CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGI R, J.---This Civil Revision has arisen out of the concurrent judgments passed by learned lower fora, whereby suit for possession through pre-emption instituted on behalf of petitioner was dismissed.
2. The admitted facts presented before this Court are that transaction of sale qua 16 kanals reflected in mutation No.2627 dated 17.01.2006 effected in favour of respondents/defendants was pirated by the petitioner through pre- emption suit instituted on 16.05.2006 for the enforcement of superior rights while claiming due performance of requisite talbs. It is pertinent that the suit was not only registered on the aforementioned day of institution, rather the learned Trial Court required the petitioner/pre-emptor to deposit zar-e-soem, which admittedly made good on 15.06.2006. After receipt and appreciation of evidence, finally learned Civil Court vide judgment dated 04.02.2010 dismissed the suit on two counts; firstly , that zar-e-soem was A deposited one day beyond time required by first proviso of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991; secondly the performance of requisite demands was not duly proved. Although the petitioner went in appeal, but failed on 16.10.2010, hence this civil revision.
3. Arguments heard and record scanned.
4. During the course of arguments, although Ch. Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din, learned counsel for the petitioner admitted the factual position that suit was filed on 16.05.2016, whereas zar-e-soem deposited on 31st day of the filing of suit, yet he while citing judgment reported as Nabi Ahmed and others v. Muhammad Arshad and others (2008 SCMR 1685 ) emphasized with great vehemence that required 30 days' time was to be reckoned after the day of institution of suit. In contra, Mehr Abdul Ghafoor Araien, Advocate on behalf of the respondents/ vendees relying upon cases of Muhammad Tufail v. Mst. Akhtari Begum (PLD 2019 Lahore 153), Hasnain Nawaz Khan v.
Ghulam Akbar and another (PLD 2013 SC 489) and Malik Tariq Mehmood and others v. Ghulam Ahmed and others (PLD 2017 SC 674) argued that statutory period for depositing zar-e-soem was within thirty days of the filing of pre-emption suit and its day of filing cannot be excluded. Assuredly , time for depositing zar-e-soem has been fixed under section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, which reads as follows:-
24. Plaintif f to deposit sale price of the property .---(1) In every suit for pre-eruption, the Cour t shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit: Provided that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property .
(2) Where the plaintiff fails to make a deposit under sub-section (1) within the period fixed by the Court, or withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall be dismissed.
(3) Every sum deposited under subsection (1) shall be available for the discharge of costs.
(4) The probable value fixed under subsection (1) shall not affect the final determination of the price payable by the pre-emptor .
The bare perusal thereof unambiguously and unequivocally confirms that it is mandatory in nature and made obligatory for the Court seized of the suit to require the pre-emptor to deposit zar-e-soem within maximum thirty days of institution of the suit, otherwise, he has to face the consequences of its dism issal as required by subsection
(2) ibid. There is no doubt to conclude that where the time is fixed by the Statute, the Court has no power to extend the same from its outer limit, even while assuming jurisdiction under section 148 of the Code, 1908. In Hasnain Nawaz Khan's case (supra), it has already been held by the august Supreme Court that deposit within thirty days is the clear command of law, therefore, irrespective of any omission or lapse on the part. of Court in passing specific/formal order in this regard, the pre-emptor has to comply with the requirement of law as there is no excuse for ignorance of law. The said situation is covered by the maxim "a communi obser vantia non est recedendum" that when a thing is to be done in particular manner , it must be done in that very way and not otherwise. See Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner , Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1971 SC 61) and Raja Hamayun Sarfraz Khan and others v. Noor Muhammad (2007 SCMR 307). Reverting to facts of the case, undoubtedly the 30th day from filing of the suit finished on 14.06.2006, which being not a holiday , it was sine qua non for the pre-emptor/petitioner to deposit zar-e-soem uptil that particular day. The starting and ending day of thirty days could not be excluded for making good 1/3rd of the sale price, as such the learned Trial Court justifiably concluded that its deposit on 15.06.2006 was one day beyond the statutory period. No doubt, in Nabi Ahmed's case (supra), the esteemed three members' Bench of the apex Court observed that the words "or, "from" or "after" were interchangeable and held that while applying provisions of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 thirty days' time was to be reckon ed after the day of institution of the suit, whereas in earlier as well as subsequent citations titling Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak and 8 others (1992 SCMR 746) and Hafiz Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Bakhsh (PLD 2012 SC 764), the Bench led by parallel number of honourable Judges of the same Court concluded that the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 being special law has not only provided fixed time limit, rather the manner of its computation, as such the provisions of General Clauses Act, being ordinary law could not be applied. This principle was again repeated in Hasnain Nawaz as well as Malik Tariq's cases (supra) by the apex Court and this Court in judgments reported as Muhammad Jahangir v.
Muhammad Abbas and 2 others (2004 CLC 538) and Raja v. Tanvir Riaz and others (2006 CLC 1455 ), therefore, the view of learned Trial Court in dismissing the suit for said reason was perfect being supplemented by law so far settled by the superior Courts.
5. Moving towards other damaging factors regarding failure of pre-emption suit, the study of plaint though reflected that notices talb-e-ishhad were dispatched, yet nowhere disclosed to have been made through registered post accompanied by Acknowledgement Due Card. Moreover , neither the pre-emptor nor any of the signatories of alleged notices stated in their examination-in-chief that those were sent by adoptin g process required by the law. It was matter of record that the postman (PW 1) also did not disclose in his statement-in-chief that the registered mail containing notices was covered by said rider. No doubt, the A.D. Cards were brought on record as Exh.P12 to 14, but through statement of counsel recorded for admission of rebuttal evidence, which was not enough to fulfil the mandate of law. Almost identical situation stood already clinched by the august Supreme Court through celebrated judgment reported as Basharat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Akbar (2017 SCMR 309) and omission in the plaint 'to plead that notice sent through registered post along with A.D.' was declared fatal for the pre-emptor , which too followed by this Court in Wali Muhammad through L. Rs. and others v. Ghulam Nabi (2018 MLD 1044 ). In addition thereto, the onus probandi qua due performance of talbs was upon petitioner/pre-emptor and A.D. Cards were to be brought on record through affirmative evidence when the postman examined, but instead of following the said mode, those were tendered via statement of counsel at the stage of rebuttal evidence, which rightly was not taken into consideration. See Khan Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 others (PLD 1973 SC 160) and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others ( PLD 2010 SC 604 ). As such, the petitioner/pre-emptor deserved failure on said count as well.
6. For the reasons discussed above, this Court feels satisfied that impugned judgments were perfectly rendered by the Courts below as per available evidence and law on the subject, whereas scope of interference therewith in revisional jurisdiction is restricted/narrower , which cannot be invoked until proved that the decrees under challenge were tainted with misreading as well as non-reading of evidence or the learned lower for a committed material irregularity or jurisdictional defect, but definitely is not the case here, hence this petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. No order as to costs.