MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, J.--The petitioners under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have assailed the notification dated 11th November, 1978, issued by the District Magistrate Quetta under section 8 (2) (b) of Baluchistan Public Safety Regulation of 1947 (hereinafter referred as Regulation), calling upon the Coal .Companies to open Coal Depots at specified places in Quetta Town and Cantonment areas and to sell Coal of good average quality, free of slates, dust and mate to the general public at the rate of Rs. 150 per ton.
2. The District Magistrate was compelled to pass this order as in his opinion, the Coal for comfort fire was not made available to the general public of Quetta City and Cantonment areas at the rate fixed by the District Magistrate Quetta during the past year. As last year some of the Mine Owners had failed to open Coal Depots at the places specified by the District Magistrate. In view of the District Magistrate, the state of affairs was likely to cause annoyance in general public which might had ultimately resulted in disturbance of public tranquillity/riot/affray. Before issuance of this notification, the District Magistrate Quetta had convened a meeting in his office, with the President, Vice-President and General Secretary of the Mine Owners Association, Quetta and discussed with them the arrangement for opening of Coal Depots, supply of Coal to the consumers in Quetta City and Cantonment areas during the winter season of 1978-79 at a particular fixed rate. However, after the issuance of notification, the Pakistan Mine Owners Association Quetta called a meeting of its members on l7th November, 1978 and resolved that the order of the District Magistrate was harsh and unjust to be complied with, as such they authorized Syed Iqbal Shah Hashmi, the Vice- President of the Association to challenge the same in the Court of law.
3. Syed Iqbal Hashmi, the Vice President of Pakistan Mine Owners' Association, Sardar Ali Ahmad, Managing Director of Messrs Sheikh Muhammad, Usman Khan Jogezai and Company and Haji Jaffar a partner of Raja Mining Company, Quetta on 21st of November, 1978 has filed this constitutional petition before the Court and sought for a declaration that the said order of 11th November, 1978, (i) be declared to have been passed without lawful authority and as such was of no legal effect ; (1t) that order was arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable and ultra vires and (iii) the provisions of clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 8 of the Regulation were bad and ultra vires.
4. We have heard Mr. S. M. Zafai and Mr. Muhammad Aslam Chiahti Advocates for the petitioners and Mr. Muhammad Ahmed Mirza Advocate-General for the respondents.
5. At the outset, the learned Advocate-General raised a feeble preliminary objection and challenged competency of Syed Iqbal Shah Hashmi the Vice-President of the Pakistan Mine Owners Association and Sardar Ali Ahmed, Managing Director of Messrs Sheikh Muhammad Usman Khan Jogezai and Company for having invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by way of instituting this constitutional petition. According to him these both petitioners could not be termed to be "aggrieved parties" within its meaning under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mr. A. G. Contended that they had neither suffered any loss nor their interests in any way were affected, as such they had no locus standi to bring the petition. In support of his contention, the learned A: G. Placed reliance on cases Pakistan Steel Re-rolling Mills Association v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 Lah. 1380) and Anjuman Araian, Behera v. Abdul Rashid and S others (PLD 1973 Lah. 500).
6. Mr. S. M. Zaffar, the learned counsel for .The petitioners repudiated this contention of Mr. Mirza and relied on cases S. M. Zakaria and another v. The Registerer, Co-operative Societies, Hyderabad and 2 others (PLD 1973 Kar. 433) and The Pakistan Barbers' Association, Lahore v. Province of Punjab through Directorate of Labour Welfare, Punjab, Lahore and another (PLD 1976 Lah. 769). In our view, the abortive contention of Mr. A. G. Will neither affect the fate of the petition nor that of the petitioners as Haji Jaffar, the third petitioner still remains before us. His locus standi has neither been challenged nor questioned by Mr. A. G.
7. The quintessence of the contention of Mr. S. M. Zaffar challenging the impugned order was that before its notification under subsection (2) (b) of section 8, the District Magistrate under provision of subsection (2) (a) of the section had to ask the Mine Owners to file returns for declaring :- "of the stock of such commodity held by him or consigned to him or under order on his account ; of any contracts for the supply to or by him of such commodity or for or in connection with production or manufacture of such commodity and of any other dealing by him therein ; of the person, with whom and the price at which any such contracts or other dealing were made or had or the prices at which such commodity has been brought or sold by him of the cost of production of such commodity, so far as it may be known to him and the profits usually made or. Expected by him on the sale thereof."
The learned counsel submitted that compliance of the provision of subsection (2) (a) is prerequisite condition for taking action under subsection (2} (b). According to him, it provides a machinery for carrying out necessary investigation for fixing the maximum prices of the commodities. Mt. Zaffar submitted that subsection (b) is indeed not independent by itself, but really dependent on subsection (a). Both these subsections are to be read together. Failure to follow the procedure enunciated in subsection (ax nullifies the action the under subsections (b) and (c). Mr. Mirza abortively tried to import his own interpretation in respect of these subsections.
Mr. Mirza reiterated that subsections (b) and (e) are independent subsections, and they have nothing to do with subsection (a). Mr. Mirza explained that subsection (a) is only an enabling provision meant for collectinginformation from Traders in respect of the commodities. He urged that it was at the sweet will and discretion of the District Magistrate for having collected the information from the Mine Owners or not. According to him, word "may" used in the sub-rule is permissive but not mandatory. He explained that this sub-clause neither stopped nor imposed any restriction the District Magistrate for collecting information from any other source Except one laid down under subsection (a). He said that the District Magistrate might have not felt the necessity of collecting the information as laid down in subsection (a) from the Traders as he had already with him the returns filed by the Mine Owners under rule 51 of the Baluchistan Mining Concession Rules.
Those returns might have fulfilled the necessary conditions of this sub-clause. Besides, on 9th October 19'8 the District Magistrate had convened a meeting of the Mine Owners Association, for fixing the fair and reasonable price of the Coal, and its distribution, he said. For interpretation of section 8 of the Regulation, which is under discussion for our convenience and ready-reference the section is reproduced "Section 8.-(1) 1f in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner it is necessary for the public advantage to control the supply of any commodity of general use in any area the Chief Commissioner may, by notification, make a declaration to that effect.
(.) In any area to which a declaration under subsection (1) extends the Chief Commissioner, the District Magistrate or any servant of the Government, authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Chief Commissioner may exercise all or any of the following powers in regard to the commodity to which the declaration relates, namely----
(a) by general or special order in writing to require any trader to make a return, in such form and within such time and to such authority as may be specified in the order, of the stock of such commodity held by him or consigned to him or under order on his account ; of any contracts for the supply to or by him of such commodity or for or in connection with the production or manufacture of such commodity and of any other dealing by him therein ; of the person, with whom and the prices at which any such .Contracts or other dealings were made or had or the prices at which such commodity has been bought or sold by him of the cost of production of such commodity, so far as it may be known to him and the profits usually made or expected by him on the sale thereof, and of any other matters specified in the order with respect to which in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner or other authority making the order, it is desirable to obtain informa-- tion for the purpose of controlling the price of such commodity ;
(b) by notification to prescribe the conditions under which (including the maximum price at which and the persons by whom and to whom) such commodity may be sold ; and such conditions may be general for the whole area or may vary as regards different localities therein, and different conditions may be prescribed for different classes of such commodity ;
(c) by order in writing, to require a trader to place the whole or any portion of his stock, whether immediately available or not, at the disposal of the Chief Commissioner at such time and place and in such manner as may be specified in the order, or receiving payment thereof at the price or prices fixed under clause (b).
(3) In this section the expression "trader" includes a manufacturer, producer, ware house keeper or vendor and, in the case of a vendor, a wholesale or retail vendor, whether acting on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, and, if not acting on his own behalf, the person on whose behalf he is acting."
8. At initial stage of the petition, Mr. S. M. Zaffar had even doubted vires of the Notification No. G-1- 42/53 (a) and No. G-1-42-53 (ii), the Annexures "H" and "H-1" issued on 26th of January, 1955 by the Chief Commissioner, Baluchistan. When Notification No. 2647/1-FGA/Mise./73, dated 8th July 1976 was brought to his notice, he frankly abandoned his objection. Mr. S. M. Zaffar candidly confined his arguments to the interpretation of subsections (a) and (b) only. He took us through sub--sections
(a) and (b) of section 8. He drew our attention to sub-clause "Chic Commissioner or any other authority making the order, it is desirable t obtain information for the purpose of controlling the price of such g commodity." Mr. S. M. Zaffar emphasized that this provision of law was intentionally inserted in the sections to lay guidance for fixing fair and reasonable price of the commodity. There is substance in contention of the learned counsel. However, Mr. Mirza was not in position to explain necessity of this provision being there. Indeed a bare reading of the section would support stand of Mr. S. M. Zaffar and would repel contention of Mr. Mirza. Despite that Mr. Mirza maintained his view and tried to get support from case of Qamar Elahf v. Government of Sind and another (PLD 1977 Kar. 421). His reliance on the citation is not only misconceived but fallacious too. Provisions either identical or similar to subsection (2) (a) are not available in West Pakistan Food Control Act, 1958.
9. Elementary rule of interpretation of Statute is that words and phrases used in it are to be used in its ordinary meaning; it is to be interpreted in a manner so that it neither leads to absurdity nor causes injustice to any party. On basic principles, its construction is to be ascertained by taking into consideration the statute as a whole. Where there are two section C dealing with the same subject-matter, one being unqualified and other containing qualifications, effect should be given to the provisions, containing the qualification.
10. In matter before us, wording of the section is neither technical nor ambiguous ; its intention is clear. Subsection (2) (b) requires fulfilment of certain prerequisite conditions, before being enforced. On these principles, we would not hesitate in observing that it was incumbent on the District Magistrate for having fulfilled the conditions laid down in subsection (2) (a) o of the Regulation before issuing the impugned notification. Indeed his failure to do so has certainly caused injustice to the petitioners. His action under subsection (b) is as such illegal.
11. Besides, Mr. S. M. Zafi'ar challenged the fixation of the maximum price of the coal free from slates dust and mate at rate of Rs. 150 per ton. He contended that it was neither fair nor reasonable. He urged that when fixing the maximum price, the District Magistrate was supposed to have taken into consideration the cost of production ; margin of profit ; other expenses etc. The District Magistrate had not done so, he said. While relying on Annexures "D", "E" and "H" he submitted that the maximum price fixed for sale of the Coal was unfair and unreasonable, much less than that of the production cost of Coal per ton. In his support, the learned counsel relied on Syed Hadi Ali v. The Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1956 Lab. 824) Qamar Elahi v. Government of Sind and another and Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Arshad Virk and 2 others (PLD 1978 Lab. 792).
However, Mr. Mirza replied that the material produced by the petitioners was insufficient to establish that the price was either unfair or unreasonable. He contended that such disputed question of facts could neither be probed into nor taken into consideration in Constitution petition by this Court. He relied on cases Muhammad Ausain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 SC 139)', Nawab Syed Raunaq All etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1973 SC 2:6) and Zulfikar Khan Awan v. The Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development, Government of the Punjab. Lahore and 8 others (1974 SCMR 530). Besides he reiterated that the District Magistrate had the authority or jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Having jurisdiction to decide it, he had the authority to decide it rightly or wrongly. A mere fact that the decision was incorrect, would not render the decision as being without lawful authority. The learned A.-G., relied on authorities Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others, Zulfikar Khan A wan v.
The Secretary Industrial and Mineral Development, Government of Punjab, Lahore and 8 others and Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others.
12. Had District Magistrate observed the provisions of subsection (2) (a), this difficult situation would not have been faced by Mr. Advocate-General His reliance on the above said authorities is of no avail to him. We are indeed not inclined to determine the fair or reasonable price of the Coal.
We are conscious of the fact that we are not sitting as a Court of appeal in our writ jurisdiction.
Nonetheless our anxiety is to see whether the respondent had observed the provisions of the relevant law before fixing the maximum prices and the prices were fair and reasonable.
13. We have hereinabove already observed that the District Magistrate) had not complied with the prerequisite conditions laid down in sub E section (b) of the relevant law, and it resulted in passing of the invalid order. Having failed to observe the relevant provisions of law, we think that the price could not be either fair or reasonable.
14. It was also grievance of Mr. S. M. Zaffar that the so-called maximum price was not fixed by the District Magistrate but by the-Martial Law authorities. The Martial Law authorities indeed have no authority in the law to do so. The fixation of maximum price as such was unlawful. The learned counsel explained that when a special functionary in any law is empowered to do any act, such act is to be done by him alone and by none else. Any act done by any other authority except by him is unlawful. He placed reliance on cases Messrs Associated Cement Companies Limited, Bombay v.
Pakistan through the Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore and 7 others (PLD 1972 Lab. 201) and Abdur Rahman Gazi v. Q. M. Rahman, Member Board of Revenue, East Pakistan and others (PLD 1969 Dacca 451). Feebly Mr. Mirza tried to explain that the maximum period was fixed , by the District Magistrate, Quetta but not by the Martial Law authorities. We are not prepared to accept this explanation of. Mr. Mirza. The impugned order is self-explanatory. In unequivocal words it says that------ "Coal of good average quality shall be made available/sold to the generalpublic at the rate of Rs.
15 per bag of 2 maunds and 10 seers (i.e. Rs. 150 per Ton) revised/fixed by the Martial Law authorities."
The Martial Law authorities find no place in the Regulation. Nor theChief Commissioner had authorized them to fix the maximum price. In absence of such authorization, the Martial Law authorities had no legal sanction to fix the maximum prices. Evidently the Martial Law authorities had transgressed in domain of the District Magistrate by fixing the price.
15. Mr. S. M. Zaffar lastly submitted that the District Magistrate at the most could have fixed the maximum price of the Coal but not ordered the petitioners to open new Depots for selling Coal. He said that in the section word "may" not "shall" has been used. He maintained that it was at the sweet will of the petitioners for having opened the Depots or not. We A are not ready to accept this absurd proposition of the learned counsel. If his contention is accepted, it would not only reduce this provision of law to nullity but would uproot statute itself. A statute is to be interpreted in a way to give it a sensible meaning to make it operative but not inoperative.
16. In an abortive submission in the end, Mr. Advocate-General stressed that the impugned order was enforced by keeping in view the severe winter cold and poverty of the people ; for only four months ; and for 30 f monthly raising of the Coal. The petitioners were at liberty to sell Coal at their own free-will for eight months and also 70 % of their monthly raising or those four months ; This contention of Mr. Advocate-General appeared to be based on compassionate ground, wbich does not carry any legal sanction behind it. It as such is repelled.
17. The impugned order has expired on the 15th of March, 1979 and thereafter it has ceased to exist.
As an interpretation of the relevant provision of law is under dispute, we are disposing of the petition as such on merits. It was also submission of Mr. S. M. Zaffar.
18. For the reasons. That (i) the District Magistrate had failed to observe the provisions of subsection
(2) (a) of section 8 before passing the impugned order and (ii) that the maximum price of the Coal was fixed by the Martial Law authorities, the impugned order dated 11th November, 1978 could not be allowed to be maintained. The impugned order as such is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and as such was of no legal effect.
19. With these observations, the petition is disposed of.
20. Parties to bear their own costs.