' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---This single judgment shall decide the present appeal (R.F.A. No,527 of 1998) and the connected appeal (R.F.A. No,45 of 1999), as common questions of law and facts are involved in both the appeals and they have arisen out of a single judgment.
2. Through the filing of these two appeals, the appellants have called in question judgment and decree dated 7-12-1998, whereby the learned Banking Court, after dismissing appellant's applications for leave to defend the suit, proceeded to pass a decree for the recovery of Rs.53,01,972.90 with costs, jointly and severally, against the appellants.
3. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of the present appeals are that the respondent-Bank, on 6-11-1993, filed a suit for the recovery of Rs.53,01,972.90, against the appellants, before the then Banking Tribunal, which issued notices to the appellants, in terms of section 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (since repealed). In response to the said notices, the appellants filed separate replies to the show-cause notices, with the prayer that suit may be dismissed. Ultimately, with the change in law, the said replies were considered as applications for leave to appear and defend the suit. Consequently, the learned Banking Court, after hearing the parties and finding that no case of leave to defend the suit is made out, dismissed both the applications and pursuant thereto decreed the suit for the recovery of Rs.53,01,972.90, jointly and severally, against the appellants, vide judgment and decree dated 7-12-1998, hence the present appeals.
4. Learned counsel of the appellants in the present appeal has contended that the learned Banking Court, without adverting to the controversies raised by the appellants in their applications, proceeded to dismiss the applications for leave to defend the suit. He has further submitted that the memorandum of deposit of title deed, attributed to defendant No,3, is blank qua the quantum of guarantee, hence on the basis of the said memorandum, the appellants cannot be saddled with the colossal liability. The learned counsel for the appellant, in the connected appeal, has submitted that the suit has been filed without any finance agreement and all the documents, relied upon by the respondent-Bank, in support of its claim are not enforceable under the law, inasmuch as most of them are blank and are also not attested by the two witnesses, as required by Article 17(2) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, while supporting the impugned judgment, has submitted that the same has rightly been decided, after taking into consideration the documents on record and the contents of the applications for leave to defend the suit.
5. We have examined the replies to the show-cause notices, which were subsequently treated as leave applications, under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and find that the appellants have raised numerous grounds/ pleas in support of their leave applications. If the contents of said applications are read in juxtaposition with the impugned judgment, to our mind, the learned Banking Court did not advert to the controversies raised by the parties and without taking into consideration the said pleas, proceeded to dismiss the applications, on extraneous consideration. We find that the learned Banking Court has brushed aside the objections/pleas, raised by the appellants in their leave applications, only after observing that "the objections raised by the learned counsel for the defendants are of casual and routine type". Suffice it to say that this sort of indifferent and casual attitude, on the part of a judicial officer, while adjudicating upon the valuable rights of the parties, cannot be countenanced under any stretch of imagination. We feel that whatever objections or the grounds were raised/agitated by the appellants before the learned Banking Court, those were to be discussed and ought to have been decided one way or the other. We are-constrained to hold that the tenor of the impugned judgment amply manifests non-application of judicial mind inasmuch as even the points of controversies have not been dealt with in accordance with law. We do not find any material on record, on which basis the learned Banking Court has held that the liabilities are not denied. The impugned judgment is also devoid of reasons and short of findings, thus, to our mind, the same is not sustainable.
6. Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in various judgments, has disapproved the passing of such perfunctory orders, which are devoid of reasons. To our mind, on this short ground the impugned judgment deserves to be reversed.
7. As we are inclined to remand the case to the learned Banking Court for the fresh decision of the case, therefore, we have refrained ourselves from giving findings on the contentions raised by the learned counsel, as in post-remand proceedings, the parties would be at liberty to raise all the available pleas, under the law, before the learned Banking Court.
8. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned judgment and find that the same is not in conformity of law and had to be set aside.
9. Upshot of the above discussion is that both the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 7-12-1998 is set aside with no order as to costs. The result would be that the suit, filed by the respondent-Bank, and the appellant's replies to the show-cause notices, which were treated as leave applications, shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Banking Court, who shall, firstly, decide the said applications, after hearing the parties, taking into consideration the record of the case, the contents of the replies and of course in accordance with law within a period of three months from today. Office is to transmit the record to the learned Banking Court, immediately.