CH. NIAMA T ULLAH, CHAIRMAN.---- This order will dispose of Custom Appeal No. K-940/1 1 filed against the Order-in-Appeal No. 5527 to 5528/201 1 dated 02.07.201 1, passed by Collector of Customs, (Appeals) Karachi (hereinafter called the appellate authority).
2. Brief facts of the case as reported are that the appellants imported a number of consignments of Energy Saver Lamps, Bulbs etc from China during the years 2006 and 2007. The goods were assessed provincially under section 81(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 (hereinafter the Customs Act) for want of determination of value of the goods for the purpose of levy of customs duty and charging sales tax. The matter remained pending for a number of years despite directives of the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh in eight (08) Constitutional Petitions (Nos. 986 and 987 of 2006, D-527 and 528 of 2009, 931 and 932 of 2007 and 148 and 149 of 2008) filed by the appellants.
Consequently , the Post Dated Cheques (PDCs) and the Bank Guarantee (BGs) submitted by the appellants within the remaining of section 81 of the Act at the time of provisional release of the goods, remained with the department for a long time. Ultimately , the assessments order was passed on 09.02.201 1 wherein the issue with regard to determination of value for the purpose of charging customs duty appears to have been mutually settled as no appeal has been filed with respect to the above stated issue.
3. The Deputy Collector of Customs, MCC, Customs House, Karachi did not agree with the declared value of impugned goods and passed an assessment order No. MCC/Law/25/Part-II/2007-PaCCS dated 09-02-201 1 on the following grounds:- "I have gone through the record of the case and heard the importers in person during the hearing on 08.02.201 1 wherein they repeated the same argume nts which they had mentioned in their representations dated 03.02.201 1.
The importer's contention, against fixation of value for the purpose of sales tax assessment at the import stage, is not supported by any legal provision and case law. Instead, there is ample evidence of relevant legislation on record which establishes that sales tax should be collected on values as fixed by the Federal Board of Revenue vide the SRO 723(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. Through the afore-referred notific ation was rescinded vide SRO 799(1)/2009 dated 11.09.2009, yet it remained in force during the period when the importers filed their CRNs. The amending SRO never ever suspended the operation of the SRO 732 from its issuance date, i.e. 13.07.2006. It has become, therefore, past and closed transaction. So, the securities deposited for differential amount of sales tax should be en-cashed. Importer's request for acceptance of their declared value is not tenable; as they themselves have been accepting provisional assessment of their goods. They have quoted in their favour the decision of the Double Bench of the Sindh High Court in C.P. No. 1285/2008. However , the fact of the matter is that the Collectorate has gone in appeal to the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan against the said decision. Therefore, the importers plea for finalization of the subject assessments by accepting their declared value is hereby rejected on the basis of facts stated above. It is also observed that, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and as these imports were of the year 2006 and the Director of Customs Valuation, while revising earlier valuation advices Nos. 871/06, 872/06, 873/06 (set aside by the SHC in subject order) through the valuation Ruling bearing No. Misc/52/2007-VIIA dated 09.02.2008, has thoroughly investigated the matter in line with the procedure and provisions of section 25 of the Act, pertaining to imports of energy saving lamps of dif ferent watts from China.
Due consideration was also given in that Ruling to the contention of the importers with regard to high ration of breakage of energy saving lamps at different stages of import as well as their after sale replacement/warranty and to the fragility of the products. The Director of Customs Valuation invoked the deductive value method, after rightfully exhausting the earlier methods of value as provided in section 25 of the Act, to determine the customs value and a committee comprising the office bears of FPCCI, representatives of importers and customs officials was also constituted to conduct the market survey . Thereafter , the value of Energy Saving Lamps of different Watts was determined and the Valuation Ruling was 'issued vide Letter No. Misc/52/2007-VIIA dated 09.02.2008, and all the Collectorate of Customs were requested to ensure applicability of the said determination of value. This ruling was challenged in the review application under section 25-D of the Act before the Director General of Customs Valuation, wherein after due consideration of the said ruling the Director General vide his order in review determined vide Letter No. DG (V) Val. Rev/46/2008 dated 22-05-2008 upheld the values determined on the basis of the said Ruling, which shows that said, valuation ruling has further gained the sanctity after review under section 25-D. After following the section 25 of the Act and in view of the foregoing facts, circumstances and legal provisions enunciated in detail in the foregoing para. I reject the plea of the importers for acceptance of their declared values, and finally determined under section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, the values regarding import consignments belonging to subject petitions, in accordance with valuation Ruling No. Misc/52/2007- VIIA dated 09.02.2008, issued under section 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969, as such determination has been found in line with proper procedure required under section 25 of the Act and has not been assailed by any competent court of law. The same questions of law have already been decided vice Assessment Orders No. MCC/Law/25/2007 dated 12.06.2008 and MCC/Law/21/2008-PaCCS dated 30.06.2008 of this Collectorate. The importers are, therefore, liable to pay additional duties and taxes, so arrived at a result of re-assessment, in the relevant heads of account of revenue, and it will be only after recovery/receipt of the differential/additional amount that the post dated cheques, secured in lieu of dif ferential amount of duties and taxes involved, `be returned to the importers."
4. The appellant aggrieved from the Assessment Order dated 09.02.201 1 filed an appeal before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi. The Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi modified the impugned order as under:- "I have thoroughly examined the entire case record and have given very careful consideration to the arguments advance before me. The principal issues involved in this case are (i) whether the provincial assessments cases should have been finalized within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) thereof, (ii) whether the impugned order through which assessment of the goods had been carried out on 09.02.201 1 was unlawful to the extent of charging sales tax on the instant goods in terms of Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 for the reason that the aforesaid notification had been rescinded nearly two years before passing of the impugned order and (iii) whether subsection (46) of section 2 of the Act allows fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage for the purpose of levy of sales tax. From the record, it is apparent that the goods imported in these cases has been provisionally assessed within the meaning of section 81 of the Customs Act on fulfillment of necessary legal requirements such as obtaining PDCs and Bank Guarantees (BGs) covering the differential amounts of duty/taxes.
Therefore, final determination of value of the provisionally assessed goods was required to be made within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) of section 81 of the Customs Act and non-finalization of provisional assessments within the stipulated time limit of six (06) (or extended nine (09) mont hs would have resulted in return of the PDCs/BGs to the appellants. However , the appellants had filed eight (08) CPs in the High Court of Sindh in response to which the hon'ble court had set aside the provisional assessments and had directed the department to assess the goods afresh after conducting necessary enquiries. Therefore, the case stood taken away from the purview of section 81 of the Customs Act and the learned counsel's plea on this point is rendered untenable as such. It, however , needs to be stated that the department should have passed the assessment order within the reasonable period of time whereas the assessment order dated 09.02.201 1 had been passed nearly five years after release of the goods and more than two years after above referred directive of the Hon'ble Sindh High Court.
In the meantime, notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 was rescinded on 11.09.2009 through Notification SRO 799(1)/2009. Therefore, at the time of passing of the impugned order on 09.02.201 1, Notification SRO 732(I)/2006 was not in existence and determining value of the goods on the basis of a non-existent notification is a nullity in the eyes of law: the only legal course of action left with the assessing officer on 09.02.201 1 was to determine value of the impugned goods for sales tax purposes under clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act. Therefore, it is the inordinate delay in passing the assessment order which has actually nullified the department's claim of determining value of the instant goods in terms of Notification 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. I accordingly rule that the impugned order is not maintainable in law to the aforesaid extent. Therefore, Issue No.(iii) referred to above, is of peripheral significance because any finding with respect to the same would not have any substantial bearing on the outcome of the instant proceedings. Anyway , the learned counsel has contended that as per the letter of law contained in subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act value of imported goods cannot be fixed at the import stage. He has also relied upon the clarification issued by the Board vide letter bearing C.No.3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.201 1 in this regard. Moreover , he has contended that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 is itself riddled with apparent legal flaws inasmuch as it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. For the ease of reference, the relevant clauses of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and Board's letter dated 18.08.2001 referred to above are reproduced as under:- Subsection (46) of Section 2 of Sales T ax Act, 1990 "Value of Supply" means ................................................................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................................................................
(d) In case of imported goods, the value determined under section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969 including the amount of customs duties and central excise duty levied thereon; ................................................................................................................................................. .................................................................................................................................................
(g) In case of a taxable supply , with reference to retail tax, the price of taxable goods excluding the amount of retail tax, which a supplier will charge at the time of making taxable supply by him, or such other price as the Board may, by a notification in the of ficial gazette, specify] [Provided that, where the Board deems it necessary it may, be notification in the official gazette, fix the value of any imported goods or taxable supplies or class of supplies and for that purpose fix different values for different classes or description of same type of imported goods or supplies].
Board's letter No. 3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 "I am directed to refer to your letter No. R&D/SC- STAX/01, dated the 7th July, 2001 on the above subject and to say that the value of supply is clearly defined in Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Clause (a) of the said subsection generally relates to all taxable supplies made in Pakistan, while subsequent clauses relate to specific circumstances. Clause (d) of the said subsection relates to valuation of goods at the time of import i.e. at the time of assessment of the bill of entry . Such imported goods when later on supplied in the local market area to be assessed in terms of clause (a), or if necessary , other remaining clauses of said subsection (46) of Section 2, [by the CBR Islamabad, under the signature of Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed Tunio, Secretary (ST -- L&P), being addressed to the Secretary , Lahore Chamber -of Commerce and Industry , Lahore]"
Clearly , various clauses of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act lay down parameters for determining value of local supplies and imported goods at the import stage for sales tax purpo se is dealt with under clause (d) thereof, according to which value for the purpose of levy of sales tax at impo rt stage is the value of goods determined under section 25 of the Customs Act, plus the amounts duty and federal excise duty levied thereon clause (g) thereof deals with valuation of both locally produced goods and imported goods with reference to retail tax. It is, therefore, obvious that it is the determination of supply of locally produce d and imported goods at the re- retail stage which is the subject-matter of clause (g) of subsection (46) of Section, 2 of the Sales Tax Act. The first proviso to the aforesaid clause (g) empowers the Board to "fix value of any import ed goods or taxable supplies or class of supplies" before supply thereof to the retailer . There is no doubt in my mind that the above referred power of the Board is restricted to fixation of value of taxable supplies or imported goods at the pre-retail stage -- and not at the import stage. The rationale behind allowing such fixation of value is to include all types of taxes and value additions/profit margins in value of the imported goods up to the pre-retail stage and guard against any slippages.
Thus, there is nothing in the letter of law contained subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, particularly clause (g) thereof, to suggest fixation of value of imported goods, at the import stage, for the purpose of levy of sales tax. The case law (PLD 1953 Lahore 433(a), 1993 SCMR 274(c), PLD 1964 SC 113, AIR 1943 Madras 733(b), PLD 1984 Kar. 345 and 1996 SCMR (sic) quoted by the learned counsel is strictly relevant to the facts and circumstances of the-instant cases. In the aforementioned case law it has been categorically held that a tax can only be charged under the clear letter of law. As a matter of example, the relevant part of one of the above mentioned authorities is reproduced as under:- "(b) Interpretation of Statutes -- T axing Statute Rule of Construction.
"Taxing statute must be construed strictly . In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no necessity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. The subject is not taxable by inference or by analogy , but only by the plaint words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case. If the person sought to be taxes comes within the letter of the law he must be taxes, however , great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if he cannot be brought within the letter of the law he is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. (AIR (30) 1943 Madras 733(b)
It is presumed for argument's sake that any such fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage has been authorized by law as the adjudication officer appears to believe, the whole scheme of collection of sales tax on imported goods at the import stage would be disturbed because there would be two values for the same goods at the same stage-one for the purpose of charging customs duty and the other for the purpose of charging sales tax.
In that eventually , the provisions of law contained in clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, which actually prescribe the method for determining value of imported goods at the import stage and charging sales tax thereon, would be severely compromised. Clearly , this could never be the intent of the legislature. The above stated position also finds strength from Board's clarification issued vide letter dated 18.08.2001, reproduced above. Thus, in my opinion, neither the letter of law nor the intent of the law contained in clause (g) of subsection
(46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act authorizes fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage for the purpose of levy of sales tax. I also observe that even the relevant provisions of law have not been quoted in the impugned notification: it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. It appears that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2 006 was intended to be issued under clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the sales Tax Act; but the 'afore-mentioned provision of law was not mentioned therein. This leads me to the strong belief that the author of the disputed notification neither read the said clause (g) himself nor took the draft notification to the Law and Justice Division for vetting. Anyway , Notification SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 had been issued without jurisdiction and, as such, was a nullity in the eyes of law in terms of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1995 Kar. 687, PLD 1975 SC 331, PLD 1971 SC 197 and PLD 1973 SC 236 and the valuation of the goods based on the void notification is not maintainable in law. It may be pertinent to mention here that, presently , no notifica tion is in the filed with regard to fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage and, therefore, the above findings does not carry any revenue implication for the department. However , it would be worthwhile for the relevant authorities to closely examine clauses (d) and (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and suitable amend the aforesaid clause (d) if, in future, value of any imported goods is sought to be fixed at the import stage for the purpose of charging sales tax. Anyway , for the reasons stated above, I set aside the impugn ed order inasmuch as the same relates to determination of value of the goods for the purpose of charging sales tax and order that the value of the instant goods for the purpose of charging sales tax be determined in terms of clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act. The impugned order is modified to the aforesaid extent only and the appeals are disposed of accordingly".
5. The appellant/department did not satisfy with the order of Collector of Customs, (Appeals), Karachi, filed this appeal before this Tribunal against Order-in-Appeals Nos. K-5527 to 5528/201 1 dated 02-07-201 1 on the following grounds:- i) That every time when the department completes the assessment and start recover the importers approached the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh and the last order of the Court was of dated 09.03.201 0 wherein the Hon'ble Court has disposed of the petition, i.e. C.P. No. D-931/2007, with the consent of the importer/petitioner's counsel, with the following order:- "At the out the set the counsel for the petitioner has placed on record a copy of Notification No. 799(I)/2009 dated 11.09.2009 by which the impugned notification dated 13.07.2006 has been rescinded. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is going to approach the customs authorities for the settlement of the matter and in terms of the order dated 20.01.2009 passed in C.P. No. D-149/2008 the customs department may be directed to examine the case of the petitioner and if any relief can be granted to the petitioner , same may be extended to them in accordance with law .
We dispose of this petition with the observation that if the petitioner is entitled to any relief, the same will be extended by the customs authorities in accordance with law ."
In the said order it is very much clearly stated that the importer/petitioner shall approach the customs authorities.
The available record shows that the petitioner/importer has not approached rather they just awakened when the department started recovery drive for the long outstanding securities. The aforesa id High Court's order is proving that the learned Collector (Appeals) observation about delay of five years is incorrect. Without prejudice to above even otherwise the law settled by the apex court in the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Tripple M (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2006 SC 209 = 2006 PTD 769 the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that:-- "No order can be scrapped or annulled or set aside only on the ground that the same has been passed with unreasonable delay"
Further in Article 245 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it is clearly stated that an order passed at delayed stage does not render such order as invalid or illegal.
That, secondly the aforesaid petition and may other petitions were filed with the prayer to declare that SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 as illegal and ultra vires, however , from plain reading of the Hon'ble High Court's order dated 09.03.2010 it is clear that the High Court has not accepted the said plea of the importers and infact remanded the case to the customs authorities to deal with in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Court was aware of the legal position that the SRO 799(1)/2009 dated 11.09.2001 has though rescind the SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 but the SRO 732(1)/2006 was neither cancelled retrospectively nor it was held to be illegal or ultra- vires, therefore, the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the issuanc e of SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 was illegal, is totally incorrect. iii) That further the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub-clause
(g) of clause (46) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is also incorrect. The learned Collector (Appeals) erred in law to attached the proviso mentioned at the end of clause (46) with the sub-clause (g) only, whereas the legal position is that the said provisos are for the whole clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which includes clauses (a) to (g). This fact is further confirmed from the contents of SRO 732(1)/2006 which clearly says that the said notification has been issued under clause (46) of Section 2 and there is mentioning of sub-clause (g) or (d), therefore, the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub- clause (g) of section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, in incorrect and infact the provisos appeared at the end of clause (46) of Section 2 provides exclusive powers to the Board to fix the value for sales tax Collector either at import stage or retail stage of supply and it is a settled principle of law that the proviso is to be read with the related parent Section. Taking into consideration the importer's submission before the Hon'ble High Court on 09.03.2010 (in C.P. No. D-931/2007) and before the learned Collector (Appeals) in para 3(i) of the impugned order-in-Appeal it is clear that the importers have otherwise satisfied with the assessment and they have only grievance with the application of SRO 732(1)/2006, that is why , their only prayer is to render the SRO 732(1)/2006 as ultra vires. iv) That the learned Collector (Appeal) reference to Board's letter C.No.3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 is incorrect and illegal. First of all copy of the said letter was not provided to the departmental representative and secondly the said clarification was issued in August, 2001, for a separate issue and not for SRO 732(1)/2006 which was issued in July, 2006, i.e. nearly after five years. Further neither the issue of proviso to section 2(46) was discussed nor the said clarification is relating to powers of. the Board for fixation of value for imported goods for levy of sales tax at import stage, therefore, the said clarifica tion is totally irrelevant to SRO 732(I)/2006 and the learned Collector (Appeals) observations in this regard carries no weight. v) That on the basis of facts and grounds plead herein above, it is prayed in the interest of justice that this hon'ble court may be pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order , passed by the learned Collector (Appeal).
6. Para-wise comments were submitted by the Advocate of respondent/importer as under:- i) That is a matter of record that Sindh High Court Order dated 09.03.2010 has nowhere said anything contrary to Respondents stand and has left it open for the departmental forums to resolve the issue at their level. Accordingly the respondent were allowed hearing where he supported the declared transaction valuation and pointed out department's inability to confront the respondent with any material to disprove the declared transaction valuation.
The respondent also pointed out the valuation adopted by department in identical/similar matters. The respondent also agitated the illegality in issuance of SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 before the Competent Authority i.e. Deputy Collector of Customs and having failed at the said forum recourse of appeal under Section 193 of Customs Act was adopted before Collector Appeal who passed a detailed order by recording his findings in para 7 of impugned order . ii) That the appellant has miserably failed to controvert any of the reasons which enabled the learned Collector of modify the impugned order by holding that SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 cannot be applied for determination of value for levy of Sales tax at import stage. The appellant have also failed to contradict the following points raised by learned Collector Appeal:- i) CBR's Clarification C. No. 3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 which has defined the terms "value of supply" under Section 2(46) of Sales Tax Act;. ii) At the time of passing impugned order dated 09.02.2001 SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.7.2006 was not in existence; iii) Determination of value based on a non-existence notification is illegal; iv) Inordinate delay in passing the assessment order has nullified the claim of department of determining value in terms of SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. v) SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 has been issued without jurisdiction. vi) Notification bears legal disqualification as preamble thereof says that notification is issued; vii) In exercise of Power conferred by first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act; iii) That "SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub-clause (g) of clause (46) of Section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 as alleged. iv) That the appellate order has clearly elaborated the distinction between sub-section -- clause and sub-clause used, in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 which has primarily constituted the basis of present legal flaw. The appellant order has very rightly made observation as under:- "Moreover , he has contended that notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 is itself riddled with apparent legal flaws inasmuch as it states to have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the first provision to clause (46) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. For the ease of reference, the relevant clauses of subsection (46) of Section 2 of Sales Tax Act and Boards, letter dated 18.08.201 1 referred to above. In the said letter the observation is backed by CBR's clarification in the letter No.3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 which is not denied by appellant". v) That the CBR's letter . C. No. 3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 specifically issued on the subject of "Clarification Regarding Value of Supply". It is specifically denied that the letter is "incorrect and Illegal" as alleged. It is open for the appellant to seek confirmation/verification of the letter from FBR. vi) That clarification of "V alue of Supply made in CBR's letter dated 18.08.2001 has lost its validity during 2006. vii) That the letter has specifically dealt with section 2(46) and -clauses (a) and (d) of the said subsection. The letter has clearly stated that "imported goods when later on supplied in the local market are to be assessed in terms of clause (a), or if necessary , other remaining clause of the said subsection (46) of section 2". It is therefore misleading to say that Section 2(46) of Sales Tax Act was not discussed. viii) The CBR's letter in clear and unambi guous terms has defined the "value of supply" relied upon by Collector in Appellate Order . ix. That in absence of controverting the reasons recorded by the Collector (Appeal), for modification of Assessment Order dated 09.02.201 1, the appeal has no merits and may be dismissed in the interest of justice.
7. I have heard the representative of department/appellant Mr. Ghulam Yasin, A.O and Mr. Ilyas Ahsan, A.O. and Mr. G.A. Khan, Advocate appearing for the importer/respondent. I have also gone through the entire record available on the file. The main issues that are involved in this case are (i) whether the provisional assessments carried out under subsection (1) of section 81 of the Customs Act in these cases should have been finalized within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) thereof, (ii) whether the impugned order through which assessment of the goods had been carried out on 09.02.201 1 was unlawful to the extent of charging sales tax on .the instant goods in terms of Notification SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 for the reason that the aforesaid notification had been rescinded nearly two years before passing of the impugned order and (iii) whether subsection (46) of section 2 of the Act allows fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage, for the purpose of levy of sales tax. From the record, it is apparent that the good s imported in these cases has been provisionally assessed within the meaning of section 81 of the Customs Act on fulfillment of necessary legal requirements such as obtaining PDCs and Bank Guarantees (BGs) covering the differential amounts of duty/taxes. There fore, final determination of value of the provisionally assessed goods was required to be made within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) of section 81 of the Customs Act and non-fin alization of provisional assessments within the stipulated time limit of six (06). (or extended nine (09) months would have resulted in return of the PDCs/BGs to the appellants. However , the appellants had filed eight (08) CPs in the High Court .of Sindh in response to which the Honourable Court had set aside the provisional assessments and had directed the department to assess the goods afresh after conducting enquiries. Therefore, the case stood taken away from the purview of section 81 of the Customs Act and the learned counsel's plea on this point is rendered untenable as such. It, however , needs to be stated that the department should have passed the assessment order within the reasonable period of time whereas the assessment order dated 09.02.201 1 had been passed nearly five years after release of the goods and more than two years after above referred directive of the Honourabl e Sindh High Court. In the meantime, Notification SRO 732(I)/2016 dated 13.07.2006 was rescinded on 11.09.2009 through Notification SRO 799.(I)/2009. Therefore, at the time of passing of the impugned order on 9.02.201 1. Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 was not in existence and determining value of the goods on the basis of a non-existent notification is a nullity in the eyes of law: the only legal course of action left with the assessing officer on 09.02.201 1 was to determine value of the impugned goods for sales' tax purposes under clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act. Therefore, it is the inordinate delay in passing the assessment order which has actually nullified the department's claim o determining value of the instant goods in terms of Notification 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. I accordingly rule that the impugned order is not maintainable in law to the aforesaid extent. Therefore, issue no (iii) referred to above is of peripheral significance because any finding with respect to the same would not have any substantial bearing on the outcome of the instant proceedings. Anywhere, 'the learned counsel has contended that as per the letter of law contained in subsection
(46) of section 2 of the Sales tax Act value of imported goods cannot be fixed at the import stage. He has also relied upon the clarification issued by the Board vide letter bearing C.No.3/41- STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 in this regard. Moreover , he has contended that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 is itself riddled with apparent legal flaws inasmuch as it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. For the ease of reference, the relevant clauses of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and Board's letter dated 18.08.2001 referred to above. If it is presum ed for argument's sake that any such fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage has been authorized by law as the adjudication officer appears to believe, the whole scheme of collection of sales tax on imported goods at the import stage would be disturbed because there would be two values for the same goods at the same stage -- one for the purpose of charging customs duty and the other for the purpose of charging sales tax. In that eventually , the provisions of law contained in clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, which actually prescribe the method for determining value of imported goods at the import stage and charging sales tax thereon, would be severely compromised. Clearly , this could never be intent of the legislature. The above stated position also finds strength from Board's clarification issued vide letter dated 18.08.2001, reproduced above. Thus in my opinion, neither the letter of law nor the intent of the law contained in clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act authorities fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage for the purpose of levy of sales tax. I also observe that even the relevant provisions of law have not been quoted in the impugned notification: it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. It appears that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 was intended to be issued under clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act; but the afore-mentioned provision of law was not mentioned therein. This leads me to the strong belief that the author of the disputed notification neither read the sad clause (g) himself nor took the draft notification to the Law and Justice Division for vetting. Anyway , notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 had been issued without jurisdiction and, as such, was a nullity in the eyes of law in terms of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1995 Kar. 687, PLD 1975 SC 331, PLD 1971 SC 1971 and PLD 1973 SC 236 and the valuation of the goods based on the void notification is not maintainable in law. It may be pertinent to mention here that, presently , no notification is in the filed with regard to fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage and, therefore, the above finding does not carry any revenue implication for the department. However , it would be worthwhile for the relevant authorities to closely examine clauses (d) and (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and suitable amend the aforesaid clause (d) if, in future, value of any imported goods in sought to be fixed at the import stage for the purpose of charging sales tax. Anyway , for the reasons stated above, I find no illegality in the impugned Order-in-Appeals Nos.5527 to 5528/201 1 dated 2-7-201 1 passed by the appellate authority . Therefore, I uphold the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the appeal.
Appeal dismissed. imported goods at the pre-retail stage -- and not at the import stage. The rationale behind allowing such fixation of value is to include all types of taxes and value additions/profit margins in value of the imported goods up to the pre- retail stage and guard against any slippages. Thus, there is nothing in the letter of law contained subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, particularly clause (g) thereof, to suggest fixation of value of imported goods, at the import stage, for the purpose of levy of sales tax. The case law (PLD 1953 Lahore 433(a), 1993 SCMR 274(c), PLD 1964 SC 113, AIR 1943 Madras 733(b), PLD 1984 Kar. 345 and 1996 SCMR (sic) quoted by the learned counsel is strictly relevant to the facts and circumstances of the-instant cases. In the aforementioned case law it has been categorically held that a tax can only be charged under the clear letter of law. As a matter of example, the relevant part of one of the above mentioned authorities is reproduced as under:- "(b) Interpretation of Statutes -- T axing Statute Rule of Construction.
"Taxing statute must be construed strictly . In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no necessity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. The subject is not taxable by inference or by analogy , but only by the plaint words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case. If the person sought to be taxes comes within the letter of the law he must be taxes, however , great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if he cannot be brought within the letter of the law he is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. (AIR (30) 1943 Madras 733(b)
It is presumed for argument's sake that any such fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage has been authorized by law as the adjudication officer appears to believe, the whole scheme of collection of sales tax on imported goods at the import stage would be disturbed because there would be two values for the same goods at the same stage-one for the purpose of charging customs duty and the other for the purpose of charging sales tax.
In that eventually , the provisions of law contained in clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, which actually prescribe the method for determining value of imported goods at the import stage and charging sales tax thereon, would be severely compromised. Clearly , this could never be the intent of the legislature. The above stated position also finds strength from Board's clarification issued vide letter dated 18.08.2001, reproduced above. Thus, in my opinion, neither the letter of law nor the intent of the law contained in clause (g) of subsection
(46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act authorizes fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage for the purpose of levy of sales tax. I also observe that even the relevant provisions of law have not been quoted in the impugned notification: it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. It appears that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2 006 was intended to be issued under clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the sales Tax Act; but the 'afore-mentioned provision of law was not mentioned therein. This leads me to the strong belief that the author of the disputed notification neither read the said clause (g) himself nor took the draft notification to the Law and Justice Division for vetting. Anyway , Notification SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 had been issued without jurisdiction and, as such, was a nullity in the eyes of law in terms of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1995 Kar. 687, PLD 1975 SC 331, PLD 1971 SC 197 and PLD 1973 SC 236 and the valuation of the goods based on the void notification is not maintainable in law. It may be pertinent to mention here that, presently , no notifica tion is in the filed with regard to fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage and, therefore, the above findings does not carry any revenue implication for the department. However , it would be worthwhile for the relevant authorities to closely examine clauses (d) and (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and suitable amend the aforesaid clause (d) if, in future, value of any imported goods is sought to be fixed at the import stage for the purpose of charging sales tax. Anyway , for the reasons stated above, I set aside the impugn ed order inasmuch as the same relates to determination of value of the goods for the purpose of charging sales tax and order that the value of the instant goods for the purpose of charging sales tax be determined in terms of clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act. The impugned order is modified to the aforesaid extent only and the appeals are disposed of accordingly".
5. The appellant/department did not satisfy with the order of Collector of Customs, (Appeals), Karachi, filed this appeal before this Tribunal against Order-in-Appeals Nos. K-5527 to 5528/201 1 dated 02-07-201 1 on the following grounds:- i) That every time when the department completes the assessment and start recover the importers approached the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh and the last order of the Court was of dated 09.03.201 0 wherein the Hon'ble Court has disposed of the petition, i.e. C.P. No. D-931/2007, with the consent of the importer/petitioner's counsel, with the following order:- "At the out the set the counsel for the petitioner has placed on record a copy of Notification No. 799(I)/2009 dated 11.09.2009 by which the impugned notification dated 13.07.2006 has been rescinded. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is going to approach the customs authorities for the settlement of the matter and in terms of the order dated 20.01.2009 passed in C.P. No. D-149/2008 the customs department may be directed to examine the case of the petitioner and if any relief can be granted to the petitioner , same may be extended to them in accordance with law .
We dispose of this petition with the observation that if the petitioner is entitled to any relief, the same will be extended by the customs authorities in accordance with law ."
In the said order it is very much clearly stated that the importer/petitioner shall approach the customs authorities.
The available record shows that the petitioner/importer has not approached rather they just awakened when the department started recovery drive for the long outstanding securities. The aforesa id High Court's order is proving that the learned Collector (Appeals) observation about delay of five years is incorrect. Without prejudice to above even otherwise the law settled by the apex court in the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Tripple M (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2006 SC 209 = 2006 PTD 769 the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that:-- "No order can be scrapped or annulled or set aside only on the ground that the same has been passed with unreasonable delay"
Further in Article 245 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it is clearly stated that an order passed at delayed stage does not render such order as invalid or illegal.
That, secondly the aforesaid petition and may other petitions were filed with the prayer to declare that SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 as illegal and ultra vires, however , from plain reading of the Hon'ble High Court's order dated 09.03.2010 it is clear that the High Court has not accepted the said plea of the importers and infact remanded the case to the customs authorities to deal with in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Court was aware of the legal position that the SRO 799(1)/2009 dated 11.09.2001 has though rescind the SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 but the SRO 732(1)/2006 was neither cancelled retrospectively nor it was held to be illegal or ultra- vires, therefore, the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the issuanc e of SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 was illegal, is totally incorrect. iii) That further the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub-clause
(g) of clause (46) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is also incorrect. The learned Collector (Appeals) erred in law to attached the proviso mentioned at the end of clause (46) with the sub-clause (g) only, whereas the legal position is that the said provisos are for the whole clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which includes clauses (a) to (g). This fact is further confirmed from the contents of SRO 732(1)/2006 which clearly says that the said notification has been issued under clause (46) of Section 2 and there is mentioning of sub-clause (g) or (d), therefore, the learned Collector (Appeals) observation that the SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub- clause (g) of section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, in incorrect and infact the provisos appeared at the end of clause (46) of Section 2 provides exclusive powers to the Board to fix the value for sales tax Collector either at import stage or retail stage of supply and it is a settled principle of law that the proviso is to be read with the related parent Section. Taking into consideration the importer's submission before the Hon'ble High Court on 09.03.2010 (in C.P. No. D-931/2007) and before the learned Collector (Appeals) in para 3(i) of the impugned order-in-Appeal it is clear that the importers have otherwise satisfied with the assessment and they have only grievance with the application of SRO 732(1)/2006, that is why , their only prayer is to render the SRO 732(1)/2006 as ultra vires. iv) That the learned Collector (Appeal) reference to Board's letter C.No.3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 is incorrect and illegal. First of all copy of the said letter was not provided to the departmental representative and secondly the said clarification was issued in August, 2001, for a separate issue and not for SRO 732(1)/2006 which was issued in July, 2006, i.e. nearly after five years. Further neither the issue of proviso to section 2(46) was discussed nor the said clarification is relating to powers of. the Board for fixation of value for imported goods for levy of sales tax at import stage, therefore, the said clarifica tion is totally irrelevant to SRO 732(I)/2006 and the learned Collector (Appeals) observations in this regard carries no weight. v) That on the basis of facts and grounds plead herein above, it is prayed in the interest of justice that this hon'ble court may be pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order , passed by the learned Collector (Appeal).
6. Para-wise comments were submitted by the Advocate of respondent/importer as under:- i) That is a matter of record that Sindh High Court Order dated 09.03.2010 has nowhere said anything contrary to Respondents stand and has left it open for the departmental forums to resolve the issue at their level. Accordingly the respondent were allowed hearing where he supported the declared transaction valuation and pointed out department's inability to confront the respondent with any material to disprove the declared transaction valuation.
The respondent also pointed out the valuation adopted by department in identical/similar matters. The respondent also agitated the illegality in issuance of SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 before the Competent Authority i.e. Deputy Collector of Customs and having failed at the said forum recourse of appeal under Section 193 of Customs Act was adopted before Collector Appeal who passed a detailed order by recording his findings in para 7 of impugned order . ii) That the appellant has miserably failed to controvert any of the reasons which enabled the learned Collector of modify the impugned order by holding that SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 cannot be applied for determination of value for levy of Sales tax at import stage. The appellant have also failed to contradict the following points raised by learned Collector Appeal:- i) CBR's Clarification C. No. 3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 which has defined the terms "value of supply" under Section 2(46) of Sales Tax Act;. ii) At the time of passing impugned order dated 09.02.2001 SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.7.2006 was not in existence; iii) Determination of value based on a non-existence notification is illegal; iv) Inordinate delay in passing the assessment order has nullified the claim of department of determining value in terms of SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. v) SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 has been issued without jurisdiction. vi) Notification bears legal disqualification as preamble thereof says that notification is issued; vii) In exercise of Power conferred by first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act; iii) That "SRO 732(1)/2006 was issued under sub-clause (g) of clause (46) of Section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 as alleged. iv) That the appellate order has clearly elaborated the distinction between sub-section -- clause and sub-clause used, in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 which has primarily constituted the basis of present legal flaw. The appellant order has very rightly made observation as under:- "Moreover , he has contended that notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 is itself riddled with apparent legal flaws inasmuch as it states to have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the first provision to clause (46) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in Section 2 of Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. For the ease of reference, the relevant clauses of subsection (46) of Section 2 of Sales Tax Act and Boards, letter dated 18.08.201 1 referred to above. In the said letter the observation is backed by CBR's clarification in the letter No.3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 which is not denied by appellant". v) That the CBR's letter . C. No. 3/41-STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 specifically issued on the subject of "Clarification Regarding Value of Supply". It is specifically denied that the letter is "incorrect and Illegal" as alleged. It is open for the appellant to seek confirmation/verification of the letter from FBR. vi) That clarification of "V alue of Supply made in CBR's letter dated 18.08.2001 has lost its validity during 2006. vii) That the letter has specifically dealt with section 2(46) and -clauses (a) and (d) of the said subsection. The letter has clearly stated that "imported goods when later on supplied in the local market are to be assessed in terms of clause (a), or if necessary , other remaining clause of the said subsection (46) of section 2". It is therefore misleading to say that Section 2(46) of Sales Tax Act was not discussed. viii) The CBR's letter in clear and unambi guous terms has defined the "value of supply" relied upon by Collector in Appellate Order . ix. That in absence of controverting the reasons recorded by the Collector (Appeal), for modification of Assessment Order dated 09.02.201 1, the appeal has no merits and may be dismissed in the interest of justice.
7. I have heard the representative of department/appellant Mr. Ghulam Yasin, A.O and Mr. Ilyas Ahsan, A.O. and Mr. G.A. Khan, Advocate appearing for the importer/respondent. I have also gone through the entire record available on the file. The main issues that are involved in this case are (i) whether the provisional assessments carried out under subsection (1) of section 81 of the Customs Act in these cases should have been finalized within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) thereof, (ii) whether the impugned order through which assessment of the goods had been carried out on 09.02.201 1 was unlawful to the extent of charging sales tax on .the instant goods in terms of Notification SRO 732(I)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 for the reason that the aforesaid notification had been rescinded nearly two years before passing of the impugned order and (iii) whether subsection (46) of section 2 of the Act allows fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage, for the purpose of levy of sales tax. From the record, it is apparent that the good s imported in these cases has been provisionally assessed within the meaning of section 81 of the Customs Act on fulfillment of necessary legal requirements such as obtaining PDCs and Bank Guarantees (BGs) covering the differential amounts of duty/taxes. There fore, final determination of value of the provisionally assessed goods was required to be made within the time limit stipulated under subsection (2) of section 81 of the Customs Act and non-fin alization of provisional assessments within the stipulated time limit of six (06). (or extended nine (09) months would have resulted in return of the PDCs/BGs to the appellants. However , the appellants had filed eight (08) CPs in the High Court .of Sindh in response to which the Honourable Court had set aside the provisional assessments and had directed the department to assess the goods afresh after conducting enquiries. Therefore, the case stood taken away from the purview of section 81 of the Customs Act and the learned counsel's plea on this point is rendered untenable as such. It, however , needs to be stated that the department should have passed the assessment order within the reasonable period of time whereas the assessment order dated 09.02.201 1 had been passed nearly five years after release of the goods and more than two years after above referred directive of the Honourabl e Sindh High Court. In the meantime, Notification SRO 732(I)/2016 dated 13.07.2006 was rescinded on 11.09.2009 through Notification SRO 799.(I)/2009. Therefore, at the time of passing of the impugned order on 9.02.201 1. Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 was not in existence and determining value of the goods on the basis of a non-existent notification is a nullity in the eyes of law: the only legal course of action left with the assessing officer on 09.02.201 1 was to determine value of the impugned goods for sales' tax purposes under clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act. Therefore, it is the inordinate delay in passing the assessment order which has actually nullified the department's claim o determining value of the instant goods in terms of Notification 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006. I accordingly rule that the impugned order is not maintainable in law to the aforesaid extent. Therefore, issue no (iii) referred to above is of peripheral significance because any finding with respect to the same would not have any substantial bearing on the outcome of the instant proceedings. Anywhere, 'the learned counsel has contended that as per the letter of law contained in subsection
(46) of section 2 of the Sales tax Act value of imported goods cannot be fixed at the import stage. He has also relied upon the clarification issued by the Board vide letter bearing C.No.3/41- STB/99 dated 18.08.2001 in this regard. Moreover , he has contended that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 is itself riddled with apparent legal flaws inasmuch as it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. For the ease of reference, the relevant clauses of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and Board's letter dated 18.08.2001 referred to above. If it is presum ed for argument's sake that any such fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage has been authorized by law as the adjudication officer appears to believe, the whole scheme of collection of sales tax on imported goods at the import stage would be disturbed because there would be two values for the same goods at the same stage -- one for the purpose of charging customs duty and the other for the purpose of charging sales tax. In that eventually , the provisions of law contained in clause (d) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, which actually prescribe the method for determining value of imported goods at the import stage and charging sales tax thereon, would be severely compromised. Clearly , this could never be intent of the legislature. The above stated position also finds strength from Board's clarification issued vide letter dated 18.08.2001, reproduced above. Thus in my opinion, neither the letter of law nor the intent of the law contained in clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act authorities fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage for the purpose of levy of sales tax. I also observe that even the relevant provisions of law have not been quoted in the impugned notification: it states to have been issued "in exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to clause (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990" whereas no clause (46) or first proviso thereof exists in section 2 of the Sales Tax Act at all meaning thereby that the aforementioned notification had been issued with least application of mind. It appears that Notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 was intended to be issued under clause (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act; but the afore-mentioned provision of law was not mentioned therein. This leads me to the strong belief that the author of the disputed notification neither read the sad clause (g) himself nor took the draft notification to the Law and Justice Division for vetting. Anyway , notification SRO 732(1)/2006 dated 13.07.2006 had been issued without jurisdiction and, as such, was a nullity in the eyes of law in terms of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1995 Kar. 687, PLD 1975 SC 331, PLD 1971 SC 1971 and PLD 1973 SC 236 and the valuation of the goods based on the void notification is not maintainable in law. It may be pertinent to mention here that, presently , no notification is in the filed with regard to fixation of value of imported goods at the import stage and, therefore, the above finding does not carry any revenue implication for the department. However , it would be worthwhile for the relevant authorities to closely examine clauses (d) and (g) of subsection (46) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act and suitable amend the aforesaid clause (d) if, in future, value of any imported goods in sought to be fixed at the import stage for the purpose of charging sales tax. Anyway , for the reasons stated above, I find no illegality in the impugned Order-in-Appeals Nos.5527 to 5528/201 1 dated 2-7-201 1 passed by the appellate authority . Therefore, I uphold the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the appeal.