' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- Having failed to deposit Zar-e-Soem in terms of the order dated 3-10-2007 passed by the learned Trial Court and the mandate of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 191 (the Act), the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 23-4-2008 (by the learned Trial Court).
The appeal against the above initiated by the petitioner failed on 21-5-2008 and so is the fate of his revision petition before . The learned Lahore High Court vide impugned order dated 15-7-2008.
2. The relevant facts of the case are, that the petitioner instituted a suit for pre-emption against the respondents on 2-10-2007, which came up for hearing before the Court for the first time on 3-10- 2007, when the following order was passed:- "Let summon be issued to the defendant subject to deposit of process fee and registered A.D. The plaintiff is directed. To deposit "ZAR-E-SOEM" in the sum of Rs,1,33,334/- within thirty days (emphasis supplied). To come up on..31-10-2007."
' Admittedly, the petitioner has failed to deposit the aforesaid amount within thirty days given (fixed) time, which ended on 2-11-2007, rather he on 20-11-2007 moved a -miscellaneous application to the Court not seeking any judicial determination/opinion, but for an administrative order asking permission to deposit the aforesaid amount in the treasury, obviously pursuant to the order dated 3-10-2007. The Court on the said application when presented to it on 21-11-2007 remarked "allowed subject to provisions of law of Pre-emption 1991". The petitioner thereafter presumably deposited the amount on 22-11-2007. Be that as it may, as the petitioner had failed to make the deposit according to the order of the learned Civil Judge dated 3-10-2007 and also as per command of Section ibid, resultantly on an application moved by the respondent-defendant, his suit has been dismissed by the court for the non deposit of the amount under section 24(2) of the Act, which order has been maintained throughout, hence this petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that by virtue of order dated 21-11-2007 the Court having allowed the petitioner to make the deposit in which no time was fixed, therefore the deposit made by the petitioner immediately on 22-11-2007, the next day, was well within time as it (the deposit) could be made within 30 days therefrom.
4. Heard. In order to appreciate the above submission, it seems expedient to dilate upon the purpose, the spirit and the nature of section 24 of the Act, the provisions whereof read as follows:-- "Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property.-(1) In every suit for pre-emption the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix:- ' Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit: ' Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property.
(2) Where the plaintiff fails to make a deposit under sub section (1) within the period fixed by the Court or withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall be dismissed.
(3) Every sum deposited under subsection (1) shall be available for the discharge of costs.
(4) The probable value fixed under subsection (1) shall not affect the final determination of the price payable by the pre-emptor."
' In the above context, it may be mentioned that in the prior law on the subject i,e, The Punjab Pre- emption Act 1913, if not absolutely akin, there were analogous provisions in terms of section 22, thereof. And while interpreting the said Section it has been held in various dicta, that the object of the deposit is to guarantee the vendee against frivolous proceedings on part of the possible pre- emptor and is a token of good faith on pre-emptor, part; and such deposit shall also service and shall be available for the discharge of the costs (Section 22(3). See Sanwal Das v. Jaigo Mal and others (AIR 1924 Lahore 68) and Mst. Sakina Begum v. Mst. Surat Bibi (1991 CLC 398) such interpretation qua its scope and nature is true for the present Section 24 ibid as well. Besides, from the plain reading of the above, it is obvious that the Court is under a legal obligation and has to require mandatorily the plaintiff-pre-emptor to deposit Zar-e-Soem and for that purpose it has the discretion to fix a specific time frame. However, in view of the proviso to section 24(1) such period cannot and should not exceed 30 days, rather it is a specific constraint on the jurisdiction/discretion of the Court and any order of the Court permitting the pre-emptor to make the deposit beyond 30 days shall be in violation of law and thus illegal and untenable in the eyes of law.
' As per section 24(2), if the plaintiff-pre-emptor fails to make the deposit in terms of subsection (1), his suit is liable to be dismissed. This part of the section is so obvious and call for no other interpretation. Therefore, on the basis of unambiguous and unequivocal wording of the noted section, there is no doubt that the provisions thereof are mandatory and if the pre-emptor has failed to comply with the order of deposit, his suit has to fail.
5. Now coming to the facts of the present case, the Trial Court on 3-10-2007 had directed the petitioner to make deposit of Rs,1,33,334/- as Zar-e-Soem within 30 days time and this order is absolutely inconsonance with the letter and spirit of the Section ibid. The petitioner was obliged to make the deposit in terms of the above order (30 days time) and having failed to do so, his suit was liable to be dismissed as per operation of the law straightaway (Section 24). Thereafter, neither petitioner was left with any right to seek extension of statutory fixed time of 30 days, nor in law (under reference) it was permissible for the Court to grant any extension, because the Court under no circumstances has the jurisdiction and the authority to extend this statutory period of 30 days, because the power/discretion of the Court to extend time as envisaged by section 148 of the C.P.C. Is only available to the Court, where the time has been fixed, by the Court itself or under the Code of Civil Procedure, but where the time for the performance of an act has been fixed by some other statute, the Court in terms of section 148, C.P.C. Has no jurisdiction at all to enlarge and extend that time. It seems being conscious of the above legal position, the petitioner having failed to deposit the amount in time, did not move any application for the extension of time, rather filed a miscellaneous application not seeking a judicial determination, but invoking the quasi administrative authority of the Court, enabling him to deposit the amount in the treasury. It was deliberately not mentioned in the application that the statutory time for the deposit, as also that granted (fixed by the Court) to the petitioner vide order of the Court dated 3-10-2007 has already lapsed. On the said application, the learned Trial Court in order to avoid any legal implications quite appropriately passed the order "allowed subject to provisions of law of Pre-emption 1991" meaning thereby that neither any time was extended nor the Court permitted the petitioner to make the deposit by enabling him to avail some fresh period, rather for all intents and purposes this order is pursuant to and inconsonance of the earlier order dated 3-10-2007 and, therefore, if by that time the statutory period of 30 days and that (period) fixed by the Court had lapsed, only for the reason that application of the petitioner for depositing the amount in the treasury was allowed by the Court, would not mean that he was give any fresh period for the deposit.
6. In the light of above, we find that the case of the petitioner was squarely hit by subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act ibid and his suit was liable to be dismissed and this is what has happened at all the three stages below. No case is made out warranting interference. . Leave is according refused.