KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, J.---This petition is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 3-7-2001 (announced on 5-7-2001 allowing Criminal Miscellaneous No,49-Q of 2001 as a result whereof the proceedings in a criminal trial arising out of F.I.R No,408 dated 14-8-1999 of Police Station North Cantt. Of District Lahore, were quashed.
2. This matter before us revolves around two individuals. Namely Dr.Imrana Bashir and Tanvir Ahmad. Dr. Imrana who is the daughter of Bashir petitioner before us and Tanvir Ahmad who is respondent No,2 before us and is the son of the 1st and the 3rd respondents, got married to each other on 14-2-1992 but the Rulchsati took place on 18-1-1995. They appear not to have had a settled matrimonial life and it was within about ten months of the Rukhsati that Tanvir respondent divorced Dr. Imrana through a divorce deed dated 25-11-1995 which divorce deed is available at pages 126 and 127 of our file. However, better sense thereafter appears to have prevailed upon them and the two spouses reunited as the divorce was revocable because only a single divorce appeared to have been pronounced by the husband. The exact date of this re-union is not discernible from the record but what is available on record is that the two spouses then lived together till 18-6-1999 and during this period two sons, namely, Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Ahmad were also born out of this wedlock. On 18-6-1999, their matrimonial life again got disrupted resulting in their separation. About the incident of the said date, an F.I.R, bearing No,172 was recorded at Police Station 'Satto Katla' of District Lahore on 28-7-1999 at the instance of the father of Tanvir respondent, namely, Zafarul Islam respondent. It was mentioned by the said Zafarul Islam through the said F.I.R that his son Tanvir and Tanvir's wife, Dr.Irmrana had a quarrel on 18-6-1999 where after Tanvir rang up Dr.Imrana's father to take his daughter away; that Dr.Imrana's father namely, Bashir petitioner came to their house with his son the same day at about 4/5 p.m. And took his daughter and her two sons to his house; that Bashir petitioner returned to their house at about 8-00 p.m. Along with his son and 8/10 other persons; that they were all armed and extended threats of killing Tanvir; that they belabored Zafarul Islam and his wife Mst. Rehana and on the alarm raised by them their neighbors and their guard got attracted; that the assailants damaged the household articles and went away and that while so leaving they took away some cash, some prize bonds and two telephone sets.
3. On 14-8-1999 i,e, about two months after the above mentioned incident, Bashir petitioner also lodged an F.I.R at Police Station North Cantt. Of District, Lahore bearing. No,408 of 1999 alleging therein that in the month of May of the year 1999 Zafarul Islam and his wife Mst.Rehana Kishwar respondents came to his house and requested for a loan of Rs,20,50 000 with a commitment to return the said amount after selling their NESPAK plot; that on 4-5-1999 Bashir petitioner paid the said amount of money to Zafar Islam and Mst. Rehana Kishwar respondents; that after some time the said respondents gave two cheques bearing No,25930763 and 25930752 for Rs,10,00,000 and Rs,10,50,000 respectively towards the satisfaction of the said loan; that Bashir petitioner presented these cheques for encashment initially on 29-6-1999 and subsequently on 7-7-1999 but on both these occasions, the cheques were returned to the petitioner un cashed. Bashir petitioner had further alleged through the said F.I.R. That through their above-noticed conduct Zafarul Islam and Mst. Rehana Kishwar had committed fraud upon him.
4. While the said F.I.R No,408 of 1999 was still under investigation, Tanvir respondent filed a Constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court bearing Writ Petition No,10946 of 2000 seeking a declaration that the Registration of said F.I.R No,408/1999 was illegal, without lawful authority and was, therefore, of no legal effect. When the said writ petition came up before the Hon'ble High Court for final disposal on 5-10-2000, the challan in the case arising out of the said F.I.R No,408 of 1999 had already been submitted in Court and the said writ petition was resultantly dismissed with the observation that since the challan stood filed in Court, therefore, the accused petitioner could avail of the remedies which had become available to him.
5. The accused respondents then submitted an application in the Court of the learned trial Magistrate under section 249-A of the Cr.P.C. Praying for their acquittal. The said application was dismissed on 20-2-2001 essentially on the ground that the trial was still in its infancy as only the charge had been framed by them; that, prima facie, material in the form of two dishonored cheques and the Return Slips of the Bank was available with the prosecution; that the veracity or otherwise of the allegations of the prosecution that the cheques in question had been issued with a dishonest intention to cheat the complainant and the falsity or otherwise of the defence plea that the said cheques had been stolen by Bashir complainant, could be determined only after+ recording of evidence; that the allegation of mala fides levelled by the accused persons was again a question of fact which could be resolved only through the recording of evidence; that the prosecution witnesses were present in Court even on the day when the said application under section 249-A, Cr.P.0 was being argued which indicated that it was not a case where the prosecution was not diligent in pursuing the same and finally that the application in question was premature and the issue could be properly decided only after some evidence had been recorded.
6. The accused respondents appear to have felt dissatisfied with the dismissal of their said application and consequently approached the Lahore High Court with an application under section 561-A of the Cr.P.C. Praying that the proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R No,408 of 1999 be quashed. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court was pleased to allow this application through the above-mentioned order dated 3-7-2001 which was announced on 5-7-2001 as a result whereof the proceedings in the said criminal trial pending before the learned trial Magistrate were quashed.
7. Hence this petition by Bashir complainant of the quashed case arising out of the above mentioned F.I.R. No,408 of 1999 of Police Station North Cantt. Of Lahore.
8. On a legal objection raised before it regarding the availability of a remedy under section 439 of the Cr.P.0 and the consequent non-maintainability of the petition under section 561A, Cr.P.C., the learned Judge in Chamber found that availability of an alternate remedy was no bar to the maintainability of an application under section 561-A of the Cr.P.C., and thereafter having proceeded to examine the merits of the case, the learned Single Judge quashed the proceedings in question.
9. On the merits of the case the learned Judge held that:- "The story of giving as a loan a sum of Rs,20,50,000 in the month of May, 1999 appears to be a concocted one." It was so held by the learned Single Judge because his lordship found that it was "not probable rather not possible" that while a suit filed by Dr. Imrana against her husband Tanivr respondent seeking maintenance for herself and for her two minor sons was pending adjudication in a Court of law, the father of the said Dr.Imrana i,e, Bashir complainant would pay a sum of Rs,20,50,000 to the father of the husband of the said Dr.Imrana. This finding of the Hon'ble Judge is not based on a proper appreciation of the facts available on record because it was not during the pendency of the said suit that Bashir complainant had claimed to have given the said amount of money to the parents of the husband of his daughter as according to the F.I.R the said money had been lent on 4-5-1999 whereas the suit in question for maintenance had been filed about two months thereafter i,e, on 3-7-1999 after the incident of 18-6-1999. Referring again to the said maintenance suit the learned Judge mentioned that Dr.Imrana's husband namely, Tanvir respondent had executed a divorce deed on 25-11-1999; that the F.I.R in question had been lodged by Dr.Imrana's father on 14-9-1999 and that "it was not understandable as to how on 25-11-1999 the matter was reconciled amicably in the presence of registration of cases from both the sides". Although it is true that in para. 4 of the plaint of the maintenance suit the date of divorce deed is mentioned as 25-11- 1999 but this was only a typographical error as a perusal of the said divorce deed, a copy whereof is available at pages No,126 and 127 of our file would reveal that the divorce- deed had in fact been executed on 25-11-1995 and not on 25-11-1999. It may also be mentioned that it had been mentioned by the Hon'ble Judge, more than once in the impugned order, that the said maintenance suit had been drafted on 29-6-1999 and had been filed in Court on 3-7-1999 and this being so that said suit could not have made a mention of the divorce deed which had been executed on 25-11-1999 i,e, about five months after the filing of the said suit. Therefore, this fact also which had led the learned Judge in Chamber into a finding of falsity of the FIR in question was factually incorrect.
10. What had also influenced the Hon'ble Judge in reaching the conclusions which his lordship reached, was that one of the two cheques allegedly issued by Zafarul Islam respondent was to be en cashed on 29-6-1999 while the other cheque in question was due for encashment on 7-7-1999 but in the plaint of the suit for maintenance which had been drafted, as per the verification available on the said plaint, on 29-6-1999, it had been mentioned that both the cheques had been returned unpaid. His lordship in the High Court was at a loss to understand as to how did Dr.Imrana know on 29-6-1999 that even the second cheque which was due for encashment on 7-7-1999 had been dishonoured. This impression of the Hon'ble Judge is also based on a misreading of the facts available on record. A bare perusal of the two cheques, copies of which are available at pages Nos.120 and 123 of the file of this Court would demonstrate that Zafarul Islam accused-respondent and his wife Mst.Rehana Kishwar accused-respondent maintained two separate accounts in the Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Bearing P.L.S A/C Nos.6884-0 and 6883-1 respectively. The cheque in question bearing No,25930763 for a sum of Rs,10,00,000 (one million) pertained to the above mentioned A/C No,6884-0 of Zafarul Islam while the other cheque bearing No,25930752 related to A/C No,6883-1 maintained by Mst.Rehana Kishwar accused. Both these cheqeus, one drawn by Zafar accused and the other drawn by -Mst.Rehana accused were dated 29-6-1999 and were thus due for encashment on the said date. They were presented together before the said Bank for the first time on 29-6-1999, as would, appear from copies of the "Return Slips" at pages 121 and 124 of the file but were returned unpaid on the said date. They were again presented for en cashed on 7- 7-1999, as would appear from copies of the "Re\turn Slips" available at pages 122 and 125 and were again dishonored on the said date i,e, on 7-7-1999. The impression of the learned Judge that it was only one cheque which was presented for encashment and dishonored on 29-6-1999 while the other cheque was to be presented only on 7-7-1999 was therefore not correct. The findings of the learned High Court that the issuance of the two cheques in question by the respondent accused persons was "all cock and bull story" was thus founded on facts which were not correct.
11. There is yet another aspect of this case. While concluding that the entire prosecution case was a concoction and was a cock and bull story, the total reliance of the learned High Court was on the two plaints filed by Dr. Imrana in the maintenance suit and in the suit seeking specific performance of the respondent's alleged commitment to transfer the house, being constructed by the respondents with her father's money, in her name/in the name of her two sons. In doing so, it escaped the notice of the Honourable Judge, firstly, that the material available on the file of another case was not legal evidence for the purpose of the casein hand and could not be used to decide the fate of the present case and, secondly, that the prosecution or even Bashir complainant were not bound by whatever had been said by a daughter of Bashir complainant in some suits filed by her till such time that she was produced as a prosecution witness in the case in question and was examined and cross-examined in accordance with law. Thus the learned Judge in Chamber had fallen into a legal error in determining the fate of this case on the basis of material which could not be legally used for the purpose.
12. What is available on the record is that the complainant was possessed of two cheques i,e, one issued by Zafarul Islam accused for a sum of Rs,10,00,000 and the other issued by Mst.Rehana Kishwar accused for a sum of Rs,10,50,000 which amounts as per the said cheques were payable to Ch. Bashir Ahmad complainant and which cheques had been returned unpaid when presented to the bank. The drawers of these cheques i,e, Zafar accused and Mst.Rehana accused do not deny their signatures on the said cheques. It was on the strength of these dishonored cheques that the complainant was alleging commission of fraud by the accused persons. Needless to add that if left unrebutted, the said allegations would constitute the commission of an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code.
13. As against this the defence plea, as is discernible from the contents of Writ Petition No,10946 of 2000 filed by Tanvir respondent in the Lahore High Court; the application filed by the three respondents before the learned trial Magistrate under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., and the petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., filed by the three respondents in the Lahore High Court which has culminated in the present proceedings before us, is that both the parents of Tanvir respondent i,e, Zafarul Islam accused-respondent and Mst.Rehana Kishwar accused respondent had put their respective signatures on the two cheques in question available in their respective cheque books some times in the evening of 18-6-1999 and bottom had left the remaining portions of the said cheques unfilled; that both of them had so done because they had to give these cheques to their son i,e, Tanvir respondent the next morning for the purpose of giving money to him; that on 18-6-1999 when Bashir complainant and his companions allegedly attacked the house of the accused party at about 8-00 p.m., they took away the two cheque books containing the said cheques in question and that the complainant then dishonestly filled up the blank portion of the said cheques and fraudulently presented them for encashment. It had also been pleaded by the accused- respondents that on coming to know of the theft of the said cheque books they had duly informed their bankers of the same on 24-6-1999 with instructions not to en cash the said cheques and other cheques contained in the said two cheque books and had also notified the police about it on 16-7-1999.
14. In the circumstances, what was required to be examined and determined was whether the said defence plea was reasonable and plausible. It had to be determined by the Court whether it was believable that two responsible persons one of whom was a responsible WAPDA Officer would sign the cheques and leave the cheque books out in the open to be given to their son the next morning.
The occurrence of stealing allegedly took place on 18-6-1999 at about 8-00 p.m and these cheques would, therefore, have been signed well before 8-00 p.m. What was the urgency and the requirement that the two accused persons signed the cheques in question in the evening which cheques were to be delivered to their son who was living with them, the next morning or what was it which had stopped the two accused persons from signing the said cheques the next morning when the same had to be handed over to their accused son and if these cheques had been actually signed an evening before then what was it which was stopping the parents from delivering the said cheques to their son at the time when they had been signed. It is the case of the respondents that they had informed their bank on 24-6-1999 about the theft of the said cheques with instructions to the said bank not to honour the same. According to the respondents' own admission these cheques were to be delivered to Tanvir respondent in the morning following the day on which these cheques had allegedly been stolen on 18-6-1999. In the normal course of events Zafarul Islam and Mst.Rehana Kishwar respondent would have come to know the next morning i,e, the morning of 19-6-1999 when these cheques were to be handed over to their son that the said cheque books were missing. The question is that why did they wait for five days to inform the bank about the theft of the said cheques and why did they not do it immediately to ensure that the one stealing the cheques could not misuse them. The question also is that having stolen the said cheques on 18-6-1999 why had Bashir complainant not taken steps to encash the same immediately and if he had to put a date on the said cheques himself then why he had put a date of 11 days later i,e, of 29-6-1999 to en cash the said cheques. As has been mentioned above, the Bank Slips returning the cheques in question to the presenter of the said cheques are on our record. At S.No,11 of the said slips the reason mentioned for returning a cheque unpaid is mentioned as "Payment Stopped by Drawer". The respondents claim to have' asked the bank on 24-6-1999 to stop payment of the said two cheques. They were presented for encashment five days later i,e, on 29-6-1999. In due course of events, if the drawers of these cheques had issued instructions for stopping payment pursuant to the said cheques then the reason given on the Return Slips should have been the one mentioned at S.No,11 i,e, "Payment Stopped by the Drawer". But a perusal of the Return Slips of 29-6-1999 and 7-7-1999 of both the cheques would show that the reasons for returning the same is the one mentioned at S.No,4 i,e, "Refer to Drawer". This is the reason usually given for returning a cheque unpaid when sufficient funds are not available for honoring a cheque presented for encashment. It may also be mentioned that the F.I.R lodged by Zafarul Islam accused which was recorded more than a month after the occurrence in which the cheque books had been stolen makes no mention of the theft of the cheque books.
15. Such and others were the crucial questions which were required to be decided and determined before a final verdict of guilt or innocence of the accused persons of the present case could be pronounced. These -questions were never attended to by the learned Judge in Chamber and understandably so because the same could not have been done unless the witnesses were examined and permitted to be cross-examined and unless the accused-persons had also been examined under section 342 of the Cr.P.C. Or under section 340(2) of the Cr.P.C. If the accused persons had elected to make statements on Oath. The Hon'ble Judge had proceeded to pronounce innocence of the accused persons on mere conjectures and surmises and that also the ones founded on incorrect facts. The prosecution had obviously been stifled and the matter had been decided without permitting the relevant facts to come on record in accordance with law.
Needless to say that errors had crept into the proceedings because. The normal course of trial had been unduly disrupted. Such is never the result designed to be achieved by the provisions of section 561-A of the Cr.P.C.
16. What then is the purpose which was sought to be secured through incorporation of section 561- A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and what is the true import of the said provision.
17. After the British occupation of the Sub-Continent, the first legislation made by them on the subject of Criminal Procedure was through Act XXV of 1861 which was ,followed by Act X of 1872 and Act X of 1882. It was after experimenting these laws for almost four decades that the Legislature finally enacted the law which is presently in force being the Code of Criminal Procedure being Act V of 1898. Having operated this law ,for a further period of twenty-five years, the then law giver tried to identify the shortcomings of the same and found, inter alia, that situations did arise which had not been foreseen by the Legislature and for which no provisions existed in the Code. It was for this reason that section 561-A was incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 1923 through the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amending) Act (XVIII of 1923).
18. The purpose of adding this provision to the Code was to recognize and reiterate the inherent powers possessed by a High Court to pass such orders as would enable it to do justice to all concerned. The object was to meet the lacunae existing in the Code and to cater for situations which could not be foreseen by the Legislature and for which no specific provision or remedy had been provided. Section 561-A was never meant or intended to offer an additional or an alternate remedy. This may be illustrated through an example of a person who is convicted and punished as a result of trial held by a Court of Session. Section 410, Cr.P.C. Provides him with a remedy of filing an appeal in the High Court to impugn the conviction and the punishment recorded against him. Such a person, therefore, cannot be allowed to seek annulment of such a conviction and punishment by invoking the provisions of section 561-A of the Cr.P.C. Instead of filing an appeal for the purpose under section 410 of the said Code. What has been consistently held by the superior Courts for over a century now is that the provisions of section 561-A cannot be used to override the express provisions of law; to offer just 'ANOTHER' remedy where a remedy already exists or to circumvent the normal course of law. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction preserved only for extraordinary situations which power must be exercised sparingly with utmost caution only in exceptional cases and not as a matter of routine. Reference may be made to Shah Kot Bus Services v. The State 1969 SCM R 325; Muhammad Sami Ullah Khan v. The State PLD 1963 SC 327; Ghulam Muhammad v.
Muzammal Khan PLD 1967 SC 317; Abdul Hayee v. The State 1972 SCM R 473; Haq Nawaz v.
Muhammad Afzal PLD 1967 SC 354; Muhammd Khalid Mukhtar v. The State through Deputy Director, F.1.A. (C.B.A.), Lahore (PLD 1997 SC 275).
19. Of late, the incidence of quashing criminal cases which are under trial with the Courts of competent jurisdiction by invoking powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is becoming increasingly frequent. It is time to take stock of this tendency and to remind ourselves of the correct principles governing the subject so that the powers meant to prevent the abuse of law are not abused themselves.
20. According to the scheme prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, determination of guilt or innocence of an accused person is a serious business which commences with a pre-trial exercise to be judicially carried out by a competent Magistrate under section 190 of the Cr.P.C. If these allegations Levelled and the evidence collected are found worth a trial, then cognizance is taken of the case and the accused is summoned to face the trial. Chapters XX and XXII-A of the Cr.P.C. Then prescribe a detailed inquiry and a thorough probe into the matter where the prosecution has the fullest right to adduce its evidence to establish the guilt of the offender and where the accused has a comprehensive right to impeach the credibility and the reliability of the evidence produced by the prosecution where the accused then has the right to explain different pieces of evidence offered against him by the prosecution; where the accused can make a statement on oath in disproof of the allegations levelled against him and finally where he can produce his own evidence to discredit the prosecution case against him What could, therefore, be at stake at a criminal trial are, on the one hand the invaluable rights of life, liberty, freedom and even of property of an accused person and on the other hand the demand of the society to be rid, permanently or temporarily, of a person who is a threat and a menace to it. The law commands a detailed inquiry as envisaged by the above mentioned Chapters XX and XXII-A of the Cr.P.C. So that a correct decision is reached by the trial Court after due consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances brought out before it. This is then the normal procedure prescribed by law for the purposes of finding out whether the person accused of the commission of a crime was or was not guilty of the same.
21. As against this, when a High Court decides to proceed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The parties get divested of their right to adduce evidence; of their right to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the other side and of their right to discredit the evidence offered to the Court. The result is that the normal course of law is disrupted; the parties get deprived of the precious and valuable rights vesting in them; the trial Court gets deprived of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law and a matter which was required to be determined after a detailed and a full-fledged trial is decided in more than a summary manner and thereby depriving the High Court of the opportunity to determine the issue in the light of proper material.
22. Using the powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. To determine the fate of a criminal case is thus a serious departure from the normal course and needless to say that any deviation from the normal path is always pregnant with risk of being led astray. Such a deviation can, therefore, never be ordinarily advisable. Extraordinary circumstances must always be shown to exist before a choice could be made to abandon the regular course and instead to follow an exceptional route. Mere claim of innocence by an accused person could never be considered sufficient to justify such a departure because if this was so permitted then every accused person would opt to stifle the prosecution and to have his guilt or innocence determined under section 561-A of the Cr.P.C. The result would be decision of criminal trials in a summary and a cursory manner rendering the trials as a superfluous activity and the trial Courts as a surplus age. This never was and could never have been the intention of the law maker in adding section 561-A to the Code. Reference may be made to Sheikh Mahmood Saeed and others v. Amir Nawaz Khan and another (1996 SCM R 839), Malik Salman Khalid v. Shabbir Ahmad, D&SJ, Karachi and another) (1993 SCMR 1973) and Mst.Sarwar Jan v. Ayub and Gulab (1995 SCM R 1679),
23. The correct import of the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. May be summarized as under:
(i) The said provision should never be understood to provide an additional or an alternate remedy nor could the same be used, to override the express provisions of law;
(ii) the said powers can ordinarily be exercised only where no provision exists in the Code to cater for a situation or where the Code offers no remedy for the redress of a grievance;
(iii) inherent powers can be invoked to make a departure from the normal course prescribed by law only and only in exceptional cases of extraordinary nature and reasons must be offered to justify such a deviation; and
(iv) in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, the trial must ordinarily be permitted to take its regular course envisaged by law and the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Should be invoked only in exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded.
24. Reverting back to the present case, as has been noticed above, the learned High Court had fallen into error in basing its impugned decision on factually incorrect foundations which error had crept into the decision mainly on account of the departure made from the normal course of law.
The impugned decision also guillotined the prosecution which led unjustifiable conclusions. The impugned judgment did not mention any extraordinary reasons justifying an extraordinary deviation from the normal procedure prescribed by law and on that account also the use of powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Could not be sustained.
25. There is yet another aspect of this matter. The accused persons had made an application before the learned trial Magistrate praying for their acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. This application was dismissed through an order dated 20-2-2001. The Code offered a specific remedy to a person aggrieved of such an order by seeking revision of the same under section 439 or 439-A of the Cr.P.C. We have not been able to find any reason in the impugned decision as to why the aggrieved persons were permitted to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., when a remedy was available to them under section 439 or section 439-A of the said.
Code Supposing the above-mentioned application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., had been allowed as a result whereof the accused persons had been acquitted. Could the aggrieved person in such a situation be permitted to approach the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.0 instead of filing an appeal against acquittal under section 417 of the said Code If the answer be in the negative, then how could a person aggrieved of the order of dismissal of such an application under section 249- A, Cr.P.C, be permitted to invoke the provisions of section 561-A and not invoke the provisions of section 439 of the Code. We would, therefore, hold that where an application under section 249-A of the Cr.P.C, is dismissed by the trial Court then the proper remedy for the aggrieved person is under section 439 or 439-A of the Cr.P.0 as the case may be and not under section 561-A of the said Code because, as has been mentioned above, the provisions of section 561-A, Cr.P.0 are not meant to provide an additional or an alternate remedy. For this reason also the jurisdiction exercised by the Hon'ble High Court was legally untenable.
26. In view of what has been noticed above, this petition is converted into an appeal which is allowed as a result whereof the impugned judgment of the- Lahore High Court dated 3-7-2001 (announced on 5-7-2001) deciding Criminal Miscellaneous No,49-Q of 2001, is set aside and the proceedings in the trial arising out of F.I.R. No,408 dated 14-8-1999 of Police Station North Cant of Lahore shall be deemed.To be pending before the learned trial Court.
27. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the learned Sessions Judge of Lahore who shall transmit the same to the relevant Court for information and compliance.
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