' This revision is directed against the order dated 19-11-2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rahim Yar Khan, whereby the learned Judge dismissed the application of the petitioners seeking pre-trial acquittal under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., in case F.I.R. No.7 of 1995, registered at Police Station Sehja, on 31-1-1995 for offences under sections 302/324/34, P.P.C.
2. The relevant facts leading to this revision are that the above noted F.I.R. Was registered on the statement of Bishna Jee son of Sheria Jee-respondent No.2. According to F.I.R. On 30-1-1995 the complainant was sleeping in a residential room alongwith. Sheria Jee (his father-deceased), Mst.
Hurmat, Mst. Seema (sisters) and Mst. Sajni (mother). On 30-1-1995 at about 10/11 p.m. (during night) Nagu Jee (guest) was sleeping near the cattle shed knocked at the door, which was opened by Sheria Jee (father of the complainant), who went outside. Where Motia Jee, Sona Jee sons of Bekha Jee and Mansoba Jee son of Rana Jee, armed with pistols, were present. An unidentified person, armed with a gun, also accompanied them. The accused had placed pistol on the temporal region of Nagu Jee. Mansoba Jee-accused asked the father of the complainant to hand over Mst. Hurmat to him. On refusal, Mansoba Jee and Motia Jee fired at Sheria Jee, who fell on the ground. While the complainant was coming out, he was also fired at by Sona Jee, which hit on his abdomen. Thereafter the accused entered into the residential room where Mansoba Jee fired at Mst. Hurmat, which hit on her abdomen. Motia Jee fired at Mst. Seema, which hit on her buttock.
Sheria Jee, father of the complainant, lost his life at the spot. The fires attracted Faqtria Jee, Budhu Jee and many other persons of the locality. On their arrival, the accused left the scene of occurrence alongwith their respective weapons. The motive as set down in the F.I.R. Was that the proposal of marriage of Mst. Hurmat with Mansoba Jee accused could not be materialized as he refused to give womenfolk in exchange (Watta). The accused felt aggrieved, and with their common intention committed the crime.
3. According to report under section 173, Cr.P.C./Challan dated 31-7-1995 the accused named in the F.I.R. Were found to be innocent and according to the above noted report the offence was committed by a different set of accused.
4. On 18-1-1997, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khanpur/trial Court on the application of the D.D.A. Summoned Motia Jee, Sona Jee, Mansoba Jee and Jeela Jee to face trial in the instant case.
The petitioners through Criminal Revision No.26 of 1997 challenged that order, which was disposed of vide order dated 2-4-2002 by this Court on the basis of statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that he lacked instructions. Certified copy of the order is available on the record as annexure 'G'. Thereafter the petitioners moved an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., which was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 19-11-2003. Hence this revision.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the petitioners were found innocent during investigation and their names were not mentioned in the column of the accused in the report/challan submitted by the Investigating Officer on 31-7-1995; that the learned trial Court could take cognizance only upon the report in writing submitted by the Investigating Officer in accordance with clause (b) subsection (1) of section 190, Cr.P.C.; that no complaint was filed against the petitioners by the first informant Bishna Jee-respondent No.2 despite the fact that the police has declared the petitioners innocent; and that the learned trial Court while framing charge committed a patent error by charging the petitioners that they shared common intention with Muhammad Yar and Karim Ullah-accused.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at length and gone through the available record (annexures) minutely. Admittedly, the names of Motia Jee, Sona Jee and Mansoba Jee alongwith their respective roles have been mentioned in the promptly lodged F.I.R. It has also been mentioned in the F.I.R. That another person, who was armed with a gun, accompanied the aforementioned accused. Order dated 18-1-1997 shows that the petitioners were duly named as accused by the complainant and the other P.Ws. The presence of the complainant and the P.Ws.
Mst. Seema and Mst. Hurmat at the time of occurrence cannot be denied, as they received fire-arm injuries during the occurrence. It reveals from the perusal of section 265-D, Cr.P.C. That the learned trial Court has not only to consider the police report or the complaint before framing of charge but the learned Court has to consider all other documents and statements available on the record. It was held by the apex Court in the case of Safdar Ali v. Zafar Iqbal and others 2002 SCM R 63 that the Court can take cognizance of offence even in case of negative report submitted by the police. The apex Court also held in the case of Khushbakht-ur-Rehman v. The State 1985 SCM R 1314 that the Court takes cognizance of an offence and not of an offender and that the Court can take cognizance of the case as a whole and not qua only some of the accused found by the police to be implicated in the case. It was further held that the cognizance can be taken even if the offenders were unknown and on taking cognizance of the offence, the Court acquired jurisdiction over all the persons involved and not only over the persons against whom the challan was submitted. The apex Court while discussing the word "Cognizance" in the case (supra) termed the word "Cognizance" as an art implying application of mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether the facts disclosed constituted an offence triable.
7. In the light of the aforementioned dictum laid down by the apex Court it cannot be said that the order whereby the petitioners were summoned to face trial by the learned trial Court was without jurisdiction and without application of mind. Prima facie sufficient incriminating material is available against the petitioners to justify their trial. Charge has already been framed in the case and the question whether the petitioners shared common intention with the other co-accused or not can easily be determined after recording of evidence. Thus I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is dismissed in limine.
8. I have noted that the occurrence took place on 30-1-1995 almost nine years ago. The petitioners were summoned to face trial on 18-1-1997. However, no progress could be made in the case due to the pendency of the criminal revision, which was disposed of on 2-4-2002 by this Court. Therefore, in these circumstances, the trial Court is directed to conclude the trial within two months, after receipt of this order, under intimation to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Bench. The trial Court would hear the case on day-to-day basis, if required and would resort coercive measures to procure the attendance of the witnesses, if necessary. Copy of this order be sent to the learned trial Court forthwith.