1. ' Petitioner is a body registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and has instituted this petition in representative capacity on behalf of its members, who allegedly have a grievance against respondents concerning their terms and conditions of service.
2. ' A preliminary question came up for discussion as to maintainability--of the petition in view of the provisions enshrined in Article 199 of the 1973 Constitution. A perusal of the scheme of the A article reveals that in cases of writs in the nature of Quo Warranto and Habeas Corpus, any person can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction, whereas concerning writs in the nature of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition--framers of the constitution have circumscribed the competency to invoke writ jurisdiction by using the expression--"aggrieved party".
3. ' In the context of things, I am of the view, that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person within the meanings of the expression deployed in the Constitution. The grievance if any is concerning the terms and conditions of service of its members and not that of the petitioner. Since it has not suffered the alleged wrong; therefore, it has no locus standi to file this petition. I am fortified in entertaining this view by the opinions expressed in the following cases; Pakistan Steel Re-Rolling Mills Association v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 138), where petition was moved under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution, by the Pakistan Steel Re-Rolling Mills Association, seeking direction to the respondent, Province of West Pakistan, to cancel Notification having been issued by the Governor in exercise of his powers under section 6 (1) of the Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961, declaring the minimum rates of wages as recommended by the Minimum Wages Board-- A learned Division Bench delivered the following judgment:-- "We consider that none of these considerations confers on the association the character of an 'aggrieved party' within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitution, as the grievance complained of must in its effect entail a direct injury to the petitioner to make it an aggrieved party, and the injury has to be co-related to the relief sought in the petition to avoid that injury. In writ jurisdiction, reliefs claimed have to be construed and granted in terms of the prayer made in the petition and the Courts are not called upon merely to decide metaphysical questions of law without reference to the relief which is sought in the petition. In the present case, the petition under Article 98, according to the subject heading, is directed against the respondent for an order to withdraw and cancel and treat as of no valid effect the minimum rates of wages recommended by the West Pakistan Minimum Wages Board, as published in West Pakistan Gazette dated the 15th of March 1963 under section 6 (1) of the Ordinance and at the end of the same prayer is repeated that the Court on being of the opinion that the respondent had acted in excess of its authority conferred on it by law may be pleased to issue an order directing the cancellation of the aforesaid Notification. It is obvious that the notification in question, laying down the minimum wages for the workers in the Schedule appended to it does not at all affect the interest of the petitioner association as such to make it an 'aggrieved party' for the purpose of making a writ petition. The Association does not have to pay the wages to workers and it cannot make a grievance of that fact--that the wages have not been legally fixed. It is the individual members, i.e. The owners of the different Steel Re- rolling Mills that have to foot the bill of the increased wages as ordained in the notification, and it is they who are individually in various degrees affected by the notification."
4. ' In the case of Messrs Pahiomal-Motiram v. The Chief Land Commissioner and 3 others (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Kar. 384) M/s Pahlomal Motiram, a joint Hindu family, filed a writ petition against the order of the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan alleging that landed property measuring 18,000 acres admittedly belonged to the said joint Hindu family.
5. ' A learned Division Bench while dismissing the writ petition held that "only an aggrieved party is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and as the petitioners were neither a party nor directly affected by the impugned order, the petition on behalf of the Joint Hindu Family was wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone".
6. ' In the case of Anjuman-i-Araian Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and 5 others (PLD 1973 Lahore 500) the Anjuman challenged allotment of some evacuee land to one Abdul Rashid under Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. This petition was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge (Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain, as his Lordship then was), which was impugned in Letters Patent Appeal and the learned L.P.A. Bench upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge held that the appellant had no locus standi to file the petition.
7. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner, confronted with the situation, by referring to the cases of S.M. Zakaria and another v. The Registrar Co-operative Societies Hyderabad and 2 others (PLD 1973 Kar. 433), Pakistan Mine Owners' Association and 2 others v. District Magistrate Quetta and others (PLD 1979 Quetta 160) and Anjman Araian Bhera v. Abdul Rashid and others (PLD 1982 SC 308) attempted to argue that the trend has undergone a change, because these petitions were heard and disposed of as having been instituted in representative capacity. The arguments of the learned counsel may be alluring on the face of it, but on closer examination and perusal of these judgments it loses its charm, since it transpires that this particular point was neither discussed nor decided in those cases. If I may say that what to talk of "stare decisis" the judgments referred to above do not even observe "obiter dicta" on the point in question, so as to offer any butress to the arguments of the learned counsel. At its best it may be a specie of sub-silentio precedent which certainly cannot run counter to and out weigh the precedent, which have so far remained unrepealed and have not been overruled or abrogated. Learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from the above has not been able to refer to any law, to the contrary, therefore, this petition having not been competently instituted is dimsissed in limine. in limine.