' The appellant/tenant has filed appeal under section 21 (1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 against the order, dated 19th November, 1981 of the Rent Controller, Karachi in Rent Case No, 261 of 1980 directing his ejectment from the demised premises and further directing that he should hand over vacant possession of the premises within two months of the order.
' The facts briefly stated are as under :-
1. The respondents who are owners and landlords of premises bearing No, 61, Kathiawar Co- operative Society, Block Nos. 7 and 8, Karachi had rented out aforesaid bungalow to appellant on a monthly rent of Rs, 4,000 on 10th January, 1980. They filed an application under section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) for ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he had defaulted in payment of rent since 1st May, 1979 and that a sum of Rs, 12,000 was due from him as arrears of rent and, therefore, Rent Case No, 3086 of 1979 had been filed. The appellant had again not paid the arrears of rent and was, therefore, liable to be ejected. It was further ground for ejectment of the appellant, as stated in the application that respondent No, 1 required the premises for his own personal use in good faith as he was a married man and was staying with his father but he wanted to have a separate house.
2. On 18th March, 1980 the appellant filed written statement admitting the tenancy and the rate of rent but stating that the respondent had filed Rent Case No, 3036 of 1979 on the ground of default in payment of rent and the appellant had filed written statement denying the allegation. It was the case of the appellant that the application for ejectment had been filed with mala fide intention and respondent No, 1 did not require the premises bona fide. It was the contention of the appellant that the respondents were sons of Ghulam Muhammad Dossul who was doing business under the firm named Ghulam Muhammad Dossul and Company dealing in arms and ammunitions and various other businesses and the respondents are owners of several buildings and properties. It was the case of the appellant that the premises at present occupied by him contains four flats and he is living therein with his wife and children. He has four married sons occupying the four flats and there are in all 22 members with the family of the appellant and that his servants and driver were living in the servant quarters. On the other hand respondent No, 1 is alone and he does not need such a big bungalow constructed on 1,500 square yards containing 12 bedrooms and other amenities for himself and his wife.
3. The two respondents filed affidavit of evidence and were cross-examined and thereafter their counsel closed their side. On the other hand, appellant Suleman Ghazi filed affidavit of evidence and was cross-examined.
4. The learned Controller gave finding with regard to the issue of bona fide personal requirement in favour of the respondents. The ground of personal requirement by the two respondents of the premises in question was considered by the learned Controller with regard to accommodation needed by them after taking into consideration, their social status. Respondent No, 1 had deposed that he is residing with his father in S. M. G. H. S. And that his father has large family. He had explained that he had married a foreign lady who does not like to live in the same house with other members of the family, he, therefore, was in need of shifting to his own house. He had also stated that respondent No, 2 would also reside with him in the demised premises after the same had been vacated. Respondent No, 2 being a joint owner of the property in question his personal need for accommodation was also a very relevant factor. Respondent No, 1 had stated that respondent No, 2 is of a marriageable age and he had contemplated marriage and the proposed marriage was held up on account of scarcity of the accommodation. The learned Controller has in his impugned order mentioned that respondent No, 1 had denied that he owns other property in the urban area.
He also observed that respondent No, 2 had fully corroborated the statement of his brother, respondent No, 1 and had further stated that he does not went to live in the same house with the joint family of his father who has a large family and present accommodation with them was not sufficient. Respondent No, 2 had also deposed to the effect that his marriage was being held up due to paucity of accommodation.
5. It is apparent from a perusal of the record that the evidence with regard to personal requirement of the premises by the two respondents was not shaken in the cross-examination and although the appellant had deposed that the respondents were bent upon to eject him from the premises with mala fide intention, he had not specified the reasons and it was only the case of the appellant that the respondents are owners of several buildings and properties and that their father was multi- millionaire. The question of personal requirement of the respondents cannot be connected with the properties owned by them and the allegation that the respondents have other properties in the urban area had been refuted and denied by respondent No, 1.
6. As observed by the learned Controller, questions were put in cross-examination by the counsel for the appellant to suggest that the appellant was being ejected in order to re-let the disputed premises on higher rent. This allegation was denied by respondent No, 1.
7. In Peerzada Rafiq Ahmad v. Ch. Abdul Rehman (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, it was inter alia observed that a demand of higher rent by itself does not cast any doubts about personal bona fide requirements if the factum of bona fide requirements is independently proved.
8. In Sh. Muhammad Riaz v. Mst. Nasim Akhtar and others (2) a decision of the Supreme Court it was inter alia observed as under :- "Mere ownership of property in the same urban area is by itself not a ground to refuse the application of the landlord for eviction of his tenant on the ground of personal requirement."
The personal requirement of the two respondents have been stated in their affidavit of evidence and have stood the test on cross-examination. No mistake appearing in the finding of the learned Controller nor any misreading of the evidence by him has been pointed out and, therefore, there is no reason for this Court to come to a different finding. Stress has been placed on the number of bedrooms and other rooms in the premises ,C with a view to show that the two respondents could not require so much
(1) 1980 SCMR7 (2) (2) 1981 SCMR 979 (1) ' accommodation. The standard of living and requirement of accommodation of different persons is totally different and since it is admitted position that the respondents belong to a rich family of traders and are themselves well off, it is not for the tenant to say what should be their requirement and the only point to be considered for the purposes of this appeal is whether there is bona fide requirement on their part for that particular premises. As already stated that they have both come forward to make their requirement known and had given reasons for the same, which were found to be proper by the learned Controller who, therefore, gave the finding in their favour.
9. In Adarnali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (1) a decision of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan Karachi Bench, the words "for his own occupation" occurring in section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance were interpreted as under :- "-the words 'for his own occupation' which occur in the paragraph (a) should be taken to include all genuine requirements of the landlord and not to be restricted to the requirement of a shelter for his own body and the bodies of his children. This is indicated by the words 'suitable for his needs' which occur in paragraph (b). The needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments. His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for a kitchen and his need for physical comfort may be projected in a form of a need for servants ; nor can 'his needs' be restricted to physical needs in contradistinction to social, economic intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library.
The needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case may not be so in another case ; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions, firstly, because his needs reflect the ideas of the society and secondly, because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them."
The observations quoted above apply fully to the case in hand the appellant cannot be heard to prescribe accommodation which according to him is suitable for the landlord. It is proud privilege of the landlord to select the accommodation for himself as permitted under the law.
' In Khalil Ahmad Siddiqui v. B. F. Cabral (2) a decision of the Supreme Court, where the house was required by the landlord for his own occupation and the tenant contended that the house was divisible into two units and, therefore, he need not be evicted from entire premises, it was observed that the contention was irrelevant, for the Rent Restriction Ordinance does not warrant division of a residential house for being shared by both the landlord and the tenant.
11. With regard to the contention that the two respondents have already accommodation in the house of their father. It may here be
(1) PLD 1965 (W. P.) Kar. 408 (2) 1970 SCMR 539 ' observed that eviction of tenant can be refused only when the landlord is found in possession of building suitable for his needs in the same, urban area as of demised property but the provisions of section 13(3)(a)(i cannot be extended to cover a building occupied by landlord but not owned by him. It was so held in Muhammad Naseem v. Azmat Khan (1)-a decision of the Supreme Court. In the instant case the building in which two respondents reside belongs to their, father and as they have indicated in their evidence they do not consider the accommodation to be sufficient for their needs specially as the foreign lady who is wife of respondent No, 1 desires to live separately. The two respondents who are the joint owners and landlords of the demised premises have stated that they require the premises for their own needs.
12. In Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 in section 13(4) where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building for his personal bona fide use does not himself occupy it within one month of the date of obtaining possession, or having been occupied the premises re-lets the same within two months of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the tenant who has been evicted is permitted to apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored of possession of such building or rented land and the Controller shall make such an order.
Similar safeguard has been retained in the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which has repealed the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and section 15-A provides penalty for use of other than personal use. The aforesaid section reads as under :-- "15-A. Where the landlord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14, or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession, he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building or the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained."
13. The afore quoted provisions are enough safeguard to a tenant against a landlord who really does not require the premises for his own personal use.
' Under the circumstances for the reasons given above I do not find any weight in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed however, with no order as to costs. 'The appellant is hereby directed to give vacant possession of the premises to the respondents within one month from the date of this order.