' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.--All the three appeals (R.F.As. Nos.587 of 2000, 588 of 2000 and 589 of 2000 are being disposed of together as common questions of law and facts are involved therein.
2. In R.F.As. Nos.587 of 2000 and 588 of 2000 the appellant No,1 is a partnership firm, while the other appellants are either partners of the firm or the guarantors/mortgagers. The appellant No,1 obtained finance facility from the respondent-Bank in the shape of Export Refinance Post- Shipment, which liability has not been fully discharged, constraining the respondent-Bank to the file suits for recovery before the Banking Tribunal. In R.F.A. No,589 of 2000 the appellant No,1 is a limited company, whereas the other appellants are the guarantors or the mortgagors and likewise the facility was obtained by the appellant No,1 which has not been paid off .And the respondent- Bank brought a suit for recovery before the Banking Tribunal. Show-cause notices were issued to the appellants, who filed replies thereto. The learned Banking Tribunal by rejecting the defence set out in the replies to the show-cause notices decreed the suits of the respondent-Bank to the tune of Rs,75,76,768.32, Rs,4,11,406.79 and Rs,10,72,213 respectively with costs and future mark-up.
3. The appellants are aggrieved of the above judgments and decrees and it has been argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the finances were sanctioned at Karachi, the appellants firm and the company resides at Karachi, the amounts in question were disbursed by the branch of the respondent-Bank at Karachi; all the relevant documents were also executed at there, therefore, the Banking Tribunal at Lahore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the suits. It is further submitted that the annual report of the respondent-Bank for the year 1997 shows that the debt amounts were written off, meaning thereby the amounts cannot be recovered from the appellants. Lastly, it is submitted that there are certain unauthorized entries in the statement of accounts charging mark- up, which was neither agreed upon between the parties nor chargeable under the law.
4. Confronted with the above, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank states that Mst. Asrna Naseer appellant No,5 was a defendant in all the cases and is one of the guarantors/mortgagors is the resident: of Lahore. Therefore, as per section 20 of the C.P.C. If the plaintiff has joint cause of action against the defendants, the sun: can be instituted before a Court in whose territorial jurisdiction one of defendants resides. It is also submitted that the annual report showing the amounts to be written off is only for the accounting purpose of the Bank, and there is nothing on the record to establish that the loan was expressly written off to the appellants and accordingly conveyed. Lastly, she has stated that according to the finance agreen lents executed between the parties, it . Was agreed that the a ppellants shall pay the mark-up specified in each and the same has been rightly charged.
5. We have heard learned cou nsel for the parties. Obviously the territorial jurisdiction of the Banking Tribunal/ Court shall be regulated by the provisions of C.P.C., if not otherwise provided by a special statute which is not so in these cases. Section 20, C.P.C. Is very clear which confers territorial jurisdiction upon the Banking; Tribunal/Court, where one of the defendants resides, against 01 the defendants. In the present cases, the cause of action against Mst. Asma Naseer at lease as a guarantor is common as regards the other appellants-defendants, therefore, th e respondent could competently institute the suits before the Banking Tribunal/ Court, Lahore.
6. For the argument that the loan had been written off, suffice it to say that there is no documen itary evidence on record produced by the appellants, if they had ever applied for written off the loan or even conveyed by the res pondent-Bank to them that the loan has been written off. If only for the purpose of accounting in the annual report the Bank has shown the amounts, as bad debt would not mean that these are not recoverable. The last submission that the mark-up has been unauthorizedly charged, we having seen n the statement of accounts, but learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to pin point any entry if the mark-up charged in these cases is over and above the agreed amount. However, we find that the future mark-up has wrongly been awarded by the Court below, because the transactions in these cases pertain to the period before the 1997 Act came into force and under the law prevalent when the agreements between the parties were executed and the suits were instituted, future mark-up could not be granted except the mark-up of the cushion period of 210 days. Therefore, we modify the judgments and decrees of the Court below and set aside those to the extent of future mark-up except for the cushion period of 210 days, which shall be calculated by the learned Executing Court at the time of execution of the decrees.
7. With the above modification, all the appeals having no merits are hereby dismissed.