' Order dated 7-4-1997 passed by respondent No,1 has been assailed through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 inter alia on the ground that the case A was heard by respondent No,1 on 10-6-1996, which was reserved for orders, but was decided through the impugned order after about 10 months of the hearing of the matter and is thus illegal and of no effect. The same order is subject-matter of Writ Petition No,4506 of 1998. Since the controversy concerns the same impugned order, petitions have been heard together and being disposed of accordingly.
2. Muhammad Latif petitioner in Writ Petition No,92-R of 1997 had rested his claim upon order dated 1-4-1980 by which a portion (10 Marlas) of Khasra No,141 was transferred to him. Two revisions, one by Chiragh Din and the other by Khursheed Anwar were filed before the Administrator (R.P.) Lahore, which were disposed of on 24-4-1982. That order gave rise to Writ Petition No,192-R of 1982 and Writ Petition No,204-R of 1982, which were accepted holding that "both the revision petitions shall be deemed to be pending before the respondent No,1 who shall decide the same afresh after determining the issues which have been highlighted in this order and after judicious application of mind to all the material already on the record and which may further be produced before him by the parties". This was vide judgment dated 31-10-1992. The matter was thereafter heard by respondent No,1 as noted above on 10-6-1996. The judgment was reserved without any date and the order impugned was passed on 7-4-1997. This is borne out from paragraph No,34 of the order itself, and copies thereof were then dispatched to the parties vide endorsement dated 12-4-1997.
Besides other contentions it is the grievance of the petitioners that the order is liable to he declared as illegal and of no effect as the same was passed long after the hearing of the case by respondent No, 1 .
3. It is contended by the learned counsel that the case was argued at length by the learned counsel for the petitioners who had also submitted the written arguments but the case of the petitioners has not received due attention and is rather based on enquiries made and material procured and received by respondent No,1 after the hearing of the case at the back of the aggrieved parties, which is violate of the law. The learned counsel for the Department, however, contends that lengthy and detailed order has been passed by respondent No,1 which shows his application of mind to the matter and mere delay in pronouncing the order does not invalidate the same. It is contended that in view of the controversy respondent No,1 had to procure and peruse the relevant record, which took lot of time. Reliance is placed upon Muhammad Ibrahim through his Legal Heirs v. Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. And 3 others PLD 1985 Kar.
95.
4. There is no dispute and it is admitted position that the case was heard by respondent No,1 on 10- 6-1996 as is apparent from paragraph No,34 of the order dated 7-4-1997 itself. In Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Faisalabad v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1982 Lah. 1, the Division Bench of this Court had observed that any enquiry made by the statutory body "without the participation of party affected by its order amounts to an action without lawful authority".It was further observed that "repeatedly the Supreme Court has made observation that in any case where judgment is reserved and it has not been written within a period of 3 to 4 months, fresh hearing is necessary in such circumstances". The order impugned was thus declared as of no legal effect and the matter was remitted to the Central Board of Revenue for decision afresh. One of the principles of natural justice well established by judicial authority is that a material likely to be made basis for a decision/order against a party should be made known to the party concerned affording opportunity of explanation and rebuttal and no extraneous material can be made use of for any such order. The concept of adjudication of matters and dispensation of justice rests upon oft-quoted principles of natural justice contained in number of books on the topic of Administrative law and justice. In Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 531 at page 541, the under mentioned passages were noted to highlight the importance of this principle:-- "The general principle is that an adjudicatory body is to decide the matter on the basis of materials placed before it in the course of proceedings. It cannot take extraneous matters unless the person against whom it is sought to be utilized has been given an opportunity to rebut or explain the same.
' If the adjudicator is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for basing his decision against the individual, then the same must be placed before him for his comments and rebuttal.
Regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that {{PAGES BLUR}} 11'6 . " he relied on against a party without giving no materials shouiu hP same. The right to know him an opportunity of explaining u... _ decision is the materials on which the authority is going to taKc u _ a part of the right to defend oneself. The principle can be seen . Operating in several judicial pronouncements where non- disclosure of the evidence to the affected party has been held to be fatal to the hearing proceedings."
' Search for the material/evidence in the case made after hearing thereof was unwarranted by law.
It may be bserved that mere length and breadth of an order is not determining factor as to its validity or otherwise when the question of exercise of judicial powers is raised before the Court.
5. Besides that, there is now a statutory obligation to decide the matters within 30 days of the hearing of a case in view of the amendment made in rule 1 of Order XX of C.P.C. Prior to the amendment made in Order XX of C.P.C. The superior Courts had been insisting for decision of the cases within a reasonable time after the hearing thereof, whereas now the law itself has prescribed the period for decision and announcement of the judgment. The reliance of the learned counsel for the respondents upon Muhammad Ibrahim case (supra) is of no help in view of the above mentioned amendment in the law. The grievance of the petitioners is that despite a lengthy order passed by respondent No,1 material aspects of the case have either been overlooked or not adverted to. This might have been due to the long interval that intervened from the date of hearing of the matter and the decision thereof. The order thus being violative of the principles of natural justice stated above and the law is not sustainable. It, therefore, has to be declared as of no effect.
' Resultantly the matter will have to be re-heard and decided afresh by respondent No,1 in terms of judgment dated 31-10-1992 passed in Writ Petition No,192-R of 1982 and Writ. Petition No,204-R of 1982. The petitions are accepted to this extent only. In view of the order passed and that the matter is to be decided afresh by respondent No,1, I have consciously refrained from making any observation as to respective merits/claims of the parties, who will have full opportunity of hearing before respondent No,1 and decision in accordance with law. No order as to costs.