' These are two connected appeals under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 against the order dated 31-1-1982 passed by the XVth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller in Rent Case No.1880/1979 (corresponding to F.R.A .No.239/1982) and Rent Case No. 1879/1979 (corresponding to F.R.A. No.240/1982) allowing the application under section 13 of the Sind Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 filed on 5-4-1979 on both the grounds of default as well as personal bona fide use.
2. The facts leading to the above appeals, briefly stated, are that the appellants Mrs. Anthony and Muhammad Naqi Khan Yousufzai are the tenants in respect of their respective portions on the ground floor of the premises bearing No.27/1/V/2, P.E.C.H. Society, Karachi on monthly rent of Rs. 180 and Rs. 250 respectively. The respondent filed two applications for ejectment against both the appellants separately, referred to above, on the ground of default as well as personal bona fide need which were allowed by the learned Controller by his order dated 31-1-1982 on both the grounds.
3. It was alleged in the ejectment applications filed by the respondent against the appellant. Mrs. Anthony (R.C.No.1880/79) that the appellant/opponent had committed default in payment of rent since December, 1978 whereas in the other Rent Case No.1879/1979 it was alleged that the appellant/opponent Muhammad Naqi Khan Yousufzai had committed default in payment of rent since January, 1979. It was further alleged in both the Rent Cases that the respondent is occupying a rented premises which is insufficient for his family. It was further alleged by him that his wife is suffering from heart trouble and blood pressure.
4. Mr.M.M.Pirzada, learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals submitted that there was no default committed by the appellants , and that the respondent has failed to prove bona fide need for personal use of the premises in question.
5. In support of his submission on the ground of default, arguing F.R.A. No.240/1982 corresponding to Rent Case No. 1879/1979 he urged that the rent for the month of January, 1979 under section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which subsequently became applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller on its promulga tion in November, 1979, as there being no agreement of tenancy in writing between the parties could be. paid within sixty days after it became due. Reading the provisions of section 10 and 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 together Mr. Pirzada argued that the rent for the month of January 1979 under section 10 was payable not later than 10th of the succeeding month and since there was no agreement of tenancy it could be paid within sixty days thereafter, that is the rent could be paid on or before 10th April, 1979. Mr. Pirzada, except for making this oral submission, produced no case-law on the point.
In my view the contention raised by Mr. Pirzada is fallacious and misconceived. Both the sections 10 and 15 of the Ordinance of 1979 are to be read separately. The provisions of section 10 provide for a grace period of 10 days. The result of this statutory grace period would be that in the absence of any date fixed for payment of rent by mutual agreement between the landlord and tenant, the law will operate as to the time for payment of rent which is to be paid on or before 10th of the month next following the month for which it is due. Section 15 speaks of a different situation where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. It provides that if the tenant has failed to pay the rent in respect of the premises in his occupation within fifteen days after the expiry of the period fixed by mutual agreement between the tenant and landlord for payment of the rent or in the absence of such agreement, within sixty days after the rent has become due for payment. In the instant case there being no agreement between the parties fixing the date for payment, sixty days period will be reckoned to be the period entitling the respondent to seek ejectment of the appellant on the ground of default which in the Rent Case No.1880/1979 corresponding to F.R.A. No.239/1982 expired on 1st of March, 1979 and in the other Rent Case No.1879/1979 corresponding to F.R.A. No.240/1982 expired on 1st of April, 1979.
6. Mr. Pirzada, learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the rent was being collected by the respondent himself who used to come in the premises in question to collect the same. Having seen that the respondent did not come to collect the rent, the appellants gave a ring at his office at Habib Bank Ltd. where he is serving, whereupon the respondent stated that he could not come to collect the rent as he was ill. It was futher submitted by Mr. Pirzada that on the 1st of April, 1979 both the appellants accompanied by the mother of appellant Muhammad Naqi Khan reached the house of the respondent to pay the rent but it was not accepted by the respondent's wife as the respondent was not present in the house. Lastly Mr. Pirzada submitted that there was a practice on the part of the respondent to come and collect the rent in lump sum for two to three months. He has relied on a number of receipts filed by the appellants in the lower Court.
7. 1 find that all these submissions raised by Mr. Pirzada are untenable in law and on fact both. It is the debtor who is to seek the creditor. The appellants were in the full know of the fact that the respondent was working in the Habib Bank Limited and in fact they gave a ring to him in the month of March 1979 as alleged. So the respondent was contactable and the rent could be paid to him.
Reliance is placed on a case Syed Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Aisha 1984 CLC 2332. The allegation that both the appellants went to the house of the respondent in April, 1979 to tender the rent seems to be untrue. Assuming, however, the same is true, it was open to the appellants to send the rent due by money order or deposit the arrears of rent in the Court of Rent Controller. It is evidence from the record that the rent due was sent by the appellants by money orders on 2-5-1979 and the same having been refused by the respondent, an application to deposit the arrears of rent was made to the Rent Controller on 30-5-1979.
8. The last contention that there was a practice of 'collecting the rent in lump sum is also without force, for two reasons: firstly, that the appellants have not produced all the receipts to prove that there was a constant practice. The receipt for the months of April, May, October, November and December, 1977 and January, February and April to December, 1978 having not been produced by the appellants, an adverse presumption may be drawn against them that the said receipts showed the monthly payment of rent made by the appellants to the respondent and secondly, the production of receipts showing that the rent was paid by the appellants and received by the respondent in lump sum for two to three months, at casual intervals, will not establish a practice. In any case, it will not override the statutory obligation as held finally by the Honourable Supreme Court. If some authority is needed for the same, reference may be had to various cases Syed Riaz Ali v. Shabir Ahmed Khan 1971 SCMR 598, Shaikh Muhammad Hasan & Co. v. Mian Mahmood Ahmed Khan 1975 SCMR 355, Abdul Rashid v. Saleh Muhammad 1980 SCMR 506, Tar Muhammad Janoo and another v. Tahir Ali and others 1981 SCMR 93, Muhammad Hamiduddin v.
Feroze Ahmed and others 1982 SCMR 422. Mrs. Alima Ahmed v. Amir Ali PLD 1984 SC 32 and Mahboob Ali v. Abdul Manan and 2 others 1984 CLC 1201.
9. As regards the second ground for ejectment, Mr.M.M. Pirzada, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that there is no evidence on the medical ground of the alleged wife of the respondent suffering from heart ailment and blood pressure. Mr. Burhani, learned counsel for the respondent concedes that there is no evidence except the word of the respondent himself. He, however, for the proof of personal bona fide need relied on the fact that the respondent is living in the rented premises and paying Rs.600 as monthly rent. He further submitted that the rented premises in occupation of the respondent is very small consisting of three rooms only whereas he has a large family consisting of the respondent himself, wife, mother, two children and one servant.
He admitted that three rooms on the upper floor are lying vacant since September 1981 but the same being insufficient to meet the need of the respondent and his family, he did neither occupy them nor let it out as he needed the entire premises. It was admitted by both the counsel for the parties that the accommodation in occupation of both the appellants consists of three rooms only, two rooms in the occupation of Mr. Muhammad Naqi Khan and one room in occupation of Mrs. Anthony. It is urged by Mr. Burhani that if the accommodation of three rooms on the ground floor becomes available to the respondent, he will occupy the entire house as it will then be sufficient for his needs.
10. Mr. Pirzada, however, submitted that the mere fact that the respondent is occupying a rented premises will not give cause to him to obtain eviction from the premises in occupation of the appellants. He placed his reliance on a case Mst.Hajra Bai Sulaiman v. Mst.Aisha Bai 1982 CLC 1444, a decision of a learned Single Judge of this court. It is true that mere desire of the landlord to shift from a rented premises in his occupation to his own house may not by itself justify requirement of personal need to be bona fide. A landlord has to prove and establish by evidence something more, to fulfil the requirement of law as to the bona fide personal need of the landlord. In the instant case the landlord has sufficiently made out his case as to the bona fide requirement inasmuch as he has stated in his evidence that the rented premises is small and insufficient to his need, and that it will be economical and convenient to him if he shifts to his own premises. The evidence adduced by the respondent has gone unchallenged. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed his reliance on several decisions of learned Single Judges of this Court reported as Rajab Ali v. Darius B.
Kandawalla and another PLD 1984 Kar. 14, Muhammad Ilyas v. Qamaruddin 1984 CLC 757 and Suleman Ghazi v. Ghulam Hyder and another 1984 CLC 2213. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are on all fours applicable to the present case.
11. For the reasons discussed above, I see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Rent Controller. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.