MRS. SYEDA TAHIRA SAFDAR, J.---This appeal was preferred against the judgment dated 20th June 2001, of the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Suppression of Terrorists Activities (STA), Quetta, whereby the accused/respondent Abdul Wadood son of Mir Ahmed Nawaz was acquitted of the charge, on acceptance of his application filed under section 265-K Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). The acquittal order was challenged on grounds that there was sufficient evidence available on the record to connect the respondent/accused with commission of the offence.
Further, the requirement of section 8 of the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, (hereinafter referred as Act. 1975), which placed burden on the accused person to establish his innocence, was not adhered to, thus an illegality was committed which needs reconsideration of the matter. Furthermore, in view of the fact that sufficient evidence was available on record, therefore the acquittal of the respondent in pre-mature stage was unwarranted. Furthermore, the provisions of section 265-K. Cr.P.0 were not attracted in the instant case. Therefore, due to misapplication of law, misexercise of discretion, and misappreciation of evidence prejudiced the case of the prosecution.
' Further, the statements of the prosecution witnesses Tanveer Qureshi, and Syed Kaleem Imam were discarded only for the reason of delay in recording of their statements under section 161 Cr.P.C, which was a misconception of law on part of the trial court. It was prayed that the impugned judgment be set aside, and the respondent/accused be convicted for the offence punishable under section 17(3) Offences against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance VI of 1979).
2. The brief facts of the cease were that pursuant to F.I.R. No,196 of 1998 Police Station Civil Lines, Quetta dated 21st December 1998, occurrence of an incident was reported, whereby several persons, under the command of the present respondent Abdul Wadood, formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons. In furtherance of their common intention, entered the premises of the Civil Hospital, Quetta, to secure the release of two accused persons namely Muhammad Ameen, and Abdul Rasool, who were under treatment in the hospital when they were in legal custody. It was reported that during course the accused persons snatched official arms, and ammunition from the police personnel, present on duty at the Hospital ward. They also detained the police personnel, on duty Doctors, and staff of the hospital, and under treatment patients with show of arms. While making firing they succeeded to escape from the site along with the said under treatment prisoneRs, The record disclosed' that the incident consisted of a chain of events, therefore, eight separate cases were prepared with distinct offences as an outshoot of the same F.I.R. The instant case pertains to commission of the offence of Harabah punishable under section 17(3) Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The respondent was charged for the offence on 29th November 2000 as under: "That you along with absconding accused in furtherance of common intention on 21-12-1998 at 8- 45 p.m. Formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons illegally entered in Civil Hospital, Quetta with intention to commit some offence and on resistance of police you snatched 38 bore revolver with 9 cartridges from Yawar Abbas, one revolver with six rounds from Ahmed Bakhsh, one Kalashnikov with 30 rounds from Syed Noor Constable and removed accused Abdul Rasool and Amin from police custody and snatched away one SMG from constable Amin with 30 round, one SMG with 30 rounds from Muhammad Yaqoob, who reached at the place of incident on getting information, and thereby committed the (-) an offence punishable under section 17(3) of Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, within the cognizance of this court."
3. The respondent/accused denied the charge, and claimed trial. Consequent thereon the prosecution produced eighteen witnesses, and their statements were recorded. But, at this stage an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Was filed by the respondent/accused seeking his premature acquittal. The trial court accepted the application, and acquitted the respondent/accused of the charge through the impugned judgment dated 20th June 2001. The instant appeal seeks the setting aside of the impugned lodgment, and further to convert the acquittal into a conviction.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent/accused objected to the maintainability of the appeal before this court. He stated that the jurisdiction vests with the Federal Shariat Court due to the fact that the charge was framed for an offence punishable under Ordinance, VI of 1979. The learned counsel referred to section 24(1) of the Ordinance, VI of 1979. He further argued that the instant appeal was filed beyond the stipulated period of thirty (30) days, therefore, it is time barred as it was filed with a delay of more than a year, that too, without any application or condonation of delay. The learned counsel also objected to the competency of the Assistant Advocate General, under whose signature instant appeal had been filed, and that the appeal must be accompanied with the. Notification disclosing his appointment as Public Prosecutor, but, no such Notification was filed. The learned counsel concluded that as the appeal being filed incompetently, therefore, deserved dismissal. As far as merits of the case were concerned, the learned counsel contended that none of the prosecution witnesses had deposed against the respondent/accused, nor implicated him in the commission of the offence. Further, the evidence of the prosecution was full of contradictions, and variations, therefore, it become doubtful, and cannot be relied upon. The learned counsel concluded that in a case of acquittal there was always a double presumption of innocence attached to the acquittal of an accused person; therefore, the appellant was to establish his case free from all doubts, on basis of specific evidence, but it was missing, in the instant case.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the State was in agreement with the proposition of the learned counsel for the respondent that the jurisdiction lies with the Federal Shariat Court, but requested that instead of returning it, the appeal be sent to the concerned court having jurisdiction in the matter for further proceedings. It was further his contention that though the appeal was filed under the signature of the. Assistant Advocate General, but he was very much competent to file an acquittal appeal, as the office he held was covered by the term "Public Prosecutor".
6. The perusal of the case file reveals that on filing of this appeal it was noted down in the order sheet dated 2nd August 2006 by our learned predecessors that: It may be noted that F.I.R. Was registered under section 17(3) Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 and case was tried and decided by the learned Sessions Judge. Record does not reflect that the matter was ever tried under the Act or any order was passed by a Special Judge for which purpose the appeal was withdrawn and filed before this Court, thus notice be issued to learned A.G. To argue and explain the position about maintainability of the appeal on a date fixed by the office."
7. That through order dated 30th June 2011, this Court decided the issue, and held. That as the matter was proceeded by the Special Judge acting under the provisions of the Suppression of the Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, therefore, irrespective of the fact whether it resulted in a conviction, or an acquittal the judgment shall be appealable before a High Court. While deciding the issue, reliance was placed upon section 7 of the Act, 1975, which is very much clear to the effect. Therefore, the appeal was Held to be maintainable before this court.
8. In addition thereto certain facts appeared from the perusal of the case file that initially the appeal was filed before the Federal Shariat Court, but it was returned vide order dated 21st November 2002 to the advocate for the State, to file the same before the proper Forum. In compliance thereof the instant appeal was filed before High Court. In presence of these facts the counsel for the respondents were not justified to raise objection on jurisdiction of this court, and to question the maintainability of the instant appeal. Therefore no further findings arc required in the matter to this extent.
9. The rejection of the instant appeal was also sought contending that it was filed by an unauthorized person. It was objected that as no notification about the appointment of Public Prosecutor was filed with the memo of appeal; therefore, the Assistant Advocate General was not competent to file instant appeal under his signature. The reply of learned State Counsel was only to the effect that the Assistant Advocate General was empowered to file the appeal.
10. Sections 492 and 493, Cr.P.C describes the power of the Provincial Government for appointment of Public Prosecutor for purpose of proceeding with the cases. The matter in hand is an appeal in case of acquittal filed under the provisions of section 7 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975, whereby an order dated 20th June 2001 had been challenged. Therefore, the appeal was required to be filed under section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which was in the filed. Section 18 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 describes the Public Prosecutor for proceeding with the cases before Anti-Terrorism Court, High Court, or Supreme Court. Subsection (2) of the Section describes the Public Prosecutor so appointed to be the same as the Public Prosecutor appointed under section 492, Cr.P.C. Section 25 subsection (4) empowers the Advocate General to file an appeal against an order of acquittal, within a period of thirty days but subject to appointment as Public Prosecutor. In case in hand the appeal was filed under the signature of the Assistant Advocate General, included within the ambit of Advocate General. Though there was negligence on the part of the office of the Advocate General by not placing on record the order to the effect with the memo of appeal, but, the appeal in hand cannot be dismissed on this ground alone. The appeal remained pending for a considerable time, and at the relevant time the Advocate General, Assistant Advocate General were conducting cases on behalf of the State before this Court.
Therefore, it can safely be presumed that he was duly empowered. Therefore. The objection is over ruled.
11. The second objection on maintainability of the instant appeal pertains to filing, of the appeal beyond the provided period. The instant appeal was filed against an order of acquittal made on 20th June, 2001. Section 25 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 describes the time, and the procedure for filing of an appeal in case of an acquittal. Thirty days' time is provided in subsection (4) of the Section for filing, an appeal against an order of acquittal. In the case in hand the judgment dated 20th June, 2001 was assailed, but the appeal was filed on 19th December, 2002. i,e, after a lapse of more than one year. However, as mentioned hereinabove initially an appeal against the impugned judgment was filed before the Federal Shariat Court, which was numbered as Criminal Appeal No,55/Q of 2001, and it remained pending, and it was returned to the appellant vide order dated 21st November, 2002. Consequent thereupon, the instant appeal was filed on 19th December, 2002 before this Court. The time is to be counted from the date of the judgment, but before approaching this court the forum of Shariat Court was moved, and upon the appeal's return the instant appeal was filed, which was within the stipulated thirty (30) days. Moreover, the appeal was admitted for regular hearing vide order dated 12th June, 2003 without any objection as to limitation, and has remained pending for a long period therefore, it needs decision on merits. Under the circumstances, the objection pertaining to the appeal being time barred is hereby overruled.
12. We now revert to the merits of the case. The involvement of the respondent in commission of the offences had to be evaluated keeping in view the material on record the perusal of the record reveals that the respondent/ accused was specifically nominated in the F.I.R. No,196 of 1998, lodged at Police Station Civil Lines, Quetta, as is apparent from its contents. The charge framed against the accused was for the offence of Harabah punishable under section 17(3) of the Offences against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The case as made out by the prosecution, not only named the present respondent but also named several other persons being involved in the commission of the offence, with further specification of their respective roles. The prosecution further asserted apprehending three of the named persons from the site soon after commission of the offence. These three persons namely Tanveer Ahmed, All Ahmed, and Rehmatullah along with co-accused Bashir Ahmed were tried, and convicted for the offence punishable under section 149, P.P.C. Vide judgment dated 15th August, 2000 of Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Quetta. The present respondent was initially declared absconder, on his arrest the case was challaned to his extent, but, he was acquitted. The fact that the findings were not recorded on merits in case of the respondent on the completion of the trial, is an admitted feature of the case. Rather, a premature acquittal was recorded in his favour by accepting the application submitted within the provisions of section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
13. The said application was filed with the contention that the identification of the accused/present respondent was doubtful, but this doubt could only be removed by holding of identification parade after arrest of the respondent. However, no identification parade was held. It was further asserted that two of the prosecution witnesses namely P.W.2 Nisar Kazim Kazmi P.W.15 Abdul Majeed though described as eye witnesses, but they were declared hostile, and the remaining independent witnesses failed to connect him (the respondent) with the commission of the offence. Furthermore, the statements of P.W.9 & P.W.10 under section 161, Cr.P.C. Were recorded with a delay of two years, without any explanation; therefore, their courts' statements were stated to be worthless, and liable to be discarded. The acquittal was also claimed on the ground that the persons from whom arms and ammunition were snatched, when appeared before the court were unable to identify him (the present respondent) as being the real culprit, as the persons had their faces covered, therefore, they could not be identified. It was contended that since the nominated persons had already been exonerated by the witnesses and only formal witnesses remained to be produced, therefore, there remained no possibility of a conviction of the respondent in the instant case, and his acquittal was prayed.
14. The perusal of the case file reveals that one of the co-accused namely Aminullah Khan was also acquitted of the charge through order dated 23rd April, 2001, by the trial court, while accepting an application of same nature filed by said accused person. However, the case of the respondent. And that of co-accused Aminullah were distinct, and have to dealt independently.
15. The trial court while deciding the fate of the application filed under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Held that only P.W.2 & P.W.3 tried to, implicate the accused (respondent) in the commission of the alleged offence. Further, the statements of P.W.9 & P.W.10 were of no importance, as they were neither examined by the prosecution during trial before the court of Sessions Judge (Adhoc).
Quetta, nor their statements were recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. In time. It was further held that the respondent was not properly identified at the site, as the prosecution witnesses described either it to be dark at the site at the relevant time, or the culprits were with muffled faces. Further, the delay in recording of the statements of P.W.9 & P.W.10 within the meaning of section 161, Cr.P.C.
Was not explained. The trial court also noted several contradictions and improvements in the statements of the witnesses, thereby concluded that the majority of the eye witnesses failed to implicate the accused in the commission of the offence. Therefore, in the absence of direct evidence to the effect that either he respondent/ accused) himself, or on his command any of his companions snatched official weapons from the police personnel, the case of the prosecution remained unproved. The trial court concluded that as the co-accused Tanveer Ahmed, Bashir Ahmed, All Ahmed and Rehmatullah, though arrested from the site, and faced trial, but were acquitted by the Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Quetta therefore, in similar situation, and on same set of evidence the accused/respondent also deserves for the same treatment. Consequent thereof the trial court recorded acquittal in favour of the respondent/accused.
16. The trial court exercised powers under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. And passed the impugned order.
Therefore. The reproduction of the. Said Section will be beneficial: "265-K. Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage-- Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case; if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence."
17. From a perusal of the Section it is clear that a court is empowered to pass an order of acquittal in favour of an accused person without waiting for finalization of any proceedings, as it uses the words at any stage of the case. However, there are few pre-requisites before exercise of such powers, Firstly hearing the prosecutor and the accused person, secondly the decision arrived at must be with reasons, and thirdly there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. Though a discretion is surely available with a court before whom the case is pending for adjudication, but, this discretion is to be exercised with due care, and caution, and within the parameters provided in the said section. Further, the existence of a right in favour of an accused person must not result in deprivation of the prosecution, from having an opportunity to produce evidence to establish its case. Therefore, in such cases the determining factor will be the non- existence of any probability that an accused can be convicted of any offence. In addition thereto this exercise of discretion under the Section must base on reasons, which are to be recorded by the court on the basis of the material available on the record. The case in hand is to be assessed, and legality or illegality of the impugned order is to be determined, on the basis of these parameters,
18. Before evaluating the material on record it will be beneficial to take guidance from verdict of the Honorable Supreme Court with reference to premature acquittal in case titled as The State v. Raja Abdul Rehman reported in 2005 SCM R 1544. It was held by their lordships that: "there can be no dispute that an application under section 249-A Cr.P.C. Can be filed, taken up for hearing and decided at any time or stage of the proceedings and the words "at any stage" denote that the application under section 249-A, Cr. P. C. Can be filed even before prosecution evidence had been recorded or while the exercise of recording of evidence is going or when the exercise is over. It is, however, to be noted that though there is no bar for an accused person to file application under section 249-A, Cr. P. C. At any stage of the proceedings of the case yet the facts and circumstances of the prosecution case will have to be kept in mind and considered in deciding the viability or feasibility of filing an application at any particular stage. The special or peculiar facts and circumstances of a prosecution case may not warrant filing of an application at a stage when the entire prosecution evidence had been recorded and the case was fixed for recording of statement of the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C. This Court in the cases of Bashir Ahmad v. Zafar ul Islam PLD 2004 SC 298 and Muhammad Sharif v. The State and another PLD 1999 SC 1063 (supra) did not approve decision of criminal cases on an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Or such, allied or similar provisions of law, namely, section 265-K, Cr.P.C. And observed that usually a criminal case should be allotted to be disposed of on merits after recording of the prosecution evidence, statement of the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., recording of statement of accused under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. If so desired by the accused persons and hearing the arguments of the counsel of the parties and that the provisions of section 249-4, section 265-K and section 561-A of the Cr. P.C. Should not normally be pressed into action for decision of fate of a criminal case."
' A complete guideline is provided by their lordships for exercise of powers under sections 249-A, 265-K and 561-A, Cr P.C. In view of the same a decision of acquittal is to be made in rare cases under the mentioned sections, instead making decision on merits is to be preferred. The learned judges further held: "18. It will not be out of place to mention that in appeal or provisional proceedings, the order of acquittal of the accused under section 249-A or section 265-K of the Cr. P. C. Would not have the.
Same sanctity as orders of acquittal on merits. Consequently, the principles which are to be observed and applied in setting aside concurrent findings of acquitted or the principle relating to the presumption of double innocence when an accused is acquitted after a full-fledged inquiry and trial to acquittals under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Would not be applicable."
' In case titled as The State v. Azam Malik reported in PLD 2005 SC 686, it was held by the honorable Supreme Court that: "There were serious allegations that there was tampering/ overwriting/cutting of the relevant register of bills of entry, the matter was inquired into at the departmental level and the allegations were found to be correct. Ex facie there was documentary, oral and circumstantial evidence to prove the charges. In the face of this material the Trial Court could not have invoked section 265- K, Cr.P.C. And acquit the respondents."
' Keeping in view the guidelines as provided, the effect of the order of acquittal made under the provisions of section 265-K, Cr.P.C, the material on record, and the reasons assigned for acquittal are to be seen, and findings are to be recorded.
19. In the instant case eighteen witnesses appeared and got recorded their statements as prosecution witnesses (P.Ws.). Out of them P.W.2 to P. W.16 were described as eye-witnesses of the occasion. The perusal of their statements revealed that while appearing before the court all of them affirmed occurrence of the incident. But, except P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.9 and P.W.10 the remaining witnesses refused to identify the accused/respondent before the court, and doubted about his (accused/ respondent's) presence at the site. Some of these witnesses described the reason for not identifying the present respondent at the site, as the culprits were either veiled, or it was dark at the relevant time being night hours, But as far as prosecution witnesses Nos.1, 3, 9 and 10 were concerned they not only asserted presence of the respondent/ accused at the site at relevant time, but, with an assertion to identify him at the site. They (witnesses) also identified him before the court. Further, these witnesses specifically deposed about involvement of the respondent/accused in the commission of the offence, with further assertion that the series of the acts were committed on the instigation, and supervision of the respondent/ accused by the co- accused persons being his accomplices. In addition thereto P.W.13 Tasleem Hassan ASI and P. W.16 Shabban Ali IP though not identified the respondent/accused in the court, but, presence of the respondent/accused at the site was asserted. Further, both the witnesses described co-accused as men of Wadood Raisani, the present respondent. The statement of these fifteen witnesses cannot be brushed aside. Further, in addition to the direct evidence in shape of eye-witnesses, circumstantial evidence was also available on record. Because none of the prosecution witnesses denied occurrence of the incident. Even this occurrence was not denied, nor the presence of the witnesses at the site at the relevant time was disputed in defence. Therefore, the depositions made by the witnesses, with identification of the accused persons at site, and in the court cannot be overlooked.
20. Furthermore, the trial court while assessing the material before it discarded the evidence of P.W.9 Kaleem Imam, and P.W.10 Tanveer Qureshi, both of them described as eye-witnesses, only on the ground that their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. Were recorded by the police with a delay of more than two (02) years, The delay in recording of statements cannot become the sole ground for rejecting evidence of two eye-witnesses, as no time limit is provided in section 161, Cr.P.C. Rather this Section only mentions about the examination of any person during the course of investigation, who is supposed to be acquainted with the facts, by a police officer while investigating the matter.
Therefore, the delay in recording of the statement of a prosecution witness under this section by itself is not a sufficient ground to make the evidence, so collected out of consideration. Rather, it will be the accompanying circumstances, which may provide a ground for non-acceptance of such statement in evidence, if the delay so occurred is based on mala fides to fill up the lacuna or there was an effort to falsely implicate a person in the commission of the offence, not nominated in initial report, which can effect admissibility of the evidence, create suspicion in credibility of the witness, and diminish its evidentiary value. The delay in recording of statements 'of witnesses, under section 161, Cr.P.C, is not fatal in each case, rather the facts, and circumstances are to be considered in each case. In the facts, and circumstances of the instant case the trial court was not justified in not believing the statements of P.W.9 and P.W.10 only on the ground of delay in recording of their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. Because, from the material on record, their presence at the site, and their participation in the operation carried out by the Police Authorities was not a disputed fact.
21 . But, this was not the case with the prosecution witness No,2 (P.W.2) Nisar Kazim Kazmi and P.W.3 Ahmed Bakhsh, because their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. Were recorded without any delay. Both the witnesses not only fully, implicated the respondent/accused in the commission of the offence, and stated that he was the main culprit, but, they also identified him specifically.
Despite their specific statements, the trial court failed to consider their testimony and did not distinguish them from P.W.9 and P.W.10. The same was the case with the remaining witnesses too.
As mentioned hereinabove the presence of these witnesses at the site was denied. Therefore, the evidentiary value of the statements of these witnesses were to be considered, while arriving at a decision. Unfortunately the trial court simply disbelieved their statements in contravention of law, and justice.
22. From the perusal of the record it was further observed that there were constant requests for declaring the remaining witnesses as hostile, during process of recording of their statements before the trial court. But, on most of the occasions the request so made was turned down by the trial court, with the reason that no previous statements of these witnesses were recorded during the course of investigation. The trial court seemed to be under some misconception. Article 150 of the Qanunc-Shahadat Order, 1984, allow a party to put questions to his own witnesses, which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. However, there is no requirement that existence of a previously recorded statement is mandatory. Rather, the only determinative factor is that the evidence given by the witness is unfavourable to the party calling him, or it is contrary to the evidence which is expected from such witness. The trial court failed to consider the same before declining the request made by the counsel for the State, thereby committed an error. The trial court further failed to realize the legal proposition that declaring a witness as hostile does not mean that reliance cannot he placed on his evidence. Therefore, merely because a witness has been declared as hostile, his evidence cannot be brushed aside. Rather its evidentiary value is to be assessed as per relevant provisions of law. However, there was a complete failure on the part of the trial court in the observance of this legal formality, which resulted in an erroneous decision.
23. From the material on record it is evident that nearly all of the prosecution witnesses cited in the calendar of witnesses appeared before the court, and there was sufficient material before the court on basis of which there was a probability that the accused person/the respondent may have been convicted for the offence alleged against him. Therefore, his premature acquittal was not justified in the circumstances. Further, though the trial court discussed the evidence at length but it failed to record findings in respect of the charge against the accused person/respondent. It seems that the trial court. While deciding applications of the same nature moved in connected cases, discussed the material in context to the said eases, but the instant case pertaining to the offence under section 17(3) Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, was very briefly discussed, and acquitted the accused/ respondent, which was not proper. The trial court should have distinctly deal with the instant case, and decide it.
24. In view of above mentioned facts, the presence of sufficient evidence, coupled with the fact that the proceedings were at final stages, the trial court should not have acquitted the accused/respondent while exercising powers under section 265-K, Cr.P.C, and instead should have concluded the proceedings, and after examining the accused, and recording, evidence in defence, made a decision on merits of the case. The Honorable Supreme in the Court in the case of State v.
Raja Abdul Rehman (supra) held "that same sanctity cannot be accorded to the acquittal at intermediary stages, such as under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr. P. C, as available for those recorded and based on full-fledged evidence". The premature acquittal of the respondent accused therefore, does not create the double presumption of innocence in his favour, which needs consideration while dealing with an acquittal secured after a judgment on merits, and not one based on an acquittal at intermediary stage under section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
24. In view of the above discussion, the trial court was not justified in accepting the application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. And recording premature acquittal in favour of the respondent.
Resultantly the impugned order is not sustainable. The impugned order dated 20th June, 2001 of Sessions Judge/Special Judge, STA, Quetta is hereby set aside. The case is deemed to be pending before the trial court which is directed to proceed with the matter strictly in accordance with law.
Since this is an old matter, therefore, the trial court is directed to proceed, expeditiously and complete the proceedings preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.
The appeal is partly allowed in above terms.