1. ' SABIHUDDIN AHMAD, J.---It is contended that the petitioner is a sub-licensee of respondent No.2 in respect of a plot of land which was licensed out to respondent No.2 by the President of Pakistan.
2. The respondent No.1, according to the petitioner, was given the authority to develop a park near the petitioner's plot. However, on the pretext that the petitioner's plot also forms part of the park area the respondent No.1 proceeded to remove certain structures raised by the petitioner. The petitioner questioned the legality of such action before this Court on the original side in Suit No.580 of 1998.
3. This suit is still pending and an interim order directing parties to maintain status quo was passed by learned Single Judge.
4. ' According to Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Bahtti, learned counsel for the petitioner, though the respondent No.1 has been restrained from interfering with the possession of the petitioner, the interim order also purports to restrain the petitioner from raising any further construction. He has, therefore, invoked, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution seeking declarations to the effect that the plot falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent No.2, the respondent No.1 has no authority to deal with the same, in any manner and that the action of demolition of the construction on the plot dated 5-5-1998 is illegal. Alongwith the petition an application for interim relief was moved praying that the Commissioner appointed by learned Single Judge in Suit No.580 of 1998 be restrained from recording evidence. We asked Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Bhatti to satisfy us on the question that when the petitioner has chosen to invoke the ordinary remedies available to him under the normal law what prompted him to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court which can be done only in absence of such remedy.
5. Learned counsel referred to Salahuddin and others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Takht Bhai and 10 others (PLD 1975 SC 244) where the Court entertained a Constitution petition despite a civil suit having been filed.
6. Indeed, the opening words of Article 199 of the Constitution show that this extraordinary jurisdiction can only be availed of when no alternate remedy is provided by law. We are conscious that the Courts have consistently asserted that this bar would be attracted not in every case but where the ordinary remedy is equally efficacious. In some very exceptional cases the Courts have entertained petitions even during pendency of suits. However, we are not aware of any principle requiring the Court to exercise this jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the time required for disposal of a suit may be a little more than that in which a Constitution petition could be decided.
7. Moreover, it has been repeatedly held by superior Courts that once a party chooses to seek redress from fora under the ordinary law it cannot normally turn around and seek relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.
8. ' The pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salahuddin's case, if we may say so with great respect is distinguishable. In that case the validity of certain appointments made on the Board of Directors of public company was first questioned through a suit with an application for seeking to restrain the defendants from holding a meeting of a Board of Directors. This application was dismissed and a meeting was, therefore, held. Their Lordships held that under those circumstances even a decree in favour of the plaintiff might not be effected and, therefore, a challenge to the appointment of certain Directors by way of a writ of quo warranto.
9. The instant case, however, stands on an entirely different footing. The question whether the respondent No.1 have any authority to demolish the construction raised on the plot in possession of the petitioner is very much a live controversy. The Court trying the suit has already facilitated the petitioner by allowing recording of evidence on Commission so as to ensure an early disposal of suit. Moreover, apart from the question of legality of the impugned action some factual controversy such as whether the plot falls within the area allocated to the respondent No.1 for development of the park, etc. May also arise. In any event, we are of the view that the petitioner cannot be allowed to subvert the ordinary process of law.
10. However, we are perturbed by the application for interim relief seeking to restrain the Commissioner appointed by the Trial Court from recording evidence. Apart from the fact such order would virtually amount to suspending an order passed by this Court in Original jurisdiction which cannot be done. It is- comprehensible why a party should be aggrieved by an interim order passed in his favour. It seems that the petitioner is not satisfied that the appropriate order of the trial Court seeking to preserve the corpus of the dispute for the benefit of both parties and wants to go ahead and raise construction even before the controversy raised by himself in the suit is resolved. We are, therefore, satisfied that conduct of the petitioner also lacks bona fides. The petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine alongwith the listed application with costs of Rs.5,000 (Rupees five thousand).