' TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILANI, J,---The goods subject-matter of this appeal i,e, Bleached Soft Wood Kraft Pulp and Bleached Hard Wood Kraft Pulp were imported from Canada, Bill of Entry was filed wherein the declared Invoice Value was US $ 678 pmt. At the time of ex-bonding the appellant prayed that the goods be assessed (a US $ 545 pmt. The goods were assessed at the rate of,declared value because the ITP of the goods of same origin was not available. This evaluation was challenged in the High Court in W.P. No,14935 of 1994 and a learned Judge of this Court vide order, dated 19-12-1994 directed that the goods be released provisionally according to ITP relating to the goods of US origin subject to furnishing of insurance guarantee to the satisfaction of the concerned Customs Officer for the payment of the additional amount in case the matter was finally decided against them. The goods were released in terms of the order of this Court. The Constitutional petitions were disposed of and the issue was left to the Customs Authorities to be decided on merit.
2. The precise case of the appellant before the Principal Appraiser was the goods should have been assessed as per ITP Commodity Code No,1040 for commodities of US origin which was US $ 545 pint and not on the declared invoice value of US $ 678 pmt. It was also averred that the appellant had purchased the goods at the higher rate but at the time of expanding, the prices had decreased and that these goods should have been assessed at a lower value. , The Principal Appraiser Customs Department vide order, dated 13-3-2000 declined appellant's prayer and assessed the goods at the declared invoice value i,e, US $ 678 pmt. This order was challenged in appeal and the learned Appellate Tribunal, while dismissing the appeal, observed that since no ITP in respect of goods of the country from which those had been imported, was available, the same be assessed at the declared value; that the ITP in respect of goods from USA origin was not relevant; that as per of S.R.O. (KE) 94 dated 22-9-1994, the value fixed was minimum and in the presence of the declared value, the latter had to be considered. It was further observed that the appellant had failed to adduce any evidence of fall in the prices of goods in question at the time of exbonding.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this appeal, has made following submissions:--
(i) That both the leaned Tribunals have failed to appreciate that the goods had to be assessed in accordance with the market price prevalent at the time of exbonding and not the one which was declared at the time of tiling the inbonding Bill of Entry;
(ii) That the august Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal against the judgment rendered by this Court in Customs Appeal Nos.430 to 450 of 2002, therefore, this appeal may be granted.
4. Learned counsel for the Customs Department, on the other hand, defended the impugned judgment and submitted as under:--
(i) That the appellant in the Bill of Entry filed at the time of exbonding had declared the value of the goods to be @ 678 pmt and they are estopped to raise any plea that the value of the goods at the time of exbonding had decreased;
(ii) That no evidence was led either before the Principal Appraiser or before the Customs Appellate Tribunal to the effect that the prices of the goods in question had decreased;
(iii) That the Leave Granting Order to which reference has been made by the appellant's learned counsel is not law declared and the interim relief granted by the august Supreme Court in C.P.L.A.
Nos.3946-L to 3966-L of 2002 alongwith C.M.A. No,16994. To 1719-L of 2002 (in Customs Appeals Nos.430 to 450 of 2002) was on account of the statement made by the learned counsel for the Customs Department and that the said statement had been made after the dismissal of their appeals by this Court and when they had already deposited rupees more than one crore of the additional amount payable to the Customs Department, only Rs,644 thousand remained to be paid.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have given anxious consideration to the submissions made.
6. Admittedly the goods were assessed at the transaction value as given by the appellant himself on the exbonding Bill of Entry. The value of goods for purposes of customs duties is the transaction value in terms of section 25 of the Customs Act which inter alia provides as under:-- "(25) Determination of Customs value of goods.---(1) Transaction value the customs value of imported goods, subject to the provisions of this section and the rules, shall be the transaction value, that is the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to Pakistan".
' The relevant date for the determination of rate of import duty has to be in accord with section 30 ibid which inter alia stipulates as follows:- "(30) Date of determination of rate of import duty.---The rate or duty applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate of duty in force:--
(a) in the case of goods cleared for home consumption under section 79, on the date on which a Bill of Entry is manifested under that section; and
(b) in the case of goods cleared from warehouse under section 104, on the date on which a Bill of Entry for clearance of such goods is manifested under that section."
7. A bare reading of the order, dated 13-3-2000 passed by the Principal Appraiser of the Customs Department shows that the appellants did not lead any evidence whatsoever to indicate that at the time of exbonding of the goods the prices of the similar goods had fallen. It was in those circumstances that the goods were assessed at the price which the appellants had themselves declared in the Bill of Entry at the time of the exbonding. It was observed that "hence their declared invoice value was accepted as normal value under section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969 read with section 30 ibid". Even before the learned Appellate Tribunal reference was made to no evidence or material which, according to the appellant, had been ignored or overlooked by the Principal Appraiser. While dismissing the appeal, the learned Tribunal rightly held as under:-- "......(i) The period of in bonding as well as ex-bonding in the case, of most of the Bills of Entry, is overlapping and in some cases where ex-bond Bills of Entry were filed shortly afterwards i,e, after a period of one to two months from the date of the last in-bond Bill of Entry, which was within the tolerance limit provided under CGO 1/81, dated 16-12-1981 and (ii) they have not been able to produce any evidence to support decline in prices except for a reference to ITP for USA origin goods fixed at US $ 545 pmt which is not relevant for the reasons discussed herein before".
8. The contention of the learned counsel that the learned Tribunal should have considered the ITP of goods of US origin i,e, $ 545 put is not tenable because under the Customs Act and the notification issued thereunder it was relevant only for goods of the country to which it D related and admittedly the goods subject-matter of this appeal were not imported from USA. The argument that the goods should have been assessed in the spirit of the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 14936 of 1994, 14937 of 1994, 1630 of 1995, 14755 of 1994, 2066 of 1995, 1475 of 1994, 14938 of 1994 and 14939 of 1994 has no substance as in terms of those orders, goods had provisionally been released subject to furnishing of insurance guarantee to the satisfaction of the concerned Customs Officer for payment of the additional amount as and when the matter is decided on merit. All the cases, including the instant one, were thereafter decided by the Tribunal below through well reasoned orders. The concurrent orders do not reflect any illegality and no question of law has been raised to warrant interference in this appeal.
9. We have gone through the Leave Granting Orders to which reference has been made above. The august Supreme Court granted the leave but did not suspend the judgment passed in those Customs Appeals. That being so and in view of the well-settled principle laid down by the august Supreme Court that Leave Grant Order is not law declared, being consistent with the earlier view taken by this Court and for what has G been discussed above we do not find any merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.