' CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J.---We intend to decide the following intra Court appeals by one consolidated order having similar facts and law:--
1. I.C.A. No, 856-2000.
2. I.C.A. No, 857-2000
3. I.C.A. No, 858-2000
4. I.C.A. No,859-2000
5. I.C.A. No,860-2000
6. I.C.A. No, 861-2000
7. I.C.A. No,862-2000
2. The brief facts out of which the present intra Court appeals arise are that the respondents filed Constitutional petitions bearing Writ Petition Nos. 25729/98, 26259/98,'25159/98, 24476/98, 25416/98, 24949/98, and 24931/98 with the following prayer:--.
"Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that the action of the respondents issuing notification dated 17-11-1998 (Annexure 'D') may kindly be declared to be unlawful and may kindly be set aside and thereby the petitioner may kindly be treated as confirmed and regular employee of the respondents on completion of satisfactory service of 10 years and the petitioner may please be awarded all the fringe benefits permissible under the law."
' The aforesaid Constitutional petitions were accepted by one judgment dated 13-11-2000 by the learned Single Judge. Hence the present IntraCourt appeals.
3. Learned counsel of the appellants submits that learned Single Judge erred in law to assume jurisdiction as the learned Single Judge has no jurisdiction to decide the controversial facts in Constitutional jurisdiction. He further submits that learned Single Judge erred in law to rely upon the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Executive Engineer Central Civil Division Pak. P.W.D. Quetta v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1996 SC 610). The said judgment had arisen out of the petition filed by the aggrieved persons before the Labour Court, therefore, it was determined in the cited case that the aggrieved person was working against a permanent post whereas in the present case the respondents were not working against any permanent post. The respondents were employed by the appellants on work-charge basis. He further urges that learned Single Judge erred in law to accept the Constitutional petitions of the respondents in violation of the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Muhammad Yaqub v. Punjab Labour Court No,1 (1990 SCM R 1539).
4. Learned counsel of P.H.A. Supported the case of the appellants.
5. Learned counsel of the private respondents submits that respondents were appointed by the appellants in the year 1987 qua the permanent projects on permanent basis. Their services were regularized by the appellants vide decision dated 20-6-1996. Therefore, was admitted by the appellants that respondents were appointed by the appellants against the permanent posts. He further submits that judgment cited by the learned counsel of the appellant is distinguished on facts and law as in the cited judgment aggrieved person was employed by the Authority on temporary basis whereas the respondents were appointed by the appellants against permanent posts qua permanent projects. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified to accept the Constitutional petitions in terms of the law laid down by Honourable Supreme Court in Executive Engineer Central Civil Division Pak P.W.D. Quetta v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1996 SC 610). He further urges that aforesaid judgment was re-affirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in lzhar Ahmad Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2000 PLC 199).
6. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record ourselves.
7. The appellants filed report and parawise comments in obedience of the direction of the learned Single Judge. It is better and appropriate to reproduce reply of para-3 and stand taken by the L.D.A.
In Writ Petition No,26259 of 1998:- "Denied that services of the petitioners were regularized vide Letter No, LDA/ADMN/7962 dated 20- 6-1996. The status of the petitioners is basically work-charged. They are not employees of the Authority as envisaged under section 2(f) of LDA Appointment and Conditions of Service Regulations, 1978. However, vide Letter No,LDA/ADMN/7862 dated 20-6-1996 it was decided that employees of projects will be treated as Regular Work-charged Employees i,e, Gulshan-e-Iqbal Sports Complex, LDA Petrol Pump, LDA School, Mechanical Directorate. In fact the terms of "Regular work-charged" is a misnomer and it does not find mention anywhere in the rules. All such functionaries are still work-charged as neither their services were regularized nor they were ever appointed against budgeted posts."
' Likewise, operative part of order of Director Admn LDA Lahore dated 20-6-1996 is reproduced hereunder:-- "It was decided that employees of projects will be treated as regular work-charged employees i,e, Gulshan-e-Iqbal Sports Complex, LDA Petrol Pump, LDA School, Mechanical Director, Race Course and Minar-e-Pakistan."
' In case the report and parawise comments filed by the appellants be read with order dated 20-6- 1996 passed by the appellants it leads to the following conclusions:--
(i) The projects in question where the private respondents were employed by the appellants are permanent in'nature; and
(ii) The respondents being employees in the said projects since last more than 10 years cannot be termed to be temporary employees.
' In view of aforesaid circumstances the judgment of the learned Single Judge is in accordance with the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Executive Engineer Central Civil Divison Pak P.W.D. Quetta v. Abdul Aziz others (PLD 1996 SC 610). The relevant observation is reproduced hereunder:-- "The ratio of the above judgment in the case of Muhammad Yaqub (supra) seems to be that period of. Employment is not the sole determining factor on the question, as to whether a workman is a permanent workman or not but the nature of the work will be the main factor for deciding the above question. In other words, if the nature of work for which a person is employed is of a permanent nature, then he may become permanent upon the expiry of the period of nine months mentioned in terms of clause (b) of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance provided, he is covered by the definition of the term "worker" given in section 2(i) thereof. But if the work is not of permanent nature and is not likely to last for more than nine months, then he is not covered by the above provision. It may be observed that once it was proved that the respondents without any interruption remained employees between a period from two years to seven years, the burden of proof was on the appellant-department to have shown that the respondents were employed on the works which were not of permanent nature and which could not have lasted for more than nine months. In this view of the matter, the provisions of the above Statute are available to the respondents. The Courts below have, therefore, rightly held that upon expiry of the period of nine months as provided in clause (b) of paragraph 1 'of the Schedule, the respondents had become permanent workmen."
' The judgment cited by the learned counsel of the appellant (Muhammad Yaqub's case 1990 SCM R 1539) is distinguished on facts and law and distinctive features were taken note of by the Honourable Supreme Court in the portion reproduced above. It is pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid judgment was reaffirmed by the Ilonourable Supreme Court in lzhar Ahmad Khan v.
Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2000 PLC 199) in the following terms:-- "If the work is of a permanent nature and likely to last for a . Period of more than nine months, the workman employed on such a work, who successfully completes a probationary period of three months, will be deemed to be a .Permanent workman.- ' The question of law has also been 'considered by the Indian Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Shri Badri Prasad (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 513). The relevant observation is as follows:-- "The distinction between a permanent workman engaged on a work of permanent nature and a temporary workman engaged on work of a permanent nature is in the fact that a temporary workman is engaged to fill in a temporary need of extra hands of permanent jobs. In this background it becomes clear that the words "engaged on a permanent nature of work throughout the year" were intended to mean "engaged on a permanent nature of work lasting throughout the year" and not "engaged throughout the year on a permanent nature of work". When a workman is engaged on a work of permanent nature which lasts throughout the year it is legitimate to expect that he would continue there permanently unless he has been engaged to fill in a temporary need."
' We perused the record specially the contents .Of the writ petitions and parawise comments filed by the appellants which, as mentioned above, bring the cases of the private respondents that private respondents were appointed by the appellants on permanent basis qua permanent projects. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the judgment of the learned Single Judge which is in accordance with the dictum laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments. Even otherwise substantial justice has been done and the learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion in accordance with law keeping in view the mandate of the Constitution of Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention here that by afflux of time the respondents have attained sufficient experience qua the duty assigned to them.
' In view of what has been discussed above, these Intra-Court Appeal have no merit and the same are dismissed.