' This judgment disposes of Writ Petitions Nos. 6481, 6482, 6483, 6484, 6485, 6486 and 6487 of 1980, which are at admission stage and have been filed by 1-lamed Ali Khan, Abdul Khaliq, Muhammad Shard, Muhammad Tahir, Faiz Muhammad, Muhammad Hafiz, Muhammad Tariq petitioners respectively, and also Writ Petitions Nos 6142, 6165 and 6188 of 1980 filed by Khushi Muhammad.
Muhammad Shafiq and Ahmad Bakhsh petitioners respectively, and have been admitted to hearing.
2. Writ Petitions Nos. 6485 and 6486 of 1980 refer to land under cultivation known as )`61,... Util while others relate to charagah land.
3. The petitioners are holders of State land for cultivation on temporary basis under different schemes. In all these writ petitions the; main question of law and facts is involved, i,e, as to whether they are entitled to retain as a matter of right the respective parcels of land under their cultivation despite the expiry of-their lease term with effect from Rabi 1980.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also certain other counsel present in Court who were interested in the law point. The learned Acting Advocate-General has also been: beard. S. The main submission that the petitioners were entitled to hold the lands subject to their payment of enhanced rent at 20 per cent. And the grievance of show-cause notice has been dealt with by me at length in my judgment delivered in Writ Petition No, 6191 of 1980, wherein after examining the memorandum letters Nos. 796-74/460-C. L I., dated the llth February, 1974 and 10993-77/195-C. L. I., dated the 7th February, 1978 in the light of the argument of the learned counsel, I have concluded:- "The condition in the previous letter that on the expiry of the lease period the petitioners will deliver vacant possession to the State has not been omitted but is in fact being incorporated in the wording of the letter .Dated the 7th of February, 1978 quoted above when it is stated .That the current temporary leases of charagah State land expiring in Rabi 1978, may be extended for further two years subject ..To the further conditions. ' The importance of the words may be extended and subject to the further conditions cannot be overlooked. It reads so as to mean that the previous lease agreement is extended mutatis mutandis and further conditions to that are being added and it does not mean that the conditions which were incorporated in the previous lease agreement are being dropped. In the previous lease conditions it is specifically mentioned :- ' On their executing a bond that they will vacate the land at the end of the lease period and would not claim its renewal or extension for the next year.'
' I, therefore, would read the letter dated the 7th February, 1978 so as to mean that the previous condition about the delivery of vacant possession of the land on the expiry of the lease period has been kept intact by the usage of the words 'may be extended' and further conditions have been added to the existing conditions by the usage of the words 'subject to further conditions'."
6. I have also taken the view therein that the petitioners even at the time of entering upon the land knew that on the expiry of the lease period they have to deliver the vacant possession to the authorities and, therefore, no further show-cause notice was necessary. The judgment may be read in continuation of the same.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners arguing in support of the writ petitions have raised the following additional points :-
(i) that a 'tenant' of State land is also covered by paragraph 25(1) of Martial Law Regulation No, 115, and therefore, they can be ejected only on the grounds mentioned in the above-referred paragraph, and therefore, a statutory right to retain their possession of the land under their cultivation that the impugned order of putting the lands under the cultivation of the petitioners to open auction for the next two years is ultra vices of the aims and objects of the Notification No, 3215-79/3973-C-II dated the 3rd September, 1979 which provides for :- .The following statement of conditions for the purchase of proprietary rights in the State land granted on temporary cultivation leases in the Province of Punjab other than the Area of Cholistan, to which the said Act is applicable."
' In support of the first submission the learned counsel for the petitioners have referred to Muhammad Yusaf v. The Province of the , Punjab (1) wherein my brother Gul Muhammad Khan, J.
After examining at length the scope of the definition, 'tenant' as provided in the Land Laws has maintained that the tenants cultivating State Lands would be included in the definition of a 'tenant' provided in the Land Laws, and therefore, would be covered by paragraph 25 (1) of Martial Law Regulation No, 115. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) P L 1) 1976 Lah. 328 {{FOOT NOTE}}
8. The above-referred judgment was negated by the Land Reforms Act, 1977, and a person holding State land has been specifically excluded from the definition of a 'tenant', and therefore, the safeguards provided in paragraph 25 (1) of Martial Law Regulation No, 115 are not available to the petitioners. Section 2, clause (12) of the Land Reforms Act, 1977, wherein the term -tenant' has been defined, reads as follows :- " 'tenant' means a person who holds land under another person and is or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person and includes the predecessor and successors-in-interest of such person but does not include-
(a) or
(b) a person holding State land in any manner and for purpose, or (c)
' Muhammad Yusaf v. The Province of the Punjab (1) has been overruled by a Division Bench of this Court while deciding Writ Petition No, 980 of 1976 wherein it was held :- "Despite the respect we entertain for legal acumen and knowledge of .Our learned brother who, decided Muhammad Yusaf v. Province of Punjab (PLD 1976 Lah. 328) we do not find ourselves in a position to agree with the view taken in that case about the scope of para.
25. In that case neither the definition of person nor the implication of the clause (c) of section 4
(26) of the Land Revenue Act nor the above effect of the provisions of the Colonization of the Government Lands Act or the Government Grants Act was considered. The Division Bench a: 'hority of the Lahore High Court in Shamir etc. v. The Chief Land Commissioner, Lahore, etc. Was also not considered."
9. The second point raised in support of the writ petitions also has no force. Importance of the preamble as an aid to construction is constantly declining, as it is no longer the normal practice to have preambles of a statute. The significance has been examined by the House of Lords in Att-Gen. v. H. R. H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, in which case Lord Normand said :- "There may be no exact correspondence between preamble and enactment, and the enactment may go beyond, or it may fall short of the indications that may be gathered from the preamble.
Again, the preamble cannot be of much or any assistance in constructing provisions which embody qualifications or exceptions from the operation of the general purpose of the Act ' If they admit of only one construction, that construction will receive effect even if it is inconsistent with the preamble, but if the enacting words are capable of either of the constructions offered by the parties, the construction which fits the preamble may by preferred." {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) P L 13 1976 Lab. 328 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Reading all the relevant memorandum letters together, it is clear that the petitioners have no statutory right to hold the land beyond the period of their tenancy or even to the grant of proprietary rights therein as a matter of right even if they were otherwise eligible to it. In accordance with the terms and conditions of their lease they have to surrender the vacant possession of the land to the concerned authorities on the expiry of their lease.
10. These writ petitions would be liable to dismissal also on the short ground that the petitioners have not pursued the alternative remedies which were available to them. They could file objections before the Colony Assistant/Collector whose decision would be subject to appeal before the Commissioner and revision before the Board of Revenue, as section 6 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1919 makes the Land Revenue Act applicable in certain matters. I am also in agreement with the learned Acting Advocate-General that some of the writ petitions may involve disputed questions of fact as to whether the areas under the cultivation lie within the prohibited clauses or not and the Colony Assistant will be in a better position to determine the eligibility to the grant of proprietary rights/leases/eligibility to take part in the open auction in individual cases. The points in issue before me have also been considered by my brother Manzur Hussain Sial, J. While deciding Writ Petition No, 5580 of 1980 (Akhtar Hussain v. Member Board of Revenue) on the 24th May, 1980. 1 have perused the judgment, and besides my own reasons recorded here as well as in Writ Petition No, 6191 of 1980, I am in full agreement with the ratio decidendi of the aforesaid judgment.
11. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in these writ petitions and the same are dismissed and the parties are left to pursue their normal remedies before the proper forum if so advised, and in Writ Petition Nos. 66142, 165 and 6188 of 1980, in the particular circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs.
Petition dismissed.