1. ' MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-The petitioner seeks special leave to appeal against the judgment dated 15-11-1976 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court by which S. A.
0. No, 376 of 1975 was dismissed.
2. ' The dispute relates to the ejectment of the petitioner from House No, 711/C situated in Gulgasht Colony, Multan. The petitioner occupied it as a tenant at a rent of Rs, 2,00 per mensum. His landlord, the respondent herein, filed an ejectment application on 14-1-1974 for his eviction on the grounds firstly that he had defaulted in the payment of rent and secondly, that he required it in good faith for his own occupation. At the trial the plea of default was given up but the application was pressed on the second ground. The Rent Controller by order dated 18-5-1974 ordered his ejectment and the first appeal against that order also failed. The petitioner thereupon filed a Second Appeal which too was dismissed on 15-11-1976.
3. ' It was contended before the learned Single Judge that the respondent had not pleaded that the house which he occupied was not suitable for his needs and as such the requirement cannot be bona fide. The learned Single Judge referred to para. 4 of the application in which the respondent had stated that he badly needed the house for his occupation as be had no other place of residence except the house in dispute and held that by implication what be meant was that the house which he was occupying was not suitable for his needs. It therefore mattered not even if he had not specifically stated that his present accommodation was not suitable for his needs. The learned Single Judge further held that his bona fides were established from the evidence on record for he stated that he was residing with his son and the house was not sufficient to accommodate the families and that further it had become impossible to stay with his son as his wife picked up quarrel with him and his wife every now and then which situation enjoined separate residence from his son. Both these circumstances according to the learned Single Judge were sufficient to establish his bona fides in the absence of any evidence to show that he had another house in the same rating areas.
4. ' It was next contended before the learned Single Judge that his son with his family resided in Lahore and that the house was in his exclusive possession. ' The learned Single Judge repelled this contention on the explanation given by the respondent that his daughter-in-law resided at Multan and occasionally visited her husband at Lahore and therefore, he was not in exclusive possession of the house. In conclusion the learned Single Judge held as under : "The overall evidence given by him shows that the children of his son lived in the same house where the respondent was living and that house was not sufficient for the families."
5. ' And refused to interfere with this conclusion in second appeal.
6. ' It was urged before us that the respondent had not discharged the onus which was on him to establish that the house was not sufficient for his needs. This contention has no force as the Courts below have on an appraisal of his evidence and that of his witnesses held that he had discharged the onus in the context of the dictum of this Court in A. R. Khan v. Muhammad Ishaque (1), which is as under :- " in the last analysis the question becomes one of fact whether a landlord does or does not require a certain premises for hi bona fide requirement, as contemplated by the Ordinance, although the intention behind the move is purely subjective, which can only be inferred from the circumstances, which must be alleged an proved by the landlord by producing evidence in manifestation of that intention."
7. ' We have no reason to interfere with that conclusion which is eminent a question of fact .
8. ' It may here be observed that be was not occupying his son's house his own right and therefore, he had every reason to seek ejectment of the petitioner from his house which he intended to occupy in terms of section 13(3)(a)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959.
9. ' Accordingly, there is no substance in the petition which is dismissed. Petition dismissed.