' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, has been directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Shariat Court on 5-11-2001, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that Mst. Shafeen Akhtar, respondent herein, married with the appellant in 1995. However, after the marriage some differences arose between the spouses, which ultimately resulted into litigation between them. Mst. Shafeen Akhtar respondent herein, filed a suit for dowry before the Judge Family Court, Kotli on 16-9-1999, whereby she claimed dowry-valuing Rs.1,83,815. The claim of the respondent was repudiated by the appellant in his written statement by alleging that the dowry was of the amount of Rs.14/15 thousands and not more than that. The learned Judge Family Court after taking necessary proceedings and recording the evidence of both the parties decreed the suit of the respondent vide his judgment and decree dated 18-9-2000. The appellant herein filed an appeal before the Shariat Court, which was dismissed, vide the judgment and decree dated 5-11-2001. It is the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Shariat Court, which are the subject matter of present appeal before this Court.
3. Before granting leave to the appellant Mr. Muhammad Riaz Inqilabi, the learned counsel, was confronted with the provision contained in the AJ&K Family Courts Act, 1993, i.e. Section 14(5) which reads as follows:-- "An appeal to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir from judgment, decree or order of the Shariat Court shall lie only if the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir being satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance grants leave to appeal."
' Thus, it was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant that the question of dowry between the spouses being a subject of dispute is not question of public importance, as such the petition for leave to appeal could not be granted under law. However, the learned counsel in support of appeal reiterated the same arguments, which were argued while granting the petition for leave to appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of petition contended that the instant case involves a substantial question of law of public importance as to whether the Judge Family Court can pass a decree of dowry valuing Rs.1,83,815 in favour of the respondent despite the fact that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction Act), 1976, has imposed certain restrictions on the amount of dowry and on its violation penalty has been provided in the relevant law. The learned counsel by referring to the above law stated that in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the gifts or presents given to bridegroom shall not exceed the value of Rs.10,000. The learned counsel also contended that a penalty clause has been provided in the said Act and its section 10(1) postulates that whoever contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine (which shall not be less than the amount proved to have been spent in excess of the maximum limit laid down in this Act) or with both. The learned counsel contended that in presence of aforesaid provisions of law, the important question that arises is that whether the Judge Family Court can pass a decree of Rs.1,83,815 for dowry in spite of the fact that law has restricted its value up to Rs.10,000.
4. The learned counsel also contended that another important question is that whether the Judge Family Court can pass a decree for payment of amount of dowry instead of first resolving the question of return of actual articles of dowry of whatever value they may be. In the instant case all the Courts have directed for payment of dowry of Rs.1,83,815 instead of returning the actual articles of whatever value they may be. The learned counsel also pointed out that there is misreading and non-reading of evidence on record. The plaintiff-respondent, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, could not prove her case and the evidence brought on record was mis-appreciated and misread. The learned counsel contended that the documents wherein the detail of articles has been mentioned have not been proved by the plaintiff-respondent so those being inadmissible in evidence, no reliance could have been placed on them. The learned counsel referred to the statements of Dost Muhammad and Abdul Aziz, the witnesses for the plaintiff-respondent, and . The statement of Shafeen Akhtar, respondent herself, and contended that there are certain contradictions in their statements, as such their evidence cannot be relied upon. The learned counsel also contended that the evidence on record has not been properly appreciated by the Judge Family Court as well as by the Shariat Court. Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment being patently illegal be set aside.
5. On the other hand Mr. Sahadat Ali Kayani, the learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that there is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Judge Family Court as well as by the Shariat Court in favour of the respondent which normally cannot be disturbed unless a case of non- reading and misreading of evidence is made out by the appellant. The learned counsel contended that all the witnesses produced on behalf of the respondent have supported her claim and although a lengthy cross-examination was made on behalf of the appellant on the witnesses for the respondent but nothing favourable to the case of the appellant was brought-on record. The learned counsel also strenuously argued that there being no infirmity and illegality in the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court and the Shariat Court, the same do not warrant any interference by this Court.
6. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be stated that Mr. Muhammad Riaz Inqilabi, the learned counsel for the appellant, in order to bring his case within the ambit of substantial question of public importance relied upon the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976, which according to him has imposed certain restrictions on the amount of dowry and on its violation penalty has been provided in the relevant law. The learned counsel also maintained that under the said Act, the bridal gifts or the presents given to the bridegroom shall not exceed the value of Rs.10,000. After careful consideration of the provisions referred to by the learned A counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion that in the said Act a penalty has been provided for violation of its provisions. Taus, if someone gives dowry of more amount than the one prescribed in the Act, he could be punished for the violation of the said Act on the complaint made by any concerned person, but it has nothing to do with the case of the spouses and the return of the dowry amount as claimed by the respondent. It may also be taken note of that this point was not raised either before the Judge Family Court or before the Shariat Court, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to be raised and argued for the first time before this Court. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, being devoid of any legal force, is hereby repelled.
7. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, as stated earlier, is that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court should have resolved the question of return of actual articles of dowry of whatever value they may be but in the instant case all the Courts have directed for payment of dowry of Rs.1,83,815 instead of returning the actual articles. Even this argument is unfounded and has no legs to stand upon because the appellant in his written statement has alleged that the articles of dowry were of the value of about 14/15 thousand rupees. The appellant does not own the list of articles of dowry relied upon , by the respondent. Therefore, in such a' situation the trial Court as well as the Shariat Court committed no error in passing a decree for dowry of the value of Rs.1,83,815 in favour of respondent.
8. We are not bound under law to appreciate in detail the evidence of the parties because that is the sole function of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court. Even if we, on the appreciation of evidence, reach at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, we cannot substitute our own opinion for that of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, but still for the safer administration of justice we have gone through the evidence of the plaintiff as well as the respondent. All the witnesses of the respondent have fully supported her case. The appellant has failed to put up his case by cross-examining the witnesses of the respondent. The appellant himself did not appear in the Court to get his statement recorded or to put up his case. Therefore, the legal inference would go against him, which has rightly been pointed out by the Shariat Court.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal, the same stands dismissed with costs.