' ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, J.--- Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment, dated 26-8-2002 passed by a learned Judge inChambers of the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Bench at Hyderabad, in Revision Application No,138 of 1987 wheieby the same was allowed and the concurrent findings recorded by two Courts below were set aside.
2. The relevant facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are that petitioner Mst. Zainab filed Suit No,101 of 1983 against respondents in the Court of 1st Senior Civil Judge, Nawabshah, for declaration and injunction averring therein that she along with her ex-husband Muhammad Jafar was in possession of House No,II-B/579 constructed over half of the said plot situated in Mohallah Manuabad, Nawabshah. Prior to the filing of the suit, the property was in possession of one Qassim Ali, father-in-law of the petitioner, in the year 1947. But the house was allotted to one Mangtoo, son- in-law of said Qassim Ali. Deceased Sher Muhammad, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, Mst.
Muni and others filled in C.H. Form before the Settlement Authorities for transfer of suit house in his favour and in the meanwhile deceased Muhammad Jaffar, ex-husband of petitioner Mst. Zainab also filed C.H. Form which was accepted and P.T.O. Was issued in his favour. After the death of said Muhammad Jaffar, deceased Sher Muhammad moved an application to Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Nawabshah, alleging therein that suit property was subjected to a double transfer which was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Nawabshah, on 23-1-1983. Said order was challenged by deceased Sher Muhammad before Additional Settlement Commissioner in appeal which was partly allowed holding that suit property comprising of two independent residential portions, one occupied by petitioner and other by deceased Sher Muhammad be transferred to them respectively. Feeling aggrieved, deceased Sher Muhammad filed revision against the said order before the District Judge and Settlement Commissioner, Nawabshah who vide order 30-8-1967 allowed the same and transferred the entire property in his name. Thereafter, revision application preferred before the same authority was rejected. Whereafter, aforesaid order was challenged in Constitution Petition No,394 of 1968 before West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, Karachi, which was dismissed in limine vide order, dated 26-8-1968. Thereafter, Letters Patent Appeal No,187 of 1968 challenging the above order was preferred before West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, Karachi but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 5-11-1979.
3. Then petitioner filed abovementioned suit for declaration and injunction against respondents which was decreed vide judgment, dated 26-8-1986 by 2nd Senior Civil Judge, Nawabshah, against which Appeal No, 156 of 1986 filed by respondents was dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Nawabshah, vide judgment, dated 31-3-1987. It was against this judgment, above mentioned revision application wasfiled by respondents before the learned High Court of Sindh Bench at Hyderabad, which was allowed by the impugned judgment.
4. We have heard Mr. Ghulam Qadir Jatoi, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner, Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui, learned Advocate-on-record for respondents Nos.1 to 5 and have gone through the record and the proceedings of the case in minute particulars.
5. As stated above in the facts, the first round of litigation attained finality on 5-11-1979 when the Letters Patent Appeal No,187 of 1968 was dismissed by West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, Karachi. Admittedly and also conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the above mentioned order passed in Letters Patent Appeal was not challenged before this Court in civil petition for leave to appeal, as such, it attained finality. In view of the above, there was no justification for the petitioner at all to re-start 2nd round of litigation by invoking the jurisdiction of Civil Court by filing above mentioned civil suit. The jurisdiction of Civil Court is also barred under section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") whereby an order passed by any Officer appointed under the Act cannot be questioned in any Court. Irrespective of above, section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure also bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try suits of civil nature where their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. Question of resjudicata is also fully attracted in this ease as the issue in this matter was the same which was in the previous litigation and was finally decided up to the level of learned High Court.The law on this aspect of the matter has been declared by this Court in several pronouncements. As an example, reference is made to the case of Abdul Majid and others v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others PLD 1982 SC 146. For better appreciation, it would be appropriate to reproduce the 'observations mentioned at sideline "H" of page 151 of the said judgment:-- "The rule which is fully attracted to this case, as already mentioned, was laid down in the case of Muhammad Chiraghud-Din Bhatti v. The Province of West Pakistan 1971 SCM R 447 that even if section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code may not, in terms, apply in support of the plea of resjudicata, it can hardly be disputed that the general principles of resjudicata are clearly attracted to debar a party from re-agitating the matter afresh by a civil suit, which had been put at rest by a judgment of the High Court passed in writ jurisdiction."
6. As regards bar to file civil suit under section 9 of Civil Procedure Code, this Court while affirming the law declared in the case of Abdul Majid referred (supra) has held that section 9, C.P.C. Provides that Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature"excepting suits of which their cognizance either expressly or impliedly barred".
7. For what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the case of petitioner is fully hit by the above mentioned provisions of law and there seems to be no justification to interfere with the impugned judgment which is accordingly maintained. Resultantly, finding no merit in the petition, the same is dismissed and leave to appeal refused.