ANWARUL HAQ, J.-This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order made by our learned brother Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, J., on the 5th of May 1969, whereby he has summarily dismissed a petition filed by the present appellants under Article 98 of the Constitution to challenge the correctness and legality of an order passed by the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (L), Multan Division, on the 4th of April 1969. The relevant facts are that in a dispute between the parties regarding the inheritance of the deceased husband of the respondent Mst. Mahboob Begum a revision petition was pending before the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (L) and by an order made on the 30th of October 1967, he had directed further enquiry to be held into the question of succession by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (L), namely the Tehsildar of the area concerned. He had further directed that after recording evidence the file should be certified to him. The Tehsildar held the necessary enquiry, and when the file came back to the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and the parties appeared before him on the 28th of March 1969, two of the appellants, namely, Mukarram Hussain and Syed Hussain, made a statement that if the respondent Mst. Mahboob Begum was to take an oath on the Holy Quran to the effect that her deceased husband Faiz Hussain was not the son of Aale Hassan but of Ishaq A.I, then the entire case may be decided in favour of Mst. Mahboob Begum. The other appellants were not present there, but their counsel is conceded to be present on this occasion, and therefore, the offer of oath must be taken to have been made by and on behalf of all the appellants. This offer was accepted by the learned counsel appearing for Mst.
Mahboob Begum by a statement made by him on the same date, and in pursuance of this offer and acceptance Mst. Mahboob Begum took the necessary oath in the presence of the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner on the 4th of April 1969, affirming that her deceased husband was not the son of Aale Hassan but of Ishaq A.I. On the basis of this statement the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner finally decided the case on the 4th of April 1969, iii favour of Mst. Mahboob Begum.
2. Before the learned Judge in Chambers it was contended that the learned Settlement Commissioner acting in revision did not have the power to record evidence, nor was he a Court within the meaning of section 4 of the Oaths Act, 1873, and, therefore, he had no authority or jurisdiction to administer a special oath and to act thereon. The learned Judge, however, did not think it necessary to examine these contentions for the reason that, in his view, the appellants had clearly agreed to the course of conduct adopted by the learned Settlement Commissioner, and after having agreed to the said course and having allowed the said authority to pursue that course, they could not be permitted to resile therefrom and challenge the proceedings, for which they themselves were fully responsible, just because the ultimate to result has gone against them.
The learned Judge sought support for this proposition from the observations appearing in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 829). He accordingly dismissed the appellants' petition in limine.
3. The same contentions have been repeated before us by the learned counsel for the appellants and an attempt has also been made to show that the factual position regarding the parentage of the deceased husband of the respondent Mst. Mahboob Begum was in their favour and, therefore, they have been seriously prejudiced by the course of action adopted by the learned Settlement Commissioner. It is submitted that the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din's ease does not lay down any inflexible rule and the Court can grant the necessary relief to the appellants in view of the serious prejudice that has been caused to them.
4. We regret we see no merit in these submissions. In the first place, we entirely agree with the learned Single Judge that as the special oath was administered to Mst. Mahboob Begum at the instance of the appellants themselves, they should not be permitted to resile therefrom just because the result has gone against them. Assuming that the learned Settlement Commis--sioner had no jurisdiction to administer the oath in question, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court still applies, namely, that "the writ is refused in such cases not because jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal concerned by waiver and acquiescence but that even though the impugned order is without jurisdiction the person seeking to have it quashed should not be granted that discretionary relief as he had stood by and allowed the Tribunal to usurp a jurisdiction which it did not possess knowing that the Tribunal concerned was committing such an illegality in consequence of something done by that person himself". As already stated, it were the appellants who had made the offer of special oath to Mst. Mahboob Begum which she accepted, and it was as a result of the appellants proposal that the special oath was then administered by the learned Settlement Commissioner. On this short ground alone, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
5. Even otherwise, we find that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the competence of the learned Settlement Commissioner to administer an oath under the Oaths Act is not well-founded. Section 4 of the Oaths Act, 1873 lays down, inter alia, that all Courts and persons having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence are authorised to administer, by themselves, or by an officer empowered by them in this behalf, oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed or conferred upon them respectively by law. Sections 8 to 10 of the same Act deal with the power of the Court to tender certain oaths proposed by one party and accepted by the other. Section 11 then lays down that the evidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated. It will be seen, therefore, that the oaths allowed under the Oaths Act, 1873 can be administered by a Court or by a person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence. Now, the question is whether a Settlement Commissioner acting in revision under section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is either a Court or a person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence. Section 23 of the Act is relevant in this behalf, subsection (1) whereof states as under :- "Every officer appointed under this Act shall for the purpose of making of any enquiry or hearing any appeal under this Act in have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely :-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) to (j) . . . . . . . . . . ."
6. The Settlement Commissioner is obviously an officer appointed under the Act, and it` while acting in revision under section 19 of the Act lie considers that the matter calls for further inquiry, he can make the inquiry either himself or through a subordinate officer. In the present case he chose the latter course and directed that the evidence shall be certified to him by the learned Assistant Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner for further proceedings. Clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 23 of the Act, reproduced above, authorises an officer appointed under the Act for the purpose of making of any inquiry or hearing any appeal under that Act to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examine him on oath in the same manner as is permissible to a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It appears to us, therefore, that the learned Settlement Commissioner must be deemed to be a Court for the purpose of recording evidence and administering oath under the Oaths Act, 1873.
7. We see no merit in the submission made by the learned counsel to the effect that as a revisional authority the Settlement Commissioner could not record evidence. The power of revision conferred by section 19 appears to be wide enough so as to enable the officer to "pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit." If the revisional authority considers that the case calls for further inquiry, we see no legal bar in the way of his conducting such an inquiry either himself or through a subordinate officer. In either case the officer would be empowered to act as a Civil Court by virtue of the provisions contained in section 23 of the Act. On this view of the matter, the learned Settlement Commis--sioner was clearly competent to administer the special oath in accordance with the procedure embodied in sections 8 to 10 of the Oaths Act.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on both the grounds mentioned above and we order accordingly.