M.S.H. QURAISHI, J.-- This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a case of ejectment under the Rent Restriction Law. The ejectment of the petitioner had been sought on the grounds of (1) default in payment of rent for the period from May 1978 to May 1979 and (2) personal need. Both the grounds having been accepted, his ejectment was ordered by the Controller but on appeal the findings were reversed and the ejectment petition dismissed. The appellate order was, however, interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction and the order of ejectment was restored.
2. The contention is that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction could not interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the appellate forum. For this, reliance was placed on Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail PLD 1981 SC 246. But the contention could prevail if, as observed in this cited case, the appellate forum had not flouted the provisions of the statute or failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts. No tender of rent in the for the alleged period of default had been made on the excuse that the landlord had refused to issue receipts. On this, the view- taken by the appellate authority was that no receipt having ever been issued, the question of paying rent did not arise and that as such there was no question of any default on the part of the petitioner. On the question of personal need, the appellate authority held that the landlady being all alone was not in a position to live at Rawalpindi and that her story of strained relations with her daughter-in-law was coined only to provide some substance to her plea. Obviously the view taken was not only contrary to the established principles of law but also to the evidence on record. The High Court was, therefore, in its writ jurisdiction competent and justified to have interfered with the appellate order. No case is made out for grant of leave to appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner then sought some the to vacate the premises. There being no objection on behalf of the respondent, we, while dismissing the petition, allow to months the to the petitioner, on the expiry of which he shall voluntarily surrender possession to the respondent.