' ABDUL MAJEED MALLICK, C. J.--The petitioner has challenged the order of the Chief Election Commissioner, passed on 24th April, 1985, whereby his nomination papers filed for the election of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly for Constituency L. A.-2, Mirpur-2, were rejected, as without lawful authority.
2. The leading facts relevant to the controversy are that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir People's Party has not been registered so far as contemplated by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Political Parties Ordinance. The Party leadership though disputed. The petitioner belonged to Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan's group and, at a time, was nominated Vice-President of the Party.
According to the petitioner, he resigned from the office of the Vice-President ship as well as primary membership of the Party and his resignation was acknowledged by the Party Head through a letter addressed to him, with effect from 30th January, 1985. The counter version is that the petitioner never dissociated from the Party and continues to hold the office of Vice-President ship upto day. The schedule of election to the Assembly was announced on 6th April, 1985. The nomination papers were to be filed on 13th, 14th and 15th of April, 1985. The petitioner filed his nomination papers on 14th and scrutiny took place on 16th. At the time of scrutiny, Ch. Muhammad Anwar, a rival candidate, objected to the nomination of the petitioner, ascribing him to be an office-bearer of an unregistered political party. In support of the objection, different press reports were adduced before the Returning Officer. The petitioner repudiated the allegation and asserted that he had resigned from the office and primary membership of the Party in January, 1985 and his resignation had been accepted by the Party Head with effect from 30th January, 1985. In support of his claim, he readily produced the original letter of the Party Head containing the recital of acceptance of the resignation. The Returning Officer overruled the objection and accepted the nomination papers of the petitioner. The matter was taken in appeal to the Chief Election Commissioner, where, in addition to the Press reports tendered by the objector and the letter's produced by the petitioner, two affidavits, one of the petitioner and the other of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, were also produced. The learned Chief Election Commissioner, however, was impressed by the press reports and treating them as an evidence of probative value, rejected the nomination paper, of the petitioner. The learned Chief Election Commissioner elaborated his finding in the light of the dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Abdul Wall Khan's case (1).
3. The petitioner also challenged the vires of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Political Parties Ordinance as well as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Elections (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1985. Mr. S, M. Zafar, the learned counsel for the petitioner abandoned objections to the vires of the provisions of these Ordinances and reduced the controversy to the legal status of the impugned order.
4. It is pertinent to review the disqualifications of Members of the Legislative Assembly. These disqualifications are postulated under section 24(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, under section 10 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Political Parties Ordinance, under section 5 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
(1) PLD 1976 SC 57 ' Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1970 and under section 3 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985. It is accepted by the respondents that the disqualifications attracted in the case of the petitioner are contained in section 3(e) (vi) and (vii) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Elections (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985. These disqualifications are reproduced below :- "A person shall be disqualified for being elected or chosen and for being, a member,-
(e) if-
(vi) be is an office-bearer of a political party which is not eligible under the Political Parties Ordinance. 1979 to participate in an election to a seat in the Legislative Assembly or to nominate or put up a candidate at any such election ;
(vii) he is office-bearer of a political party which has not been registered, or the registration of which has been cancelled, under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Political Parties Ordinance, 1979 ;"
5. The disqualification listed in clause (vii) is relevant to the present case as the accepted proposition of fact is that the political party to which the petitioner belonged in the past, was unregistered. It is undisputed that the provisions of the disqualification are prospective. This suggests that the disqualification is enforceable only if the petitioner is presently found to be an office-bearer of an unregistered political party. As to whether the petitioner is an office-bearer or not, is purely a question of fact and this question of fact is to be determined in the light of the evidence adduced before the learned Chief Election Commissioner and this Court. But before undertaking an exercise on that aspect of the case, it is equally relevant to mention here that the aforesaid disqualifications were enforced with effect from 20th April, 1985, that is to say, six days after the filing of the nomination papers and four days after their scrutiny. Despite,/ the fact that the language of the Ordinance is clear and suggests that the Ordinance was enforced on 20th April, 1985 for our satisfaction, we asked the learned Advocate-General to enquire from the Law Department as to when the first Ordinance containing the disqualifications in question was enforced and we were appraised by the learned Advocate-General that the disqualification in question was enforced for the first time on 20th April, 1985 and not before. Be as it may, the fact remains that at the time of passing of the impugned order, the disqualification was in operation but the date of enforcement of the disqualification shall be relevant for the purpose of determination of legal value of the impugned order.
6. Mr. Manzoor Elahi Qureshi, the learned counsel for respondent No, 2, contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the impugned order as the same was out of the ambit of the provisions of Article 44 of the Interim Constitution Act. It was emphasised that the Chief Election Commissioner was vested with jurisdiction to decide the matter one way or the other, therefore, it was within his competence to decide rightly or wrongly. The contention was sought to be supported by reference to authorities of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and this Court, PLD 1974 SC 193, PLD 1982 SC Azad J& K 107 and PLD 1984 Azad J& K 15. The authorities cited by the learned counsel are not helpful to his case, rather these authorities support the counter claim.
7. The contention was controverted by Mr. S. M. Zafar. It was contended that consensus is that an order passed by a special tribunal, suffering from an error of fact or law, is subject to scrutiny in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He cited various authorities from Pakistan jurisdiction and Indian jurisdiction in support of his contention.
8. Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and. Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 confers jurisdiction on this Court, among others, under subsection 2(a)(ii), to declare that any act done or proceedings taken by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect. The condition precedent is that the Court must be satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law to the aggrieved party seeking indulgence of the Court. In the present case it is undeniable that the petitioner, whose nomination papers have been rejected in appeal, has no other adequate remedy to seek his redress.
9. The jurisdiction of the Court is attracted only if it is satisfied that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority. The words "without lawful authority" ordinarily signify an act in excess of lawful authority or in derogation, contravention or departure from an accepted norm of law. The words "lawful authority" connote that the subordinate tribunal was constituted under law and that its actions and functious strictly confined within the four walls of the law relevant to the proposition under consideration. In case of any deviation, slip, derogation or departure from law exposed the action of the tribunal to indulgence of this Court. In other words, a legally constituted tribunal is supposed to run on law rails and the moment it is derailed, it is enjoined upon this Court to put it on the rails of law. This is so, as the paramount jurisdiction conferred on this Court, strictly speaking, is to ensure that subordinate tribunals act in lawful manner. The supervisory duty entrusted to the High Court gains more importance in the present day functioning of the Government, particularly when the statutory rights of the citizens are controlled, restricted and abridged by every day's suitable legislation. Mr. M. Munir, in his famous treatise "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", at page 413 (Second Edition, 1976) emphasised that a proceeding can be quashed and an act declared void, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, if it is in excess of lawful authority of the person taking or doing it. The question what is lawful authority of a person and whether the act questioned was beyond such authority will depend upon the terms of the statute under which he purported to act."
10. Mr. V. D. Mahajan, in his commentary on the Constitution of India, at page 89, describes "that "even when a tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, certiorari lies where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, where the tribunal has acted contrary to the principles of natural justice, where the determination is arrived at mala fide, or where the order of the inferior tribunal has been obtained by fraud, collusion or corruption". It is undeniable that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court is wider in scope as compared to the jurisdiction of writ of certiorari. The aforesaid principle is equally enforceable in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on this Court under the provisions of the Interim Constitution Act.
' The objection raised by Mr. Manzoor Elahi is, therefore, to be settled within the frame-work of the aforesaid principle and before reaching a conclusion, it is relevant first to examine the objections raised by Mr. S. M. Zafar, whereby the impugned order has been assailed as without lawful authority.
11. The first objection of Mr. S. M. Zafar is that an error was committed by the learned Chief Election Commissioner by admitting the the press reports in evidence. It was contended that the press reports being hear-say evidence, were inadmissible in evidence. The learned Chief Election Commissioner by ignoring the legal limitations in this behalf, acted without lawful authority. It is well accepted that the press reports are anonymous. Unless the author or the originator of the reports proves such reports in evidence, they are not admissible in evidence and carry no weight of evidence in the eye of law. The consensus is that press reports being hear-say, are inadmissible in evidence. In Bawa Sarup Singh's case (1), the learned Judges disallowed the admission of newspapers as secondary evidence on the ground that newspapers could not be admitted in evidence unless someone appeared to produce them formally in order to prove them to be what they were alleged to be and, secondly, that mere production of a newspaper was not a proof of the truthfulness of its contents. In that case, the newspaper carried a story of participation of the appellant in the meeting of Akali leaders in a room of Akal Takht, whereas the two eyewitnesses produced by the prosecution denied the presence of the appellant in the meeting. In presence of the testimony of two eye-witnesses, the press reports sought to be admitted in evidence to connect the appellant with the incident, were not allowed to be admitted in evidence.
12. In Messrs Haji M. Zakaria and Company's case (2), the subordinate Court declined to admit a newspaper carrying the story of the relevant facts, in evidence. The finding of the subordinate Court was upheld by the High Court and it was observed that mere production of the newspaper without examining any witness, was not sufficient to prove the contents of the newspaper.
13. In Alim-ud-Din's case (3), the story of the incident of murder was published in local dailies wherein it was described that the incident of murder was not witnessed by any person. Against the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the defence attempted to produce the newspapers in its support but the newspapers were not allowed to be admitted in evidence as hear-say and were ruled out of consideration.
14. It is evident from the observations in the aforesaid authorities that newspapers are inadmissible in evidence unless the author or the originator of the contents appears in the Court or tribunal to prove them. In the present case, the learned Chief Election Commissioner placed his reliance on the press reports. He appears to be impressed particularly from the press report published in Daily tang on 16th April, 1985. Despite the fact that press reports are inadmissible in evidence, respondent No, 1 felt convinced to rely upon them and sought guidance in doing so from the dictum of the Supreme Court recorded in Abdul Wali Khan's case (4). Mr. S. M. Zafar took us through the relevant observations of the Supreme Court recorded at pages 111 and 112 of the report and pointed out that the impugned order was incompatible with the dictum of the Supreme Court. Mr. Rafique Mahmood Khan, Advocate-General, when confronted with the observation of the Supreme Court, frankly conceded that the
(1) AIR 1925 Lah. 299 (2) 1981 CLC 615
(3) PLD 1982 Lab, 141 (4) PLD 1976 SC 57 impugned order was not in accordance with the dictum of the Supreme Court. In Abdul Wali Khan's case, among others, the prosecution produced press reports in support of the allegations ascribed to N. A. P.'s leaders and argued that the press reports were admissible in evidence. Reliance was placed on Dunlop's case of the United State (1). In the light of the aforesaid authority, Mr. Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman, C. J., (as he then was) observed :- "Neverthelss, it cannot be denied that so far as newspaper reports of contemporaneous events are concerned, they may be admissible particularly where they happen to be events of local interest or of such a public nature as would be generally known throughout the community and testimony of an eye-witness is not readily available. The contemporary newspaper account may well be admitted in evidence in such circumstances as has often been done by Courts in the United States of America not because toy are 'business records' or 'ancient documents' but because they may well be treated as a trustworthy contemporaneous account of events or happenings which took place a long time ago or in a foreign country which cannot easily be proved by direct ocular oral testimony.
' The Courts in this country have also accepted newspaper reports in certain circumstances. Thus, in the case of Sher Muhammad v. The Crown PLD 1949 Lah. 511 (Munir, J., as he then was) accepted articles published in a daily newspaper the contents of which were not denied by the Crown. The learned Judge took the view that "where there is no affidavit by the Crown the facts stated in the newspaper, report must be accepted as correct". Thus, if a person does not avail of the opportunity to contradict or question the truthfulness of the statement attributed to him and widely published in newspapers he cannot complain if that publication is used against him. Such an user would not be hit by the rule of hearsay."
It is evident from the observation of the Supreme Court that newspapers may be admissible in evidence in exceptional cases and these exceptions are :
(i) where they happen to be events of local interest or of such public nature as would be generally known throughout the community, and (ii)where the testimony of an eye-witness is not readily available.
' In that case, reliance was also placed on Sher Muhammad's case i2). But the source of authority of Sher Muhammad's case rests on the observation of Mr. Munir, J., in "In re : Nawai Waqt Daily" (3), to the effect that "where there is no affidavit by the Crown, the facts stated in the newspaper report must be accepted as correct". At page 111 of this report, it was described : "The same learned commentator, however, concedes that "newspapers or newspaper articles are not ordinarily admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein."
15. Apart from the distinguishable facts of Abdul Wali Khan's case, the pre-conditions described by the learned Judge in admitting newspapers in evidence, are not shown to have been complied with in the present case.
(1) 165 U. S. 486 41 Led. 799 (2).1) L D 1949 Lah. 511
(3) AIR 1948 Lab. 161 In the present case, the Press reports were published in `Nawa-i-Waqt' and `Jang' dailies printed at Rawalpindi. The learned Chief Election Commissioner held his sessions at Islamabad. In case he was impressed by the newspapers, in order to admit them in evidence, it was imperative for him to send for the news editors or concerned reporters for proving the contents of the reports in evidence. His failure to do so has rendered his action nugatory to the rules of evidence. In other words, reliance on inadmissible evidence tantamounts to record decision on no evidence. As against this, the learned Chief Election Commissioner was in possession of documentary evidence consisting of original letter produced G by the petitioner as an acknowledgment of acceptance of his resignation, an affidavit of the petitioner and an affidavit of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan.
The affidavits completely corroborated the letter as well as the claim of resignation of the petitioner and completely contradicted the objectionable parts of events listed in the press reports.
Thus, the dictum of the Supreme Court enunciated in Abdul Wali Khan's case was not adhered to. It is noticed that respondent No, 1 was conscious of his wrong approach to the proposition and it was in view of this that he mentioned in the impugned order that he was not overlooking the observation of the Supreme Court concerning the non-availability of direct evidence. The relevant part of the impugned order is reproduced : "The crucial question arising in these appeals and on which considerable argument was addressed was, the evidentiary value of these reports, particularly authors of the reports not having appeared nor have they sworn affidavits to vouch for the authenticity of the reports. However, it seems to me the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the N. A. P.'s case. (PLD 1976 SC 57 at pp. 111-112 offers useful guidelines on this question. It was ruled in that case that reports of contemporaneous events in the newspapers are admissible" as evidence particularly when such events are of local interest and are of such public nature which are generally known to the community and "testimony of eye-witnesses is not available". Any person affected by such reports and not availing of the opportunity to contradict or to question the truthfulness cannot later complain of such publication. I am not overlooking the observation concerning the non-availability of direct evidence. But this should be viewed against the backdrop of that case in which evidence of certain events happening near Pakistan Afghan border and inside Afghan territory, were sought to be proved by means of photographs and contemporaneous reports. The present cases in my view stand in different footing for relevant purpose .............
16. Another aspect of the proposition relevant for the discussion is that respondent No, 1 overlooked the importance of the direct evidence of the petitioner in the manner that the affidavits carrying the presumption of oath were given no credence over anonymous press reports carrying no presumption of oath. May be that the petitioner being a party was interested to save his candidature by testifying in support of his claim but it is difficult to believe that Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, who also testified in favour of the petitioner, would have done so to facilitate the contest of the petitioner, particularly when Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and his party is opposed to the elections in the present conditions and actually boycotted the elections and chalked out a programme to ensure success in the boycott. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, who is the founder-President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, apart from a statesman and a politician, is a man of integrity and we have no doubt in our mind that he has not and would not give an affidavit in support of a wrong event. The rejection of affidavits and the letter, by no stretch of imagination can be held a compliance with the rules of evidence. Thus respondent No, 1 fell in error of law by permitting admission in evidence of inadmissible press reports and discarding the primary evidence out of consideration in an arbitrary fashion. The act of the respondent No, 1 is, therefore, without lawful authority.
17. It is well known that political parties in Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir are not governed by strict rules of organization. People associate with political parties verbally by their demonstration in attending public meeting or acceptance of offices. Likewise, dissociation is demonstrated by verbal disagreement with the policies, absence to attend meetings, retirement from politics or by joining rival political party. Verbal or written resignations are also accepted as modes of dissociation. This is just to point out that there is no hard and fast rule to dissociate from a political party. The finding of respondent No, 1 that the letter carried no date of resignation nor it described the resignation in writing, was not a sound approach to the proposition. In our view, resignation could be tendered in writing or verbally and the fact of the matter is that the resignation of the petitioner was accepted and acknowledged through a letter. The impugned order also suggests that the letter was manoeuvred to save the candidature of the petitioner. The suggestion is tantamount to conjecture as the letter was promptly produced before the Returning Officer when the candidature of the petitioner was objected to by the rival candidate. Production of the letter by the petitioner at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers is pointer of the fact that the letter was delivered to him definitely prior to the filing of the nomination papers. On this premises, it is safe to hold that at least on the day of filing of the nomination papers and scrutiny, the petitioner had already resigned from the office of the Party. As mentioned in the earlier part of the order, the disqualification was enforced on 20th April, 1985 while the letter was already placed before the Returning Officer much earlier to the enforcement of the disqualification, therefore the petitioner was no more an office-bearer of an unregistered political party on 20th. Respondent No, 1 is not shown to have applied his mind to this legal aspect of the case. Failure to consider the legal aspect of the proposition under consideration, on the part of respondent No, 1, was an error of law and it rendered the impugned, order without lawful authority.
18. The aforesaid view finds equal support from Rahim Shah's case (1). Rahim Shah was elected as a member of the National Assembly. A complaint was lodged against him for having entered into a contract with the Government of N.-W. F. P. For supplying and spreading shingle on road under construction. The learned Chief Election Commissioner on perusal of the evidence appended with the pleadings of the parties upheld the objection and disqualified Rahim Shah from the membership of the National Assembly. A writ filed in the High Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali, J. Who spoke for the Court, analysed the scope of writ jurisdiction of the High Court and by recording disagreement of the Supreme Court with the finding of the High Court, quashed the order of the Chief Election Commissioner as without lawful authority.
(1) P L D1973 SC 24
19. In Raunaq Ali's case (1), the Supreme Court reiterated its view in the following manner it is also now well-established that where an inferior tribunal or Court has acted wholly without jurisdiction or as Robinstein puts it in his book on "Jurisdiction and illegality" taken any action "beyond the sphere allotted to the tribunal by law and, therefore, outside the area within which the law recognizes a privilege to err", then such action amounts to a "usurpation of power unwarranted by law" and such an act is a nullity ; that is to say, "the result of a purported exercise of authority which has no legal effect whatsoever". In such a case, it is well-established that a superior Court is not bound to give effect to it, particularly when the appeal is to the latter's discretionary jurisdiction.
The Courts would refuse to perpetuate, in such circumstances, something which would be patently unjust or unlawful.
' An order in the nature of a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside has occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked."
20. In Mehr Dad's case (2), it was observed that if the jurisdiction of the person acting or taking proceedings is made by law to depend on the existence of certain facts and those facts are not found by the High Court to exist, or certain facts have been assumed to give himself jurisdiction or an erroneous view of law has been taken to assume or deny jurisdiction, the act or proceedings will be without jurisdiction.
21. In Mojakkir Ali's case (3), it was held that the essential conditions for the exercise of writ jurisdiction are excess or denial of jurisdiction or contravention of the law under which the functionary acts, resulting in some legal injury to the applicant.
22. In Maula Bakhsh's case (4), the learned Judges of Quetta High Court were of the view that the question of fact dealt with by a forum competent to decide, could be challenged before the High Court under writ jurisdiction only on ground of case being a case of no evidence.
23. In Messrs National Tyre and Rubber Company's case (5), it was observed that in all cases where there is a finding of fact which is shown to be, prima fade, contrary to the established facts on record or is based on misreading of facts, it can always be disturbed in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. This is such a settled view, according to the learned Judge, that it hardly needs any authority.
24. In Muhammad Abdullah's case (6), an identical view was expressed by Mr. Justice Khalil-ur- Rehman Khan wherein it was held that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court extended not only to see that inferior
(1) PLD 1973 SC 236 (2) PLD 1974 SC 193
(3) PLD 1967 Dacca 6 (4) 1982 CLC 37
(5) PLD 1977 Kar. 33 (6) 1982 C I. C 1201 tribunals acted within the sphere allotted to them but also to see that they act within jurisdiction and observe law.
25. Franchise is a celebrated right of the citizens. It is always desirable that this right is exercised by the citizens of the State freely, without discrimination, restriction and hindrance. Restrictions enforced to abridge or control the franchise are always construed strictly keeping in view the rule of beneficial construction. Likewise, an order of a tribunal tantamounting to refranchise a citizen, which is subject to scrutiny of this Court, is to be tested in a manner favourable to safeguard the right of franchise. In the present case, the petitioner persistently denounced his association with the political party and asserted that he resigned from the office and primary membership much earlier than the enforcement of the said disqualification. He is to be believed for the reason that he has openly and publicly departed from the programme of the Party, refrained from attending its indoor and public meetings, put up himself as an independent candidate in the elections and thereby deviated from the Party programme to boycott the elections. All these factors go a long way to make us believe that the petitioner was not an office-bearer of the unregistered political party at the time of the filing of the nomination papers and thereafter. It is futile to insist that the petitioner is still an office-bearer particularly in presence of the letter and affidavit of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan. These facts, though are questions of facts, are of primary consideration in the settlement of the controversy. Therefore, rejection of these facts tentamounts to an error of fact. In other words, establishment of these facts is not refuted by any counter evidence of the rival candidate nor such evidence, barring the press reports, was placed before the learned Chief Election Commissioner, Ch. Muhammad Anwar, undoubtedly, has placed an affidavit on the file of this Court in support of his contention but on the rule of oath against path, we rule out of consideration the affidavits of the parties and give full credence to the letter and affidavit of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan. On this view, the proposition is even factually found in favour of the petitioner. Here, the consideration of the learned Chief Election Commissioner is also relevant and the relevant part of the impugned order is reproduced : "There is no manner of doubt that letter is written and signed by the President of the Party and addressed to Ch. Abdul Majid who realizing its importance produced the original before the Returning Officer in support of his candidature. In course of these appeals two affidavits sworn by the President and Ch. Abdul Majid to vouch for the genuineness of the letter."
26. We have examined the press report appearing in Daily Jang of 16th April, relevant to the proposition under consideration. It is undeniable that the petitioner nowhere pretended to be an office-bearer of the unregistered political party. He described his programme of development and reasons for his participation in the election. However, the reporter, on his own, made a reference to the effect that it may be known that the petitioner was counted as one of the leaders of the party.
The reference of the reporter, in our estimation, is insufficient to lead to the conclusion adverse to the case of the petitioner. Even if it is believed that the observation of the reporter was genuine, even then, in our view, the/ petitioner cannot be disqualified as the report does not label him to be an office-bearer of the Party. It may be remembered that the Legislature itself exempted from the operation of this disqualification members of Working Committees of the parties despite the fact that members of Working Committee are also addressed as leaders of party. Therefore, a person by being mentioned as leader of a party, by no stretch of imagination, can be presumed to be its office-bearer, as contemplated by the provisions relating to disqualifications. The press report of the aforesaid date in no manner brings the case of the petitioner within the scope of mischief of words "office-bearer" so as to disqualify him from contesting the elections.
' The reasons recorded above lead to the conclusion favourable to the petitioner. It is, therefore, held that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority, as such, it is of no legal effect.
The writ petition is allowed. As the petitioner, in the light of the interim order of this Court, was allotted a symbol and his name and symbol was directed to be rented in the ballot papers, in the light of the decision in this case, the petitioner is eligible to contest the elections of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly from Constituency L.A.-2, Mirpur 2. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.