1. ' K. M. A. SAMADANI, J.-This is a petition by Ch. Atta Muhammad of Rahim Yar Khan District and his 10 brothers. The respondents are the Federal Land Commission, the Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab, the Land Commissioner, Lahore, and Shahzada Alamgir, a retired Government servant (hereinafter called the Government servant for the convenience of reference). In the year 1963, he was granted a piece of land measuring 239.10 acres (say 240 acres) in village Kamoo Shaheed in Taluka Ubrao District Sukkur under the scheme for the grant, by way of sale, of State agricultural land in the areas of Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, Guddu Barrage and Taunsa Barrage. In accordance with the terms of the grant, he obtained possession of the land in the year 1964 on payment of the first instalment of Rs, 12,000 towards the price thereof. But soon thereafter two of his sons were murdered while they were managing the land on behalf of their father. As a result of this unfortunate episode, the Government servant appears to have lost interest in the land. So he set out to get rid of it. But having already invested huge sums of money, he sought to transfer whatever legal interest he had in the land at that time and what he would have in future, for consideration. It was at this juncture that the petitioners came into the picture and agreed to purchase the interest of the Government servant in the land in question. Accordingly, an agreement of sale was executed and registered in the year 1968, to the relevant terms of which reference will be made as and when necessary.
2. ' However, in pursuance of one of the terms of the agreement, the Government servant also executed in January, 1969, an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of Ch. Atta Muhammad petitioner No, 1, who held and still holds a power of attorney to act also on behalf of his brothers.
3. Consequently, the petitioners came to occupy the land in January 1969 and started making developments thereon. Three years later in March 1972 the Land Reform Regulation of 1972 was promulgated in which there appeared a special provision with regard to the land acquired by certain Government servants which reads as follows :- "10.-(1) No person who is or has been in service of Pakistan and has at any time between the first January, 1959, and two years of his ceasing to be in service acquired any land or any right or interest therein, by any means whatever, either in his own name or in the name of any of his heirs or any other person, shall own or possess any land exceeding one hundred acres : ' Provided that, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, any such person may, in addition to one hundred acres of land, own or possess any land which has devolved on him by inheritance or any other land, not exceeding the land so inherited, whether by exchange or sale, either in his own name or in the name of any other person.
(2) Where any person as is referred to in sub-paragraph (I) has, within the period specified therein, transferred in favour of any of his heirs or has acquired in the name of any of them any land, and such land continues to be owned or possessed by his heirs he shall for the purposes of that sub- paragraph be deemed to the owner of such land.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph shall apply to a person who is serving or has retired as a member of any of the Defence Services of Pakistan."
4. (Explanation omitted as not relevant)
5. ' Since the Government servant was of the opinion, as it is also conceded now on his behalf, that since the first (preamble) part of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 10 was applicable to him and to the land in question, he filed a declaration in respect thereof but set up the plea that he had transferred his interest therein to the petitioners and as such the land was exempt from the operation of paragraph 10 in view of sub-paragraph ( f ) of the Punjab Land Commission letter No, DSL-366-72/1498-LC (II), dated the 5th of May, 1972 as amended by letter No, ASR-11-2495-73/1069 LC (II), dated 14th of March, 1973, which is reproduced below for the convenience of reference :- "(f ) A Civil servant who had acquired more than 100 acres of land within the period specified in paragraph 10 of the Regulation, but had before the promulgation of the Regulation, transferred the land in favour of a person who is not any of his heirs, is not required to file any declaration under the Regulation."
6. ' But neither the Land Commissioner, Lahore, nor the Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab nor the Federal Land Commission was of the view that the land in question fell under the exception of the sub-parapraph (f ). In their opinion, the claim for exemption being based merely on an agreement to sell and not on a complete sale, it was not a valid claim. The Government servant was accordingly called upon to surrender the area in excess of 100 acres. Hence this writ petition.
2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that on the terms of the agreement and the irrevocable power of attorney referred to above, the transfer of the Government servant's interest in the land in question in favour of the petitioners was complete for all intents and purposes in January 1969 and, therefore, the land in question is not resumable under the Land Reforms Regulation firstly because it is not hit by the operative portion of sub-paragraph
(1) of paragraph 10 thereof and secondly because it is fully covered by sub-para. (f ) of the letter of the Land Commission reproduced above.
3. In order to resolve the controversy arising from the transaction between the petitioners and the Government servant I consider it necessary to ascertain the real intent of the agreement before examining the implications of the various laws attracted thereto.
7. ' The agreement undoubtedly purports to be an agreement of sale. From clause (1) of the agreement, it is evident that the petitioners paid a sum of Rs, 1,40,000 to the Government servant on the day it was executed (i,e, on 17-10-1968) and also gave him a post dated cheque on the United Bank Ltd., Rahim Yar Khan Branch, for a further sum of Rs, 1,00,000 to be encashed on or after the 15th of January, 1969, so that when encashed, the total amount paid as consideration would be Rs, 2,40,00.
8. ' Clause (2) of the agreement shows that the petitioners agreed to pay all the remaining instalments (the first instalment of Rs, 12,000 having. Already been paid by the Government servant) of the sale price of the land with interest thereon to the Government on behalf of the Government servant on or before due date along with all Government taxes and public dues that would accrue after the execution of the agreement.
9. ' By clause (3) it was further agreed between the parties that when the full sale price and interest thereon was paid to the Government and thus the full title to the plot of land vested in the Government servant, it would be his bounden duty to do all and everything to get the said plot of land transferred, conveyed and registered in the name of the petitioners or their nominee or nominees and to execute all necessary deeds and instruments in that behalf.
10. ' In clause (5), however, it was stated that the Government servant would have no right to acquire the land or the possession thereof unless he paid Rs, 4,50,000 to the petitioners but at the same time it was agreed that it would not be the option of the petitioners to refuse to have the land transferred to them and to demand Rs, 4,50,000 from the Government servant.
11. ' Clause (8) of the agreement says that the Government servant shall execute an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of Ch. Atta Muhammad (petitioner No, 1) on the very day the post dated cheque of Rs, 1,00,000 is encashed. Thereafter, the petitioners will be able to act on behalf of the second party and obtain its produce. The Government servant shall execute as soon as possible an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of Ch. Atta Muhammad so that when all the instalments are paid to the Government he may have the land transferred in the petitioners' names and then execute registered sale-deed on behalf of the Government servant in favour of the petitioners or their successors-in-interest; and ' According to clause (9), the petitioners are entitled to all the produce of the land without being required to render any accounts to the Government servant. However, by clause (10) it was agreed that if the Government servant desired to retain the land acid transfer it to the petitioners only after it was finally conveyed to him by the Government, he would be entitled to do so provided he paid Rs, 2,10,000 to the petitioners as development and paid instalment charges and Rs, 2,40,000 already received by him from the petitioners, the total being Rs, 4,50,000 as given in clause (5).
4. In pursuance of this agreement, the post-dated cheque was duly encashed and the Government servant executed an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of Ch. Atta Muhammad (petitioner No, 1) on 17th January, 1969, a copy of which is also on record. The effect of this power of attorney was that Ch. Atta Muhammad (petitioner No, 1) in his own right as well as on behalf of his 10 brothers stepped completely into the shoes of the Government servant in respect of the land in question inasmuch as it was he (the petitioner No, 1) who was to pay all the Government dues and to have the land transferred and conveyed on behalf of the Government servant to the petitioners.
12. ' In short, by executing the agreement and the general power of attorney, the Government servant has indeed, as asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, completely washed his hands off the land in question provided the power of attorney is truly irrevocable as it purports to be.
5. Therefore, the next question to be examined is the nature and the effect of the power of attorney.
13. According to section 202 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of any express contract be terminated to the prejudice of such interest.
6. From the facts of the present case, it is evident that petitioner No, I, i,e, the agent, has undoubtedly all the interest of a full owner in the property inasmuch as he has on, behalf of all the petitioners paid, as is admitted on all hands, the entire sale consideration to the Government servant and all the dues by way of sale price or otherwise payable to the Government except a small amount of Rs, 22,000 which remains to be paid, as part of interest, to the Government and which the petitioners are ready and willing any time to deposit. It is thus clear that even if the power of attorney had not been described as an irrevocable power of attorney, it would be irrevocable.
14. ' Therefore, the emphasis laid by the learned Assistant Advocate-General representing respondents Nos,1 to 3 before us on clause (5) of the agreement to demonstrate that the transfer is not yet complete and the Government servant can at any time get land back from the petitioners on payment of Rs, 4,50,000 loses all its force. The Government servant has, for all practical purposes, been removed from between the petitioners and the Government qua the land in question. The interest of the Government servant therein is only notional and exists only as a legal fiction and to let this legal fiction prevail over reality or to give preference to the form over the substance amounts to nothing short of perverting the purpose of the 1 aw.
15. In my opinion, the Government servant has, within the meaning of sub-paragraph (f) of the Land Commission's letter, referred to earlier, transferred the land in question in favour of the petitioners who are not in any way his heirs or even remotely related to him. Therefore, the Land Commission has no authority to resume any part of their land.
7. It is to be noted in this case that there is no allegation of collusion between the petitioners and the Government servant to dodge the provisions of the Land Reforms Regulation or to defraud the Government in any manner. In fact, there was no possibility of such a collusion. For, in the year 1968, when the agreement led was executed and registered and in the year 1969, when the irrevocable power of attorney was executed and registered and possession was delivered to the petitioners, the parties could have had no idea of the Land Reforms to be introduced in future by a Party which had not even been elected at that time. Therefore, in my opinion, the transaction is genuine and, in the circumstances of the case, deserves to be given full credit and effect.
16. ' However, even if it be assumed that despite the irrevocable power of attorney, the Government servant can take the land back after duly compensating the petitioners, the operation of paragraph 10 of the Land Reforms Regulation being continuous in future, the land and the Government servant both will be bit as soon as he comes to own or possess it and the Land Commission can then move in to resume from the Government servant the area in excess of 100 acres. Therefore, if the transaction in question is not genuine, neither the Government servant nor the land can for long escape the Land Reforms Regulation. That being so, it would be premature to apply paragraph 10 to this case at the present juncture. For, at this moment, the Government servant does not own the land in question, the Government being still the owner; and, for all practical purposes,, he has parted with possession.
17. ' Another question raised by the learned Assistant Advocate-General is that the transaction mean into by tie Government servant with the petitioners is void ab initio in view of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act which was made applicable to the entire Province of West Pakistan, with the exception of the Tribal Areas, in the year 1969. According to him, the Government servant is a tenant under the said Act by virtue of clause (b)(ii) of subsection (4) of section 184 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. The said subsection would for the purposes of this case read as follows :- "184(4)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in this Act, or in any law, or in any order or decree of a Court or other authority, or in any rule of custom or usage, or in any contract, instrument, deed or other document, any person who, immediately before the commencement of this Act, was the holder of any land under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bombay Act, V of 1879), or the Sind Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Sind Act V of 1879), as the case may be (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the Code) shall-
(a) ........................................
(b) If such land was granted by Government to any person on or after the first day of January, 1928, otherwise than on lease-
(1) be deemed, if he has paid the full price on which the land was granted to him, the owner of such land, and be subject to all the rights and liabilities of a proprietor under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912); and
(ii) be deemed, if he has not paid the full price on which the land was granted to him, a tenant of Government under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 (Punjab Act V of 1912), on the conditions on which the grant was made; provided that on such person paying the full price on which the land was granted to him in accordance with the conditions of, and within the period provided in the grant, the provision of sub-clause (i) shall apply."
18. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners concedes that the Government servant was a holder of land under the Sind Land Revenue Code (Sind Apt V of 1879) and as such, subsection (4) of section 184 applies to his case with full force. But he disputes the proposition that the transaction in question is void in view of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act. Therefore, the question for determination is whether, in case the Government servant is a tenant of the Government under the Colonization Act, the transfer of his rights made by him in favour of the petitioners is not hit by section 19 of that Act. The section reads as under:- "19. Except as provided in section '17, none of the rights or interest, vested in a tenant by or under the Government Tenancy (Punjab) Act, 1893, or this Act, shall without the consent in writing of the Commissioner, or of such officer as he may by written order empower in this behalf, be transferred or charged by any sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage or other private contract, other than a sub- tease for not more than one year in the case of a tenant who has not acquired a right of occupancy, and seven years in the case of a tenant who has acquired a right of occupancy. Any such transfer or charge made without such consent in writing shall be void, and if (after the commencement of this Act) the transferee has obtained possession, he shall be ejected under the order of the Collector."
19. The expression to be taken special note of in the above provision is "none rib the rights or interest vested in a tenant by or under the Government Tenancy (Punjab) Act, 1893, or this Act". The land in question being situate in Sind and that Act having been made applicable to that area in the year 1969 while the Government servant secured the grant in 1954, it is clear that the rights or interest which the Government servant has transferred to the petitioners had not been vested in him by or under that Act. And there is no dispute that those rights or interest had not been tested by or under the Tenancy Act. The grant was made under a scheme by the Governor of West Pakistan as an executive fiat and not under any powers derived from any Act.
20. Further, a perusal of clause (b)(ii) of subsection (4) of section 184 of the Land Revenue Act, reproduced above, will show that the Government servant became a tenant on the conditions on which the grant was made. In fact, to be more accurate, he did not become a tenant of the Government under the Colonization Act, but was only to be deemed a tenant under that Act. This deeming clause in fact further restricts the scope of the application of the Colonization Act to him.
21. As was observed by James L. J. In Ex parte Walton, In re: Levy"When a statute, enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which'in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.' This case was relied upon also by our own Supreme Court in B. H. Syed v. Mst.
22. Afzal Jahan Begum and a.Eotherwherein the relevant observations are as follows:- "It is true no doubt that where the Statute says that you must imagine the state of affairs; it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. But at the same time it cannot be denied that1 2 the Court has to determine the limits within which and the purposes for which the Legislature has created the fiction."
23. In view of the above authorities it cannot be said that by virtue of section 184 (4) of the Land Revenue Act, the Government servant can be deemed also to have acquired rights or interest in the land in question by or under the Colonization Act. The conferment of rights on him was not made either under the Tenancy Act or under the Colonization Act. Instead, the grant was made only under the conditions given in the statement of conditions under the Scheme. If we construe section 184(4) of the Land Revenue Act to mean that the rights and interest should also be deemed to have been conferred upon the grantee under the Colonization Act, it will amount to enlarging the scope of the deeming clause rather than restricting it to the letter of the law. Such a construction will be against the principles of interpretation enunciated in the authorities cited above. Section 184 (4) of the Land Revenue Act merely bestowed the status of a tenant on the grantee Government servant without prejudice to the rights or interest which he had acquired long before the promulgation of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 and the application of the Colonization Act.
24. ' The import of section 184 (4) ibid becomes farther clear from section 7 of the Colonization Act, which, as reconstituted by West Pakistan Ordinance XXXVI of 1969 reads as follows :- "7.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, Chapter VII of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1857,or the corresponding provisions of any other law relating to tenancy for the time being in force in the area where proceedings under this Act are to be taken; and the rules thereunder, shall apply to all proceedings under this Act : Provided that nothing in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, or any other law relating to tenancy for the time being in force in West Pakistan, shall be as construed as to vary or invalidate any condition entered in any statement of conditions issued by the Provincial Government."
25. From the proviso to this section it is evident that it was never the intention of the Legislature to vary or invalidate any condition entered in the statement of conditions issued by the Provincial Government. Since Condition No, 13 of the Statement of Conditions contained in the Scheme does not make the alienation of land before the payment of full price to the Government void ipso facto but only renders the land liable to resumption and that too on the refund to the grantee of the price already paid by him, the alienation cannot be held void under section 19 of the Colonization Act. It will not be out of place here to quote the following rule of construction from p. 316 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 7.
26. "If the grant is for valuable consideration it must be construed, strictly in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign ; and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit. Where, however, two interpretations may be given to the grant both of which are good, that which is most favourable to the Crown is in many cases preferred."
27. ' Although this rule is not directly applicable to the present case inasmuch as there is no dispute with regard to the validity of the grant itself, since a Commission set up by the Government now seeks to invalidate it for the purposes of resuming the granted land, it is necessary that the provisions of law, on the basis of which the Commission wants to do so, should be construed strictly and as far as possible in favour of the grantee. In other words, it will be more in accordance with this rule of construction to hold the alienation made by the Government servant to the petitioners as valid than otherwise until it is expressly avoided by fulfilling all the requirements of condition No, 13 of the Statement of Conditions.
28. In short, for the reasons recorded above, I am of the opinion that the transfer made by the Government servant in favour of the petitioners cannot be held to be void. It will have to be recognized as what in reality it is. It I was made neither in violation of any law nor collusively to dodge one It no doubt contravenes condition No, 13 of the Statement of Conditions which is only directory in nature and not mandatory. As held in NiazJ Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib : "As a general rule a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but not when those directions are followed up by an express provision that, in default of following them, the facts shall be null and void. To put it differently, if the Act is directory, its disobedience does not entail any invalidity ; if the Act is mandatory disobedience entails serious legal consequences amounting to the invalidity of the act done in disobedience to the provision "
29. ' The land in question was, by the contravention of condition No, 13, rendered only liable to resumption by the Government i,e, by the Board of Revenue of the Province concerned. This means that the said Board of Revenue may or may not resume it despite the breach of the condition. The circumstances which compelled the Government servant to enter into the transaction in question were such that the Board of Revenue may not consider it just or proper to resume the land with the result that whenever the remaining balance of Rs, 22,000 and odd is paid up, the Government servant will notionally become the owner of the land whereupon the petitioners will have it transferred in their own names in which case the effect will be the same as if the Government servant had become the owner in 1969 and sold it to the petitioners immediately thereafter. If it had so happened in actual fact the Land Commission would not have had the authority to apply paragraph 10 of the Land Reforms Regulation to the land in question and the Government servant.
30. ' It has next been contended that, merely because in the opinion of the. High Court, the Land Commission has wrongly held the transaction in question to be a transfer within the meaning of sub-paragraph (f) of the Land Commission's letter referred to before or that the Land Commission has wrongly held the provision of paragraph 10 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1974, to be applicable to the facts of the present case, the orders of the Land Commission directing the resumption of the land from the Government servant or the petitioners cannot be said to be without lawful authority or of no legal. Effect. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others, wherein it has been observed :- "It is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
31. But in my opinion, the argument is fallacious and the reliance is misplaced. For the Land Commission authorities are not Courts or tribunals of general jurisdiction. They have not been vested with the powers to resume the land of every land holder or, in the context of the present case, to resume the land of every Government servant. The authority to resume land which is exercisable by the Land Commission authorities depends upon the existence of certain facts. For example, they can resume land from a Government servant under the authority of paragraph 10 only if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied and the case does not fall within the purview of sub-paragraph (f) of the Punjab Land Commission's letter mentioned I above. Therefore, the authority depends not only upon the correct interpretation of the expression "transferred" used in sub-paragraph (f) but also on the correct application of the provisions of paragraph 10 of the Regulation. In other words, whether the Government servant "owns" or "possesses" the land in question, within the meaning of paragraph 10 of the Regulation, and whether he has "transferred"3 4 that land to the petitioners, are jurisdiction facts. Therefore, an erroneous determination of these facts leads to a wrongful assumption of authority. On this point the precedent case that can be more appropriately referred to than the one relied upon by the learned Assistant Advocate- General is Mehr Dad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and anotherwherein the following passage from the Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edn.), Vol. II, para. 270 under the heading "Collateral facts" was reproduced by the Supreme Court without expressing a contrary view :- "The case is more difficult where the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal depends, not upon some preliminary proceedings but upon the existence of some particular fact. If the fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, that tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to it, give itself jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess, unless by statute the inferior tribunal is given power to determine conclusively questions relating to its own jurisdiction.
32. The inferior tribunal must, indeed, decide as to the collateral fact, in the first instance but the superior Court may upon certiorari enquire into the correctness of the decision, and may quash the proceedings in the lower Court if such decision is erroneous. On the other hand, if the fact in question is not collateral, but a part of the very issue which the lower Court has to enquire into, certiorari will not be granted, although the lower Court may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it."
33. In my opinion, therefore, it is the duty of the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction to examine whether the said jurisdictional facts hay been correctly determined. For the reasons already recorded, I am of the view that the provincial and the Federal Land Commissions have both erred in holding that the Government servant has not yet transferred the land in question to the petitioners and that it is, therefore, hit by the provisions of paragraph 10 of the Martial Law Regulation.
34. ' While construing the word "transfer" it was necessary that the purpose and the spirit of the Land Reforms Regulation should have been kept in view. It must be noted that this Regulation has not been enacted to regulate the transfers of immovable property from one party to another, Therefore, it was wrong to have given that meaning to the expression "transfer" which under the law governing the transfers of property, it normally carries. The error of Land Commission authorities lies in the fact that they construed the word "transfer" strictly in a manner which would be justified only in a case where the dispute was between the transferor and the transferee. In the present case, it may be noted that there is no conflict between the positions taken by the Government servant, who is the transferor, and the petitioners who are the transferees. It is the Government as a third party that is seeking to hold the transfer invalid in order to resume the bulk of the land in question. In these circumstances, what the Land Commission is to see is whether in effect the transfer is complete even if it is not strictly so under the general law governing the transfers of property.
35. In my opinion, for the purposes of the Regulation, it is the de facto position that counts and not the de jure one except where the validity of the transfer is disputed also by one or the other party to the transfer. Similarly, while interpreting the words "own" and "possess" occurring in paragraph 1 of the Regulation, the Land Commissions should always bear in mind the purposes of the Regulation itself. For, it is only to enforce the provision of that Regulation that the Commissions have been created and not to settle disputes relating to transfers of properties between the transferors and the transferees. In the circumstances of this case, the transferor has complete gotten rid of the property. Therefore, be cannot be said either to "own" or "possess" it within the meaning of paragraph 10 of the Regulation. Since, for the reasons given above, I am of the view that the Federal and Provincial Land Commissions did not put the correct construction on the relevant provisions of the Land Reforms Regulation and the Notification issued by the Punjab Land Commission, I hold5 that on the basis of that mis-construction, they assumed authority in the matter of resumption of land from the Government servant which did not vest in them.
36. ' Consequently, I declare the impugned orders of the Provincial and the Federal Land Commissions to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
37. ' The writ petition is allowed, but I make no order as to costs. 17 Ch. I) 746 PLD 1970 SC 29 PLD 1964 SC 14 PLD 1974 SC 139 PLD 1974 SC 193