' NASIR-UL-MULK, J.---New Green Hotel, through its proprietor has filed this S.A.O. Under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 against the order in Appeal No, 799/PB of 2002, dated 4-2-2003 of the Customs Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar Bench as well as the order in Original No,29 of 2002, dated 18-3-2002 passed by the Deputy Collector (Adjudication), Peshawar.
2. The appellant was issued Central Excise Licence on 6-12-1997 for the supply of liquor to valid permit holders. On 16-11-2000, the Deputy Collector (Adjudication) Peshawar issued show-cause notice to the appellant, based on the report of the Audit Officer. It was alleged that the appellant had made taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with the Retail Tax Rule 1998 for Alcoholic Beverages during the period 1-9-1998 to 15-8-1999, but failed to get it registered and to pay the retail tax, amounting to Rs,1,88,4047. The appellant was directed to show cause as to why they should not pay within 10 days the said amount and the additional tax to be calculated at the time of the actual deposit. The appellant submitted reply to the show-cause notice, contesting their liability to pay.
3. The appellant had prayed for the withdrawal of the show-cause notice on 9 grounds, which has been reproduced in the order in original. Grounds 2, 3 and 9 are material for the present appeal.
They are:
(2) That all the liquor acquired during the audited period were for self-consumption as was served within the premises of the Hotel, hence, falls within definition of excisable services liable to tax under section 4(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, therefore, the requisite C.E.D. Was paid thereon, hence, being construed as served within the premises, thus, this self-consumption cannot be taken as supply of goods within the purview of section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 otherwise this situation would create an irreconcilable anomaly whereas the respondent activity is being construed as service while under the Sales Tax it is being treated vide the instant show-cause notice as supply. This anomaly is impermissible.
(3) That without prejudice, the respondent is not liable to be registered as retailer for being not falling within the definition of retailer which is defined in the Sales Tax Act 1990 as under:-- ' Section 2(28) "Retailer' means a person [not being a manufacturer or producer or an importer.] supplying goods to general public for the purpose of consumption.
(9). That in an identical case Avari Hotel Limited v. The Collector Sales Tax and others it has been held that during the subject period the serving and supplying of liquor to the permit holders do not make liable the licence-holder to be registered as a retailer under the provision of Sales Tax Act, 1990. On the same judgment the respondent also rely which is reported as 2000 PTD 3765".
4. The plea of the appellant was not accepted. The judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Avari Hotel Limited v. Collector was not followed by the Collector on the ground that same had been impugned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appellant was therefore, directed to pay the amount stated in the show-cause notice.
5. The order in original was challenged before the Appellate Tribunal. By the time the appeal came up for hearing the Honourable Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Avari Hotel Limited in Civil Appeal No,1587 of 1999 = 2002 PTD 1912 and it was held that the permit holders to whom the licence-holders supplied liquor fall within the definition of "general public" referred to in the definition of retailer given in section 2(28) of the Sales Tax Act. That subsequently the license-holders of alcoholic beverages were liable to pay Sales Tax on the beverages supplied by them to the permit holders. The judgment of the Appellate Tribunal reveals that in the light of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court the counsel for the appellant conceded that the said judgment applied to the appellant's case. However, the learned counsel has claimed that as he was making taxable supplies within the meaning of the Sales Tax Act, he was not liable to pay central excise duty during the relevant period for the services in the shape of supplying alcohol. It was therefore, claimed that during the period of 9/98 to 9/99 the appellant was not liable to pay central excise duty which he had already paid. The learned counsel therefore, prayed that a sum of Rs,15,57,870 paid as central excise duty during the said period be adjusted against the sales tax now levied by the Collector. The Appellant Tribunal did not accept this plea and held that the prayer was not admissible under the law in that central excise duty and the sales tax were leviable under different statutes.
6. The present appeal was admitted to full hearing to consider the following three questions of law formulated in the memorandum of appeal:-- ' Under the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the Appellate Tribunal order is erred for not allowing adjustment of the CENTRAL EXCISE DUTY paid on liquor during the period 1-9-1998 to 15-8-1999 in lieu of SALES TAX payable during the same period as held by the Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order in view of the Honourable Supreme Court judgment in case of the Collector Sales Tax. Lahore v. Avari Hotel Limited reported as 2002 PTD 1912 declaring selling liquors to permit-holder as a supply of taxable goods as a retailer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act 1990.
(H) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, whereas it has been declared by the august Supreme Court that supply of liquor during the aforementioned period was a taxable supply of goods in terms of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 the respondent are not bound to allow the input adjustment of the tax paid on purchases of the liqur during that period, the impugned order is subsilentio on the issue.
(III) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, whereas virtually by mistake of law, the Appellant has paid the demanded amount during the subject period instead paying in sales tax head paid it in the Central Excise head, the appellant is liable to additional tax under the section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for having no net loss to the treasury. The impugned order is sub- silentio on the issue.
7. At the hearing of the appeal Mr. Amir Javed, Advocate, appearing for the Collector of Sales Tax raised preliminary objection that the appellant, namely Messrs New Green Hotel has no locus standi to file the present appeal as the licence for the supply of liquor was issued in the name of Director Green Hotel, who at the relevant time was eyed Adil Shah who has since long passed away. Responding to the said objection, the learned counsel representing the petitioner Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi submitted that the show-cause notice was issued to the appellant's establishment, whose sole proprietor is Syed Aqil Shah and therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the counsel representing the Collector Sales tax to raise such an objection. We would agree with the learned counsel for the appellant and overrule the preliminary objection as the Collector Sales Tax has himself issued the show-cause notice in the name of Messrs New Green Hotel Peshawar Cantonment and there has never been any dispute that Syed Aqil Shah is its proprietor.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant elaborated the questions of law formulated in the appeal and submitted that the Appellate Tribunal has erred in not allowing the appellant adjustment of the Central Excise Duty erroneously prepared by the appellant against the demand of the Sales Tax. He referred to the proviso to section 3 of the Central Excise and Sales Tax Act and letter No,3 (70) STM/99, dated 20-12-1999 and submitted that the law permits adjustment of the Central Excise Duty against the arrears of sales tax. The learned counsel reiterated that since the appellant has paid excise duty on the supply of alcohol as services he cannot be subjected to the sales tax on the same supply in that if the supply of alcohol is considered as supply of goods it cannot be simultaneously treated as providing excisable services. The learned counsel also stressed that the petitioner appellant had not been allowed input adjustment of the sales tax amounting to Rs,440291 paid by the appellant on the purchase of the liquor during the relevant period.
9. The learned counsel representing the respondent submitted that appeal under section 47 of the Sales Tax to the High Court lies only on a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal passed under section 46 of the Act and that in the present appeal points have been raised regarding which the Appellate Tribunal has given no determination. The question whether or not the appellant is liable to pay sales tax on supplies of alcoholic beverages stands settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Sales Tax Lahore v. Avari Hotel Limited and others 2002 PTD 1912 where the apex Court reversed the decision of the Lahore High Court and held that to whom liquor is supplied by the license holder would fall within the description of general public stated in the definition "retailer given in sub- A section (28) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act.
Since the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court was pronounced during the hearing of the appeal before the tribunal the Appellate Tribunal restricted itself to the question of adjustment of the Central Excise duty paid by the appellant in the relevant period of 1-9-1998 to 15-8-1999 is against the sales tax payable during the said period and which was questioned before the Tribunal. This is also the main question raised before us.
10. The appellant had raised the question of adjustment before the Adjudicating Officer but no finding thereon has been given. The Appellate Tribunal declined adjustment simply on the ground that the Central Excise Duty and the sales tax are levied under different statutes and therefore, not amenable to adjustment against each other. The Tribunal did not consider the question of adjustment in the light of section 48 of the Sales Tax Act and the letter of the C.B.R., dated 10-12- 1999. According to the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Central Excise Act, the Excise Duty under the Act "shall be levied and collected as if were tax payable under section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and all the provision of that Act and the rules, notifications, orders and instructions made or issued thereunder shall,, as far as may be and with necessary modification, apply".
' Section 48(1) (clause a) provides: "48. Recovery of arrears of tax.-(1) where any amount of tax levied, penalty imposed or demand raised under any bond or other instrument executed under this Act due from any person, the officer of sales tax may:--
(a) deduct the amount from any money owing to person from whom such amount is recoverable and which may be at the disposal or in the control of such officer or any Officer of Income Tax.
Customs or Central Excise Department.
Thus, under the said provision, the officer of the Sales Tax empowered to deduct from the levy of Sale Tax any amount owed to the assessor that may be in the control of an Officer of the Central Excise Department. The position is further clarified by the letter, dated 20-12-1999, which refers to rule 10 of the Sales Tax Refund Rule 1998.
The letter runs as follows:--- .
"I am directed to enclose copy of the Chairman, C.B.R's. C. No,(1) Ch. C.B.R./99, dated 17th December, 1999 on the above subject and to say that rule 10 of the Sales Tax Refund Rules, 1998 already provides as hereunder:-- "10. Deduction to be made from a sanctioned order.-Where any tax, additional tax or penalty under this Act or under the Central Excise Act, 1994 (I of 1944). Wealth Tax Act, 1963 (XV of 1963), Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), and Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (XXXI of 1979), are outstandlg against the claimant, such amount of arrears shall be deducted from the sanctioned amount of claim before issuing him a cheque for the balance, if any."
From the above provisions it is not difficult to conclude that the law itself has made provisions for adjustment of one tax against another. It is also stated at the Bar that Collector Sales Tax has also been entrusted with the powers of adjudication of the Central Excise Officer, though there is no impediment for making adjustment claimed by the appellant.
11. Having held that the appellant is entitled to adjustment of the Central Excise Duty payable by him as against the Sales Tax for the relevant period, there is difficulty in granting relief to the appellant. The appellant had in its reply to the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy. Collector (Adjudication) taken a ground that if the appellant was liable to pay sales tax on supply of liquor as goods he could not be subjected to excise duty for the same supply as services. The Collector however did not in the order in original give any finding on this ground. Similarly, the same ground was explicitly taken before the Appellate Tribunal. Without touching the merits of this ground the Tribunal proceeded to determine whether adjustment of the two taxes was permissible. There is therefore, no finding of either the Adjudicating Officer or the Tribunal as to whether or not the appellant was not liable to pay excise duty on the supply of liquor when he has been subjected to sales tax.
12. The appellant had though urged before the Adjudicating Officer that Central Excise Duty and Sales Tax cannot be simultaneously imposed on the same supply. He had not in his reply to the show-cause notice mentioned the amount of Excise Duty that he has paid during the relevant period and regarding which he claims adjustment. So also he has not given the figure of the Sales tax that he had paid on purchases of the liquor for which he now seeks adjustment against the output tax. These figures were mentioned for the first time in the memorandum of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal however did not advert to this aspect of the case as it confined itself to the question of adjustment. Thus, there is no determination either by the Adjudicating Officer or by the Tribunal as regarding the amount of excise duty paid by the appellant during the said period as well as the sales tax paid by the appellant on the purchase of liquor during the said period.
13. As a result before any adjustment could be allowed to the appellant it would be necessary to first determine whether the appellant was not liable to pay excise duty during the relevant period and if not the amount of duty to the refund of which he was entitled. Similarly, the sales tax paid by the appellant during the said period, required determination.
14. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the petitioner-appellant would be entitled to the adjustment of excise duty paid by him during 1-9-1998 to 15-8-1999 as against the sales tax, if he is found to be not liable to pay the same. However, we would remand the case to the Adjudicating Officer to first determine the question as to whether or not, and to what extent, the appellant was not liable to pay Central Excise Duty during the said period and also as to whether the appellant is entitled to input adjustment of the Sales Tax paid by him on the purchase of liquor during the said period. In case the present Adjudicating Officer is also Adjudicating Officer under the Central Excise Act, he shall make determination in exercise of such powers. However, if this is not the case, the Adjudicating Officer under the Central Excise Act shall determine the liability of the appellant for the payment of Central Excise Duty during the relevant period. It is after such determination that adjustment shall be allowed to the appellant. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
Order accordingly.
203 PTD 2642 [Karachi Lahore High] Before Anwar Zaheer Jamali and Gulzar Ahmed, JJ Messrs INTERGLOBE COMMERCE PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others Constitutional Petition No, D-373 of 2003, decided on 4th July, 2003.
Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 21---Notification S.R.O. 400(1)/97, dated 31-5-1997-Notification S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-6- 2001-Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition-Exemption from customs duty---Factual inquiry---Technical aspect of equipment-Locally manufactured parts--- Compatibility with imported equipment---Dispute was with regard ..To import of equipment for oil exploration project---Components which could not be locally manufactured were exempted from import duty---Engineering Development Board had decided that the disputed components could be locally manufactured, therefore, such components were not exempted under the Notification S.R.O. 400(1)/97, dated 31-5-1997 and Notification, S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-6-2001---Plea raised by the importer was that the locally manufactured components were not compatible with the imported equipment and the Board had not provided opportunity of hearing to the importer---Validity---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction would not enter into disputed questions of fact and more so when the technicalities of manufacturing of equipment was involved---Law had itself created a forum for determining the disputed question about the status of imported equipment---Importer had submitted to such forum and after elaborate determination of all relevant aspects, the Board had decided against the importer---Function of Engineering Development Board was only to determine the question as to whether the equipment imported was being locally manufactured or not---Board was not supposed to determine the compatibility or suitability of the imported equipment with that of the equipment manufactured locally---Law did not make any provision for determination of compatibility or suitability---Engineering Development Board had examined and gone through the material placed by the importer and had also provided him opportunity of hearing and thereafter had passed the order---Such order did not suffer from any illegality requiring interference by High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction---Petition was dismissed in circumstances. [p. 2647] A Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 SC 329; Messrs Gulshan Weaving Mills Ltd. Lahore v. Collector of Customs, Lahore PTCL 1999 (CL) 186; Abdul Rehman Yusuf Mapara v. Collector of Customs 1988 MLD 795; Messrs Globe Textile Mills Ltd. v.
Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad 1989 CLC 1962 and Messrs Arshad & Company v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad 2000 SCMR 1557 ref. Dr. Amjad Hussain Bukhari for Petitioner.
S. Mehmood Alam Rizvi, Standing Counsel for Respondent No,l. Akhtar Hussain For Respondent No,5.
Date of hearing: 16th May, 2003.
' GULZAR AHMED, J.---The petitioner was awarded contract, hated 14-9-2001 for construction of sub-stations alongwith battery houses inclusive of modular buildings by Alston a British Oil and Gas Company engaged in development of oil and gas at Bhit Exploration in Kirthar Petroleum Concession Area in Pakistan. The contract also envisaged import and supply of certain equipment.
It is stated by the petitioner that LASMO Oil Pakistan Company is subsidiary of Alston and LASMO through its letter, dated 3-12-2001 requested respondent No,4 for issuance of import authorization in favour of the petitioner and that such letter also mentioned the equipments for which import authorization was sought. On the basis of the letter of LASMO, the petitioner through its letter, dated 14-1-2002 approached respondent No,4 for issuance of import authorization and declared that such equipment are not manufactured locally in Pakistan. It is alleged that respondent No,4 vide its letter, dated 29-1-2002 conveyed it's no objection to the respondent No,2 for the import of the equipments. The petitioner imported all the equipments between 13-12-2001 and 27-5-2002. It is alleged that imports of the equipments by the petitioner was exempt from levy of Custom duty under Notification. S.R.O. 400(1)/97, dated 31-5-1997 and S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-6-2001 and thus the petitioner requested the respondent No,2 for such exemption certificate. The respondent No,2 issued a provisional certificate, dated 20-6-2002 for the clearance of the imported equipments on the condition that the petitioner shall furnish bank guarantees and that the certificate shall automatically stand withdrawn in case it is found at any stage that the raw material and components imported are also being locally manufactured and hit by relevant C.G.O.
The petitioner deposited the bank guarantee in favour of respondent No,5. The petitioner then requested the respondent No,2 for the release of the said bank guarantee. The respondent No,2 referred the matter to respondent No,3 the Engineering Development Board (EDB) for opinion about local manufacturing status of equipments imported by the petitioner. The respondent No,3 gave opinion that some of the items imported by the petitioner can be locally manufactured in Pakistan and petitioner is not entitled to grant of exemption. The petitioner thereafter wrote number of letters to the respondent No,3 with supporting material for determination by the respondent No,3 about the local manufacturing status of the imported items. It is alleged that the respondent No,3 without considering the material produced by the petitioner and without hearing the petitioner and without reasons passed order, dated 19-3-2003, deciding the status of some of the items as manufactured locally. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order of the respondent No,3 and has impugned the same in this Constitution petition. Notices were issued to the respondents.
Respondent Nos. 2 and 5 have filed counter affidavit as well as their parawise comments to the petitioner. Respondent No,3 has also placed on record its parawise comments. Petitioner has filed rejoinder/objections to the parawise comments of respondent Nos.2, 3 & 5.
' Mr. Amjad H. Bokhari learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that equipments imported by the petitioner were exempt from levy of Custom duty under S.R.O. 400(1)/97, dated 31-5-1997 as the imported equipments were for oil exploration project. He further contended that the equipments imported by the petitioner were not being locally manufactured and the respondent No,3 by the impugned order while deciding the status of some of the imported equipments as being locally manufactured has not considered the material produced by the petitioner to show that such equipments were not being locally manufactured. He has further contended that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner by the respondent No,3 before passing of the impugned order. He has relied upon Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1991 SC 329; Messrs Gulshan Weaving Mills Ltd. Lahore v. Collector of Customs, Lahore PTCL 1999 (CL) 186, Abdul Rehman Yusuf Mapara v. Collector of Customs, 1988 MLD 795, and Messrs Globe Textile Mills Ltd. v.
Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad 1989 CLC 1962. Mr. Akhtar Hussain learned counsel for the respondent No,5 has contended that the petitioner was allowed to import the relevant equipment under S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-6-2001 which was conditional and subject to final determination by Engineering Development Board regarding the manufacturing status of the imported equipment. He has stated that the matter was referred to the Engineering Development Board who provided all opportunity to the petitioner to produce full information regarding the imported equipments. The information produced by the petitioner was referred to relevant industry of each equipment for information of local manufacturing status and it was found that some of the equipment imported by the petitioner were being locally manufactured. He further contended that in arriving at the impugned decision, the respondent No, 3 has not only considered all material produced by the petitioner but has also provided to the petitioner opportunity of personal hearing.
He stated that the present petition is misconceived and not maintainable and relied upon Messrs Arshad and Company v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad, 2000 SCMR 1557. Mr. S. Mahmood Alam Rizvi Standing Counsel for the respondent No,1 has adopted the arguments of. Mr. Akhtar Hussain.
' We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel and have gone through the record.
' It is not disputed between the parties that Notification S.R.O. 400(1)/97, dated 31-5-1997 and Notification S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-6-2001 granted exemption from levy of Custom duty on equipments as are not manufactured locally if imported by exploration and productions Companies including O.G.D.C. And their contractors and sub-contactors and service companies for the projects. S.R.O. 400(1)/97 , in its para 10 provide that in the event of dispute whether any item is entitled to the exemption under this notification, the item/consignment will be immediately released by the Collector of Customs against a corporate guarantee from the company. A subsequent certificate from the relevant regulatory authority that the item is covered under this notification shall be given due consideration by the Collector of Customs or the Central Board of Revenue as the case may be towards finally resolving the disputes. Similarly S.R.O. 435(I)/2001, contains explanation that for the purpose of this notification the expression "not produced or manufactured locally" shall mean the goods which are not included in the list of locally manufactured goods specified in the General Order issued by the Central Board of Revenue or certified as such by the Indigenization Committee of Engineering Development Board. It should be clarified that the respondent No,4 while granting no objection for import of equipments by the petitioner has attached the following rider in its letter, dated 29-1-2002 annexure 'E' to the petitioner:- "(2) The admissibility of the import of components by Interglobe Engineering Services will however, be determined by Chief (Survey), C.B.R. In accordance with the aforementioned S.R.O. And C.G.O.
7/98."
' The above quoted para refers to S.R.O. 435(1)/2001, dated 18-2-2001.
' Now it appears that dispute arose between the petitioner and the respondents as to the local manufacturing status of the equipments imported by the petitioner. The petitioner furnished the bank guarantee and got the equipment released and thereafter the petitioner approached the respondent No, 2, C.B.R., for granting of exemption certificate and N.O.C. For release of bank guarantee. The respondent No,2 pursuant to the explanation contained in S.R.O. No,435(I)/2001, referred the matter for the opinion and necessary certification by the respondent No,3 that is the Engineering Development Board. The petitioner submitted to the respondent No,3 and placed before it necessary material to demonstrate that the equipment imported by it are not being manufactured locally. It appears that the respondent No,3 provided full opportunity to the petitioner to substantiate its point of view and has also given personal hearing to the petitioner.
The respondent No,3 in the course of enquiry has obtained information from local manufacturers which information was confronted by the petitioner. Copies of information and material procured by the respondent No,3 for the purpose of enquiry in the matter are attached with parawise comments of the respondent No,3. After considering all relevant aspect of the matter, the respondent No,3 appears to have passed the order finding that some of the equipments imported by the petitioner are manufactured locally. The petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Sohail Jute Mills Ltd. (Supra) in which vires of levy of surcharge and Iqra surcharge was challenged and further exemption from levy of Custom duty was sought on the ground that at the time of making of contract for import of machinery, it was not manufactured locally. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding levy of surcharge and Iqra Surcharge legal remanded some of the cases to the departmental authorities for making of factual enquiry as to whether at the relevant time the machinery imported were being manufactured locally as no such enquiry was conducted. In the case of Messrs Globe Textile Mills Ltd. (Supra) the question was whether the CGO issued by the Central Board of Revenue under section 21 of the Customs Act mentioning items which were exempt from payments of Customs duty was not withdrawn due to replacement of S.R.O.
Mentioned in C.G.O. In the case of Abdul Rehman Yusuf Mapara (Supra) the matte was with regard to encashment ' of bank guarantee by the Customs Authority without giving opportunity of hearing that the imported item by the petitioner was liable to concessionary rate of Customs duty under relevant P.C.T. Heading. The case of Messrs Gulshan Weaving Mills Ltd. (Supra) is a decision of the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore which too is distinguishable from the present case as in that case, no determination was made about the local fabrication of humidification plant and thus the matter was remanded.
' As stated above, the respondent No,3 has considered all relevant aspect after providing full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and has reached conclusion that some of the equipments by the petitioner were also being locally manufactured. Both the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and respondent No,5 have argued that about the technical aspects of the imported equipments in as much as the petitioner's counsel has contended that the locally manufactured equipment are not compatible to the imported equipments. Insofar as the argument with regard to the technical aspect of the matter is concerned, it is well established law that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction will not enter into disputed questions of fact and more so where in the present case the technicalities of manufacturing of equipment is involved. The law has itself created a forum that of respondent No,3 for determining the disputed question about the status of imported equipments by the petitioner and to such forum the petitioner has submitted and after elaborate determination of all relevant aspects, the respondent No,3 as a statutory forum has decided the question by the impugned order. The function of respondent No,3 was only to determine the question as to whether the equipment imported by the petitioner were being manufactured locally or not. It was none of the function of the respondent No,3 to determine the compatibility or suitability of the imported equipment of petitioner with that of equipments manufactured locally. The law did not make any provision for the determination of compatibility or suitability. We are satisfied that the respondent No,3 has examined and gone through the material placed by the petitioner and has also provided opportunity of hearing and thereafter has passed the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the impugned order suffers from any illegality requiring interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction.
Resultantly the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed alongwith C.M.A. No,1209 of 2003.