' Briefly put, the facts of the case are that on 28.11-1963, the land in dispute was allotted to one Muhammad Shah. He sold it away to two persons namely, Muhammad Zarif and Abdur Rauf. The former alienated it in favour of petitioners Nos. 2, 6 and 8 and two others named Shah Muhammad and Maula Bakhsh who died-during the pendency of the litigation and are represented by petitioners Nos. l and 7 respectively. The land purchased by Abdur Rauf was likewise sold away by him to petitioners Nos. 9 and 10.
3. One Sada filed a 'mukhbari' application against Muhammad Shafi, which was accepted by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated 18-5-1966 and his allotment cancelled.
The vendees who were not heard, challenged this cancellation, by means of two Writ Petitions Nos.
1286/R-96 and 954/R-68, in which a status quo order dated 9-8-1966 was also passed. Both the Writ Petitions were accepted on 20-12-1972 and the case sent back to the Tribunal below to give a fresh decision, after giving to the parties concerned, an opportunity of being heard.
3. Consequently, the Assistant Commissioner Hafizabad with powers as Chief Settlement Commissioner passed a fresh order dated 28-10-1976, whereby he upheld the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order dated 18-5-1966, to the extent of cancellation of Muhammad Shafi's allotment. It appears that in the meanwhile, out of the `Khata' held in his name, some allotments were made to other persons. The Assistant Commissioner did not disturb these allotments. So far as vendees/petitioners are concerned, he permitted them to acquire proprietary rights, on payment of sale price of the produce index units, as per instructions of the Provincial Government. This A.C. Was transferred and when the petitioners made an application, to his successor-in-office to deposit the sale price, the latter referred the matter to the Secretary Rural i,e, respondent No, 2.
4. It transpires from the entries figuring against Khata No, 191 of RL-II Register (Annex. 'H') that after the cancellation of allotment of Muhammad Shafi, the name of Mst. Anwar Begum respondent No, 3 was entered therein and her claim shown to have been received from village Seoowal, Tehsil Pasroor, District Sialkot. By order dated 22-2-1968, recorded in the RL-II, the A.R.C. (Land), a recommendation was made to the Provincial Committee to allot the land to respondent No, 3 and in the meanwhile it was reserved in her name.
5. The circumstances which led to the institution of the instant writ petition are, that Mst. Anwar Begum respondent, moved an application before the learned C.S.C./Member Board of Revenue that the land was proposed in her name on 22-2-1968 but it was not confirmed. She thus prayed for its confirmation. On this application, the learned Member Board of Revenue, allowed the confirmation and his order, in this respect, was communicated to the /VC. Hafizabad, by the Secretary Rural, by his letter dated 17-12-1981. The validity of his order has been assailed by the petitioners now.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at some length. He heavily relied on Memo.
No, 24/Pol/74 dated 9-1-1974 issued by the Settlement Commissioner, to argue that unallotted rural agricultural land had to be offered for sale to the persons who were in actual cultivating possession thereof, for a period of at least 4 harvest preceding on 15-6-1973. The submission was that since the petitioners fully satisfied " OW1 the requirements of this policy letter, the A.C. By his order dated 1).3,3138- 104 976 rightly ordered the sale of the land in their favour. Reference was also made by the learned counsel to section 3 of Act XIV of 1975 and it was urged that on the repeal of the evacuee laws, the land stood transferred to the Provincial Government and in accordance with the "Scheme 03 of or disposal of unallotted agricultural land" formulated by the Board of evenue, the A C. Was competent, to order the sale to the petitioner; and thus the order passed by him was in conformity with Law. He also criticised the refusal of the authorities concerned to accept the sale price from the petitioners, on the ground of limitation. According to the learned counsel, since the land vested in the Provincial Government, it could not be dealt with under the Repealed Act and allotment -confirmed in her name by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. His other argument was that there was no proposal in favour of the respondent and as the reservation of the land in her name, was not countenanced by Para. 20 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, the order dated 22-2.1968 passed by the A.R.C. (Land) was wholly illegal. It was further argued that this order having been passed, during the pendency of the aforesaid two Writ Petitions and in violation of the status quo order dated 9-8-1966, was not of any legal efficacy.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners then referred to section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Order XXII, rule 10, C. P. C. For the argument, that it was obligatory for the respondent, to have got herself impleaded as a party in the writ petitions. He went on to argue that since the power of general supervision, was conferred on the learned Member Board of Revenue, by Notification No, 488/pol/76 dated 1-11-1976 whereby the Scheme formulated under clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 3 of Act XIV of 1975, was amended, on the date of passing the impugned order, he was not possessed of any jurisdiction, to order confirmation of the land in the name of the respondent. The impugned order was also assailed on the ground that the petitioners were not heard. In support of these contentions the learned counsel also cited some case-law.
8. The petitioner's whole case hinges on the observations made by the A.C. In his order dated 28- 10-1976. This order was passed, when the evacuee laws stood repealed. With the repeal of these laws, all Schemes formulated and directives issued thereunder, also ceased to have the force of law. The learned counsel's explicit reliance on the Memo. Dated 9-1-1974, is thus wholly misplaced.
At the relevant time Act XIV of 1975, held the field. The case, therefore, has got to be examined with reference to this enactment. Under section 2 (2) of the Act, all pending proceedings stood transferred to the officer notified by the Provincial Government and as envisaged by subsection (3) of section 2, such pro ceedings were to be disposed of, in accordance with the provisions of the Repealed Act namely, the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, as if it had not been repealed.
9. The moot point requiring decision thus would be as to whether or not, the respondent's case could be treated as pending proceedings, within the meaning of section 2 (2) of Act XIV of 1975. The copy of the RL-1I Register (Annex. 'H') demonstrates that the respondent's claim was received in District Gujranwala under the orders dated 12-7-1966 of the A.D.C. Gujranwala and after the cancellation of the allotment of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest under khata No, 191, the name of the respondent was entered against the same. I have been told by the learned counsel for the Settlement Department that during the period when the order dated 22-2-1968 was made by the A.R.C., a Provincial Committee had been constituted and recommendations for allotment of the land were made to the said Committee.
10. The precise entry appearing in Column No, 9 of the RL-II Register is reproduced below {{URDU TEXT}} The argument of the Other side is that this entry does not conform to the procedure prescribed by Para. 64 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme and thus cannot be treated as a proposal.
Whether or not, there was really a proposal, in favour of the respondent, need not be determined, for, the fact remains that the land had been earmarked for her and I have no doubt that the entries aforesaid constitute pendin proceedings, in contemplation of section 2 (2) of the Repealing Act. In this connection, a reference to Nawaz Din v. Member, Board of Revenue will provide :- ".The affixation of word "all" before the word "proceedings" does not authorise exclusion of any type of proceedings from the ambit of that word by making a division of the kind of judicial proceedings and executive proceedings, so long as those were proceedings under the Act dealing with the Settlement of land and deciding the eligibility of an applicant for its transfer......"
' It is clear to me that the instant case is covered by the dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in this precedent.
11. The matter as to the allotment of the land in dispute to the respondent, was a pending case, covered by section 2 (2) and thus had to be dealt with under the Repealed Act. The land, therefore, was not available for sale to the petitioners, under section 3 (3). The A.C., therefore, acted illegally and without jurisdiction in permitting the sale in their favour. My attention has not been drawn by the petitioners' learned counsel, to any document showing that they applied to purchase the land in dispute. Seemingly, the A.C's order in this behalf, was unsolicited.
12. There is no gainsaying that the rule embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem is well entrenched in our system of law but for earning a right of hearing the petitioners must show that they were deprived of some right vested in them. It is well settled that a void B order, or an order without jurisdiction does not create any vested right. The order dated 28-10-1976, to the extent of allowing sale to the petitioners having been adjudged void, is rendered incapable of conferring any right on the petitioners to entitle them to claim hearing,
13. It remains to be seen whether the order dated 22-2-1968 is violative of the status quo order passed in the aforesaid writ petitions.
' A.C's order relied upon by the petitioners, amply reflects that the status quo order was conditional and the condition attached thereto was not fulfilled by the petitioners. The status quo order thus did not become operative. Evidently, for this reason, the A.C. Himself upheld certain allotments made out of the khata of Muhammad Shafi. In this view of the matter the petitioners' reliance on the status quo order cannot advance their cause. Equally ill-grounded is the argument resting on section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Order XXII, rule 10, C. P. C. It was for the petitioners to have impleaded the respondent as a party.1
14. Under the Repealing Act as well as the Scheme framed thereunder, the Board of Revenue has a supervisory jurisdiction and in fact all orders passed under the Repealed Act are implemented by the Board. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners' learned counsel, that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error. D In any case this argument is not available to the petitioners. The reason being that they have not been found eligible for the sale of the land in their favour. Thus, they will have no locus standi to question the respondent's entitlement and to assail the order of the learned Member Board of Revenue, in this behalf.
15. The rulings cited by the learned counsel have no bearing on the questions calling for consideration in the instant case. I have, therefore, avoided to burden this judgment with the discussion thereof.
16. For the foregoing reasons this peon is found without any merit. It is accordingly dismissed in limine. PLD 1979 SC 846