' This appeal has been filed by Mst. Sakina Bibi against the respondent, Muhammad Ashraf, to assail order, dated the 27th November, 1986, passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantonment, whereby he directed the appellant to vacate a portion of the house belonging to the respondent. He ordered her ejectment on the ground that the disputed premises were needed by the respondent for personal use.
2. Earlier too an order of eviction was made against the appellant on 30th July, 1980 but that was on the ground of default. The appellant went in appeal before the District Judge, Lahore, who accepted the appeal, set aside the above order and remanded the case for re-trial, vide his order dated the 9th March, 1981.
3. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that while making the earlier order of ejectment, the learned Additional Rent Controller decided the issue of personal need against the respondent and, therefore, it could not be re-opened after the remand of the case. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention to order passed by the learned District Judge in which it was noted by him that the case had not been properly tried. He, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Additional Rent Controller in toto and sent back the case to him for retrial. Thus, the learned District Judge set aside the finding of the learned Additional Rent Controller on the issue of personal need also and directed him to decide that issue afresh. In other words, learned District Judge re-opened the issue of personal need and, therefore, the learned Additional Rent Controller could decide it again. In the circumstances, no legitimate exception can be taken to the recording of the fresh finding by the learned Additional Rent Controller on the issue of personal need.
4. It was also pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent is already occupying a house and, therefore, he is not entitled to seek eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute. For this proposition, reliance was placed by him on subsection (4) of section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. In reply, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the house now lived in by the respondent is not owned by him and, therefore, its occupation would not operate as a bar to his seeking eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute.
5. Relevant provisions of subsection (4) of section 17 of the said Act, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, read as follows:- "(4) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:--
(a) in the case of a residential building, if:-
(i) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family; and
(ii) he or the member of his family, as the case may be, is not occupying any other residential building suitable for his needs at the time, in the Cantonment area concerned or in any local area in the vicinity thereof; and
(iii) he or the said member has not vacated such a building in the said area or vicinity without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act:--
6. Admittedly, the house in which the respondent now resides with his family belongs to his wife whereas the premises in dispute are owned by him. In view of the words "as the case may be" occurring in sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of subsection (4) of section 17 of the said Act, and the word "or" appearing before the said words in clause (a), if a landlord seeks to evict his tenant from a house on the ground of his personal need, his (landlord's) occupation of another suitable house owned by him would operate as a bar to his so doing; and if a landlord asks for vacation of his house on the ground that it is required by any member of his family, he (landlord) would not be able to succeed if it is found that such member is occupying another suitable house owned by such member. In other words, availability of a house owned by any member of the family of a landlord would not cause any difficulty to him (landlord) if he wants to eject his tenant from a house owned by him (landlord) so that he and other members of his family may live in that house.
In this view of the matter, the fact that the respondent and his family members now live in the house belonging to his wife would not preclude him from seeking eviction of the appellant from his (respondent's) house on the ground that he needs it for himself and his children. In taking this view I am fortified by Ghulam Nabi v. Rao Muhammad Usman All Khan 1980 SCMR 751, Muhammad Bashir v. Vensimal and 4 others PLD 1980 Kar. 409 and Mian Abdur Rehman v. Haji Muhammad Hussain and another PLD 1971 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 17. The cited cases were under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, containing provisions analogous to those of section 17 of the said Act. In the cases of Ghulam Nabi and Muhammad Bashir, it was held that if a landlord is occupying a house belonging to his son, he is not debarred from seeking eviction of his tenant from a house owned by him (landlord) on the ground that he needs it for personal use.
Similar opition was expressed in the case of Mian Abdur Rehman which was in regard to a shop. 7.
It was not disputed by learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent has as many as eight children. According to learned counsel for the respondent, one of his sons is also married.
Admittedly, the respondent has already succeeded in getting two rooms of the disputed house vacated but that much accommodation can hardly cope with the requirements of his large family.
In this state of affairs, finding of the learned Additional Rent Controller that the disputed premises are genuinely needed by the respondent for his own use is unexceptionable.
8. There is no merit in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed in limine. Appellant is, however, allowed four months time to vacate the disputed premises.