' SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, J.--- By this common judgment we intend to dispose of the above mentioned petitions, which are directed against a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, dated 22-6-2004, whereby the Constitutional petitions filed by petitioner, were dismissed.
2. Petitioner is a tenant of respondent No,1 of two rooms on second floor of building known as Akbar Manzil, situated at Survey No,11/3, Survey Sheet No,RY-9, Elender Road, I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, on rent of Rs,525 per month, which was initially rented out to the petitioner by the previous owner late Syed Nazir Ali, husband of respondent No,1. There are seven rooms at first floor of the said building which were let out by the previous landlord to the petitioner. In the year 1972, petitioner had paid a huge amount as "Pagri" to the previous owner. It was practice of respondent No,1 (landlady) to receive rent from the petitioner through her rent collector in lump sum. Accordingly, the rent collector received rent from January, 1993 to July, 1993 at the rate of Rs,525 per month from petitioner and issued rent receipts. After that, respondent No, l's rent collector promised to collect the rent but he avoided to receive the same, therefore, petitioner sent the rent through money order on 25-10-1993 which was refused to be accepted by respondent No,1 as reported by the postal authorities, thus, petitioner in order to avoid default in payment of rent deposited the same in Rent Misc. Case No,1581 of 1993 from August, 1993 to January, 1994 (photo copy of the Rent Misc.
Case is available at pages 94-97 of the paper book). Respondent No,1 had filed ejectment application bearing R.C. No,1727 of 1993 under section 15 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 against petitioner on the ground of default in payment of rent w.e.f, August, 1993 and on the plea of nuisance, which application was dismissed. Again respondent No,1 filed another ejectment application bearing R.C. No,1904 of 1996 against the tenant-petitioner. Petitioner contested the ejectment application by filing written statement, seriously controverting and denying the contentions of the landlady.
3. The learned Rent Controller after framing necessary issues and hearing learned counsel for the parties dismissed the ejectment application vide judgment and decree, dated 31-5-2001.
Respondent No,1/landlady filed an appeal bearing F.R.A. No,1436 of 2001, which was allowed by the learned Appellate Court vide judgment, dated 9-3-2004.
4. Being aggrieved, petitioner filed Constitutional petitions, which were dismissed by the learned High Court of Sindh, Karachi, vide impugned judgment, dated 22-6-2004, hence these petitions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contended that First Appellate Court illegally allowed the ejectment application, as the said learned Court bas miserably failed to apply its independent judicial mind to the documentary evidence adduced by the petitioner; that the learned High Court has also not appreciated that on refusal to receive the rent, petitioner deposited the rent from August, 1993 in Rent Case No,1581 of 1993 and no wilful default was committed by him; that the judgments of the learned High Court as well as of the First Appellate Court are not sustainable in law, because both the Courts did not consider the case in its proper perspective, which is the result of misreading and non-reading of the material; that the finding of the learned High Court about the 'General Power of Attorney (Exh.0/2 available at page 90-91 of the paper book) is not tenable, because the said document was executed validly in accordance with law; that under the provisions of section 10(3) of the Sindh Rent Premises Ordinance, 1979, petitioner had offered the rent to the landlady, which was not accepted. Subsequently, the tenant sent the rent through money order, which was also not accepted.. Thereafter, tenant-petitioner started depositing the rent in the Court as mentioned hereinabove. In support of his said plea learned counsel has referred to the certificate issued by the Assistant Postmaster Money Order, Karachi G.P.O. (copy available at page 100 of the paper book). In support of his contentions, learned counsel has relied on Muhammad Akhtar v. Manna 2001 SCM R 1700. He further pointed out that under Article 30 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 10 of 1984, the General Power of Attorney was properly executed; that the wilful default in payment of rent was also not proved through evidence, therefore, in the circumstances of the case the impugned judgments are not sustainable in law.
6. Respondent-landlady vehemently opposed the contentions of learned counsel for petitioner and supported the judgments of the First Appellate Court as well as the learned High Court.
7. We have considered the arguments of the parties and have carefully scanned the record. We find that the General Power of Attorney (Exh.O/2) was validly executed, and its relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:-- "(2) To engage Advocate or Advocates to appear in the Court cases-Civil Suit, Constitutional petitions, Appeal, Revision or any other Court proceedings.
(4) To sign and file applications, plaints, writ statements, memo. Of appeals, revision, representations, in Court of Law or in Administrative Tribunal in the Vth Wage Board case and any other case wherein we are interested.
(7), The attorney has full powers to make statements on oath or otherwise and the attorney shall have full access to all office records. The attorney can compromise cases."
8. As the landlady-respondent refused to accept the rent through money order, petitioner approached the learned Rent Controller for depositing the rent by filing an application under section 10(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and relevant paragraph of the application is reproduced below:-- "(7) That the applicants having no option but to send the rent for the above period i.e, July, 1993 to the opponent through money order which was refused by, the opponent to accept the same."
' Petitioner deposited the rent without any delay, which is also evident from the record.
9. So far as Article 30 of Qanun-e-Shahadat is concerned, as mentioned hereinabove. It would be advantageous to refer here the aforesaid Article, which reads as under:-- "30. Admission defined.--- An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned."
Postal certificate produced by the petitioner before the trial Court about non-acceptance of rent through money order was not controverted by B respondent No, 1/landladty and her witness/attorney Syed Nasir Ali during trial in evidence. As the postal certificate is a public document signed by Government functionary, presumption of its correctness cannot be doubted.
For the sake of convenience and ready reference it would be advantageous to refer here subsection (3) of section 10 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which reads as under:-- "10. Payment of rent.---(1).....................................................
(2) .........................................................
(3) Where the landlord has refused or avoided to accept the rent, it may be sent to him by postal money order or, be deposited with the Controller within whose jurisdiction the premises is situate."
10. So far as the power of attorney is concerned, it is well-settled by now that the power of attorney must be strictly construed and it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the whole instrument the authority in question may be found within the four corners of the instrument either in express terms or by necessary implication. Furthermore, respondent-landlady herself did not appear before the trial Court to rebut the contentions raised by the petitioner. We have also gone through the evidence of Syed Nasir Ali, son of landlady, which shows that during cross-examination no such suggestion was made to the witness to the effect that the rent was offered by the petitioner, which was refused and that even the money order was refused. In our considered view, the case-law cited by the learned counsel fully supports the case of the petitioner. The impugned judgment of the High Court is not sustainable, which is the result of misreading and non-reading of the evidence adduced before the trial Court. The points urged by the landlady-respondent were rightly turned down by the Rent Controller; whereas the First Appellate Court and the High Court had not properly appraised the evidence adduced by the petitioner.
11. For the foregoing facts, circumstances, reasons and the case-law, we convert these petitions into appeals and allow the same. The impugned judgments of the High Court and the First Appellate Court are set aside and that of the Rent Controller is maintained.