SHAHID WAHEED, J.---The solitary cause which has been made basis to seek review of the order dated 7th December , 2018 dismissing the revisional application, that is, C.R. No.21 1935 of 2018 is the opinion that has been expressed in "Javed Iqbal, etc v. Province of Punjab, etc." (W.P.No.203044 of 2018), hereinafter called Javed's case, on the effect of subsection (5) added to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act-V of 1908 ("C.P .C.") by the Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018 ("Amendment Act, 2018"). It implies that instant application not only seeks review of the order dated 7th December , 2018 but also intends to get authoritative pronouncement from this Bench regarding the effect of addition made in section 115, C.P.C. by the Amendment Act, 2018.
2. The question posed to us by this application has nothing to do with the merits of the dispute between the parties, so there is no need to recapitulate the facts that led to the cause for bringing the action in the original Court. In fact, we are here concerned only with those events indicating how and when did the case go up in the litigation ladder .
They may be briefly stated. It is not disputed in this case that the applicant is the holder of the decree dated 27th September , 2003 whereby he was held entitled to the transfer of the property (i.e. plot No.147, Nishter Block, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore) subject to payment of the average market price to the Lahore Development Authority ("LDA"). This decree was maintained till the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. On 14th November , 2006, the applicant took out the proceedings for execution of the decree. During these proceedings, the judgment debtor , namely , the LDA submitted the challan form in respect of the interim cost of the property demanding the deposit of Rs.15,846,160/- as an assessment of average market price. The applicant invoki ng the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. objected to the assessment made by the judgment debtor . The objections were declined by the Executing Court vide order dated 1st February , 2011. Under section 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. this order was appealable and so the applicant preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Lahore. This appeal was dismissed vide order dated 14th April, 2018. In the meantime, it had so happened that on 20th March, 2018 the Amendment Act, 2018 was promulgated and thereby subsection (5) was added to section 115, C.P.C., which set forth that no proceedings in revision would be entertained by the High Court against an order passed by the District Court under section 104, C.P.C. This amendment came under consideration in Javed's case and it was held that it would not affect the rights to remedy by way of appeal or otherwise available under an original enactment to the litigating parties on the date of commencement of the lis. It appears that the applicant was neither aware of this opinion nor had any knowledge of the amendment made in section 115, C.P.C. and he in routine on 12th May, 2018 presented his memorand um of revision in the office of this Court to challenge the order dated 14th April, 2018 of the Additional District Judge. Since the office was conscious of the opinion made in Javed's case, it entertained the applicant's revision and fixed it for hearing before a Single Bench of this Court. The applicant's revision came up for hearing before the Single Bench on 7th December , 2018 when his counsel was asked as to how after the promulgation of the Amendment Act, 2018 the proceedings in revision were competent for which he could not offer any reply and thus, on this short ground, the revisional application was dismissed being not competent. Subsequently , the applicant got knowledge of the opinion expressed in Javed's case, which was diametrically opposed to the one through which his revisional application was declined. He then filed the instant review application. Taking note of the divergent views of two Single Benches of this Court, the matter was referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting Full Bench so as to settle the issue conclusively . Accordingly the case was processed and now this application is before us.
3. In the light of circumstances described above, the question we have to address is whether the addition of subsection (5) in section 115, C.P.C. by the Amendment Act, 2018 will also have an effect on the cases which had already commenced in the original Court before its enactment. In order to untangle the intricacies of this question, it will be necessary to take note of the provisions of section 115, C.P.C. as they stood before amendment and after amendment. Before the amendment the provisions of section 1 15, C.P .C. were like this: "115. Revision.---(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears.
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law , or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity , the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.
Provided that, where a person makes an application under this subsection, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court. and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the subordinate Court, Provided that such application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof, and the High Court shall dispose of such application within three months.
(2) The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.
(3) If any application under subsection (1) in respect of a case within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District Court, no further such application shall be made to either of them.
(4) No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order made under subsection (2) by the District Court." It is to be noted that prior to the amendment, the power of revision was wider and it could be exercised in any case where a jurisdictional error was committed by the original Court or where substantial injustice had resulted. It seems that the legislature felt that this power should be suitably curtailed and thus, through the Amendment Act, 2018 amendments were made in section 1 15, C.P .C., which became like this:- "115. Revision.---(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears-
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law , or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity , the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that where a person makes an application under this subsection, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the sub-ordinate Court and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the record of the subordinate Court.
Provided further that the subordinate court shall provide copies of the document to a person within three days of the decision, and the High Court shall dispose of such application within six months,
(2) The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount of value of the subject-matter where of does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.
(3) If any application under subsection (1) in respect of a case within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District, no further such application shall be made to either of them.
(4) No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order made under subsection (2) by the District Court. (5) No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order passed by the District Court under section 104."
4. Here we are concerned with the newly added subsection (5) in section 115, C.P.C. by the Amendment Act, 2018 and its plain reading makes it clear that an order passed by the District Court under section 104, C.P.C. is no longer the subject matter of revision. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that the right to move the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was vested right which attached to litigation when it commenced and that it could not be affected by any subsequent amendment unless an express provision was made giving retrospective operation to the amendment; that exercise of revisional power by the High Court was not part, of procedural law; and, that the provisions of section 115, C.P.C., which were in force on the date when the litigation had commenced, would be decisive of the question as to whether a revisional application was or was not maintainable. In response, it is submitted that plain meaning of provisions of a statute has to be given full effect and even a bare reading of newly added subs ection (5) makes it clear that order made by the District Court cannot be brought under challenge through the proceedings in revision and thus, the order dismissing the applicant's revision was on terra firma; that there was no vested right to file a revisional application; and, that if the revisional power did not exist when it was invoked, the revision al application filed by the applicant, would not be held to be maintainable.
It is just a coincidence that Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate-Amicus Curiae is of the view of the applicant and the other Amicus Curie, namely , Mr. Khalid Ishaq, Advocate has endorsed the arguments of the respondent.
5. Before we make up our minds as to which set of arguments is plausible, we have to determine two ancillary issues, the answers to which will contribute to settle the main question. These issues are that in which category of law the C.P.C. falls and that what is the nature of the remedy of revision provided in it? It is to be noted that here we are confronted with a code of law whose title though contains the word "proc edure", but nevertheless, on its basis, its category cannot be ascertained with certainty . We think the real nature of any statute cannot be determined by its nomenclature and description, but for that a glance at its actual contents is essential and before undertaking this exercise it ought to be kept in mind that this is a fact that although the distinction A between substantive law and procedural law is clearly drawn in theory , there are many rules of procedure which, in their practical operation, are wholly or substant ially equivalent to rules of substantive law. Such a type of complexity also appears in physical science, and probably for that reason, we find that the issue we are discussing at the moment is similar to what Gilbert N. Lewis said in his book. 'The Anatomy of Science . He said, "one by one we have seen how categories, which at first seen sharply defined, merge one into another , and how every classification when analyzed shows that some imaginary line has been arbitrarily taken as a boundary". This brings us to the point where we have to see which appropriate test can be applied to get the correct answer to the issue under1 discussion. The easiest and simplest test, as far as we understand, is the one that has been suggested by Sir John Salmond . According to him the law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation. All the residue is substantive law and relates not to the process of litigation but to its purpose and subject matter . This test has been recognized by our Supreme Court and appli ed in various cases. Let us now apply this test. The C.P.C. has been divided into two parts, one consisting of sections 1 to 158 and the other comprising the Orders I to LII which are divided into rules. The part consisting of the Sections is generally referred to as the body of the C.P.C. and gives several substantive rights to the litigants whereas the other part is referred to as rules which govern the conduct of the parties as well as of the Court at various stages of the proceedings in the Court; provide a mechanism for settlemen t of the disputes, and specify the process through which a case gets to its final conclusion. Upon this analysis, the conclusion to which we cannot resist is that virtually every important rule of both procedure and substantive law are intertwined in the C.P.C. so as to make it as much as possible comprehensive compendium to cover a complete system of the Courts of Civil judicature.
6. Proceeding to the second supplementary issue, we may mention that the body of the C.P.C. provides different remedies to a litigant, one of which is revision. This remedy has been provided under section 115. The Superior Courts have differing views on the nature of this remedy . Some say it is the right of a litigant and some say it is his privilege. It is important to note that precedents are the anchors of the law and thus, respect and adherence to them is the rule rather than the exception. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court is unqu estionably the ultimate expositor of law , the High Courts and other Courts are absolutely bound by its {{Foot Note}} 1 The Anatomy of Science (1926) P . 178 2 Salmond on Jurisprudence by P . J. Fitzgerald, 12th Edition, Section 128 3 "Nabi Ahmed and another v. Home Secretary , Government of the West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others"
(PLD 1969 SC 599 )
"S. M. Junaid v . President of Pakistan" (PLD 1981 SC 12 )
"Aftabuddin Qureshi and another v . Mst. Rachel Joseph and another" (PLD 2001 SC 482 )
"Muhammad Asghar v . Hussain Ahmad and others" (PLD 2014 SC 89 ) {{Foot Note}} precedents. It is not only a matter of owing, obedience but also of developing consistency in the evenhanded administration of justice in the courts. Nevertheless, it often happens, that we are confronted with discordant decisions and for that, we cannot provide ourselves with an excuse in the words of Oscar Wilde when he said that "consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative". The rule, however , that applies is that when there is a conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court, it is the decision of the larger of the Benches, whether it is earlier or later, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts in the country5. Mindful of this principle, when we began to study the precedents that have been presented to us, we looked at Karamat Hussain's6 case which was heard and decided by a five-member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In that case second appeal was filed in the High Court which by virtue of amendment made in section 102, C.P.C. by the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972 was found not competent because the value for the jurisdiction of the suit given in the plaint was less than Rs.2,000/-. It was then pleaded before the High Court that further proceedings in the matter be taken after treating the second appeal as revision. The High. Court, however , instead of doing so held that as the regular second appeal was incompetent valuation-wise and that since there was no obligation in law to convert the said appeal into revision especially when a revision was "only a privilege and not a right" and that the intention of the legislature in making the amendment in section 102, C.P.C. was to discourage litigation in matters of small valuation. The High Court accordingly declined to convert the second appeal into revision petition and proceeded to dismiss it as incompetent. On appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while disapproving the said viewpoint remanded the matter to the High Court declaring that mere fact that exercise of revisional jurisdiction was discretionary did not mean that it was a privilege and not a right. It would be profitable if the relevant extract of that judgment is reproduced below not only for the facility of reference but also for clarity of thought:-2 3 "Thus, if the second appeal that is brought before the High Court exhibits certain features which demonstrate that it falls within the scope of interference under section 1 15, C. P . C., the {{FOOT NOTE}} 4 The Relation of Dress to Art in Pall Mall Gaz. (28 Feb. 1885), sprinted in Aristotle at Afternoon Tea: The Rare Oscar Wilde 52 (John W yse Jackson ed., 1991)
5 "Muhammad Riasat, SET (Science) and others v. The Secretary of Education,N.W .F.P.,Peshawar and 2 others"
Azmatullah through LRs. v. Mst. Hameeda Bibi and others (2005 SCMR 1201 ) "National Bank of Pakistan through Chairman v . Nasim Arif Abbasi and others" (2011 SCMR 446 )
6 Karamat Hussain and others v . Muhammad Zaman and others" (PLD 1987 SC 139) {{FOOT NOTE}} Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the said provision of law. It hardly needs saying that the Court will be in a position to examine this aspect of the matter only if it considers the facts of each case and this can only be done if the appeals are treated as revisions whereafter the question can be examined by the High Court whether the Court subordinate to it has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested or acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity . True, the exercise of this jurisdiction by the High Court is discretionary but that does not mean that a revision is not a right but only a privilege. A privilege is some particular benefit or advantage conferred on a person or a class of persons which other citizens do not enjoy while a right is some benefit conferred on a person by virtue of a given law. Here, the provisions of section 115 of the C. P. C. confer on every person who has litigated before a Court subordinate to the High Court the right to assert before the latter that the decision rendered by the subordinate Court against him is liable to correction under its revisional jurisdiction. Indeed where the conditions for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction are satisfied the High Court should itself interfere. Of Course, it may in certain circumstances, in exercise of its judicial discretion, refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner such as where the petitioner has approached the Court, without reasonable cause, with undue delay or his conduct has been contumacious or because of the existence of some other special circumstances which disentitle him from relief. But the mere fact that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is discretionary does not mean that it is a privilege. Even the Writ Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts by the Constitutional is discretion ary. But the right to apply for a writ is certainly not a privilege. On the contrary it is one of the most valuable right that can be conferred upon a citizen."
7. The principle explained in Karamat Hussain's case was re-examined by a three-member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mandi Hassan's' case and reiterated that though revision is a supervisory jurisdiction, which is vested in a higher forum and is exercised for scrutiny if a case decided by the subordinate court suffers from any defect in terms of exercising of its jurisdic tion on the ground that it has acted in exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity , but nevertheless it is not a privilege but a valuable right of {{FOOT NOTE}} 7 Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another v . Muhammad Arif (PLD 2015 SC 137 ) {{FOOT NOTE}} an aggrieved party . Let us be acquainted with the exact observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while describing revision as a right. They are like this: "2. Before embarking upon to resolve the above proposition, we find it expedient, to briefly assess the nature of the jurisdiction of courts in relation to civil revision filed in terms of section 115, of the C.P.C. There can hardly be two opinions on the nature of revisional jurisdiction. It is a supervisory jurisdiction, which is vested in a higher forum (subject to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the case either the learned District Court or the learned High Court) and is exercised and/or is invoked for scrutiny if a 'case decided' by the court subordinate to the higher court's jurisdiction, suffers from any defect in terms of exercise of its jurisdiction and/or on the ground(s) that the court subordinate has acted in exercise of such jurisdiction illegally and/or with material irregularity . On the basis of the law enunciated and settled by this Court, there is wee room for doubt that being a supervisory jurisdiction, the higher forum which is approached (i.e. the revisional court) is conferred with the power to ensure that the court subordinate thereto (to the revisional court) conforms to the parameters of its jurisdiction, In other words the revisional jurisdiction is meant to rectify; to obviate, forefend and stave off the exercise of jurisdictional errors/defects and the illegalities and/or material irregularity committed by the subordinate court in that regard. But the "case decided" (order/judgment assailed) has to squarely fall within the scope and the purview of section 115 of the C.P.C. It may however be categorically and unequivocally mentioned here, that approaching a higher court in the revisional jurisdiction for the redressal of one's grievance, if the case is covered by section ibid (115, C.P.C.) is not a privilege, but is a valuable right of an aggrieved party . Obviously , such exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall be subject to the rules of discretion; but the matter of approaching the revisional court cannot be relegated to a mere privilege of the court and not a right. The above view is fortified by a five Members Bench judgment of this Court reported as Karamat Hussian and others v. Muhammad Zama n and others (PLD 1987 SC 139) which held that "True the exercise of this jurisdiction by the High Court is discretionary but that does not mean that a revision is not a right but only a privilege". In an another case Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334 ), this Court concluded that "the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is a matter exclusively between the High Court and the subordinate Courts, albeit the parties to the litigation have a right (emphasis supplied by us) to bring to their notice the jurisdictional/legal errors as envisaged in section 115 of the C.P.C.". This is the apt, the conclusive and the final enunciation of law on the subject by this Court. And any view set out by certain dicta, of the various learned High Courts contrary to the above principle, which invariably comes to our notice, treating and considering the revisions to be a mere privilege and not a right carries no legal sanctity ."
8. It is an admitted fact on all hands that the view expressed in Karamat Hussain's case has not yet been altered or changed or modified by any five-member Bench of the Supreme Court, therefore, the same view will be adhered to.
On being faced with this scenario, counsel for the parties as well as Amicus Curiae jointly submitted that revision is a vested right of an aggrieved person/litigant. In this milieu, there is no need to discuss the other precedents cited before us to determine the nature of the remedy of revision. We, therefore, hold that to seek revision by filing an application under section 115 of a case decided in which no appeal lies, on the ground of irregular or improper exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction, is a substantive right conferred by the C.P .C..
9. We deem it expedient to explain why the remedy of appeal or revision or second appeal is considered the substantive right. In our opinion, it is so because only these remedies safeguard a proper control of the Courts and the quality of the granted legal protection by a Court of higher rank. Though the control of the exercise of Court functions is essential in a democratic state under the rule of law but certainly , it cannot be done by other state powers because under the doctrine of separation of powers contemplated by our Constitution the independence of the courts excludes it. Consequently , as single possible control which does not affect the independence of the courts remains a review and action for annulment of judicial decisions by appeal or revision or second appeal on which decides another Court of the higher rank. The possibility to review judicial decisions, through the said remedies, has a further positive consequence for the quality of legal protection: It improves the image of justice in the public and increases the confidence of the society in the rightness of judicial decisions. At the same time, these remedies oblige the Courts to issue correct and convincing judgments because the Judges know that their activity can be subject of control.
10. Having determined the category of the C.P.C. and the nature of the remedy of revision provided in it, we have now reached the stage where we have to find the answer to the main question whether the Amendment Act, 2018 reveals any intention to take away the right to file revision against the order of the District Court passed under Section 104 C.P.C. in the proceedings pending on the date of its promulgation. We can conveniently note that under the Amendment Act, 2018 the second proviso of subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C. has been changed and at the same time subsection (5) has been added within it. This strict scrutiny analysis thus provides us with a calculus that the Amendment Act, 2018 is in the nature of an amendatory statute which has made an addition to or operates to change the original section 115, C.P.C. so as to effect an improveme nt therein, or to more effectively carry out the purposes for which the C.P.C. was promulgated. It is now well settled that where a section of a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there'. In such a situation, we are of the opinion, that the rules applicable to repeal may also apply to amendment. To substantiate this view we can cite with confidence Saeed Ahmad's case which states that there is no difference at all between a case where the legislature says that a particular section will stand amended in a particular way and a case where it says that the section stand s repealed and its place will be taken by a new section if the new section is the same as the amended section. The relevant excerpt from the judgment made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saeed Ahmad's case is as follows: - "It will be observed that in accordance with this section all rights, liabilities, etc. continue in spite of repeal and all proceedings can be taken and continued which could have been taken or continued if the repealing Act did not come into force. When I asked learned counsel for the appellant what he had to say in reply to this section his only answer was that this section applies to a repeal and not to an amendment and before us there is a case of an amendment. Every amendment contains repeal for the law in the form in which it stood previously disappears and a new law comes into force. There is no difference at all between a case where the Legislature says that a particular section will stand amended in a particular way and a case where it says that the section stands repealed and its place will be taken by a new section, if the new section is the same as the amended section. Whenever there is an amendment the Legislature could very well have said that the previous provision would be omitted and the {{FOOT NOTE}} 8 People v. Supervisors of Montgomery (67 N.Y.109) The Construction of Statute by Earl T. Crawford, Saint Louis Thomas Law ' Book Company (1940), Chapter XII; and, Understanding Statutes by S. M. Zafar , Second Edition, Chapter-VI.
"Saeed Ahmad v . The State (PLD 1964 SC 266 ) {{FOOT NOTE}} provision as amended would be inserted. There is no reason for giving any different effect to these two methods which achieve the same result. At the same time there is no difference in principle between repeal and amendment and if in the case of a total repeal a proceeding can be continued as if there was no repeal why should the proceeding not be continued in the case of an amendment."
11. The general rule as to the effect of repeal of a statute follows from the legal maxim "nova constitutio fututris forman imponere debet non prateritis " i.e. a new law ought to regulate what is to follow , not the past. This maxim was statutorily recognized in section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which is on the same lines as Section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956 and it provides for the effect of repeal. Now it becomes necessary to have a look at the provisions of Section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956 which reads as under:- "4. Effect of repeal.---(1) Where this Act or any other Punjab Act repeals any enactment then, unless different intention appears, the repeal shall not_
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty , forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability , penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty , forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act had not been passed.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall apply on the expiry or withdrawal of any Ordinance promulgated by the Governor under section as if it had been repealed by a Punjab Act."
12. In view of Section 4, the repeal of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment was still in force. In other words, such repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue-to be concluded as if the enactment has not9 been repealed. In fact, when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystalized on that date.
The mandate of Section 4 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commences under the un-repealed provisions unless the contrary intention is expressed. We find clause (c) of Section 4, refers to the words "any right, privilege, obligation acquired or accrued" under the repealed statute. We may hasten to clarify , the mere existence of a right not being "acquired" or "accrued", on the date of the repeal would not get the protection of Section 4 of the General Clauses Act.
13. It must be underscored that section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956 occurs in a group of sections 3 to 12 and heading of that group of Sections is "General Rules for Construction". The Courts have applied its principles on the question whether a remedy given under the repealed provisions of law is such a right which survives the repeal. In this regard we may cite the case of Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke' wherein it was observed that "every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect". This principle was followed in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited's case". In that case, although the right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland of His Majesty in Council given by the repeal law had been taken away by the repealing enactment, which provided only an appea l from the Supreme Court of Queensland to the High Court of Australia, yet the Act not being retrospective, the Privy Council ruled that a right of appeal to the King in Council in a suit pending when the (repealing) Act was passed and decided by the Supreme Court afterwards was not taken away .
Exact observation made in this case reads as under: - "As regards the general principles applic able to the case there was no controversy . On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand; if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of {{FOOT NOTE}} I0 "School Board Election for the Parish of Pulborough, Bourke and others v . Nun" (1894) 1 QB 725 11 "Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v . Irving " (1905 AC 369) {{FOOT NOTE}} authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the Appellan ts would be entitled to succeed.
The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majest y in Council a right vested in the Appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt.
To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."
14. It is a matter of fact that whenever the superior Courts of Pakistan or India have faced such a question like the one we are presently discussing, they have invariably placed reliance on the principle settled in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company . The list of such type of cases is long and we do not want to burden this judgment by discussing the facts of each of them and the principle settled . therein . It would, however , be suffice to say that the principle that emerge from the reading of those judgments' are that: (i) the legal pursuit of a remedy , appeal or second appeal or revision are really but steps in a series of proceedin gs all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding, (ii) the right of appeal or revision or second appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right, (iii) the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal or revision or second appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit, (iv) the right of appeal or revision or second appeal is a vested right {{FOOT NOTE}} 12 Muhammad Ishaq v. The State (PLD 1956 SC256)" Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Coudhry and others " (PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 448)
"The State v. Maulvi Muhammad lama and others " (PLD 1965 SC 681) "Muhammad Alam and 3 others v. The State " (PLD 1967 SC 259 )
"Adnan Afzal v . Capt. Sher Afzal" (PLD 1969 SC 187 )
"Nabi Ahmed and another v. Home Secretary , Government of the West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others " (PLD 1969 SC 599 )
"Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v . Messrs Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners " (PLD 1981 SC 553 )
"Idrees Ahmad and others v . Hafiz Fida Ahmad Khan and 4 others " (PLD 1985 SC 376 )
"West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v . Rashid Ahmad and another (1988 SCMR 526 ) {{FOOT NOTE}} and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date of the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing as the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal, (v) this vested right of appeal or revision or second appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly 'or by, by necessary intendment and not otherwise.
15. Whereas the Amendment Act, 2018 does not indicate that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when it was passed.
In the case before us the proceedings were instituted on 14th November , 2006, and on the principle established by the decisions referred to above the right of revision vested in the parties thereto at that date and is to be governed by the law as it prevailed on that date, that is to say, on that date the parties acquired the right, if unsuccessful, to go up in revision from the District Court to High Court under section 115, C.P.C. provided the conditions thereof were satisfied. We would, therefore, accept this application and hold that the applicant could have brought revision against the order made by the District Court under section 104, C.P .C.
16. The legal issues having been disposed of, the civil revision will now come up for hearing before an appropriate Single Bench as to the rest of the points that may be urged.
17. The foregoing were the reasons that persuaded us to accept the instant application through the following short order: - "For the reasons to be recorded later, this application is accepted and order dated 7th December , 2018 on review is hereby recalled. The office is accordingly directed to fix Civil Revision No.21 1935 of 2018 before any learned Single Bench after soliciting order from the Hon'ble Chief Justice."
18. Before parting, we must record our thanks to Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate and Mr. Khalid Ishaq, Advocate, who have assisted us as Amicus Curiae in deciding this application and we also express our appreciation to the cogent arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties.