' SALMAN HAMID, J.---Rent Case No.943 of 2009, (Rent Case) was chosen by Mrs. Shehnaz Babar, Zaheeruddin Saam Babar and Mrs. Saamia Minhas (respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5) against Captain PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited, (Petitioner) for eviction from the first floor of the main building and its annexe on Plot No. 18/2, Survey Sheet CL-A, Civil Lines, Karachi, (Demised Bungalow) on the foundation of personal bona fide need of respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 and also on the position of default in payment of rent thereof. Rent Case was determined by the VIII-Rent Controller., Karachi, South, (Rent Controller) in terms of Order dated 4-9-2010, (Order) in favour of the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 on the ground of personal bona fide need only whereas the ground of default went against such respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5. The respondents No.3, 4 and 5 did not work up the ground of default further and it reached finality. Conversely, the Petitioner laid into the Order by filing First Rent Appeal No.360 of 2010 (FRA), which was allowed to go by the VI- Additional District Judge Karachi, South, (VI-ADI) in terms of Judgment dated 22-1-2011, (Impugned Judgment), preserving the Order of Rent Controller.
2. By way of this measure in shape of Constitutional Petition, (Petition) contemporaneous result on personal bona fide need has been confronted by the Petitioner on the basis that the Demised Bungalow on Respondents No.3, 4 and 5's own showing comprised of a main building and an annexe and rent agreements in respect thereof had been executed separately and independently in different epoch, decade apart and therefore two independent proceedings ought to have had been filed, which admittedly were not preferred and that two causes of actions had been joined together by respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 in the Rent Case, which, according to the petitioner's counsel were not permissible and that despite raising such legal protestation, it was not appreciated by the two courts below though it touched the very root of the case. Therefore the decisions handed down by the two courts below are not sustainable. Next it was contended that it was not mentioned in the Rent Case as to which part (main building or the annexe) was required by respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 for their personal bona fide use, more particularly when respondents Nos.3 and 4 were already residing on the ground floor of the main building. It was also urged that to prove personal bona fide need, respondents Nos.3 and 4 did not step into the witness box and such inaction goes against them. It was also urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that according to respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5's own showing the Demised Bungalow was not suitable for residential accommodation and that proceedings for enhancement of rent had been initiated and also that the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 agreed to sell the Demised Bungalow to the petitioner therefore the ground of personal need raised in the Rent Case was not bona fide.
3. It was implored that though the two courts below recorded the above contentions of the petitioner in the Order and the Impugned Judgment, failed to give any findings and therefore the case be remanded back for a decision on such points inasmuch as that the petitioner would not like to loose the right of appeal after findings on such points before the appellate forum if such, upon giving reasons non-suit the petitioner. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the cases of Noor Ali v. Salim (1996 MLD (Karachi) 71), Hafiz Ferozuddin and 2 others v. Arshad Begum and others (2010 CLC 365 (Karachi), Haji Abdullah Jan v. Anwar Khan (PLD 2000 SC 787) and Arshad Butt v. Manzoor Ahmed (1992 CLC 723 Karachi) to contend that eviction cannot be ordered when only one landlord has led evidence. Learned counsel also relied upon Muhammad Yousuf through special attorney v. Mst. Anwar Begum and 7 others (2010 MLD 147 Lahore). Adamjee Jute Mills v. Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC Pak 272), Mollah Ejahar Ali . Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173), Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others v. Chairman Inspection Team Chief Executive Secretariat Muzaffarabad and others (1989 CLC 870 SC AJ&K), AH Alvi v. Muhammad Tariq (PLD 2001 Karachi 389) and Mirza Shamsul Arlin v.
Mst. Abida Khatoon (1989 CLC 1926 Karachi) asserting on the ground that findings on all issues/objections must have been given. Learned counsel also relied upon cases of K.C.A Mamoo v.
Mrs. Badrunnisa (1985 CLC 332) (Karachi) and Chaudhary Tufail Muhammad v. Syed Burhanuddin (1989 MLD 3559) (Karachi) to support the argument of lack of thorough scrutiny of evidence. Cases of Muridke Refine Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Secretary Revenue Division Islamabad (2009 PTD 910) and Haji Muhammad Iqbal and 7 others v. Collector of Customs (Appraisement) Dry Port Mughalpura Lahore and another (2005 PTD 1189) were also relied upon, urging that principle of natural justice apply in cases where no findings have been given in the impugned judgment. Learned counsel also relied upon the cases of Messrs A.C.E. Enterprises v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (1987 SCMR 1174) and Lal Din Masih v. Mst. Sakina Jan (1985 SCMR 1972) to show the scope of the High Courts interference in exercising of constitutional jurisdiction; Messrs Imperial Builders v.
Lines (Pvt.) Limited (PLD 2006 Karachi 593) on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action also cited. Arshad Butt v. Manzoor Ahmad (1992 CLC 723, (Karachi) and Ghulam Muhammad v. Zahir Ahmad Khan (1986 CLC 681) (Karachi) was relied upon to show that personal need has to be established and not merely asserted.
4. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 urged that such respondents have proved their personal bona fide need through evidence for which purpose respondents No.5 who is one of the owners of the Demised Bungalow entered the witness box and established such bona fide need only whereafter eviction was ordered on such ground and therefore interference of this court in the decisions of the two courts below is not required. It was next contended by the learned counsel that though in the Rent Application it was mentioned that the Demised Bungalow is comprised of two portions, by no stretch it is as such and it is one and the same inasmuch as that there is a main building and is annexed with it is an annexe and such constitute Demised Bungalow and is being used as one unit and/or would be used as one unit by the respondents Nos.3, 4.And 5 inasmuch as respondents Nos.3 and 4 shall continue to reside in main building, ground and first floor (Demised Bungalow) and the respondent No.5 shall reside with her three children in the annexe (Demised Bungalow) and presently she is living with her ailing mother (Respondent No.3) and ailing brother (Respondent No.4) and is looking after both of them after returning back from Saudi Arabia. As to the argument that personal need was not there inasmuch as the Demised Bungalow was agreed to be sold by the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 to the petitioner, it was contended that it was clearly mentioned in the Rent Case that because of changed circumstances (ailment of respondents Nos.3 and 4), the respondent No.5 had to come back to Karachi, Pakistan so that ailing respondents Nos.3 and 4 may be attended and therefore because of such changed circumstances, the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 gave up the idea of selling the Demised Bungalow and decided that all the three respondents shall reside in the Demised Bungalow and that the respondent No.5 shall look after the ailing respondents Nos.3 and 4 for which purpose she has come back to Pakistan with her children permanently. As to the argument that two causes of action had been joined in one Rent Case inasmuch as that Demised Bungalow comprised of two independent parts (main building and annexe for which two independent rent agreements at two different points of time had been executed-only one Rent Case was filed), provision of Order II Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code were relied upon. It was argued that it is permissible under law that plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant (admittedly the cause of action was personal bona fide need of respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 and default and admittedly the defendant was also one i.e. The petitioner and therefore there was no impediment in law which prevented the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 in filing the Rent Case. Combating the argument that though the ground taken by the petitioner had been mentioned in the Order and the Impugned Judgment but no reasons given, it was argued that in terms of subsection 5 of Section 19 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO 1979), the Rent Controller framed issues on the ground of default and personal bona fide need and decided the same and since the law permits joining of several causes of action in a single case, there was no occasion for the Rent Controller or the VI-ADJ to have specifically framed issue on the ground of filing of a Rent Case on several causes of action and/or more than one cause of action as it was not required. As to the argument that the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 did not come in the witness box to prove their personal bona fide need, it was mentioned that respondent No.5 being one of the landlords of the Demised. Bungalow along with respondents No.3 and 4 came forward and gave evidence, which was enough to prove the bona fide need and the same was established and therefore there was no violation of law as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner. Having argued as much, it was lastly contended that since no misreading or non- reading or even otherwise error of jurisdiction having been pointed out and/or available in the two decisions of the courts below, the petition merits dismissal inasmuch as this court while exercising constitutional jurisdiction would not ordinarily interfere into the findings of the courts below based upon the evidence which was neither misread nor .Non-read.
5. I have considered the arguments of learned counsel and have perused the record. It is evident from the record of the file and an admitted position that respondent No.5 is one of the owners of the Demised Bungalow and she having asserted her bona fide need by entering into the witness box and proving it by explicitly deposing that the accommodation which is presently in their possession is not enough A and that the respondent No.5 is literally living in a living room with her three daughters and the need was eminent and desperate and that she also has to take care of her ailing mother of advance age and his ailing brother who has bi-polar disorder and for such purpose specially she has returned back from Saudi Arabia permanently and that her children are also studying in Karachi and that she is here for good, was enough evidence to show the bona fide need of the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 which could not be shattered, by the petitioner the two courts below decided in their favour.
6. The authorities those were relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that eviction cannot be ordered when only landlord has led evidence in the facts and circumstances of the case are either not applicable or clearly distinguishable and that in all such cases the premises were commercial and not residential. In the case of Noor Ali this court came to the conclusion that evidence of the two sons of the landlord was required when such landlord concealed the fact that earlier in time case on the ground of default had been filed in which the landlord did not succeed and such fact was concealed and the credibility of the landlord under the circumstances was under clouds and to establish bona fides evidence of the two sons of the landlord was required. However, in the present case, such is not the situation. Nothing Was concealed by the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5; in fact it was clearly mentioned that initially they wanted to sell the Demised Bungalow but because of changed circumstances such was not possible which only shows their bona fides and clear inters and nothing else. In the case of Hafiz Ferozuddin and 2 others a single Judge of this court came to the conclusion that since it was not shown as to which of the landlords would conduct business an whether such business would be joint or individual and such fact was not brought forward by way of evidence, the landlords there had been non-suited. Such is not the case in hand. Firstly, the Demised Bungalow is not a commercial property where respondents. Nos.3, 4 and 5 were to start some business jointly and or independently and secondly the respondents No.5 came forward and specifically asserted that she has come back to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia to look after her ailing mother and brother and therefore she has to live with them for which purpose the Demised Bungalow is required and that it was specifically shown and established through evidence that the need was bona fide. In the case of Haji Abdullah Jan the property that was involved was not shown as to whether it was partitioned or not and who was the owner of which portion; whereas in the present case it has come on record that respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 are the co-owners of the Demised Bungalow and that respondents No.5 came forward in the witness box asserting and proving bona fide need thereof and that respondents Nos.3 and 4 are in occupation of only ground floor of the main building of the Demised Bungalow. In the case of Arshad Butt the landlord whose personal need was asserted did not enter in the witness box altogether to establish such need. However, in the present case respondent No. 5 came forward being one of the owners of the Demised Bungalow and proved her bona fide need for it.
7. Coming to other argument of learned counsel for the, petitioner that findings on all issues ought to have been given by the two courts below which according to him such Courts had failed to give is not correct inasmuch as that in terms of subsection (5) of section 19 of SRPO 1979 substantial issues which were before such court had been framed and findings on such issues are available and since the issue of joining of causes of action was' not a material issue, which was raised by the petitioner, question of deciding the same never arose inasmuch as it was permissible under the law that several causes of action could be joined and/or brought in a single suit which in the present case by way of Rent Case was brought in before the Rent Controller. Therefore, the cases of Muhammad Yousuf and that of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited so also the case of Mollah Ejahar Ali, Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others and AH Alvi and Mirza Shamsul Arfin are not applicable as in the case of Muhammad Yousuf through Special Attorney, the question involved was that of relationship of landlord and tenant and though the documents of title had been referred, the same were not discussed, which had gone to the root of the matter; whereas in the present case it was only mentioned by Rent Controller and VI-ADJ that the issue of joint causes of action has been raised and the same was not discussed as it did not go to the root of the matter and only controversy which goes to the root of the matter, under law needs to be discussed. In the case of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited, the apex court observed that where there has been no prior adjudication of a matter and substantial question of law is raised by an applicant invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, it is, in such a situation, undoubtedly duty of the High Court to state what the precise point raised by the applicant and the ground on which it was rejected. Suffice to observe that the decisions of the two courts below would show that the ground of personal bona fide need was sufficiently established by the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 and such having been established, eviction was ordered which was the main point of controversy and the other point regarding joint causes of action did not go to the root of the matter as it was permissible under the law to bring a case on more than one cause of action and therefore it was were not deemed appropriate to be discussed by the courts below, though mentioned as such did not change the complexion of the case. Under the circumstances, the case of Adamjee Jute Mills is not applicable.
Similar in the position with the case of Mollah Ejahar Ali where the apex court came to the conclusion that the High Court though perfunctory gave the impression of a hasty off hand decision and therefore the appeal was decided in favour of the appellant therein keeping in view that the order was without logic and reasoning which have always been the traditional pillar of judicial pronouncement whereas in the present case it is again and again observed that the issues were framed in terms of the provisions of subsection (5) of section 19 of SRPO 1979 and a reasoned Order had been passed and if there was no finding on the issue of joint causes of action, the same was not of much significance inasmuch as that same did not change the dynamics of the Rent Case as under law it was permissible and/or the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 were allowed to bring different causes of actions in a single case against the same defendant which admittedly in the present case was only the petitioner. In the case of Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others and of Mirza Sohail Arfin, it was observed that since the High Court,' and the Supreme Court are the courts of record, and both the courts, for that matter every court expected to decide every important issue involved in the case, which it seems in those cases had not been decided, appropriate favourable orders had been passed. In the present case it is not the situation as, "important issue involved in a case" had been decided by the two courts below and question of joining of two causes of action was not important as the law permits such joining of causes of action in a suit. As to the case-law cited on the point of lack of thorough scrutiny of evidence i.e. K.C.A Mamoo (1985 CLC 332) and Chaudhary Tufail Muhammad (1989 MLD 3559), it may again be observed that in such case prima facie the Rent Controller and the leaned Additional District Judge did not took into the evidence thoroughly and therefore, in such cases, the courts came to the conclusion that the orders passed by two courts below were not sustainable. In the present case however such is not the situation. Entire evidence was discussed in a befitting manner and it was thoroughly scrutinised by the two courts below. The case of Muridke Refine Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. That was referred in support of argument on tie principle of natural justice the same would apply in cases where no finding is given in the impugned judgment. It amply came on record that findings on the relevant issues by the Rent Controller and the VI-ADJ have been given.
8. Under the circumstances and for what has been discussed above, this court would not interfere while exercising. Constitutional jurisdiction into the findings of the two courts below as the same have been found to be correct and based on the evidence and therefore the case of Messrs A.C.E.
Enterprises (1987 SCMR 1174) and of Lai Din Masih (1985 SCMR 1972) relied upon for interference of the court are inapplicable inasmuch as in such cases the courts below failed to follow the enunciation of law made by the superior courts.
9. The case of Messrs Imperial Builders (PLD 2006 Karachi 593) that was relied upon on misjoinder of causes of action of two different tenancies and that the same cannot be joined together in one suit, in my opinion, goes in favour of the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 rather than in favour of the petitioner inasmuch as in such reported case a single Judge of this court had observed that Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. Does not bar filing of a suit on joinder of two causes of action...From the pleadings in the plaint, it is apparent that the plaintiffs have filed this suit for specific performance of two independent agreements in respect of separate properties....For invoking this rule it is necessary that the plaintiffs are jointly entrusted in the causes of action and the right of relief claimed by two plaintiffs C must be in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction and they are not independently liable to defendant(s) as there must be some common link. In the case in hand, the respondents, the property and the tenant are the same and the benefit of Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. Was fully available to respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 which was availed of by such respondents. The cases of Arshad Butt (1992 CLC 723) and Ghulam Muhammad (1986 CLC 681) that was relied upon to contend that personal bona fide need has to be established and mere assertion was not enough, suffice to observe that respondent No.5 succeeded in proving the bona fide need through evidence which remained unshattered and therefore it was not just an assertion but actual bona fide need was established. However, in the above two cases relied upon by the learned counsel, the landlord therein failed to establish such bona fide need and therefore such were decided against the landlords therein.
10. In view of above discussion, and looking at the various documents, it has amply come on record that respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 are the joint owners of the Demised Bungalow and that due to changed circumstances the negotiations those were going on between the petitioner and the respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 regarding selling of Demised Bungalow could not be materialized and that the respondent No.5 had to come back to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia with her three daughters to take care of her ailing mother and brother and for which purpose she require the Demised Bungalow for her abode which was amply proved by her and it was mentioned that presently she is living with her three daughters in a living room on the ground floor of the Demised Bungalow and that it is well-settled by now that it is not the tenant who is to decide as to how and in what manner and in which part of the building and/or which building the landlord should choose to reside and it is the discretion of the landlord to decide as to which part is required and more suitable.
11. Under the circumstances, the petition is found to be meritless and is therefore dismissed in limini.
The petitioner is directed to hand over possession of Demised Bungalow to respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5 within 30 days from the date of this pronouncement, failing which writ of ejectment would be issued by the Rent Controller/executing court after thirty days' period expiration without notice.
Petition disposed of accordingly.