' IJAZ-UL-HASSAN, J.---Mst. Allah Rakhi, petitioner, by way of filing instant writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeks that respondents be restrained from making any recovery of the outstanding dues from the petitioner without extending her benefit of the package dated 23-7-1997 announced by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 31-3-1997.
2. The facts which we have been able to gather from the record of the case are that the petitioner was granted loan in a sum of Rs,40,000 by the respondent-Corporation in the year 1976 against the guarantee of Pir Muhammad Khan son of the petitioner. The petitioner had to deposit the total amount with interest etc. Within a span of 20 yeaRs, The repayment performance of the petitioner remained unsatisfactory which obliged the respondent-Corporation to file suit for recovery of Rs,3,58,161, before Judge Banking Court, Peshawar. The suit was decreed ex parte vide order dated 15-10-1999. The ex parte decree was set aside by order dated 26-2-2002. Ultimately, a compromise was effected between the parties and a consent decree for recovery of Rs,1,28,715 was passed in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation against defendant-petitioner by means of judgment and decree dated 27-3-2001, which is being assailed before us through instant writ petition.
3. Mr. Pir Muhammad, Advocate/guarantor for the petitioner contended with force that benefit of the package dated 23-7-1997 announced by . The Prime Minister of Pakistan, regarding recovery of Corporation loans from widows, orphans and retired person, has been refused to the petitioner without any justifiable reason and the petitioner has been treated discriminately qua the other loanees placed in similar situation. The learned counsel maintained that the petitioner approached the quarter concerned time and again but her applications remained unresponded which constrained her to approach this Court by filing a writ petition.
4. Syed Qalbe Abbas, Advocate for the respondent-Corporation, on the other hand, controverted the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to the concession of the widows package which was announced on 31-3-1997 while the petitioner applied on 6-4-2001 for remission of loan but the remission was withdrawn on 21-2-2002.
The learned counsel also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition and contended that the petitioner had an adequate remedy of appeal and as such the extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court could not have been invoked.
5. We have heard at length the arguments and submissions of learned counsel for the parties in the light of the material on file. In order to appreciate the contentions of learned counsel for the parties, we consider it appropriate to reproduce below section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 which reads:-- "21. Appeal.---(1) Subject to subsection (2), any person aggrieved by a decree, or an order refusing to set aside a decree, or an order permitting or preventing the sale of property, or a sentence passed by a Banking Court established under section 4 may, within thirty days of such order, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court.
(2) The High Court shall, at the stage of admitting an appeal, or at any time thereafter either suo motu, or on the application of the decree-holder, decide by means of a reasoned order whether the appeal is to be admitted in part or in whole depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
(3) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges and, in case the appeal is admitted, it shall be decided within ninety days from the date of admission.
(4) An appeal may be preferred under this section from a decree passed ex parte.
(5) No appeal, review or revision shall lie against any interlocutory order of the Banking Court other than an order passed under subsection (6) of section 18."
6. Article 199 of the Constitution provides that no petition would lie if any other adequate, alternate remedy is available. As pointed out above remedy of appeal is already available which has not been resorted to by the petitioner. In the case of Sheikh Gulzar Ali 86 Co. Ltd. And others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCM R 590 it was observed that the High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction cannot take over the function of machinery provided by the statute. We are also of the opinion that the course open to the petitioner was to have instituted appeal against the decree instead of invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court petitioner was to have instituted appeal against the decree instead of invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.Exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary which is to be used in good faith having look to all the attending circumstances and relevant factors of the case. The same is to be used in just, fair and reasonable ways. The financial assistance was provided to the petitioner in the year 1976 for construction of a house on certain terms and conditions. The petitioner has not discharged her liability. The entire loan is outstanding against her. Above conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles her from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Even otherwise a writ petition is not maintainable where consent decrees are passed. Shaikh 'Gulzar Ali & Company and 2 others v. Special Judges, Special Court of Banking for Sindh at Karachi and another 1989 CLC 1958 Karachi.
7. In view of the above discussion finding no substance in this writ petition we dismiss the same with no order as to costs.