' The brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that the appellant availed auto finance facility amounting to Rs,2,34,400 alongwith mark'-up. An agreement was also executed between the appellant and the respondent/bank. The appellant had to repay the outstanding of the respondent/bank in easy instalments. The appellant had paid the instalments regularly. The balance amount of Rs,67,191 had become due against the appellant which was deposited by the appellant on 17-10-2001 for total clearance of his account with regard to the auto finance facility availed by the appellant. The respondents refused to return the documents to the appellant, in spite of the clearance of the outstanding of the respondent/bank by the appellant. The appellant being aggrieved by the inaction of the respondent/bank sent a legal notice to respondent No,2 on 13-11-2001 which was received by respondent No,2 but he refused to issue the required clearance certificate to the appellant on one pretext or the other. Respondent No,2 issued a bill amounting to Rs,18,276 to the appellant on 4-11-2001 in connection with payment of credit card as per terms of the Credit Card Scheme. The same was also deposited by the appellant on 8-11-2001. The appellant filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction with consequential relief against the respondents/bank alongwith an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The learned Banking Court dismissed the application of the appellant under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C.
Vide order, dated 1-4-2002, hence the present Appeal.
2. The learned counsel of the respondents has raised a preliminary objection on 24-10-2002 that appeal under section 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is not maintainable as no final order has been passed by the Banking Court against the appellant.
3. The learned counsel of the appellant submits that the Banking Court passed the judgment against the appellant on 1-4-2002 on the application of the appellant. The order passed on the application of the appellant under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. By refusing to grant interim relief to the appellant is a judgment. In support of his contentions, he relied upo Shah Pabulal Khimji v.
Jayaben D. Kania and anoth r (AIR 1981 SC 1786). He further submits that the judgment means the judicial decision of a Court or a Judge, therefore, the impugned order is termed as a judgment. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) Syed Qadar and others v, Muhammad Afzal and others (PLD 1997 SC 859), (2) Ghulam Hussain Shah v. Ghulam Muhammad (PLD 1974 SC 344), (3) Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf Hussain (1986 SCM R 1736).
' He further submits that impugned order is a judgment as is envisaged in section 2(a) of C.P.C.
4. The learned counsel of the respondents submits that the appeal is not competent in view of section 22(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which clearly envisages that no appeal/review or revision shall lie against the order accepting or rejecting an application for leave to defend, or any interlocutory order of the Banking Court which does not dispose of the entire case before the Banking Court other than an order passed under subsection
(11) of section 15 or subsection (7) of section 19. He further submits that in case the appeal is accepted then the appellant would be able to get the total relief in the garb of interim relief which is not permissible in the eyes of law. He further submits that subsection (5) of section 21 of the Banking companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 is exactly similar to section 22(6) of present Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The aforesaid subsection (5) of section 21 was interpreted by the superior Courts and held that appeal against the interim order is not maintainable.
In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. And 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. (2002 SCM R 1419), (2) Messrs Tri-Star Polyster Limited and another v. Citibank (2001 SCM R 410),
(3) Ms. Afshan Ahmed v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited (2002 CLD 137).
5. The learned counsel of the appellant in rebuttal, submits that there is lot of difference between section 22 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. The word final order is specifically mentioned in subsection (1) of section 22 whereas word 'final' was not mentioned in section 21(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997. He further submits that subsection (2) of section 22 clarifies the position that appellant had to send notice to the respondents under Order 43, rule 3 of C.P.C., therefore, appeal is competent. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) Province of the Punjab v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari (PLD 1997 SC 351), (2) Mst. Sajida Sultana v. A.D.B.P. Model Branch, Lahore (2002 CLD 592).
6. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.
7. The question of law has been finally settled by the Honourable Supreme Court since 1993 in the case of Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. (PLD 1993 SC 109). The relevant observation is as follows:-- "The object of enacting the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, is to provide speedy measures for recovery of outstanding loans of the Banking Companies as their recovery suits remained pending in the Civil Courts for years together. If the orders in the nature of interlocutory orders are brought under challenge before the High Court, the object for which the enactment was made would be frustrated."
' Similar view was also taken by the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in Ms. Afshan Ahmed v.
Messrs Habib Bank Limited (2002 CLD 137). The Honourable Supreme Court also took the same view in the case of Messrs Tri-Star Polyester Limited and another v. Citibank (2001 SCM R 410), and Messrs Huffaz Seamlen Pipe Industries Ltd. And 2 others v. Messrs Security Leasing Corporation Ltd. (2002 SCM R 1419). It is pertinent to mention here that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel of the appellant, are distinguishable on facts and law as the question of law was not specifically raised and decided.
8. In view of what has been discussed above, this appeal is not maintainable and the same is dismissed. However, in the interest of justice and fairplay, the learned Banking Court is directed to finalize the matter as expeditiously as possible. No order as to costs.