1. ' An ejectment petition was filed on 2-1-1993 by the respondent against the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants on the grounds stated therein. While the same was pending Muhammad Anwar their predecessor-in-interest died. The petitioners successors of Muhammad Anwar (deceased) then chose to file 'a suit for declaration and injunction qua the disputed property on 5-12-1995. Both these matters were consolidated, tried and heard together. The learned Civil Judge 1st Class/Rent Controller Gujranwala vide its judgment, dated 2312-1997, :dismissed the declaratory suit filed by the appellants and accepted the ejectment petition of Muhammad -Arshad respondent, through a composite judgment giving 120 days time to the appellants to vacate the premises by removing superstructure. The said judgment was assailed through two separate appeals before the First Appellate Court which appeals were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala on 27-11-1999. The judgment of the Rent Controller rendered in the ejectment matter and upheld by the First Appellate Court is subject-matter of this appeal whereas the judgment of the trial Court qua the declaratory suit and upheld by the learned Additional District Judge is subject-matter of challenge in Civil Revision No,1456 of 2000. Due to' commonness of the parties, the subject-matter and the issues arising, the same have been argued together by the learned counsel for the parties, thus, the appeal (S.A.O. No,11 of 2000) and the revision petition (Civil Revision No,1456 of 2000) shall stand disposed of through this judgment.
2. ' It is contended by the learned counsel that the respondent was not the owner of the premises and, therefore, could not take out ejectment proceedings against the appellants and that in any case the ejectment petition was not competent after the expiry of period of tenancy fixed in the deed, dated 15-4-1976. In support of his contentions reliance is. Placed upon Nawab Haji Muhammad Dawood Khan and others v. Muhammad Usman Ghani and others 1985 CLC 2309 and Trustees of Port of the Karachi v. Messrs Hyesons Commercial and Industrial Corporation 1987 CLC 1932. It is contended that the Revenue Record has been misinterpreted and misconstrued by the Courts below. C.M. No,1364/C of 2003 has been moved in order to produce additional evidence in the form of report Roznamcha, dated 19-6-2003. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has contended that the judgments rendered by the Courts below recording concurrent findings on questions of fact cannot be upset either in second appeal or in revisional jurisdiction.
3. According to him the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners in his life time had not disputed the title of the respondent nor denied the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and that - even the appellants had initially contested the matter on the premises that the rent had been regularly paid. According to him, the principle of "once a tenant always a tenant" estopped them to raise any such plea. It is contended that a new case is sought to be set up before this Court which was never pleaded in the lower Courts.
2. The respective contentions have been considered in the light of the pleadings of the parties, the evidence led by them and the findings recorded by the Courts below. Admittedly, on 15-4-1976 (Exh.A-2), a rent deed was executed between the parties which was registered with the Sub- Registrar according to which the tenancy had to commence w.e.f, 1-1-1976 and had to remain operative for five years. The contents of this document would show that Muhammad Anwar predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had admitted and acknowledged the respondent as owner and landlord of the premises. During the currency of the lease period or even thereafter he did not dispute his title or status as landlord. It was after his death that the appellants instituted the suit in the year 1995 when the ejectment petition was already pending. It may be noted that in the ejectment petition ex parte order was passed on 16-2-1993. For the setting aside whereof an application was filed by the appellants A in the month of May, 1993. The tenor of the said application clearly spell out that the respondent had been conceded, admitted and acknowledged as landlord and the property as the demised premises. It is thus, not difficult to discern that the denial of title of the respondent by the appellants was an afterthought and a counterblast to the ejectment proceedings. Besides that the appellants could not succeed by pressing a plea which had no basis or backing of the pleadings, their conduct and drift in their stance also estopped them and they could not succeed on such premises. The reliance of the learned counsel upon Nawab Haji Muhammad Dawood Khan and others (supra) and Trustees of the Port of Karachi (supra) is inapt and is of no assistance to the appellants inasmuch as in Mrs. Zarina Khawaja v.
4. Agha Mahboob Shah PLD 1988 SC 190, it was held that notwithstanding the expiry of the tenancy agreement, the terms thereof continue to operate and govern the parties. Similar was the view taken in Mrs. Zehra Begum v. Pakistan Burma Shell Ltd. 1992 M LD 2494. Even a belated action by the landlord for ejectment would not militate against him as the mere passage of time would neither denude the landlord of his title nor create any adyerse title in favour of the tenant. It may be observed that the two Courts below have on their appreciation of the facts and the evidence recorded correct findings Which admit of no exception by this Court nor there is any justification for interference therewith.
5. ' Insofar as the attempt to produce copy of Roznamcha Waqiati (demarcation pending the litigation) is concerned, I find no justification to allow any such application, C.M. No,1364/C of 2003 is thus, dismissed.
6. ' In view of the above, the appeal as also the revision petition are dismissed. It may, however, be observed that the appellants were allowed by the Courts below to remove superstructure (Malbah), I consider it appropriate to allow a reasonable time to them. For, this purpose six months time is given to the appellants from today for handing over vacant possession of the premises failing which the legal process would follow. No order as to costs.