' MALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.---These appeals under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 call in question the common judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 9207 of 1995, 9208 of 1995, 10428 of 1996, 10430 of 1996 and 11712 of 1996, as legal as well as factual dispute in these petitions was the same.
2. The appellants are admittedly institutions being run by the Roman Catholic Church, Arch Diocese of Lahore and Faisalabad and carrying the educational work.
3. Through the notification issued by the Government of the Punjab on 7-10-1980 the appellant was notified as an "establishment" and the provisions of West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 were applied to them. The matter remained in hibernation till 1995 when a notice was issued to the appellant by the Punjab Social Security Institution for recovery of Social Security Contribution.
4. The petitioners by filing Constitutional petitions, mentioned above, called in question validity of the notification issued by the Government of the Punjab under section 1 subsection (3) of the aforesaid Ordinance and the impugned notice dated 8-5-1995 for the payment of the Social Security Contribution.
5. These petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide his judgment and order dated 8-5-1997. The main contention raised before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant being Educational Institutions did not qualify to be an establishment within the meaning of the Ordinance, and, as such, the provisions of the aforesaid Ordinance could not be made applicable to them. This contention was repelled by relying upon a large number of cases from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in which it was held that the Educational Institutions were covered by the definition of establishment given in the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. Hence these appeals.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the definition of the word "Establishment" as given in the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 was quite different from the definition of Establishment in the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, which was much wider than the defenition of Establishment in the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 and, therefore, the cases decided under the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 had no relevancy. According to the learned counsel the appellant being an institution which does not carry on any commercial or industrial or agricultural activity cannot be considered to be an establishment.
7. There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that since the definitions of "Establishment" in the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 and Employees Old-Age Benefits Act. 1976 are not similar but the precedents under the later enactment cannot form basis of the decision of these cases.
8. Although the learned Single Judge was correct in, holding that as the legislation in question namely the Social Security Ordinance, 1965 was beneficial in nature and it could not be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic sense out this does not mean that the definition of the establishment as given in the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965 should be stretched and strained to bring it at par with the definition in the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. At this stage the definition in two enactments may be reproduced:-- Section 2(11) of the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965 reads as under:-- "Establishment" means an organization, whether industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise.
' In the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 the following definition appears in section (2) (e)(i):-- "an establishment to which the West Pakistan Shops and Establishment Ordinance, 1969, for the time being applies, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 5 thereof, includes Clubs, Hostels, Organizations and Messes, not maintained for profit or gain and establishments, including hospitals, for the treatment or case of sick, infirm destitute or mentally unfit person.
(ii)..........................
(iii)..................
9. It follows from the above, the Act of 1976 not only makes reference to the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969, but includes various other organizations within its ambit which generally would not have been corrected by the earlier part of the definition. The defenition in the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 is much larger, comprehensive and exhaustive than the definition in the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965.
10. Now coming to the question as to whether a School would fall within the definition of "Establishment" as given in the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965, it needs to be reiterated that the establishment, has been defined in the Ordinance as an institution,industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. Admittedly the Schools being run by the petitioners are not industrial, commercial or agriculture in nature. That being so the question which arises is whether the word "otherwise" would cover the Schools. While construing this provision it should be kept in mind that word "otherwise" has to be construed adejusdemcenaris and must take colour from the preceding words. The use of word "otherwise" does not enlarge the scope of the definition. In the case of The Attorney General v. Seccombe (King Bench Division 1911 page 688), it has been ruled out that the word "otherwise" must be read as meaning the same arrangement as ejusdemcuuris with contract that is to say a forcible arrangement. Reference may also be made to the judgment of India Supreme Court reported as M. NuryananNambior v. State of Kerala (AIR 1963 S.C. 1116), in which it was observed:-- "The juxta-position of theword "otherwise" with the words corrupt or illegal means and the dishonesty implicity in the word "abuse" indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on the part of the public servant to bring him within the meaning of the clause."
' Again it was observed at Page 1118 that:- "Some limitation will have to he put on that word and thatlimitation is that it takes colour from the preceding words along with which it appears in the clause."
11.. It will be appreciated that the School is not place where commercial business, or industrial activity as is carried out but the place of learning where education is imparted to the students. In the case reported as K.G: OTD, Principal, Charistian T.T.C. v. Presiding Officer B.T. Court and others (PLD 1976 Lah. 1097) it was observed that the education is not an industry.
12. From the above discussion it follows that the word "Establishment" as defined in the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965 does not cover the educational institution especially if it runs on a charitable basis.
' As a consequence of the circumstances stated above the impugned judgment is set aside and the Constitutional petitions filed by the appellants are accepted with no order as to costs.