The appellant was employed in the respondent's organization in the year 1962. On 15th December, 1964 he was confirmed as Timekeeper. On 11th October, 1975 his services were terminated on the ground that his eye-sight was defective and he was unable to perform his duties. This opinion was based on the reference of the Medical Board dated 20th August, 1975.
After the termination of his services, the appellant submitted an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called "I. R. O.") to the Labour Court, Quetta seeking re-instatement in service but it was dismissed on 20th March, 1976. He next preferred an appeal before this Tribunal but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 13th June, 1977 on the ground that the appellant desired to pursue some remedy before the Labour Court. The nature of such remedy was, however, not disclosed by him.
2. Later, on 23rd October, 1977 the appellant submitted an application to Labour Court, Quetta under section 25-A of I. R. O. Seeking enforcement of his claim of Rs. 20,000 being the amount to which he was entitled under Group Insurance Scheme by virtue of S. O. 10-B of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as "Standing Orders"). The respondent in his reply raised following two objections to the maintainability of this claim on the ground that-
(a) the appellant was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of S. 25-A, I. R. O., and
(b) the application in question had been submitted beyond the period prescribed by section 25-A of I. R. O. For preferring application to enforce a claim. Both these objections were up--held by the Labour Court and consequently the application was dismissed vide order dated 11th February, 1979, impugned in this appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the appel--lant was an aggrieved party within the meaning of section 25-A of I.R.O. To the extent of his claim under reference which remained to be satisfied by his employer and that the period of limitation for filing application for its recovery had to be taken from S. 10 (1) of Workmen's Compensation Act and not from the I. R. O as S. O. 13-B of the Standing Orders by virtue of its clause (5) provides that for the recovery of the claims pertaining to Group Insurance the procedure as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 shall be followed.
4. As far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned suffice it to say that term "aggrieved party" does not admit of such limitations as the Labour Court has tried to place in this case. As long as any claim, legally tenable remains unsatisfied a party entitled to en--force such claim shall be considered to be an aggrieved party under section 25 of I. R. O. It will not cease to operate for the reason that as some other claims had been satisfied by the employer, therefore it could not be resorted to as held by the Labour Court. The petitioner continued to be an "aggrieved party" in as far as the satisfaction of his above said claim was concerned. The finding of the Labour Court on this point is highly erroneous--- and is accordingly set aside.
5. The other contention is with regard to the period in which the application in question should have been preferred to the Labour Court. Undoubtedly section 25-A of I. R. O. Provides a period of limitation of 3 months for the making of applications in respect of enforcement of claims covered by it. But it is a general provision and shall give way to the period of limitation, if any, provided by the law under which such right has been guaranteed. In the instant case the provisions of sec-- tion 10-B of the Standing Orders while guaranteeing the right in question provided that for its enforcement the provisions of section 10 of Workmen's Compensation Act shall apply. These later provisions provide three years period for making of application for the enforcement of such right.
Accordingly guidance as to the period of limitation could not be sought in this case from. Section 25-A of I. R. O. Which is in the nature of general law. In this view of the matter I am fortified principles laid down in section 29 of the Limitation Act which provides that when a Special or Local Law prescribed a period of limitation of its own for any proceedings then the provisions of Limitation Act on that point shall not be applicable. I accordingly hold that the period of imitation for pressing the claim in question being three years, the application of the appellant was within time and the findings of the Labour Court on this point as well is not sustainable.
6. The case could be finally disposed of on the basis of these findings but Mr. Nazir Ahmad, appearing for the respondent has brought to my notice that the question of quantum of the amount due to the petitioner requires determination in the light of the last drawn salary by the appellant which is subject to certain dispute. The case is accordingly remitted back to the Labour Court for final decision in the light of the findings on the points discussed above. There shall however, be no order as to costs.