' On 9-5-1961, State land now in dispute was allotted to the petitioner for a period of 10 years under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme which was then renewed in the year 1971 for a further period of five years but not later and his lease terminated on 9-5-1976. Prior thereto, in the year, 1969 proceedings had been started at the instance of one Ghulam Muhammad to deprive the petitioner of the land. The litigation was taken upto the Board of Revenue by the said Ghulam Muhammad where order dated 11-3-1979 was ultimately passed by a learned Member to repel his claim by simultaneously ordering even the petitioner to be evicted from the land in dispute for the main reason that the period of his lease had already expired.
2. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner, on 6-5-1980, filed a civil suit against the Province of Punjab to claim a declaration of invalidity about the order of the Board of Revenue. The suit was contested by denying the claim of the petitioner and was set down to be tried on four issues whereof issue No.1 is with regard to the absence of cause of action in the plaintiff; issue No.2 relates to the legality and effectiveness of the order of the Board of Revenue and issue No.3 was settled to determine the plea that the plaintiff cannot be rejected from the suit land without recourse to Martial Law Regulation No.115. Issue No.4, however, embodies the defendant's claim for special costs. The suit was ultimately decreed by the trial Court with the clarification that in case the lease in favour of the plaintiff was not extended and an ejectment order was passed against him then its decree would not stand in the way of his liability to be ejected from the suit land in due process of law. An appeal thereagainst filed by the respondent-Province has been accepted by the learned District Judge, Bahawalpur to dismiss the suit of the petitioner for the reason that the term of his lease has expired and the order directing him to vacate the suit land was not legal and also that he was not entitled to the protection of the Martial Law Regulation No. 115, as had been held in Khushi Muhammad v. Government of Punjab, etc. 1981 CLC 1677. Plaintiff has come up to this Court on revision.
' 2-A. Record of the case, summoned in pursuance of the order dated 10-7-1983, has been received and perused with the assistance of the earned counsel. The determining factor in this case is that the petitioner's tenancy has come to an end already on 9-5-1976 and by irtue of para. (25)(xv) of the terms and conditions governing his ease, he is committed to thereupon peacefully surrender the possession .f the land. Since the impugned order of the learned Member Board of evenue proceeds upon this very premises and cannot be held to be llegal, void or ineffective against the plaintiff-petitioner, therefore, e is not left with any right or locus standi to claim the declaration .Rayed for in the suit. This order holds the field in the context of ection 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, therfore, the petitioner cannot have the aid of a Court to perpetuate his possession over the land in dispute, without any right or title vesting in him. An order under section 10 ibid is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to pass and Board of Revenue being the ultimate authority in the hierarchy, it is not open to a civil Court to substitute its views with regard to the desirability of selecting a particular person as a tenant for any specified land because it is explicitly prohibited in section 36 thereof.
3. There is no illegality or error of jurisdiction involved in the trial Courts decree having been reversed by the learned District Judge. Petitioner's suit is also barred by time under Article 14 of the Limitation Act and even though an objection to that effect was not taken in defence of the suit, yet, by virtue of section 3 thereof, this aspect of the case is not capable of being disregarded and hence, the order to dismiss the suit is simply unexceptionable.
4. There does not emerge any case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Hence, in limine.