the instant case, a revision was pending from before the passing of the Martial Law Regulation No. 84, against the appellate order of the Additional Claims Com--missioner. Subsection (5) of section 7 of the Act clearly says that 'subject to the foregoing provisions of this section any order ., . . . Shall be final'. Thus so long as Revision was pen--ding the impugned order of verification could not be regarded as final. From the very fact that paragraph 4 (1) of the Martial Law Regulation makes provision for disposal of claims pending verification, it is clear that the Regulation never intend-- ed to confer any finality on such orders which were under appeal or revision. We are, therefore, unable to read paragraph 12 of the Regulation. In such a way so as to give it a meaning which is obviously contrary to the express provision of the Regulation. We may further observe that to hold that the pending revision would be infructuous would really mean that the aggrieved party would be deprived by the retrospective operation of the Martial Law Regulation No. 84, of a right possessed by him. In the absence of any clear provision to that effect in the Regulation this would be against all cannons of construction. On the contrary, as already pointed out, pending cases were kept alive by paragraph 4 (1) of the Regu--lation No. 89."
14. It is thus clear that according to the view of this Court as expressed above, so long as the revision of respondent No. 1 was pending, the order regarding the verification of his claim could not be regarded as final, and his claim would be treated as pending on the date when Martial Law Regulation No. 89 came into force. In this view of the matter, Malik Aslam Hayat was fully competent to examine the validity of the respondent's claim and verify it under section 4 (1) of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, which he did.
15. In view of clause 12 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, tae order of Malik Aslam Hayat was final and could not be called in question in any Court. In this situation, the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner acted without authority to discard the order of Malik Aslam Hayat.
16. According to the order of Malik Aslam Hayat dated the 30th of November 1962, which was validly in the field, respondent No. 1 was entitled to be compensated out of the lands which were temporarily allotted to him under clauses 7 and 8 of Martial Law Regulation No. 89.
17. As we agree with the conclusions of the High Court, this appeal must fail, and is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.