Civil Appeals No, 2650/2006 Ejaz Afzal Khan, J.--By this single judgment, we propose to decide the above captioned civil appeals and petitions as a common question of law is involved in all of them.
2. Facts relevant for the purpose of these appeals and civil petition mentioned above are that revision petitions filed before the Lahore High Court and Peshawar High Court were dismissed, without attending to the merits of the cases, on the ground that they were filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that neither Section 5 nor Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable to such petitions. The difference between Civil Appeal No, 2650/2005 and the other appeals is that the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Lahore dated 20.5.2003 dismissing the revision petition, filed by the appellant, on the ground of limitation was upheld by the High Court vide judgment dated 15.7.2003.
3. Leave in Civil Petition No, 2182-L/2003 (now C.A. No, 2650/2006) was granted to consider inter alia whether delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in filing revision petition. Leave in Civil Petition No, 484/2007 (now Civil Appeal No, 269/2008) was granted to consider inter alia whether the time consumed for obtaining certified copies of the judgment, decree or other documents could be excluded under Section 12 read with Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Leave in Civil Petition No, 2427-L/2006 (now Civil Appeal No, 2753/2006) was granted to consider inter alia the question whether the High Court is denuded of powers to condone delay in filing civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Leave in Civil Petition No, 141-P/2008 (now Civil Appeal No, 1136/2008) was granted on the question which was raised in Civil Petition No, 484/2007 while leave in all other cases was granted on the strength of the order passed in Civil Petition No, 141-P/2008 (now Civil Appeal No, 1136/2008). Leave in other petitions is also sought on above ground.
4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that where the subordinate Court passing the order sought to be revised did not deliver its copy within three days, any delay in filing the revision beyond 90 days is liable to be condoned. The learned counsel next contended that where proviso to Section 115 of the Code clearly provides that a person making an application under Section 115(1) of the Code is required to furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and orders of the subordinate Court, time consumed for obtaining the certified copies of such documents cannot be construed to the detriment of the litigant as it is well beyond his control. The time thus consumed, the learned counsel added, for obtaining the copies has to be condoned under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, The learned counsel by referring to Section 29 of the Limitation Act contended that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for .any suit, appeal or application different from the one prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 9 to 18 and 22 shall apply to the extent provided their application is not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If this aspect of the case, the learned counsel added, is considered, Section 12 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable, therefore, the time thus consumed for obtaining the attested copies could be excluded. When asked whether the Code of Civil Procedure can be termed as a local or special law, the learned counsel frankly conceded that it is not The learned counsel by referring to Section 115(1)(2) of the Code contended that where High Court or for that matter the District Court has the power, to call for the record of any case decided by a Court subordinate thereto and pass an appropriate order if such subordinate Court has exercised jurisdiction not so vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Court seized of a petition under the aforesaid provision of the Code is bound to decide it on merits notwithstanding it is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the second proviso to Section 115(2) of the Code. The learned counsel to support his contention placed reliance on the cases of Province of Punjab through Collector and others u. Muhammad Farooq and others (PLD 2010 SC 582) and Banori v. Jilani (PLD 2010 SC 1186).
5. As against that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that where Section 115 of the Code itself provided a period of limitation for filing a revision petition, application of Sections 3, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act cannot be attracted as these Sections deal with the period of limitation prescribed by the First Schedule of the Act. Section 29 of the Act, the learned counsel added, provides a room for the application of Section 12 if any special or local law has prescribed a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application different from the one prescribed by the First Schedule but since the Code being a general law cannot be pushed within the definition of special or local law reference to Section 29 would be of no help to the petitioner seeking benefit of Section 12 of the Act. The learned counsel next contended that where period of 90 days is more than enough for getting all the documents required for filing a revision petition, the plea for condonation of delay or prayer for exclusion of time consumed for obtaining copies cannot be countenanced. The learned counsel also argued that when copy of the decision and other documents required to be filed in support of petition were already available to the petitioner a month before the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for filing revision petition, no indulgence could be shown to him and that the order dismissing the petition on the score of limitation was not open to any exception. The learned counsel next contended that though Article 162-A was inserted in the Limitation Act providing for a period of limitation for filing a revision petition but it was omitted by virtue of Act XI of 1965, therefore, recourse to Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act can't be had either for condonation of delay or exclusion of time consumed for obtaining certified copies. Where the provisions mentioned above, the learned counsel concluded, can't be applied, revision petition filed beyond the period of limitation has no other fate but dismissal. The learned counsel to support their arguments referred to the cases of Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and other (2001 SCMR 286), Tahirali v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court, Karachi (PLD 1960 (W.P) Karachi 795), Abdul Waheed Khan v. Ruqia Bibi (PLD 2006 Peshawar 156), Shujahat Hussain v. Muhammad Habib (2003 SCMR 176), Faizullah v. Rustam (PLD 2003 Peshawar 217), City District Govt. Lahore v. Muhammad Saeed Amin (2005 PSC 364), Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (AIR 1970 SC 1), Hukumdev Narain Yadav v.
Lalit Narian Mishra (AIR 1974 SC 480).
6. We have gone through the entire record carefully and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
7. Before we discuss the merits of the case it is worthwhile to refer to Section 115 of the Code which reads as under:-- "115. Revision.--(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears--
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that, where a person makes an application under this sub-section, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents, and order of the subordinate Court and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the subordinate Court: Provided further that such application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof and the High Court shall dispose of such application within six months.
(2)The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by sub-section (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.
(3)If an application under sub-section (1) in respect of a case, within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District Court, no further such application shall be made to either of them.
(4)No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order made under sub-section (2) by the District Court."
8. A look at the above quoted provisions would reveal that the High Court or the District Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to either of them and if it appears that such subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not so vested in it or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, either of the Courts may make such orders in the case as it deems fit. The Courts aforesaid may also exercise such jurisdiction on the application of the person aggrieved. It also provides that a petition under the aforesaid provision shall be made within 90 days of the decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within 3 days after its announcement. Copies of pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court in support of such petition are also required to be furnished but their copies cannot be provided by the same Court as their record, more often than not, is lying either with the establishment of Senior Civil Judge or some other office. He even after getting the copy of the decision, cannot file a revision petition. In some cases such documents are readily available but in some they are not. Naturally sometime is consumed in obtaining the copies of such documents, therefore an effort was made to canvass at the bar that at least Section 12(2) if not Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to a revision petition filed under the Code if seen in the light of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners would require an in depth examination of the relevant provision of the Code as well as the Act. Before we deal with this aspect of the argument it is worthwhile to refer to Section 29 of the Act which reads as under:-- "29. Saving.--(1) Noting in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872.
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law; (a)the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b)the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act (IV of 1869).
(4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of "easement" in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend."
9. A bare reading of the provision reproduced above would reveal that the legislature intended to bring almost every suit, appeal or application under the umbrella of the Limitation Act. The only exception it recognized is a suit, appeal or application filed under a local or special law. The expression local or special law has not been defined by the Limitation Act, but according to Black's Law Dictionary "local law" means "a law which operates over a particular locality instead of whole territory". While the expression "Special law" means a law made for individual cases or for particular places and District. It includes "a law ,operating upon a selected class rather than the public-at- large". In the cases of "Koer Durag Pal Singh, v. Th. Pancham Singh" (AIR 1939 Allahabad 403), a full Bench of Allahabad High Court held that Code of Civil Procedure being a general Act cannot be called a special or local law. In the cases of "Kandaswami Pillai. v. Kannappa Chetty" (AIR 1952 Madras 186) and "Putchalapalli Venkata Subbareddi. Duvvuru Papireddi" (AIR 1957 Andra Perdesh 406), it was held that Code of Civil Procedure as well as Code of Criminal Procedure being general law do not fall within the definition of a local or special law so as to attract the application of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. This view does not appear to be correct when considered in the light of the scheme of the Code and that of the Limitation Act. Any law which prescribed a period of Limitation for a suit, appeal or application different from the one prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act shall be treated as a special law for the purpose of the Act. The Code, in this context, is a special law for all legal and practical purposes inasmuch as it prescribed a period of limitation for filing a revision petition. West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1908 is, no doubt, a general law but it is considered as a special law for the purpose of Limitation Act inasmuch as it prescribed a period of limitation for filing a revision petition. So is the case with the Code of Criminal Procedure as it, too, prescribed a period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal. Act XIV of 1994, whereby second proviso, prescribing a period of limitation for filing a revision petition, was inserted in Section 115 of the Code would also go a long way to show that even the legislature never intended to treat the Code as a general law for the purpose of Limitation Act. Had it so intended, it would have prescribed a period of limitation for filing a revision petition in the First Schedule of the Act by making an amendment therein; as was done by virtue of Ordinance XLIII of 1962 which was subsequently omitted by Act of XI of 1965. In the case of "Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh" (AIR 1964 S.C. 260) the Supreme Court of India after considering a string of judgments held that even the Code of Criminal Procedure despite being a general law is a special law for the purposes of Limitation Act inasmuch as it prescribed a period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal. The relevant paragraph reads as under:-- "(7) It has been observed in some of the cases decided by the High Courts that the Code is not a special or a local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, that is to say, so far as the entire Code is concerned because it is a general law laying down procedure, generally, for the trial of criminal cases. But the specific question with which we are here concerned is whether the provision contained in Section 417(4) of the Code is a special law. The whole Code is indeed a general law regulating the procedure in criminal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land Revenue Code may be a general law regulating the relationship between the revenue- payer and the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent-receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship but it may contain special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation.
Such a law will be a 'special law' with reference to the law generally governing the subject-matter of that kind of relationship. A 'special law', therefore, means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays down any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated by Section 417(3) and (4), read together, it will be special law contained within the general law. As the Limitation Act has not defined special law, it is neither necessary nor expedient to attempt a definition. Thus, the Limitation Act is a general law laying down the general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act; but there may be instances of a special law of limitation laid clown in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the law of limitation. For example, rules framed under Defence of India Act, vide Surya Mohan V. State of Bihar, ILR 30 Pat 126: (AIR 1951 Pat 462) Canara Bank Ltd. V. The Warden Insurance Co., ILR (1952) Born 1083; (AIR 1953 Bom 35) dealing with the special rule of Limitation laid down in the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bom XXXIII of 1948). These are mere instances of special laws within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Once it is held that the special rule of limitation laid, down in sub-section (4) of Section 417 of the Code is a 'special law' of limitation, governing appeals by private prosecutors, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly out of the way, in view of Section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act".
Another paragraph germane to the situation also merits a reference and thus reads as under:-- "(8). But the question is whether it can be said that even though the provisions of Section 417(4) are a 'special law', they prescribe a different period of limitation from that prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, because Section 29(2) applies where there is a difference between the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and that prescribed by the special law. It is said that the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. In the first instance, the Limitation Act, Article 157, has prescribed the rule of Limitation in respect of appeals against acquittal at the instance of the State. Hence, it may be said that there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. Thus, there is a difference between the Limitation Act and the rule laid down in Section 417(4) of the Code in respect of limitation affecting such an application. Section 29(2) is supplemental in its character insofar as it provides for the application of Section 3 to such cases as would not come within its purview but for this provision. And for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, it has made the provisions of the Limitation Act, referred in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 29 applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and clause (b) of that sub- section expressly lays it down that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply to cases governed by any special or local law. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Cade supplemented by the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, made it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code".
10.A look at the above quoted paragraphs reveals that though the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general procedural law yet it has been treated as a special law inasmuch as it prescribed a period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal. The Code of Civil Procedure as held above despite being a general law, is a special law within the terms of Section 29 of the Act. We, therefore, hold that Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 of the Limitation Act would be applicable even to a petition filed under. Section 115 of the Code. Any time consumed for obtaining certified copies of pleadings, documents and order required in support of such petition would thus be excluded. It may, however, be made clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable to such petition as it does not find mention in Section 29 of the Limitation Act.
11.Now comes the case law cited at the bar. In the case of Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others (supra) this Court refused leave to appeal by holding that where the law under which proceedings have been launched itself prescribed a period of limitation, benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can't be availed. In the case of Shujahat Hussain v. Muhammad Habib (supra) this Court granted leave to appeal in view of the provisions contained in Section 56 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules providing for exclusion of time spent for obtaining certified copies. In the case of City District Govt. Lahore v. Muhammad Saeed Amin (supra) this Court refused leave by holding that in view of the judgment rendered in the case of Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others (supra) Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 115 of the Code. In the case of Banori v. Jilani (supra) this Court after discussing the scope of revision petition held as under:-- "4. As has been mentioned above, the power under Section 115 of the C.P.C. was basically a power exercisable suo motu. Therefore, no restriction whatsoever was placed on the sources from which the information regarding any error, illegality or irregularity of the kind mentioned in S. 115, C.P.C. could reach the High Court, Resultantly, nothing stopped even the parties to a lis from laying any such information before the High Court and this is then what permitted even private persons from filing applications in the High Courts which gradually came to be, known a revision petitions. And since no limitation of time regulated the said matter, therefore, such a revision petition could, in theory, be filed even after months and years of a decision taken by a subordinate Court. The record of the proceedings in question would then be called by the High Court and, not infrequently, when such revision petitions were filed with respect to decisions relating to interlocutory matters, the proceedings in the main suit also got stayed on account of summoning of record resulting in inordinate though avoidable delays in dispensation of justice.
5. It was to eliminate such-like delays that through the Ordinance No, X of 1980, a proviso was added to provisions of Section 115 of the C.P.C. which provisions had been, through the Law Reforms Ordinance No,. XII of 1972 re-numbered as sub-section (1) because three other sub-sections were also added to the said Section 115, C.P.C. which sub-sections are however, not relevant for the purposes of the present case. The said proviso which then became the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115, C.P.C. provided that where information laid before the High Court leading to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction arose out of an application filed by some person, then such person world be bound to furnish copies of the pleadings, of the documents and the order of the subordinate Court along with such an application and further that the High Court would then decide the fate of such an application without calling for the record of the concerned subordinate Court.
14. Reverting now to the facts and merits of this appeal, we find that while dismissing the appellant's application (Revision Petition) being barred by time, the High Court took no step to find out whether the legal command contained in the above-mentioned second proviso regarding supply of a copy of the decision in question within three days, had been complied with and if so, when was the said copy provided to the appellant. What also appears not to have been examined and considered by the High Court was that if the copy in question had not been supplied to the revision petitioner within the said prescribed time, then what was to be the effect thereof.
15.Resultantly, we allow this appeal; set aside the impugned judgment dated 14-4-2010 passed in Civil Revision No, 249 of 2004 and remand the matter back to the High Court where the said Revision Petition would be deemed to be pending which shall then be decided afresh in accordance with the principles and the law laid down hereinabove. No order as to costs.
16.But before we part with this judgment, we consider it necessary to reiterate that the Courts of law can never be a party to putting legal provisions to disuse or to discard the same. It is one of the obligations of every Court to give effect to each and every provision of each and every law.
Needless to add that the provisions of the two provisos added to Section 115, C.P.C., were extraordinary provisions incorporated to eliminate or at least to minimize delays in dispensation of justice. It was to avoid delays caused in the process of obtaining copies of decisions that the Courts were asked to provide such copies within three days. Summoning and retention of subordinate Courts' record by the revisional Courts was another factor contributing towards such delays. As a cure, the applicants were ordered to furnish copies of the requisite record along with the applications submitted by them and the Courts were asked to decide these applications without calling for the subordinate Courts' records unless that availability of such record with the revisional Court was indispensable on account of reasons to be recorded in writing. Fixing of outer limit of time for filing of applications invoking revisional jurisdiction and also fixing of time for final disposal of these applications, were also wrung of the same ladder."
12. In the same judgment this Court after analyzing all the aspects of Section 115 of the Code summed up as under:-- "17. To show the required respect to these provisions by following them in letter and spirit, we direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Registrars of all the High Courts who would place the same before the Hon'ble Chief Justices of the High Courts and also circulate them to all the learned Judges of the subordinate Courts within their respective jurisdictions so that it is ensured:
(a) that steps are taken, in accordance with law, to order the applicants under Section 115, C.P.C. to supply copies of the pleadings and documents where these pending applications were not accompanied by the same; (b)that steps are then taken again in accordance with law, to return the records to the subordinate Courts where the same had been summoned otherwise than through specific orders passed by the revisional Courts or where the same had been requisitioned not for indispensable reasons recorded in writing by the revisional Courts; (c)that in future, no applications filed under Section 115, C.P.C., are entertained unless accompanied by copies of the commanded documents and record; (d)that ever subordinate Court provides a copy of the decision sought to be revised to the person who so seeks, within the prescribed three days; and finally; (e)that the revisional Courts decide such-like "applications within six months and do so without calling the subordinate Court record unless it was indispensable to summon such a record."
13. In the case of Tahirali u. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court, Karachi (supra) a Division Bench of High Court of Sindh after referring to the provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act held as under:-- "It is clear that this sub-section will be available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of a judgment. This sub-section nowhere mentions revision application. This is made further clear by the expression appealed from or sought to be reviewed employed in the sub-section. The omission of revision application from the sub-section, in any opinion, is not accidental. While sub-section (1) employs the word application without any qualification, subsection (2) restricts it to merely two kinds of applications namely an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of a judgment. There was nothing to prevent the Legislature to mention revision application in the sub-section if they so intended.
I am clear in my mind that sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act was not intended to apply to revision applications. Extending the provisions of Section 12(2) to revision applications, will, therefore amount to enlarging its scope, for which, in my opinion there is no justification. The petitioner therefore cannot avail of these provisions. That being so, the time spent in obtaining the copy of the impugned order, cannot be excluded when computing the period of Limitation.
The provisions of Section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act prescribing period of limitation are unqualified."
14.The case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (supra) cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not relevant to the case in hand as it simply deals with the scope of the revisional jurisdiction. The case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (supra) too has no direct bearing on the cases under consideration. Therefore, we need not to discuss in detail. In the case of Abdul Waheed Khan v. Ruqia (supra) a single Bench of Peshawar High Court dismissed a revision petition by holding that it being filed after the expiration of 90 days is liable to be dismissed and that neither Section 5 nor Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would be applicable. In the case of Govt. of NWFP through Secretary W & S Department v. Muhammad Iqbal Khan & others (PLD 2007 Peshawar 98) a Division Bench of the same High Court by reiterating the same view dismissed a revision petition filed beyond the period of 90 days.
15.In all the judgments cited and discussed above it has been held that revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code is liable to be dismissed if filed beyond ninety days and that Section 5 and Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable but it does not appear to be correct in view of the discussion made above, except to the extent of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is, however, significant to note that in none of these judgments, the part of the provision relating to the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction by the revisional Court has either been argued or adverted to except in the judgment rendered in the case of Province of Punjab through Collector and others v.
Muhammad Farooq and others (supra). In the aforesaid judgment, no doubt, this Court held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable yet it did not approve of dismissal of a revision petition on the score of limitation. It, instead, appreciated the decision on merits in the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction of such Court, if, the conditions sine qua non for such exercise are satisfied.
16.Reference to the argument that Article 162-A was inserted in the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act by Ordinance XLIII of 1962 but it was omitted by Act XI of 1965 would be irrelevant when Section 115 of the Code itself provided a period of limitation for filing a revision petition.
17.Now question arises whether suo motu jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court or the District Court in a case where a revision petition has been filed after the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The answer to this question depends on the discretion of the Court because exercise of revisional jurisdiction in any form is discretionary. Such Court may exercise suo motu jurisdiction if the conditions for its exercise are satisfied. It is never robbed of its suo motu jurisdiction simply because the petition invoking such jurisdiction is filed beyond the period prescribed therefor. Such petition, could be treated as an information even if it suffers from procedural lapses or loopholes. Revisional jurisdiction is pre-eminently corrective and supervisory, therefore, there is absolutely no harm if the Court seized of a revision petition, exercises its suo motu jurisdiction to correct the errors of the jurisdiction committed by a sub-ordinate Court. This is what can be gathered from the language used in Section 115 of the Code and this is what was intended by the legislature, legislating it. If this jurisdiction is allowed to go into the spiral of technicalities and fetters of limitation, the purpose behind conferring it on the Court shall not only be defeated but the words providing therefor, would be reduced to dead letters. It is too known to be reiterated that the proper place of procedure is to provide stepping stones and not stumbling blocks in the way of administration of justice. Since the proceedings before a revisional Court is a proceeding between the Court and Court, for ensuring strict adherence to law and safe administration of justice, exercise of suo motu jurisdiction may not be conveniently avoided or overlooked altogether. The Court exercising such jurisdiction would fail in its duty if it finds an illegality or material irregularity in the judgment of a sub-ordinate Court and yet dismisses it on technical grounds. This brings us to the case of Union of India v. Pratap Chandra (AIR 1964 Assam and Nagaland 141) wherein a Bench of High Court of Assam and Nagaland proceeded to examine the award notwithstanding objections there against were not filed within the time stipulated under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. The relevant paragraph merits a reference which runs as under:-- "As held by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Deep Narain Singh v. Mt. Dhaneshwari, reported in AIR 1960 Pat 201, if the entire scheme of the Arbitration Act is considered, it is apparent that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction and power to set aside an award if it is vitiated by any illegality, including any illegality arising out of the invalidity, of the reference independent of any objection filed by the affected parties to the award. The mere fact that an objection is not filed by any of the parties to the award does not altogether absolve the Court from its responsibility of deciding whether there was a competent reference and whether the award was a valid award on the face of it. These are matters which really go to the root of the award itself and irrespective of any objection by the parties; these matters have to be decided by the Court before a decree can be passed on the basis of the award."
18.In the case of Pakistan v. Q. M. R Expert Consultants (PLD 1990 SC 800) this Court while highlighting the duty of the Court observed as under:-- "However, we may observe that under Section 17 of the Act, it is the duty of the Court to examine, whether there was any reason for modifying of the award or for setting aside the award notwithstanding that an affected party may have failed to file objections to the award on account of the expiry of the limitation period or the parties to the arbitration proceedings may be in collusion and because of that, they may not file any objection to a collusive award."
19.In the case of Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali (PLD 1963 SC 382) this Court while dealing with procedural technicalities held as under:-- "I must confess that having dealt with technicalities for more then forty years, out of which thirty years are at the Bar, I do not feel much impressed with them. I think the proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant to the people of their rights. All technicalities have to be avoided unless it be essential to comply with them on ground of public policy. The English system of administration of justice on which our own is based may be to a certain extent technical but we are not to take from that system its defect. Any system which by giving effect to take form and not to the substance defects substantive rights is defected to that extent. The idea must always be a system that gives to every person what is his."
In the case of Manager, Jammu & Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan u. Khuda Yar & another (PLD 1975 SC 678), this Court while dealing with a similar aspect held as under:-- "The proposition could hardly be disputed that the principal object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice. In fact while considering the importance of legal technicalities and rules of procedure in the administration of justice, it is inevitable to recall the various evolutionary stages in the transition from justice without law of primitive society to justice in accordance with law of modern society and the conflict between equity and law in judicial history.
It cannot be denied that legal precepts were devised with a view to impart certainty, consistency and uniformity to administration of justice and to secure it against arbitrariness, errors of individual judgment and male fide. Over a period of time this development of codes and rules led to the evolution of what is called 'jurisprudence of Conception" a system of logical deduction from fixed premises. In order to avoid, the rigidity and hardship of ultra formalism recourse is had to principle of equitable application and interpretation of legal precepts and conferment of judicial discretion on the Courts as envisaged by Order XLI, rule 33 of the C.P.C. in regard to Constitutional power of this Court to do complete justice in all matters. These two provisions read together lead to the irreparable conclusion that mere technicalities unless offering an insurmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice."
20.In the case of Mst. Gohar Taja v. Sajid and others (2003 YLR 1994) one of us held as under:-- "7. Since in view of the, proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the C.P.C. a person making an application under this subsection shall, in its support, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court, the principles of propriety and good conscience demand that such time be excluded by applying the principles of Section 12 of the Limitation Act by considering an application under Section 5 thereof. Even otherwise when this Court can suo motu exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C, if any of the conditions sine qua nan for its exercise are in existence, it would be just academic to discuss this aspect of the case in any further detail particularly when there is no fetter of law of limitation on suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction under the aforesaid provisions of law."
21.The ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Province of Punjab through Collector and others v. Muhammad Farooq and others (supra) not only appears to be in tune with what we held above but also conforms to the letter and spirit of Section 115 of the Code. The relevant paragraph for the purpose of reference is reproduced as below:-- "4. It is not a healthy approach to brush aside the cases on the ground of limitation which, with reference to Section 115, C.P.C. is not absolute either. A perusal of the section would indicate that a High Court may at any time call for the record of any case from a subordinate Court in order to determine as to whether the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or has acted illegally or with material irregularity. It is a matter of commonsense and simple logic that if such power is vested in a High Court, it should not be restricted by any period of limitation. So it does when Section 115, C.P.C. was originally enacted.
The controversy seems to have cropped up because of the amendment in year 1992 when, through second proviso, a period of 90 days was fixed for filing a Revision Petition. A plain perusal of first and second provisions would indicate that a limitation of 90 days is relevant only when some revision petition if filed by some person or party to the proceedings. Such impediment is non- existent when Court itself exercises the power of revision under sub-section (1) of Section 115, C.P.C."
22.Another paragraph being germane to the controversy stirred before us also merits a reference and thus reads as under:-- "5. As the job of a Court is to do ultimate justice, it can look into the matter itself despite the fact that some application filed by party might by barred by time. Any such application can be considered by the Court as a mere information. What we intend to bring home is that if merits of the case demand that the challenged order be set aside, a High Court Should not avoid hearing under Section 115(1), C.P.C. for which no limitation is provided, merely because the application is filed by some body who is bound by limitation. This Court in Riaz Hussain's case 2003 SCMR 181 has observed in principle that "mere technicalities unless suffering any surmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice and the logic of words should yield to the logic of realities."
23.The case of Banori v. Jilani (supra) being close to the text covers all the essential aspects of the provision including suo motu exercise of jurisdiction with reference to its origin and background. It also highlights the purpose behind prescribing the period of limitation and fixing the outer limit of time for final disposal of such petitions but what is the occasion for the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction has not been elaborately dealt with. We, therefore, while summing up hold that suo motu revisional jurisdiction as vested in the High Court as well as of District Court may be exercised if conditions for its exercise are satisfied, notwithstanding the revision petition is filed beyond the period prescribed.
24.A perusal of the impugned judgments would reveal that the Courts exercising revisional jurisdiction dismissed the revision petitions on wrong premises. The judgments, thus delivered cannot be maintained and that remand of the cases would be inevitable for their just decision.
25.We, thus, allow Civil Appeal No, 2650 of 2006, set aside the impugned orders and send the case back to the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Lahore for decision-afresh in the light of the principles enunciated above.
26. We, for the same reasons, also allow all other appeals and convert Civil Petition No, 473-P/2007 into appeal, allow it, set aside the impugned judgments of the High Courts and send the cases back thereto for decision afresh in accordance with the law as mentioned above. We, however, observe that if in the opinion of the Courts, seized of the revision petitions, conditions for the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction are satisfied they may exercise such jurisdiction irrespective altogether of the procedural technicalities.