' HAMID FAROOQ DURRANI, J.---This judgment shall also dispose of Civil Revision No,177 of 2003, as common questions of law and facts are involved in both these cases.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of petitions in hand are that the respondents, in both the petitions, filed their respective references under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act wherein decrees were passed in their favour from the Court of Judge Land Acquisition/Senior Civil Judge, Mansehra on 15-3-2001. The petitioners, including the Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary Works and Services Department, submitted applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. On 23-12-2002 before the learned Referee Judge questioning the decrees so passed against them mainly on the grounds that the proceedings in the objection petitions were taken at the back of the petitioners. It was also alleged that the fact of representation/appearance of petitioners through a representative, though Was reflected in the order sheets, but there was no authorization available on the record in favour of the said representative. Further, the petitioners were not personally served in the matter nor there was any sanction in favour of the Special Government Pleader purporting to represent the petitioners in the matters. Besides, the relevant order sheets were silent about the name of the Special Government Pleader appearing before the learned Court. It was further claimed that the acquired property was not the kind of 'Bari' land but in the impugned judgment it was found that the entire acquired land was considered to be of the said kind. That the real facts were withheld from and misrepresented to the learned Referee Court, therefore, an exorbitant price for the acquired land amounting to Rs,2,03,289.60, per kanal, was fixed while passing the impugned judgment and decree. It was prayed that the decree under application was liable for setting aside.
3. The respondents contested the application on both factual as well as legal counts and the learned Referee Court was pleased to dismiss the same on 6-2-2003. The revision petitions in hand were filed by the petitioners feeling aggrieved from the judgments of dismissal of their applications under section 12(2), C.P.C.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents, while relying on a judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Waheed Khan reported as PLD 2006 Peshawar 156 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision petitions in hand on the ground of the same being barred by time. It was stated that the impugned judgments were passed by the learned Referee Judge on 6- 2-2003 while the petitioners applied for issuance of certified copy thereof on 8-2-2003. The requisite copies were provided to the petitioners on 18-5-2003 whereupon the revision petitions in hand were filed on 12-8-2003, beyond a period of 90 days from the date of announcement of impugned judgments, therefore, the same were to be out rightly dismissed by invoking the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
5. In response to the said preliminary objection the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as the copies of the impugned judgments were made available to the petitioners consuming the time between 8-2-2003 and 18-5-2003, the said period was to be excluded. In doing so, the revision petitions in hand were to be considered as duly filed within the prescribed period of 90 days, the learned counsel maintained. In his view, the preliminary objection by the other side was frivolous and was required to be overruled.
6. A perusal of section 29 of the Act ibid would show that where a special or local law provided a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 for filing any suit, appeal or application, the provisions of section 3 of the Act ibid were to apply. It is further seen that under clause (a) to subsection 1 of the said section the provisions of section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 of the Act ibid have been made applicable to the period of limitation provided by special or local law, if not expressly excluded by such special or local law itself. It is further gatherable in clause (b) to subsection (1) of section 29 that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall not apply to the period of limitation provided by special or local law.
7. Undoubtedly, the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 does not provide a period of limitation for filing a revision petition under section 115, C.P.C., therefore, it can be safely concluded that while computing the period of 90 days as provided in section 115, C.P.C., for filing of revision petitions, the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908 can be resorted to.
8. In the said context it would also be useful to resort to the provisions contained in section 12 of the Act ibid. It is provided in subsection (2) of the referred provisions that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment, the date on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. A minute scrutiny of the said provision of law would make it abundantly clear that though the provision of section 12, by virtue of section 29, have been made applicable for computing period of limitation provided in special or local statute but for the purposes of case in hand the former section would not be applicable because the scope of section 12(2) Limitation Act, 1908 does not include an application for revision of a decree, order or sentence.
9. On the other hand the provisions of section 3 of the Act ibid having been made applicable to the case under special or local statute, will have to be resorted to in case a civil revision is filed after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed therefor. It is further noticed that in the present cases the petitioners having obtained certified copies of the requisite documents on 18-5-2003 abstained to file the revision petition up to 12-8-2003. A period of almost three months was consumed in addition to the period intervening 6-2-2003, the date of pronouncement of impugned judgment, and the issuance of certified copies of the documents.
10. The cases in hand, while examined in the light of the above, would clearly transpire that the revision petitions were tiled beyond a period of 90 days as provided in section 115, C.P.C. From the date of judgments/decrees impugned therein. The operation of provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 will leave this Court with no option but to dismiss the petitions in hand being barred by time. Needless to mention that the concession allowable under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 would not be available to the petitioners, therefore, in their case the period of limitation shall have to be computed from the date of impugned judgment up to filing of revision petition before this Court without excluding the time consumed in obtaining the copies required for the purpose.
11. Before parting with the instant judgment we would like to observe that the question of application of provisions contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, to the revision petitions filed under section 115, C.P.C. Has lastly been set at naught by the Apex Court in the case of "City District Government v. Muhammad Saeed Amin"2006 SCM R 676. It was concluded that the said provisions of the Limitation Act were not applicable to the proceedings under section 115, D C.P.C., therefore, the delay occurring in proceedings initiated beyond the period of limitation provided through the latter could not be condoned. We are also mindful of the fact that in certain cases, though very rarely, the requisite documents for filing of a revision petition under section 115, C.P.C., are not made available to a party within the period prescribed under the statute. In such an eventuality, a party desirous of having the impugned judgment/decree revised, can file a petition for the purpose by annexing un-certified copies of the documents required to be appended therewith and also provide an affidavit to the effect that the requisite documents, in spite of best efforts of the petitioner, were not made available in time which could facilitate the filing of the petition within the prescribed period.
12. There is yet another class of cases wherein, like the petitions in hand, in spite of receipt of requisite certified copies of the documents, the petitioners delay the filing of revision petitions for a considerable time which act apparently does not have any reason for the belated institution of the petition. The purpose behind the said class of petitions, most of the time, is to protract and prolong the litigation between the parties. The legislature, at the time of providing period of limitation for filing revision petitions under section 115, C.P.C. Through an amendment brought about in the year 1992, was conscious of the above noted fact, therefore, the said period was stretched to 90 days which included the time consumed in obtaining the requisite copies. The purpose, undoubtedly, was to curb the inordinate delay in bringing to an end the litigation between the parties. It was for the said reason that a period of three days was provided for the Courts on account of preparation and delivery of certified copies of the judgment/decree sought to be impugned. The provision for the stated purpose, however, is directory in nature as the same does not provide consequences in case of its non-compliance. Reliance is placed on 2000 SCM R 1305. Be that as it may, in case of late delivery of requisite copies the concerned party can have resort to the exercise as mentioned in para. 11 supra.
13. We would also like to note that the revisional jurisdiction, as bestowed upon the Courts through section 115, C.P.C., cannot be invoked only through a petition by a person but also the revisional Court can take suo motu cognizance of a matter where it is apparent on the face of the record that through the impugned judgment/decree, the Court subordinate to the revisional Court, had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. For the exercise of said supervisory jurisdiction the limitation period of 90 days shall not operate as a bar because of the fact that the conditionality is attached only to the setting in motion, the process of law, by a person through a petition under section 115, C.P.C. And not by the revisional Court itself.
14. As a sequel to the above, both the petitions being time-barred are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.