1. G. SAMAR SHAH, J.--Property No. B-II-10-S-1270, situated at Hafizabad was transferred to Musawar A.I, and others on 24-12-1959 on the basis of earmarking scheme. Since the property in question formed part of the compensation pool, constituted under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the same was transferred to Musawar A.I and others by the Settlement Department. The Evacuee Property Trust Board, the petitioner in this case, however, claimed the said property to be Trust property, therefore, it filed an application before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner praying therein that for the determination of the character of the said property the matter be referred to the District Judge for his decision. The record would show that after recording the evidence of the parties, the learned District Judge held that the property belonged Mehraj Krishan and Kanshi Ram evacuees and consequently he negatived the claim of the petitioner Board that the same was Trust property. Being aggrieved of the said order the petitioner Board went in appeal to the High Court under section 4 (4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, but the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge, vide his order, dated 29-5-1975. It is in this background that the petitioner Board has come up to this Court praying for leave to appeal against the said order of the High. Court.
2. The petition is admittedly barred by 33 days. Therefore, when the case came up before a Bench of this Court on 25-6-1978, it was adjourned to enable the learned counsel for the petitioner to amend his application for the condonation of the said delay. And in compliance with the said order he has filed the amended application. Now the main grounds on the basis of which the condonation of the delay is sought are that this case pertain to the Central Government that before filing the petition in this Co the petitioner Board had to obtain the opinion of its lawyers; and that to the procedural difficulties the Government always takes a longer time to decide whether a petition has to be filed in this Court or not. Now apart from the fact that none of these considerations are relevant for the condonation of the said delay, the further difficulty in the way of the learned counsel is the he has even violated the order of this Court dated 25-6-1978 by which he was allowed to present the amended application for the condonation of delay and thereafter the case was ordered to be put up within one month fen consideration. The order of the Bench was passed on 25-6-1978 whereas this amended application was filed on 29-7-1978, evidently therefore, the application has been filed after the delay of four days for which also no ' explanation has been furnished. In these circumstances, therefore, this petition is clearly barred by limitation, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation in that behalf, the same is hereby dismissed.