' These are 57 appeals by the Textile Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Hyderabad, hereinafter referred to as the corporation, against the decision of the learned VIth Labour Court, Hyderabad, given on 30th June 1981, directing the re-instatement in service of the 57 respondents with back benefits. It may be mentioned that separate appeals have been filed by the Corporation in respect of each respondent. This order will dispose of all the 57 appeals.
2. The facts which form the background of these 57 appeals, shortly stated, are that the corporation, which is stated to be a Private Limited Company, is engaged in the manufacture of cotton yarn and owns mills which are located at Hyderabad. It appears that the said Mills had been incurring losses in business since the accounting year 1974 and consequently, as a measure of retrenchment, it terminated the services of as many as 230 workmen, out of a total work force of over 600, by identical orders, dated 2nd June 1979. The said orders read as follows :- "Letter of termination :-The Management regret to inform you that there has been continuous financial losses for the past few years with the consequential financial position of the Company making it practically impossible for this Management to operate this Mills with no reasonable chances of profit. Furthermore, the Management do not have any further financial liquidity to operate the Mills which has become an economic unit. Hence, the Management has decided to retrench surplus workers keeping in view the principle of 'last in first out'.
' That since you are one of the junior most worker in your category, hence your services with the Management are no longer required and the same are hereby terminated with one month's pay in lieu of notice with effect from 3rd June 1979 under Standing Order 12 read with Standing Order 13 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
' You are directed to collect your dues on any working day and submit your latest postal address so that in case we at all restart the mills during one year of the termination of your services, then preference in fresh employment will be given to you in accordance with law keeping in view your length of service.
' For the Textile Corporation of Pakistan Limited.
(SO General Manager."
3. The respondents challenged the orders of termination of their services by way of grievance petitions filed before the learned VIth Labour Court. Out of the 57 respondents, 29 respondents filed 2 grievance petitions, one praying for re-instatement in service with full back benefits and the other for their re-employment in service. Both these applications were consolidated by orders of the learned VIth Labour Court, dated 21st November 1979. The remaining 23 respondents filed one joint application for re-instatement in service with back benefits. All these 3 grievance petitions were directed against the Textile Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. The appellants herein. It is necessary to reiterate this fact because it appears that sometime after the termination of services of the 57 respondents and 224 other workmen, the Mills of the appellants are said to have been restarted with some of the old workmen and some new workmen, in about August, 1979, by Sheharyar Textile Mills, to whom the Mills are said to have been leased out by the corporation by agreement of lease, dated 20th August 1979. There is also a supplementary lease agreement between the parties, dated 27th August 1979. I will refer to some of the provisions of these 2 agreements when dealing with the issue of liability of the corporation to re-employ the respondents.
4. The appellants resisted the grievance petitions of the respondents on the grounds, firstly, that they were time-barred and not maintainbale, secondly, that there was no provision in the I.R.O. For multiple grievance petitions, thirdly, that as the Mills have been leased out to Sheharyar Textile Mills Ltd., the respondents have no right of re-instatement or re-employment against the appellants, and finally, that the termination of the respondents was bona fide and was necessitated due to continuous losses in the working of the Mills over a fairly long period.
5. The learned Labour Court, by its order, dated 30th November 1980, allowing the grievance petitions of the respondents, directed their re-instatement in service with back benefits. On appeal against the said decision, this Tribunal, on 24th March 1981, passed a consent order remanding the case to the learned Labour Court with the direction to give an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence, firstly, in regard to the audited accounts of the Mills of the appellants after November, 1978, since the view taken by the learned Labour Court was that the new Management of the corporation had taken over the affairs of the corporation as a going concern only in November, 1978, the Corporation had no material for coming to the conclusion that the working of the Mills under it was running into losses, and secondly, as to the terms and conditions on which the Mills had been leased out to Sheharyar Textile Mills. The learned Labour Court was also required to go into the question whether the lessor and lessee were substantially the same concerns under different names. On remand the learned Labour Court has reaffirmed its earlier decision after examining evidence on the points formulated in the order of remand. The finding of the learned Labour Court that the termination of service of the respondents was mala fide was mainly based on the view taken by it that the losses in the working of the Mills, prior to 1978, were not on account of any shortcoming on the part of the workmen, as bad been alleged by the Management, but in the working of the Mills, and, as to alleged losses after November, 1978, not only the corporation had taken over the Mills with the full knowledge of the accumulated losses but further the services of the respondents were terminated even before the new Management of the appellants had time to take stock of the situation.
6: I have heard Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani for the appellant Corporation and Mr. Ali Amjad, Advocate, for the respondents. Mr. Mahmood Ghani assailed the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court on the following grounds-
(i) that the grievance petitions in respect of 11 of the respondents, namely, Fazal Ahmad (Application No, 204/79), Ali Mohammad (Application No, 172/79), M. Saleem (Application No, 201179), Mohammad Haroon (Application No, 173/79), Ahmed Khan (Application No, 206/79) Abdul Shakoor (Application No, 218/79), Mohammad Sultan (Application No, 171/79), Saeedullah (Application No, 266/79), Rahim Dad (Application No, 184/79) and Asaf Ahmed (Application No, 114/79) are not maintainable as they have failed to serve the requisite grievance notices upon the appellant corporation ;
(ii) that the grievance petitions filed by 26 of the respondents, claiming re-instatement in service with back benefits, is not maintainable, firstly, because the Mills were no longer being run by the appellant Corporation but by Sheharyar Textile Mills, and secondly, they are time-barred in that they were filed much after the date on which their services had been terminated ;
(iii) that the learned Labour Court has misconstrued the order, dated 24th February, 1981, of this Tribunal remanding the case to it, and has wrongly concluded that the findings given by it in its decision, dated 30th November, 1980, have been approved or upheld by this Tribunal ;
(iv) that the Management is entitled in case of losses through whatever cause arising to re- organize its business and effect retrenchment of its staff ; that the retrenchment of the respondents and other workmen was bona fide and valid exercise of the right of the Management ; and
(vi) that on the re-starting of the Mills by Sheharyar Textile Mills, no right of re-employment accrued to the respondents under Standing Order I will deal with each of the above contentions of Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani seriatim.
7. As regards the first contention of Mahmood Abdul Ghani, I find that not only each of the eleven respondents concerned has specifically stated in his grievance petition that he had served the requisite notice on the appellant-Corporation, but further each of them has filed with his grievance petition a copy of the grievance notice. No doubt, the said respondents have not adduced direct evidence, either of the postal authorities or any other witness, as to the service of their notices on the employer, as the endorsement on their grievance notices, evidencing receipt of the notices, is said to be of the Advocate of the appellant-Corporation, who cannot be considered to be even the agent of the employer for the purposes of service of notice, in the absence of tangible evidence in this behalf, but in each case, there has been filed a letter, dated 7th October, 1979, from the appellant-Corporation addressed to the worker concerned acknowledging the receipt of the grievance notice. These letters, the authenticity whereof is not disputed, indisputably establish that the requisite grievance notices were received by the appellant-Corporation. Faced with this situation, Mr. Mahmood Ghani sought to argue that as the grievance notices were in respect of re- instatement in service, they are time-barred in that they were served much after the expiry of 3 months from the date of termination of services of the respondents on 2nd June, 1979. The following paragraphs in the various grievance notices, however, make it clear that the grievance of the said 11 respondents was not only in respect of the termination of their services but also against the non-employment of respondents in service, upon the re-starting of the mills, contrary to the provisions of Standing Order 14 :- {{URDU TEXT}}
8. I am, therefore, of the view that the above two-fold contentions of Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani with regard to failure on the part of eleven of the respondents to serve valid grievance notices on the employer is without substance.
9. The second contention of Mr. Mahmood Ghani is also based partly on limitation though the nature and the substance of the objection are somewhat different. The precise contention of Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani was that a Labour Court is required to confine itself to the relief which is claimed by a party and if the relief is claimed after the expiry of the grievance petition it is liable to be rejected on that ground alone. Elaborating his arguments in this behalf, it was contended by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani that 21 of the respondents, whose list includes some of the 11 respondents in respect of whom the first objection was raised, had filed only one joint grievance petition in which the sole relief claimed by them is re-instatement in service on account of wrongful termination of services and since this petition was filed more than 56 months after the termination of their services on 2nd June, 1979, their grievance petition is time-barred and hence not maintainable. No doubt, the prayer in the common grievance petition of the 28 respondents concerned is solely for re-instatement in service with back benefits and not for re-employment under Standing Order 14, but the prayer clause must be read in conjunction with the other averments made in the grievance petition and also the grievance notices service by the respondents upon the employer. I have already referred to some of the paragraphs of the grievance notices served by the respondents upon 'le Corporation, and have shown that their grievance was not only in respect of the termination of their services but also their non-re-employment upon the re-opening of the Mills. In their common grievance petition the above-said 28 respondents have reiterated their twin grievances and have referred to the infringement of their right of re-employment upon the re- starting of the Mills. The relevant paragraphs in the comment grievance petition read as follows :- {{URDU TEXT}}
10. In view of the above facts, I am of opinion that notwithstanding the fact that no specific prayer for re-employment has been made in the common grievance petition filed by the 28 respondents concerned, and their prayer clause is confined to re-instatement in service with full benefits, the grievance petition also asserts in the alternative, a claim for re-employment with effect from the date that the Mills were re-started. Mr. Mahmood Abdul. Ghani, however, contended that the Labour Courts are required to confine their attention strictly to the prayer made in the petitions before them, and in support of the contention has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Pakistan Match Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Match Workers' Union (1) and Bannu Woollen Mills v. Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Court, Lahore (2). The decisions in the cases before the Supreme Court, however, proceeded on the basis of the special facts of those cases. In the case of Pakistan Match Company, their Lordships have observed that the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act; 1947, is that before making a reference to the Tribunal the Government should know what is the precise matter in dispute upon which it proposes to invite .a binding adjudication by the Tribunal and that the making of a reference by Government of a general dispute to the Tribunal which will provide an opening for the Tribunal to allow the Unions to put forward as many demands as they pleased, was not authorised, under the Act and constituted a perversion of the provisions of the Act. In the case of Bannu Woollen Mills, the demand by the workers was for the setting up of a cooperative store. This demand was rejected but the Industrial Court directed the supply to workers of wheat at subsidised rates. The Supreme Court held that the 2 reliefs, the one in respect of which the demand was made and the other actually granted by the Industrial Court, were entirely different and consequently the award of Industrial Court was not sustainable. In the instant case, however, the relief which the respondents were basically claiming was their being taken back on the job and it, in my opinion, clearly includes the allied, though technically different, claim of re-employment. I am conscious of the fact that the right of re- instatement arises in those cases where the original orders of termination of services are invalid where right of re-employment under Standing Order 14 arise to retrenched workmen on the re- employment by the employer, within one year of the retrenchment, of persons belonging to the category to which the retrenched workmen belonged ; but in cases where grievance is respect of infringement of both these rights the mere failure to specifically state in prayer clause of the grievance petition the relief of reemployment should not be considered sufficient to shut out such a relief to the workmen, they are otherwise entitled to the same.
11. It next falls to be considered whether in concluding that this Tribunal had concurred in or approved its decision, dated 30th November 1980, in regard to the merits of case, the Labour Court has misconstrued the order of this Tribunal, dated 24th March, 1981. The main dispute in this behalf was whether by reason of the continuous losses which the corporation had been suffering, it was entitled to effect reduction or retrenchment of its staff. The view taken by the learned Labour Court in its decision, which was the subject of the appeal, was that the losses were not due to the wasteful working by the workmen, as asserted by witness Aftab Ahmad, a Director of the Corporation, but due to the fault of the Management, and that further the Management could not possibly come to the conclusion in June 1979 that for that accounting year or the succeeding year it would be suffering losses. The order of remand by this Tribunal, dated 24th March, 1981 does not discuss the above issues at all, and consequently, no question of approbation or disapprobation of the views on the said issues by the Tribunal arises. In fact, this Tribunal had specifically directed that an opportunity be given to the parties to lead evidence in regard to the audited accounts of the appellant- {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1960 PLC 205 (2) PLD 1966 SC 498 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Corporation after November, 197$. This shows that the Tribunal had kept an open mind on these issues and required further evidence to be taken before taking decision thereon.
12. The question, therefore, whether the termination of services of the respondents was a valid exercise of the right of the Management, remained open and requires examination. According to the Management, the Mills had suffered accumulated losses amounting to Rs, 2,29,25,000 during the period from 30th September, 1974 to 30th September, 1978. The learned Labour Court has not disbelieved or disputed the evidence on this point, but has taken into consideration three circumstances in coming to the conclusion that the retrenchment was mala fide. The first was the allegation made by Aftab Ahmad, Director of the appellant Mills, to the effect that the losses were mainly due to the attitude of workers in being absent and in not giving the required quantity of production. According to the learned Labour Court, however, the losses were due entirely to different causes, namely, rise in the price of cotton, increase in wages, slump in the textile and the yarn trade, closure of the factory for some period and strikes and lockout. The second circumstance which the learned Labour Court has taken into consideration in this behalf is the litigation between the Management and the workmen which has led the learned Labour Court to believe that there was no love lost between the Management, which wanted anyhow to get rid of its workmen. The last circumstance relied upon by the learned Labour Court in this behalf is the fact the Management applied under Standing Order 11-A for the closure of the Mills. Now as regards the first circumstance taken into consideration by the learned Labour Court it appears to me that the learned Labour Court has misconstrued the legal position in this behalf. This Tribunal, in 3 recent cases, namely, Boyer Pharma Ltd. v. Hussain Akhtar (1), Corning Glass Pak. Ltd. Karachi v.
Muhammad Hanif (2) and Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. v. Mehboob Nurul Amin, decided on 23rd September, 1981, has reviewed the authorities, both in Pakistan and in the Indian jurisdiction, on the subject of what constitutes retrenchment and when retrenchment can be validly resorted to by the employer. The rule followed in all those 3 decisions is that the Management' has the right and the power to re-organise, mechanise or improve the industrial establishment and for the purpose of effecting recovery or cutting losses, is entitled to retrench surplus staff, provided that the retrenchment is bona fide and is not a cloak or device to get rid of any workmen who are considered inconvenient or undesirable. Huge losses having been incurred by the Mills of the appellant-Corporation not only during the period from 30th September, 1974 upto 30th September, 1978, but also for the subsequent period, as appears from the audited accounts of the Mills produced by the Chartered Accountant of the Mills, Sirajuddin Qasim, which indicate that during the period from 30th September, 1978 to 30th September, 1979, the Mills bad suffered a loss of Rs, 57,54,649.75, the Management of the appellant Mills was not only entitled to but clearly appeared to have been acting on sound business principles in effecting ostensible retrenchment within the provisions of law. In one of the earliest reported cases, namely, Sind Patent Tiles Ltd. v. Karachi Factory Workers Union (3) the Industrial Tribunal at {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1981 PLC 24 (2) 1981 PLC 361
(3) (1947.1957) L L C 189 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Karachi held that where a company had suffered losses, it was the inherent right of the Company to curtail expenses by effecting retrenchment of its staff. It is immaterial due to what circumstances or whose fault the losses have occurred or whether the losses could have been avoided or minimized by a more careful Management of the affairs of the Company. Since one of the means of reducing losses is the retrenchment of the staff, this means cannot be denied to the Management, if the retrenchment is bona fide and within the limits of the law. In the case of Tatanagar Foundry Co. v. Their Workmen (1), the Supreme Court of India, while disapproving the action of the Industrial Tribunal in going into the question whether the lay-off resorted to by the Management could have been avoided by more prudent Management of the affairs of the Company, observed as follows :- "But when dealing with a lay-off like the one with which we are concerned in the present appeal, it would not be open to the Tribunal to enquire whether the appellant could have avoided the lay-off if he had been more diligent, more careful or more far-sighted. That is a matter relating to the Management of the undertaking and unless mala fides are alleged or proved, it would be difficult to assume that the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the acts of Management or the employer and investigate whether a more prudent management could have avoided the situation which led to a lay-off. The danger involved in permitting such jurisdiction to the Tribunal is illustrated by the present award itself. The Tribunal has found that the appellant was in financial difficulties at the relevant time, it has found that the appellant was not actuated by any mala fide intentions, it has come to the conclusion that the lay-off was not the result of any ulterior motive, and yet it has finally come to the conclusion that if the affairs of the appellant had been better managed and more foresight had been shown by the appellant prior to the time when the crisis was reached, pig iron could have been secured and lay-off could have been avoided. Apart from the fact that this conclusion does not appear to be borne out by any evidence on record, it seems to us that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in trying to decide whether better Management could have avoided the crisis. The appellant is, no doubt, expected to manage, its affairs prudently, but it would, we thing, not be reasonable of fair to hold that if the employer is faced with a situation under which for lack of raw materials he has to lay-off his workmen, it is necessary that he must submit to enquiry by the Industrial Tribunal about the prudence of the Management and the forethought displayed but it in anticipating and avoiding the difficulties. That is why we think in embarking upon an enquiry as to whether the appellant had shown sufficient foresight in managing its affairs, the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction."
' Although the above judgment is in respect of the Management's right to resort to lay-off the observations made by the Supreme Court would apply with equal force to retrenchment.
13. The other two circumstances relied upon by the learned Labour Court are also wholly insufficient for drawing the inference that the {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1962 SC 1533 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' termination of services of the respondents was ma/a fide. As already pointed out, the total number of workmen retrenched was 280 out of whom only 57 respondents have filed grievance petitions. This means that as many as 223 workmen were satisfied with the orders of termination of their services. The termination orders, as expressly stated in the orders themselves, were necessitated due to the huge losses suffered by the Mills and the consequent tattering financial plight of the Corporation. The evidence as to losses has not been disputed even by the respondents and has been rightly relied upon by the learned Labour Court. Moreover, it appears that in terminating the services of the respondents the Corporation strictly followed the principles of "last in first out". All these circumstances clearly lead to the inference that the orders terminating the services of the respondents were bona fide and in accordance with law. The fact that the Corporation had applied to the labour Court for closing down the Mills does not militate against this inference. This action, on the contrary, suggests that the financial position of the Corporation was not such as to be with the working of the Mills and when it found that its application for the closure of the Mills was rejected it had to resort to transfer/ lease of the Mills to its sister concern, Shaharyar Textile Mills. The leasing out of the Mills by the appellants thus has to be viewed a part of the process or scheme of cutting down their losses.
14. It remains to be considered whether the Mills have been restarted and the fresh recruitment of the workmen has been made in contravention of Standing Order 14. It is not disputed that the Mills have been re-started and that fresh recruitment of workmen has been made. It is, however, contended by Mr. Mahmood Ghani that Standing Order 14 has no application to the present case, as according to him the liability under the said Standing Order extends only to those cases where the employer who had retrenched workmen seeks to employ person for doing the work which was being done by the retrenched workmen and does not extend to the new employer to whom the establishment or its working may have been let out or transferred. His alternate argument was that even if the transferee or lessee is to be deemed to be or made responsible for the enforcement of Standing Order 14, on the ground that he is the successor of the original employer, he must be made a party to the proceedings. Although, no decision of a Court in Pakistan was cited in support of the proposition that a successor of the employer could be responsible for the enforcement of Standing Order 14, there are a number of authorities from the Indian jurisdiction in support of this proposition. I would refer to two of them. In the case of Dangapara Tea Estate v. Their Workmen (1), the labour Appellate Tribunal of India observed that the term "employer" for the purposes of an industrial dispute was wide enough to cover a dispute between the old staff, which had been retrenched, and the new employer, who should be considered to be the successor of the old employer. In the case of Kays Construction Co. v. Its Workmen (2), the facts were that the Kays Construction Company, Allahabad, by its sole proprietor, Mr. H. M. Khosla, had been carrying on the work of constructing railway coaches under the orders of the railway authorities but it is alleged that he decided to close the business due to financial difficulties and to terminates the service of his employees. In the mean- {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1956 L L J 187 (2) AIR 1959 SC 208 {{FOOT NOTE}} {{PAGE CUT}} npany, by name of Kays Construction Company (Private) rporated and it submitted 2 tenders for construction of S..' #4. -.-a 0 a which were accepted by the railway authorities. This 7.-)Z ny entered into an agreement with Khosla for the purchase 7 try, tools, furniture and fittings of the company owned by 0 AI ;mployed some workmen of the latter company. Meanwhile *,1 ,P arisen between the Company owned by Khosla and its work- P) 9 ded in a compromise according to which the Company agreed ;4: to the workmen for the period of its existence. As the new " I not accept the claim of the workmen that notwithstandingf name it (the new company) was bound to employ, and con- iployment of, all the workmen of the Khosla Company on the and conditions of service, the matter was taken to the Indus- ''' c-;' :al which took the view that the new company was the continuer cessor to the Company owned by Khosla and hence the former o (new company) was required to re-instate the old workmen of ts 3mpany and restore them to their old jobs. Although the Sup ri- art rejected the appeal of the newly-formed Kays Construction Cow,- j on the ground that it would not like to interfere with findings of fact which found favour with the Industrial Tribunal a perusal of the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court leads to the inference that the Supreme Court agreed with the findings and the views of the Industrial Tribunal. Since the Shaharyar Textile Mills is not only a sister concern of the appellant Corporation but has taken over the Management of the Mills of the appellant though for a limited period, and have employed or rather are continuing the employment of the old employees of the Corporation, it would, as in the case of the Kays Company of India, be deemed to be a successor of the Corporation and is required to comply with the provisions of Standing Order 14 and the undertaking given in the orders of termination of service of the respondents. {{PAGE CUT}}
15. There remains to be considered the question whether the failure on the part of the respondents to join Shaharyar Textile Mills as a party to the proceedings, disentitles them from obtaining in these proceedings the relief of re-employment in the said Mills. It would appear that Shaharyar Mills Ltd., though a separate legal entity from the appellant Corporation, is not only a sister concern of the Corporation but a benamidar of the Corporation and that notwithstanding the alleged lease of the appellant-Corporation's Mills to it, the Corporation continues to be the employer of the Mills for at least certain purposes. It has been admitted by Zahid Hussain, General Manager of the Corporation, in his cross-examination before the learned Labour Court that not only the proprietors of Shaharyar Textile Mills are also the proprietors of the Textile Corporation of Pakistan but that further their offices are located in the same building. It has been found by the learned labour Court that Abdul Qader, who was employed as Administrative Officer in the appellant corporation continues to be so employed in the Shaharyar Textile Mills Ltd. It would further appear that the office staff of the appellant-Corporation is being controlled by Shaharyar Textile Mills. In the circumstances, the learned Labour Court took the view that the alleged lease of the Mills to Shaharyar Textiles was in the nature of a benami transaction. I am inclined to agree with its views.
It was held in the case from the Indian jurisdiction of V.V. Kakhte v. S. P. Shinde (1), that where transfer {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1953 A C 61 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' is effected in favour of a benamidar with a view to victimize the workmen such a benamidar would not become the employer and the original employer would not cease to be the employer.
Moreover, in the instant case, not only is the lease of the mills to Shaharyar Textiles on month to month tenancy basis but further the supplementary agreement entered into between the parties on 27th August 1979, clearly stipulates that the Corporation would continue to remain registered under the provisions of the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976, the Workers' Children Education Ordinance, 1972, and the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, and that the income tax/taxes/cesses under the said laws would continue to be paid by the Corporation, though the amounts thereof would be refunded to it by the Shaharyar Textile Mills. Keeping all these circumstances into consideration, I am of opinion that they indicate that the Corporation continued to be the real employer of their old workmen for whose transfer or paying them off no provision whatsoever had been made by it and that the alleged lease to the Shaharyar Textile Mills, which in fact controlled the Corporation, was in the nature of a benami transaction. The Corporation thus cannot shirk its liability under Standing Order 14.
16. In the circumstances, while conceding the right of the respondents for re-employment under Standing Order 14, notwithstanding the fact that the Mills have at least ostensibly been leased out to Shaharyar Textile Mills, I am inclined to the view that looking to the financial position of the Corporation, which admittedly has suffered huge losses, it would be unreasonable to award back benefits to the workmen who are to be re-employed by it. It may be mentioned that even in the case of the Construction Company of India, the Industrial Tribunal, while directing the reinstatement in service of the workers of the old Company, had awarded them only 50% back benefits. I would, therefore, disallow to the respondents the award of back benefits. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani submits that the respondents have become employed and are receiving the wages and prays that the amount of the back benefits deposited with this Tribunal be refunded to the Corporation. In view of the special circumstances of this case, the amount deposited by the appellant-Corporation is directed to be refunded to it.