' KHAWAJA MUAHMMAD SAEED, J.---This appeal, with leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of the High Court passed on 12-6-2001.
2. There is no need to mention in detail the facts of the case suffice it to say that a requisition for five posts of Assistant Engineer B-17 was sent to the Public Service Commission for its recommendations. Out of these five vacancies two seats were reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan. Appellant Muhammad Anwar was recommended by the Public Service Commission against one of such seats whereas preformrespondent No.2 was recommended against other vacancy. Respondent 0.1 Maqsood Ahmed Minhas, filed a writ petition in the High Court whereby he challenged the recommendations of the Public Service Commission for the appointment of the appellant and proforma respondent No.2 against the vacant seats falling in the quota reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan inter alia on the ground that the appellant is not a refugee settled in Pakistan. According to the respondent he is a bona fide domicile of District Muzaffarabad. He based his claim on the basis of the State Subject Certificate and Domicile Certificate which the appellant had previously obtained from Deputy Commissioner Muzaffarabad. According to respondent No.
1. The appellant on the basis of Domicile and State Subject Certificate issued in his favour by the Deputy Commissioner Muzaffarabad had obtained admission in the Engineering College Mirpur against the seat which was reserved for District Muzaffarabad and later on his father obtained Domicile Certificate from District Sialkot on 16-5-1989 on the basis of which the appellant also obtained his Domicile Certificate from Sialkot on 25-6-1989. According to respondent No.1 due to this device the appellant obtained the recommendations in his favour from the Public Service Commission against vacancy reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan. It was further averred by the learned counsel for respondent that on the basis of two conflicting Domicile Certificates, one obtained by the appellant from District Magistrate Muzaffarabad showing himself the permanent resident of Plate, a part of Muzaffarabad city, which he utilized for getting admission in the Engineering College Mirpur against the seat reserved for District Muzaffarabad and secondDomicile Certificate obtained by him from District Magistrate Sialkot on 25-6-1989 was wrongly utilized by him for obtaining the post of Assistant Engineer Electricity B-17. The High Court while allowing his writ petition vide the judgment dated 16-11-1999 set aside the recommendations made by the Public Service Commission in favour of the appellant along with the order of appointment issued in his favour on the basis of recommendations of the Public Service Commission by the Government. On appeal this judgment of the High Court was vacated by this Court and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh decision on the ground that the documents relied upon by the appellant, herein, were not taken into consideration. The relevant para of the judgment of the Court reads as follows:-- "We have given due consideration to the arguments raised. It may be stated that irrespective of the fact as to how the domicile certificate of Muzaffarabad on the basis of which Muhammad Anwar, appellant, secured admission of the Engineering University would affect the subsequent domicile certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner Narowal, the fact remains that first it is to be resolved as to whether in fact Muhammad Anwar, appellant or for that matter his father is permanently settled in Sialkot or at Muzaffarabad. It is only after the aforesaid finding the question would arise as to how the factum of the domicile certificate issued by the concerned authority at Muzaffarabad would affect the factum of the appellant being domicile of Narowal, Pakistan. The perusal of the judgment of the High Court would reveal that none of the documents which the appellant, herein, has placed on record regarding the question that he was permanently settled in Narowal was discussed."
3. After the remand of the case once again the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 and set aside the recommendations made by Public Service Commission along with his order of appointment as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. This judgment of the High Court is under challenge in the present appeal.
4. Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, the learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the grandfather of the appellant was a State Subject who migrated in 1947 and settled in Narowal District Sialkot. The present appellant was born at Narowal. His father on account of his service shifted to Muzaffarabad due to his posting and constructed a house and few shops in Plate Muzaffarabad.
The appellant on account of the posting of his father at Muzaffarabad also shifted to Muzaffarabad and obtained his education at Muzaffarabad. He during that period passed hisF.Sc. Examination from Muzaffarabad. As he was settled with his father at Muzaffarabad, therefore, obtained Domicile Certificate from District Muzaffarabad and also got admission in the Engineering College Mirpur against a seat reserved for District Muzaffarabad. According to the learned counsel subsequently the father of the appellant and his client, abandoned their domicile of choice of District Muzaffarabad and reverted to the domicile of origin. He referred State Subject Certificate of Sharif- ud-Din, father of the appellant, which he had obtained in the year 1960 by disclosing himself a refugee of Jammu Province settled in Narowal. According to the learned counsel sufficient material was filed by his client with his written statement but despite clear direction of this Court the same was not once again taken into consideration by the High Court while allowing the writ petition of the respondent whereas there is no cavil to the legal proposition that the judgment of this Court is binding on all Courts. The observations or direction recorded by this Court cannot be overlooked as that would amount to violation of the Interim Constitution Act and the Supreme Court Rules but in this case the High Court has totally ignored the directions of this Court contained in its judgment.
He further argued that this case was on the file of Mr. Justice Chaudhry Riaz Akhtar, who found that some important ints involved in the case, therefore, he for the constitution of the Larger Bench sent the case back to the learned Chief Justice vide his order dated 1611-2000. On 17-11-2000, a Division Bench was constituted by the learned Chief Justice consisting of learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Muhammad Riaz Akhtar Chaudhry. According to the learned counsel on 7-6-2001 the said Bench heard the arguments in the case and the judgment was reserved. On 12-6-2001 the judgment was announced by the learned Chief Justice alone who also directed the office to inform the learned counsel for the parties. On 18-6-2001 a notice was issued to the learned counsel for the appellant which was received by him on the same day whereby he was informed that judgment has been announced on 12-6-2001. The appellant applied for the attested copies of the judgment on the same date which was supplied to him on 28-6-2001. The attested copy which has been provided to his client on 28-6-2001, is signed by the learned Chief Justice alone and not by the other Judge. From the perusal of the file it appears that the file was sent to the other member of the Court by the learned Chief Justice on 18-6-2001 who signed the judgment on 30-6-2001.
According to the learned counsel the whole procedure adopted in this case was contrary to the scheme as envisaged by the High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 and established practice of the Court. This, according to the learned counsel, is no judgment in the eye of law as it was not announced by the Court which was seized with the case because after the announcement of the judgment signatures were obtained from the other Judge.
5. On the other hand, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the respondent, argued that his client is not at fault. He has got very good case on merits. The appellant who is in service is outside the country now a days whereas respondent who has genuine claim against one of the reserved seats for refugees settled in Pakistan is out of service as post has been illegally occupied by the appellant. He requested that as this Court has got very wide powers to decide the controversy between the parties without remanding the case, therefore, according to the learned counsel we should ourselves decide the same in the light of the record made available by the parties on the file of the High Court as well as on the file of this Court.
6. We have considered the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. In the first round of litigation it was observed by this Court that documents which the appellant had submitted before the High Court 'along with written statement in support of his claim that he was permanently settled in Narowal were not discussed, therefore, the case was remanded to the High Court with the direction that it shall rehear the arguments of the parties in the light of the documents which the parties had placed on record and shall decide the same afresh in accordance with law but once again the documents which the appellant had placed on record in support of his case were not taken into consideration. All the Courts including the High Court are bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court, therefore, the directions recorded by this Court should have not been overlooked or bypassed as that would amount to violation of the Interim Constitution Act, and the Supreme Court Rules. This view fads support from the case titled Abdul Qadeer and 148 others v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir University and another (2000 SCR 22). In this case while recording the judgment, the directions of this Court were ignored, therefore, it was held that the judgment of the High Court cannot sustain. Even otherwise in the present case settled practice was flouted. The case was reserved for judgment on 12-6-2001 by the Division Bench but the judgment was written and signed by the learned Chief Justice who announced the same on 12-6-2001 and directed the office that the result of the litigation be communicated to the counsel for the contesting parties. The judgment came in the notice of the appellant on 18-6-2001.
He applied for the supply of the copies on the same day which were made available to him on 28- 6-2001. The record was sent along with the judgment by the Chief Justice to the other member of the Bench who was holding circuit at Mirpur on 18-6-2001 and sigoed the judgment on 30-6-2001.
This practice is not recognized by taw./ Before the judgment is announced through short or comprehensive order,. The same must contain the signatures of the learned members of the Court but in this case, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, this procedure was adopted contrary to the High Court Procedure Rules as well as the settled practice of the Courts.
' In view of the above reasoning we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. No doubt this Court has got ample powers to decide any controversy between the contesting parties itself but such practice is not adopted so that the affected party may have second chance to submit its case for reconsideration. The practice adopted by this Court in cases where points have been left undecided is to remand the case to the lower Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. In this case we also want to have the wisdom of the High Court, therefore, we cannot accept the suggestion of the learned counsel for the respondent that we should ourselves decide this case. Therefore while remanding this case we expect that the High Court shall decide the case in the light of the documents placed on record by the parties by taking this case out of its turn so that the same is decided within next two months after receiving the file.