' Through the institution of the present Constitutional petition, the petitioner/judgment-debtor has called in question order, dated 3-7-2001, passed by the learned Judge Banking Court No,IV, Lahore, whereby the learned Banking Court recalled order, dated 4-5-2001.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this Constitutional petition are that pursuant to passing a decree for recovery of Rs,26,30,722 on 22-6-1998, against the petitioner and others, by respondent No,1, respondent No,2 initiated execution proceedings, wherein the property of the petitioner was ordered to be auctioned through Court auctioneer, appointed by the learned Banking Court. The reserve price of the property was fixed at Rs,30 lacs, but on an application, filed by the Judgment- debtor, the reserve price was fixed at Rs,80 lacs by the Banking Court vide order dated 4-5-2001.
Subsequently as the property could not be sold on the said reserve price and as a matter of fact no bidder was attracted towards the sale, therefore, the learned Banking Court reduced the reserve price from Rs,80 lacs to Rs,60 lacs. Even on this reserve price the property could not be sold and, therefore, the learned Banking Court, most probably realizing that the reserve price is too high, reduced the same from Rs,60 lacs to Rs,50 lacs vide order, dated 3-7-2001 which order has been called in question by the petitioner through the filing of this writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of section 27 of Act XV of 1997, the learned Banking Court has no jurisdiction to review his earlier order, therefore, the impugned` order is not sustainable in law. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No,2 has submitted that the earlier order has not been reviewed by the learned Banking Court, but, in fact, the reserve price has been reduced by recalling the previous order, as such, the said order does not fall within the scope of section 27 of Act XV of 1997.
4. There is no cavil with the proposition that finality is attached to the orders passed by the Banking Court and perforce of section 27 of Act XV of 1997, the Banking Court cannot review its order and it is so held in the cases reported as Messrs Shah Jewana Textile Mills Ltd. v. United Bank of Pakistan through Attorney (PLD 2000 Lahore 162) and Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Digital Radio Paging (Pvt.)
Ltd. And 4 others (2000 CLC 1153), but the question which has risen for determination in the present petition is whether the present case falls within the . Purview and scope of "review". The order sheet manifests that on the application of the judgment-debtor, the reserve price was enhanced from Rs,30 lacs to Rs,80 lacs. By recalling the earlier order, whereby Rs,30 lacs was fixed as reserve price.
As the said order was apparently in the benefit of the petitioner, therefore, no exception was taken by her for the recalling of the earlier order and the enhancement of the reserve price. The property could not be sold at that price and no bidder even attended the auction proceedings, therefore, the learned Banking Court in its own wisdom realizing that the reserve price is on a higher side, reduce the reserve price from Rs,80 lacs to Rs,60 lacs vide order, dated 11-5-2001. The judgment- debtor even on this action did not appear to be aggrieved, therefore, she never challenged the order, dated 11-5-2001. The record of the case manifests that even on the said reserve price the property could not be auctioned, resultantly the learned Banking Court again reduced the reserve price from Rs,60 lacs to Rs,50 lacs vide order, dated 3-7-2001. This time the petitioner felt aggrieved and averred that the Banking Court cannot "review" its own order. This can hardly be termed to be a "review" of order. If such a harmless order cannot be recalled by the Banking Court, then I am afraid the Banking Courts, which have been established for speedy disposal of the Bank's recovery cases. Cannot function and will be standstill.
5. Another aspect of the matter is that when on 4-5-2001. The learned Banking Court enhanced the reserve price from Rs,30 lacs to Rs,80 lacs, by recalling its earlier order whereby he fixed the reserve price of Rs,30 lacs, the petitioner did not come up with the plea that the learned Banking Court cannot review its own order, rather this enhancement in the reserve price was at the behest of the petitioner and as it went in her favour, therefore, she kept silent. Again on 11-5-2001, when the reserve price was reduced to Rs,60 lacs by Banking Court by recalling its order. Dated 4-5-2001, the petitioner did not raise any objection and acquiesced over the matter. The above narrative would show that the petitioner did not raise any objection to the recalling of previous two orders, dated 4- 5-2001 and 11-5-2001 and acquiesced over the said order as they were not assailed through the filing of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show that how she is now aggrieved from the impugned order and what difference existed between the two orders, which compelled the petitioner to assail the latest order while the two previous orders were acquiesced over by the petitioner, whereas in pith and substance the nature of all the orders was the same. If the order, dated 11-5-2001, could not have been recalled by the learned Judge Banking Court by virtue of the order, dated 3-7-2001, then how the petitioner can explain the recalling of earlier order, which was made on 4-5-2001. The principle of approbation and reprobation is fully applicable in this case.
6. Main purpose for the establishment of Banking Courts is for the expeditious disposal of the cases relating to the recovery of bank dues. The Banking Courts cannot be handicapped by some unscrupulous customers/ judgment-debtors under the threat of section 27 of the said Act. If it be held that the Banking Court cannot even recall such minor and harmless orders, then I am afraid the Banking Courts cannot, function for all practical purposes and will fell prey in the hands of the defendants/judgment debtors, who spare no opportunity to prolong the proceedings, in the recovery suit/execution. In case, such orders are not allowed to be recalled by the Banking Court under the garb of section 27 of Act XV of 1997, I am afraid it will amount setting at naught the very provisions of the Act and the purpose for the establishment of. The Banking Courts. The Court is to examine the facts and circumstances of each and every case and then to decide on its merits, as to whether the case falls within the scope C of "reviewing" or "recalling" of the order.
7. Upon the examination of the record and the impugned ,order, I am of the considered view that the impugned order does not fall within the scope of "review" and as a matter of fact, the learned Banking Court has simply recalled the order, to which neither section 27 of Act XV of 1997, is attracted nor the affronted case-law is applicable.
8. Another aspect of,the case, which cannot be ignored at this juncture, is that the decree for recovery was passed in the month of June, 1998, and for the execution of which the execution proceedings were initiated by the decree-holder on 8-9-1998. Admittedly, the judgment-debtors, including the petitioner, failed to liquidate their liabilities saddled upon them by the decree. The petitioner has been able to prolong the execution proceedings by way of filing different applications and the instant writ petition is further futile effort towards the same direction. The petitioner is not liquidating her liabilities, the decree passed against her, as far back as in June, 1998, is still unsatisfied and on the other hand, she is not allowing the Banking Court to proceed with the execution proceedings. From the history of the case, it is evident that the petitioner has made it impossible for the Banking Court to proceed with the execution application and as a matter of fact, forestalled the execution proceedings. In these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled for any discretionary and equitable relief in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
' The upshot of the above discussion is that the writ petition is devoid of merits, thus, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.