DECISION ' This is an appeal of the appellant, Soofi Muhammad Aslam, against the impugned order passed by the Sind Labour Court No, IV at Karachi who had dismissed the grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R.
0., 1969.
2. The facts are that Soofi Muhammad Aslam was a permanent workman of the respondents as the respondents appointed him as a Cashier on monthly salary of Rs, 1,560. He was appointed on 5th April, 1981.
On 12th October, 1982 he was removed from the appointment without any letter of termination. The respondents have filed the written statement and contended that the appellant was performing the duties of supervisory nature and as such he is not coming within the definition of workman. The contention primarily of the respondents was that the services of the appellant were terminated due to the re-organization of the Accounts Branch of the Department of the respondents and the services of one Cashier became surplus. The appellant was junior most, therefore, was retrenched from service by letter of termination, dated 12th October, 1982 and also the appellant acknowledged the letter so received.
3. The matter was argued by the learned counsel and I have perused the evidence, recorded by the , lower Court. The victimization is not proved inasmuch as the appellant in his grievance notice has stated as under :- "As you know that my services have been terminated on your organization, with effect from 12th October, 1982 being surplus, by my legal dues not yet paid."
4. During the course of evidence neither victimisation nor grudge nor any other ailment is proved. He was removed because he was the junior most.
5. It is open for the management to reorganize its business and to retrench workers surplus to its requirements in the circumstances. In the case of Bayer Pharma Ltd. v. Mirza Hussain Akhtar , this Tribunal has held as under :-1 "It is well-established preposition that it is within the discretion of an employer to organize and arrange his business in the manner he considers best. The law, however, requires that in effecting retrenchment for any reason whatsoever, the employer must be acting bona fide and not for the purposes of victimizing his employees or as a cloak to get rid of the services of any particular employee. Justification for the retrenchment has, however, to be assessed by the reasonableness of a decision taken by the management in a particular situation of actual or threatened losses or actual or expected reduction in the quantum of work. As was pointed out by Annanthanarayanan, J. In the well-known case of Film Distributors Employees' Association v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer (India) Limited, reasonableness of retrenchment is not to be assessed as the vindication of that step by future events and by the substituted judgment of any other agency, judicial or otherwise, which has no responsibility or hazard in the industry. I may also refer to the observations of Hidayatullah, J., in the Supreme Court I of India in the case of Ghatge and Patil Concerns Employees' Union v. Ghatge and Patil (Transport)
(Private) Limited. The learned Judge expressed himself as follows in that case :- `A person must be considered free to go arrange his business that he avoids a regulatory law and its penal consequence which he has' without the arrangement no proper means of obeying. This, of course, he can do so long as he does not break that or any other law.
6. To support this view a host authorities exist, namely ; 1981 PLC 615 ; 1982 PLC 391 ; 1969 PLC 459 and 1983 PLC 1286.
7. The law is that any management is free to reorganize retrench the employees, provided the retrenchment is of the junior most employees and it does not involve the victimization I have seen the evidence and the impugned order. I have come to the conclusion that neither the victimization has taken place nor malice is encountered in the evidence nor any thing else could be seen in favour of the appellant. The impugned order has gone further to indict the appellant as he has spoken certain lies in the course of evidence. However, I am of the view that this appeal has no force and, therefore, it is dismissed. 1981 PLC 24