' This appeal arises out of a judgment of learned Single Judge granting compensation in the amount of Rs.8,20,000 to the respondent. Briefly it may be stated that deteased Ale Hussain son of the respondent died as a consequence of being hit by live electric wire. The accident according to the respondent occurred at about 10-00 a.m. On 17-7-1988, but remained unattened till 3-00 p.m.
Learned trial Court in a well reasoned judgment found that notwithstanding the heavy rain, the duty to keep wires properly was not performed by the appellant and therefore negligence was established. With regard to quantum of damages the learned. Single Judge calculated the loss of income on the part of the deceased for 25 years. He expected increase in the income of the respondent after deduction of 1/3rd of the expected income.
2. Mr. Muzaffar ul Haq did not question the liability of the appellant to compensate the respondent.
However, he appeared to be aggrieved by the findings as regard the quantum of damages on three grounds, which are as follows:--
(i) That life expectancy of the plaintiff should have been treated as 65 years instead of 70 years in view of the pronouncement of theCourt in Qazi Arifuddin v. Government of Sindh (PLD 1991 Kar. 291).
(ii) That deduction of merely 1/3rd of the income towards personal expenses of the deceased was too meagre.
(iii) That there was no evidence to indicate that the respondent's income would have increased with the passage of time and award of 20% on such motional basis.
3. In respect of the first contention Mr. Nasir Maqsood has pointed out that there is no rule of law requiring the Court to take 65 years as life expectancy of every person. He has relied upon the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pakistan Steel Mills v. Abdul Habib (1993 SCM R 848), wherein it was observed that basically life expectancy was a matter of intelligent guess-work.
Indeed with the improvement in medical facilities and quality of life in general longevity has increased around the world and therefore, life expectancy of a person cannot be expected to remain the same as it used to be a few decades ago. The recent pronouncements of this Court inter alia in Bibi Surat Jan v. Mir Azam Khan (PLD 1993 Kar. 168), Rafiq Jabir v. Superintendent Police (1993 CLC 1751), Muhammad Ilyas v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (1994 M LD 2485), Umeruddin v.
Sher Gul Khan Niazi (1995 CLC 1164), Mst. Mima v. Mukadam Wali (1993 M LD 610) and Bibi Khalida v.
Government of Sindh (2000 CLC 381) and Dost Muhammad v. Pakistan Steel Mills (1996 CLC 530) show that normal life expectancy has consistency been treated to be 70 years. Therefore, we find no force in Mr. Muzaffar ul Haq's contention.
4. The learned Single Judge has indeed taken into consideration the fact that the respondent could not move around freely. Nevertheless, he rightly held that this fact by itself was not sufficient to prove that he could not be expected to live upto 70 years in the absence of any evidence to the effect that he was suffering from such disease which was likely to cause his early death. We find no infirmity in the above conclusion.
5. Likewise it may be observed that as a matter of consistent practices which has almost developed into a rule of law the Courts have been in the absence of any cogent evidence, adding 20% to the amount of compensation calculated on the basis of the current income of the deceased by way of chances of the advancement as this they are required to do in view of the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in Abdul Habib's case. Again only 1/3rd of the income is expected to be deducted towards the personal expenses of the deceased unless it could be shown that he was incurring more expenses on himself. Therefore, we find no merit in the second and third contentions raised by the learned counsel.
6. In any event it may also be pertinent to refer to another pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Karachi Road Transport Corporation v. Latifur Rehman (1992 SCM R 1149) where their Lordships approved the dicta laid down by British Courts there an Appellate Court will not interfere with the quatum of damages awarded by the trial Court unless it could be shown that the latter applied a wrong principle of law in assessing damages on the damages were assessed unreasonable. Neither of the two conditions appeared to exist in the present case and we would therefore, dismiss this appeal.