' This revision petition is directed against the order dated 22nd December, 1977, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore.
2. The facts necessary for the purpose of this revision are that the respondent-landlord filed a petition for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from shop No 78, Mozang Road, Lahore, in the Court of the Rent Controller, Lahore. On the ground of default in the payment of rent. The learned Rent Controller, by his order dated 14th January 1975, accepted the aforementioned petition and ordered ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the property in dispute.
3. The petitioner-tenant preferred an appeal to the learned Additional District Judge against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, who by his judgment dated 6th October, 1976, dismissed the same.
4. The petitioner-tenant thereupon preferred a second appeal (S.A.O. No, 760 of 1976) to this Court which was also dismissed by order dated 26th January, 1977, passed by my learned brother Aftab Hussain, J. In the S.A.O. Aforementioned, an order, inter alia, was passed on 3rd November, 1976, which reads as under :- "The order of ejectment shall not be executed in the meanwhile if the appellant furnishes security for all the arrears of rent due up-to-date within two weeks to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller and also to deposit future rent at the rate of Rs, 50 per month before the 15th of each succeeding month."
' In pursuance of this order the petitioner-tenant as principal and one Muhammad Iqbal son of Ch. Ghulam Abbas as surety furnished a bond in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lahore, dated 10th November, 1976, undertaking to deposit in Court the sum of Rs, 3,060 in the event of dismissal of the petitioner-tenant's appeal (S.A.O. No, 760 of 1976) by the High Court. The exact words used in the aforementioned bond read as under{{URDU TEXT}} ' This surety bond was accepted by the Executing Court by order dated 17th November, 1976.
5. After dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court, the respondent-landlord filed an application for execution against the tenant-petitioner and his surety, namely Muhammad Iqbal, for realization of the sum of Rs, 3,060 which they had undertaken to pay to the respondent in case of failure of appeal of the petitioner-tenant in the High Court as they had failed to fulfil their undertaking.
6. In the aforementioned Execution Application, the petitioner-tenant filed an application under section 151, C.P.C. Before the Executing. Court, on 28th November 1977, alleging that the respondent- landlord was not entitled to recover the rent for the period for which the rent was being recovered and that the execution proceedings may be dropped. This application was rejected by the learned Civil Judge, by his order of the same date on the ground that the application was only intended to delay the proceedings and was not even accompanied by an affidavit.
7. The petitioner-tenant filed a revision petition against the order aforesaid in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore.
' The said revision was disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge, by his order dated 22nd December 1977, on the basis of the statements of the parties whereby the respondent-landlord agreed to have the execution carried out first against the immovable property of the petitioner- tenant and in case of non-satisfaction through other steps that may be available to her. Hence this revision petition.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order dated 3rd November 1976, was an order deemed to have been passed under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and as such not one which could be executed. He relied in this regard on Aurangzeb v. Bakhshi Mahmood Ali and Abdul Ghafoor v. Ahmad Kunhi. He further submitted that the High Court could not pass an order under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance as held by the Supreme Court in Begum Humayun Zulfiqar Ismail and another v. Begum Hamida Saadat Ali.
9. The learned counsel next contended that the order was not a decree and as such not executable. Reliance was placed by him in support of this contention on S. Pin Liu v. Mrs. Najma Kazmi.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the order of the learned Additional District Judge had been passed in the revisional jurisdiction and as no second revision lies to this Court against such an order, the present revision petition is not competent. He relied on Mst. Lqbal Begum v. Sh. Ashraf Pervaiz and 3 others.
11. He further submitted that apart from the preliminary objection raised above that the present revision petition is not competent, the order in question was one which could be executed by virtue of section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
12. He also contended that there was a compromise order passed by the learned Additional District Judge which otherwise also cannot be questioned further.
13. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to this case and that the revision was competent because the matter which was taken up before the learned Additional District Judge though initiated as a revision was, in fact, an appeal as the order of the learned Civil Judge against which the revision was filed was passed on the objection raised by the petitioner to the execution proceedings and such an order was appealable under Order XLIII, rule 1, C.P.C.
It has been rightly argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in view of the amendment in section 115, C.P.C. There could only be one revision either to the High Court or to the learned District Judge. If an order has been assailed in the revisional jurisdiction of the learned1 2 3 4 5 District Judge, the order passed by the District Judge or the' Additional District Judge, as the case may be, shall not be open to challenge in a second revision before the High Court as no such power has been vested in the High Court in this regard. Apart from the above position, it may also be pointed out that the petitioner himself having invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge shad stand precluded from raising an objection that the Additional District Judge could not deal with the matter in revisional jurisdiction when the case has been decided against him on merits. Reference in this regard can usefully be made to Nazar Hussain v. Faqir Mohammad in addition to the case cited by the learned counsel for the respondent on this point.
The revision petition is, therefore, not competent.
15. On merits even, the petitioner does not appear to have any case. Section 145, C.P.C. Is reproduced hereunder for facility of reference: "145. Enforcement of liability of surety.-Where any person has become liable as surety-
(a) for the enforcement of any decree or any part thereof, or
(b) for the restitution of any property taken in execution of a decree, or
(c) for the payment of any money, or for the fulfilment of any condition imposed on any person, under an order of the Court in any suit or in any proceedings consequent thereon, ' the decree or order may be executed against him, to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable, in the manner herein provided for the execution of decrees, and such person shall, for the purposes of appeal be deemed a party within the meaning of section 47 : ' Provided that such notice as the Court in each case thinks sufficient has been given to the surety."
16. On a true construction of the above provision it emerges that where any person has become liable as surety for the payment of any money under an order of the Court in any suit or any proceedings, the order may be executed against him in the manner provided for the execution of decrees. Now, it is the admitted position that in pursuance' of the order of the High Court dated 3rd November, 1976, the petitioner had furnished a surety bond for payment of the amount in question by deposit thereof in the Court in case his appeal failed in the High Court. The order was apparently such which was capable of being executed. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary therefore have no force. The cases cited by him in support of his contentions are also distinguishable. In Aurangzeb v. Bakhshi Mahmood Ali the controversy involved was whether an order passed by the Rent Controller under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was such as could be termed as a decree of the civil Court, and, thus, got executed. In Abdul Ghafoor v. Ahniad Kunhi (3) the question which arose for determination was whether an order passed under section 13(6) of the Ordinance remained operative even after the final disposal of ejectment proceedings initiated by the landlord which was answered in the negative. In S. Pin Liu v. Mrs. Najma Kazmi it was held that when the High Court passed an order staying operation of the lower Appellate Court's order for ejectment on the condition of the tenant continuing to deposit monthly rent it does not pass such an order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance and that failure to comply with the order passed by the High Court as a condition for stay of operation of the lower Court's order would entail only dismissal of the application for interim relief.
17. In the case in hand, the point involved is different. The admitted position is that after the passing of the High Court's order a surety bond was executed by the petitioner and another person to pay the amount in question by depositing the same in the Court in case of failure of his appeal. The petitioner had obviously become liable as surety for payment of the amount in question under an order of the Court in the proceedings before it and the amount therefore payable under the undertaking was recoverable by execution under section 145, C.P.C. If such an interpretation is not put on the provisions of section 145, C.P.C. Then the furnishing of securities under orders of the6 7 8 Courts for fulfilment of certain obligations in the event of the persons giving the undertaking failing in their cause shall become meaningless.
18. In addition to the above factors, it may also be mentioned that it was on the statement of the petitioner's counsel himself that the revision was disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge in terms of the statement. Having obtained a relief as the petitioner then wanted from the Court of the learned Additional District Judge he cannot be permitted now to turn round and raise an objection to the order when the order no longer suits him, especially when the order sought to be impugned is not revisable in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as already discussed above while dealing with the objection raised on behalf of the respondent as to the competence of this revision.
19. In view of the foregoing, I find no merit in this revision which is dismissed with costs. PLD 1961 Lah. 619 PLD 190 SC 424 1968 SCMR 828 PLD 1978 SC 275 PLD 1978 Lah. 1252 1974 SCMR 188 P L.D 1969 Lah. 619 PLD 1978 SC 215