SAYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.-- Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 initiation of proceedings by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner and issuance of show-cause notice dated 12.6.2003 and another notice dated 17.10.2005 (for hearing by the Council) are sought to be assailed.
2. Since undisputedly the matter is still pending with respondent No. 1, the learned counsel for the parties have addressed arguments quite ably and diligently, the crux being the propriety of interference by this Court at this stage. The fact of the matter is that notice for. Hearing had been issued to the petitioner as contemplated by Section 20-D of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance X of 1961).
3. The background, in which the whole controversy has emerged, may not be mentioned or dilated upon as, assuming for the sake of argument that there be substance in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order that I propose to make, would warrant exercise of restraint. The foundation and the edifice of the case set up by the learned counsel primarily is that since there was no "complaint" s envisaged by Section 20A(2) of the Ordinance, the initial step of commencement of proceedings against the petitioner was unwarranted. According to him, the follow up thereof i.e. The report of the Investigation Committee and issuance of notices are liable to be declared as of no legal effect, as the assumption of jurisdiction itself was ultra vires. Cites Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Page 258, Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, Volume-1, Page 5 to 7 and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan v. Messrs Hyder Ali Bhimji & Co. And another (2002 CLD 1207) for this purpose.
The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 as also the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 contrarily have objected to the very maintainability of this petition at this stage. According to them petition is premature as the matter is yet to be heard, considered and to be decided by the Council and in case any adverse order is passed the matter will be assailable before the High Court under Section 20-K of the Ordinance. It is contended that since the petitioner has ever since the initiation of the proceedings been participating, he cannot now agitate the matter when even no order has been passed. It has been pointed out that the petitioner has in reply to the notice taken all such pleas which will be attended to by the respondent after hearing the petitioner. In order to show that interference by this Court at this stage is not only improper rather should be declined, reference has been made to Virasat Ullah v. Bashir Ahmad, Settlement Commissioner (Industries) and another (1969 SCM R 154), Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali, etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1973 S.C. 236), Mir Nabi Bakhsh. Khan Khoso v. Branch Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Jhatpat (Dera Allah Yar) Branch and 3 others (2000 SCM R 1017), Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Forest Department Punjab, Lahore through Divisional Forest Officer v. Ghulam Nabi and 3 others (PLD 2001 S.C. 415) Muhammad Sharif through Legal Heirs and 4 others v. Sultan Hamayun and others (2003 SCM R 1221), Muhammad Shoaib and 2 others v. Government of N.W.F.P. Through the Collector, D.I. Khan and others (2005 SCM R 85) and Kabir Khan v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Local Government and Rural Development Department and another (2002 M LD 672).
4. I would like to make it clear that such domestic bodies /Tribunals, who derive their powers from statute, their actions/orders are amenable to judicial review in appropriate cases, as commented upon by Sir William Wade at Pages 623 to 326 of.Administrative Law, Eighth Edition. It may be observed that for assumption and exercise of jurisdiction the Court, Tribunal or the authority must possess the power to decide the matter before it. For that matter the existence of basic facts qua which the jurisdiction can be exercised assume relevance and importance. Sir William Wade in his famous work on Administrative Law Eighty Edition at Page 260 summarize the point as follows:--- "Where a jurisdictional question is disputed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal must necessarily decide it. If it refuses to do so, it is wrongfully declining jurisdiction and the Court will order it to act properly. Otherwise the Tribunal or other authority 'would be able to wield an absolutely despotic power, which the legislature never intended that it should exercise'. It follows that the question is within the Tribunal's own jurisdiction, but with this difference, that the Tribunal's decision about it cannot be conclusive." A quotation from the opinion of Lord Goddard, CJ. Appearing at page 261 makes it clear that it is the "correctness of the decision" of the Tribunal concerned as to existence of jurisdiction which can be enquired into in the proceedings in certiori. It means that in the first instance the Tribunal is expected to record its decision, validity whereof then can be examined by the Court. To the same effect is the rule stated by the Hon'able Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mehr Dad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and another (PLD 1974 S.C. 193). It may also be stated that there is no hard and fast rule as to interference by the Court in writ jurisdiction where defects of jurisdiction are apparent on the face of the record. Such an instance is the case of Sindh Employees Social Security Institution v. Dr. Mumtaz Ali Taj and another (PLD 1975 S.C. 450). That was a case where the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was found lacking in that matter.
5. It may be observed that it is all dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case as also the conduct of the petitioner in the proceedings. In the instant case since 2003 the petitioner had been taking part in the proceedings, filing reply to the notices and even disputing the allegations and objecting to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1, he could not at this intermediary stage seek annulment of the proceedings. He should wait for the decision by the Council.
Therefore, on consideration of the matter I am constrained to observe that as the matter is still pending before respondent No. 1 and the Council, a statutory body as per Section 9 of the Ordinance, is seized of the same, who had issued notice to the petitioner for affording him the opportunity of hearing as contemplated by Section 20-D of the Ordinance, all such issues can be raised by the . Petitioner before the Council on the basis of which the legality and validity of the proceedings initiated against him is sought to be assailed. Undoubtedly the same will be adverted and attended to by the Council. It is rather appropriate that in the first instance the Council records its opinion, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It needs no reiteration that the council would consider the matter objectively as any adverse action/order against the petitioner would have far reaching effects.
Thus, in order to enable the Council to express its view, I am not inclined to interfere in the matter at this stage and dismiss the petition as premature. No order as to costs.